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Abstract	  	  
Juris-­‐diction	   is	   the	   “speaking	   of	   the	   law,”	   the	   performative	   and	   enunciatory	   mode	   of	  normativity.	   As	   the	   expressive	   register	   of	   the	   law,	   jurisdiction	   names	   practices	   for	  declaring,	  showing	  and	  determining	  the	  limits	  and	  possibilities	  of	  legality.	  Read	  in	  these	  terms,	  jurisdiction	  poses	  centrally	  important	  questions	  to	  law	  and	  jurisprudence	  but,	  as	  a	  principle	   in	   its	  own	  right,	   it	  has	   received	   little	   attention.	  Contributing	   to	  a	   small	  but	  growing	   critical	   literature	   on	   jurisdiction	   this	   thesis	   contends	   that	   jurisdiction	   has	   a	  unique	  character	  that	  deserves	  careful	  theorising.	  	  	  Taking	   the	   common	   law	   tradition	  as	   its	  primary	   site	  of	   engagement,	   the	   thesis	   argues	  that	   jurisdiction	   has	   a	   dual	   aspect,	   functioning	   to	   both	   offer	   a	   ground	   for	   positive	   or	  formal	   law	   and	   reflect	   an	   extant	   set	   of	   informal	   practices.	   In	   this	   sense,	   jurisdiction	  operates	   as	   a	   third	   term	   for	   the	   law,	   mediating	   between	   two	   lawful	   registers:	   the	  positive	   law	  and	  a	   “law	  of	  originary	   sociability.”	   I	   argue	   that,	   though	  attempting	   to	   fix	  and	  determine	  this	  relation,	  jurisdiction	  is	  marked	  by	  ambivalence	  and	  instability.	  This	  indeterminacy,	   however,	   is	   often	   overlooked;	   jurisdiction	   is	   presented	   as	   if	   it	   were	  simply	   a	   matter	   of	   sovereign	   force	   or	   fiat.	   Rather	   than	   conceive	   jurisdiction	   as	   an	  expression	   of	   the	   law’s	   sovereign	   authority,	   the	   thesis	   argues	   that	   jurisdiction	   is	   a	  privileged	   point	   at	   which	   we	   can	   see	   the	   law’s	   fragility.	   Jurisdiction,	   then,	   is	   a	   legal	  technique	  open	  to	  critical	  intervention	  and	  interruption.	  Such	  strategies	  of	  intervention,	  that	   seek	   to	   occupy	   jurisdiction’s	   function	   but	   articulate	   it	   otherwise,	   I	   name	  “juriswriting.”	  	  My	  approach	  to	  jurisdiction	  is	  developed	  through	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Jacques	  Derrida	  and	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy.	  Both	  thinkers	  understand	  law	  to	  have	  two	  distinct,	  but	  related,	  senses.	  On	   the	   one	  hand,	   there	   is	   the	   law	  as	  positive,	   determinative	   and	  violent,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  law	  is	  presented	  as	  inoperative	  and	  indeterminative,	  connected	  either	  to	  the	  law	  of	  différance	  or	  an	  ontological	  assertion	  of	  our	  “being-­‐with”	  (Mitsein).	  Both	  Derrida	  and	  Nancy	  reserve	  a	  place	  for	  “law”	  that	  exceeds	  the	  positive	  law	  and	  is,	  in	  fact,	  bound	  to	  it	  in	  a	   paradoxical	   double	  bind,	   both	  providing	   its	   conditions	  of	   possibility	   and	  denying	   its	  full	   efficacy.	   This	   characterisation	   of	   a	   doubled	   aspect	   to	   law	   provides	   the	   theoretical	  frame	  for	  my	  understanding	  of	  jurisdiction	  and	  is	  traced	  through	  my	  engagements	  with	  Kafka;	   the	   sixteenth	   century	   constructions	   of	   the	   common	   law;	   jurisdiction’s	  performative	   and	   declaratory	  mode;	   as	  well	   as	   jurisdiction’s	   role	   in	   bringing	   political	  community	  into	  relation	  with	  the	  law.	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  The	  engagement	  with	  Derrida	  and	  Nancy	  not	  only	  provides	   the	   theoretical	  orientation	  for	  this	  study	  of	  jurisdiction	  but	  represents	  a	  second	  strand	  to	  the	  argument	  pursued	  in	  the	  thesis.	  Moving	  away	  from	  the	  Levinasian	  inspired	  understanding	  of	  deconstruction	  and	  the	   law	  of	   the	  1990s,	   the	   thesis	  seeks	   to	  offer	  a	  more	  holistic	  reading	  of	  Derrida’s	  work,	  drawing	  on	  both	  his	  later	  texts	  with	  a	  specifically	  juridico-­‐political	  bent,	  as	  well	  as	  the	   earlier	   interventions	   on	   writing	   and	   speech	   act	   theory.	   Nancy	   –	  particularly	   his	  ontology	  of	  “being-­‐with”	  and	  his	  work	  on	  community	  –	  provides	  a	  useful	  supplement	  to	  Derrida’s	   thinking.	   As	   the	   ethical	   readings	   of	   deconstruction	   in	   the	   1990s	   turned	   to	  Levinas,	  I	  turn	  to	  Nancy	  in	  order	  to	  foreground	  a	  political	  current	  within	  Derrida’s	  work.	  Reading	  Derrida	  with	  Nancy	  allows	  me	  to	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  political	  possibilities	  at	  stake	   in	  reimagining	   jurisdictional	  practices	  and	  techniques,	  particularly	   important	   for	  my	  understanding	  of	  juriswriting.	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  Motha.	   Not	   only	  possessing	  detailed	  knowledge	  of	  Nancy	  and	  Derrida	  but	  also	  a	  shared	  love	  of	  the	  grape	  and	  the	  grain	  and	  all	  that	  it	  has	  to	  offer,	  Stewart	  has	  been	  a	  great	  friend	  and	  ally,	  offering	  sage	  counsel	  throughout.	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick	  has	  been	  a	  much	  valued	  interlocutor	  over	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  years	  and,	  through	  his	  reading	  group	  –	  running	  now	  for	  some	  thirty	  years	  –	  has	  offered	  a	  rigorous,	  challenging	  and	  stimulating	  forum	  in	  which	  to	  pick	  over	  many	  of	  the	  texts	  that	  animate	  these	  pages.	  Peter	  has	  maintained	  a	  vital	  space	  for	  scholarship	  and	  intellectual	  camaraderie	  for	  which	  I	  owe	  sincere	  thanks.	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It	   has	   been	   a	   great	   privilege	   to	   be	   part	   of	   the	   community	   of	   PhD	   students	   and	  researchers	  at	  the	  Birkbeck	  Law	  School,	  all	  of	  whom	  continue	  to	  amaze	  by	  their	  talent,	  knowledge	  and	  application.	  Tackling	  sophisticated	  and	  important	  work,	  this	  inoperative	  community	  of	  scholars	  and	  friends	  has	  not	  only	  provided	  some	  of	  my	  fondest	  memories	  but	  has	  also	   inspired	  me	  to	  seek	  greater	  clarity,	   to	  expend	  more	  effort	  and	  deepen	  my	  often	  all	   too	  shallow	  knowledge.	  Two	   friends	  deserve	  special	  mention.	  Tara	  Mulqueen	  provided	  much	   needed	   perspective	   and	   thoughtful	   commentary	   as	   drafts	   of	   chapters	  emerged	  and	  Roberto	  Vilchez	  Yamato,	  whose	  pitifully	  brief	  eighteen	  months	  at	  Birkbeck	  left	   an	   indelible	   mark	   on	   my	   thinking.	   Roberto’s	   appetite	   for	   Derrida	   centred,	   booze	  heavy,	  late	  night	  conversation	  is	  seemingly	  limitless.	  Anastasia	  Tataryn,	  Hannah	  Franzki,	  Chris	  Lloyd,	  Stacey	  Douglas,	  David	  Thomas,	  Başak	  Etür,	  Lisa	  Wintersteiger,	  Eddie	  Bruce-­‐Jones,	   and	   Mayur	   Suresh,	   as	   well	   as	   recent	   additions	   to	   the	   Birkbeck	   troupe,	   Paddy	  McDaid	  and	  Kojo	  Koram,	  all	  proffered	  much	  needed	  advice	  and	  support,	  intellectual	  and	  more	   besides.	   A	   special	  mention	   to	  Hannah	  whose	   home	   fronting	   Lake	   Fondi	  with	   its	  extraordinary	  crepuscular	  symphony	  of	  frogs	  and	  cicadas	  offered	  a	  beautiful	  spot	  for	  a	  week	   of	   tinkering	   at	   the	   end.	   Kanika	   Sharma	   and	   Laura	   Lammesniemi,	   my	   fellow	  travellers	  in	  Greenwich,	  kept	  me	  smiling	  in	  all	  weather.	  	  	  Away	   from	   Birkbeck,	   too	   many	   friends	   to	   mention	   have	   endured	   my	   confusing,	   and	  often	  confused,	  accounts	  of	  what	  it	  is	  that	  I	  have	  been	  doing	  for	  the	  past	  four	  years.	  Ben,	  Ben,	  Ed	  and	  Emma	  deserve	  special	  thanks	  as	  they,	  more	  than	  others,	  bore	  the	  brunt	  of	  my	   struggles.	   For	   their	   love	   and	   friendship	   I	   am	   forever	   grateful.	   Robbie	   –	  avuncular	  consigliere	   –	  provided	   good	   food	   and	   familial	   comforts	   when	   needed	   most.	   Last,	   and	  most	   importantly,	   I	  would	   like	   to	   thank	  my	  parents	  Beryl	   and	  Paul.	  My	  debt	   to	   them,	  financial	  and	  otherwise,	  falls	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  calculable.	  For	  always	  encouraging	  me	   to	   ask	   questions,	   for	   teaching	  me	   the	   value	   of	   laughter,	   wine	   and	   poetry,	   and	   for	  letting	  me	  make	  my	   path	   by	  walking,	   I	   am	   thankful	   beyond	  words.	   I	   did	   it	   –	   and	   it’s	  down	  to	  you.	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Preface	  	  	  For	  every	  static	  world	  that	  you	  or	  I	  impose	  Upon	  the	  real	  one	  must	  crack	  at	  times	  and	  new	  Patterns	  from	  new	  disorders	  open	  like	  a	  rose	  And	  old	  assumptions	  yield	  to	  new	  sensations.	  The	  Stranger	  in	  the	  wings	  is	  waiting	  for	  his	  cue,	  	  The	  fuse	  is	  always	  laid	  to	  some	  annunciation.	  (Louis	  MacNeice)1	  	  	  In	  a	   letter	   to	  Georges	  Bataille,	  Maurice	  Blanchot	   identifies	   two	  registers	  at	  work	   in	  his	  writing.	  The	  first	  is	  dialectical	  and	  totalising,	  the	  other	  non-­‐dialectical	  and	  fragmentary:	  To	   this	   double	   impulse	   responds	   a	   double	   language,	   and	   for	   all	   language	   a	   double	  gravity:	  one	  is	  a	  speech	  of	  confrontation,	  opposition,	  and	  negation,	  meant	  to	  reduce	  any	  opposition	  so	  that	  the	  truth	  as	  a	  whole	  may	  be	  affirmed	  in	  its	  silent	  equality	  (a	  path	  the	  demand	  of	   thought	  must	   take).	  But	   the	  other	   is	   the	   speech	   that	   speaks	  before	   all,	   and	  outside	  of	  all,	  speech	  that	  is	  always	  first,	  without	  concord	  or	  confrontation,	  and	  ready	  to	  welcome	  the	  unknown,	  the	  stranger	  (where	  the	  poetic	  demand	  passes).	  One	  names	  the	  possible	   and	  wants	   the	   possible.	   The	   other	   responds	   to	   the	   impossible.	   Between	   these	  two	   impulses,	  which	   are	   both	   necessary	   and	   incompatible	   there	   is	   a	   constant	   tension,	  often	  very	  difficult	  to	  bear,	  and	  truly,	  unbearable.2	  Blanchot	   identifies	   a	  doubled	   life	   to	   speech,	  perhaps	   something	  with	  which	  we	  are	  all	  familiar:	   on	   the	   one	   hand	  we	  want	   to	   name	   things,	   to	   capture	   things	   in	   language	   and	  preserve	  their	  integrity	  and	  limits,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  know	  that	  our	  speech	  and	  our	  naming	   always	   exceeds	   itself	   by	   having	   the	   capacity	   to	   gesture	   beyond	   this	  determinative	   register.	   Something	   always	   seems	   to	   get	   lost	   in	   our	   communication;	  exceeding	  the	  register	  of	  limitation	  or	  closure,	  the	  poetic	  always	  appears	  to	  lurk	  within	  the	   prosaic,	   the	   expressive	   appears	   to	   overflow	   the	   significative.	   It	   would	   be	  understandable	  to	  think	  that	  the	  law	  only	  ever	  speaks	  in	  the	  first	  register:	  the	  impulse	  Blanchot	   describes	   as	   totalising	   and	   dialectical.	   The	   law’s	   desire	   to	   name,	   delimit	   and	  contain	  is	  well	  known	  and	  its	  primary	  technique	  in	  so	  doing	  is	  jurisdiction.	  Jurisdiction	  (juris-­‐diction,	   the	   law’s	   speech)	   is	   commonly	   associated	  with	   establishing	   the	   limits	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Louis	  MacNeice,	  “Mutations,”	  Collected	  Poems	  (London:	  Faber	  &	  Faber,	  2002),	  195.	  	  2	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  Political	  Writings,	  1953-­‐1993,	  trans.	  Zakir	  Paul	  (New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  xxxi-­‐xxxii.	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legality,	   marking	   its	   territorial	   and	   conceptual	   boundaries	   thereby	   naming	   the	  possibility	   of	   law.	  Animating	   this	   thesis	   is	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   the	   law	  might	   also	  submit	  to	  Blanchot’s	  second	  impulse	  and	  respond	  in	  a	  fragmentary	  and	  poetic	  register	  to	   something	   beyond	   the	   merely	   possible.	   Might	   we	   understand	   law’s	   speech	  (jurisdiction)	  as	  caught	  in	  the	  unbearable	  tension	  that	  Blanchot	  describes	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  own	  work?	  It	  is	  the	  existence,	  nature	  and	  significance	  of	  a	  similar	  bifurcation	  at	  work	  within	  jurisdiction	  that	  I	  explore	  in	  what	  follows.	  In	  offering	  an	  account	  of	  jurisdiction,	  I	  seek	  to	  assess	  how	  we	  might	  introduce	  the	  non-­‐dialectical,	  poetic	  and	  fragmentary	  into	  a	  theoretical	  account	  of	  the	  law.	  	  	  	  Given	   the	   central	   importance	   of	   jurisdiction,	   as	   a	   category	   in	   its	   own	   right	   it	   has	   not	  received	  the	  sort	  of	  scrutiny	  afforded	  to	  similarly	  significant	  principles	  for	  law	  and	  legal	  theory.	   In	   contemporary	   scholarship,	   justice,	   sovereignty,	   punishment,	   authority	   and	  fairness	  have	  all	  been	  central	   concerns	   for	   theoretically	   informed	  accounts	  of	   the	   law.	  One	  reason	  for	  the	  relative	  paucity	  of	  theoretical	  accounts	  of	  jurisdiction	  might	  rest	  on	  the	  supposition	  that	  this	  principle,	  on	  close	  scrutiny,	  is	  really	  nothing	  more	  than	  one	  of	  these	  more	  fundamental	  concepts	  in	  other	  clothes.	  One	  might	  suggest	  for	  example	  that	  jurisdiction	   simply	   enunciates	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   a	   people	   or	   territory,	   or	   that	  jurisdiction	   relies	   on,	   or	   simply	   is,	   the	   expression	   of	   the	   authority	   of	   this	   or	   that	  institution.	   Jurisdiction	  on	  such	  a	   reading	  would	  appear	  secondary	   to	  other	  categories	  and	  concepts.	  The	  argument	  developed	  here	  rejects	  this	  characterisation.	  Jurisdiction	  –	  conceived	   as	   the	   law’s	   expressive	   and	   performative	   register	   –	  has	   a	   unique	   character	  that	   cannot	   be	   so	   easily	   subsumed	   within	   some	   broader	   notion	   of	   sovereignty	   or	  authority.	  	  	  This	  thesis	  contributes	  to	  a	  growing,	  but	  small,	  body	  of	  literature	  that	  has	  taken	  up	  the	  task	   of	   theorising	   jurisdiction.	   A	   theoretical	   account	   of	   jurisdiction	   is	   developed	   here	  that	   relies	   on	   deconstructive	   strategies,	   concepts	   and	   texts,	   particularly	   the	   work	   of	  Jacques	  Derrida	   and	   Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy.	  By	   reading	   jurisdiction	   through	  a	  deconstructive	  lens,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   principle	   can	   be	   seen,	   not	   only	   as	   an	   instrument	   in	   the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  law’s	  authority	  but	  also,	  constitutive	  of	  the	  law’s	  very	  fragility.	  It	  is	  here,	   then,	   in	   the	   processes	   and	   practices	   of	   jurisdiction	   that	   critical	   interventions	  within	  the	  law	  might	  be	  possible.	  If	  jurisdiction	  expresses	  the	  limits	  and	  possibilities	  of	  legality,	   the	   principle	   represents	   the	   possibility	   of	   reworking	   and	   reimaging	   legality	  otherwise.	   The	   thesis	   argues	   that	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   line	   drawing	   and	   determinative	  impulses	   usually	   associated	   with	   the	   term,	   jurisdiction	   also	   engages	   a	   register	   of	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sociality	   that	  exceeds	  and	   interrupts	   the	   jurisdictional	   limit,	   creating	  an	  openness	  and	  instability	   within	   the	   law.	   Moving	   away	   from	   a	   purely	   territorial	   understanding	   of	  jurisdiction,	   I	  assess	  this	  doubled	  life	  to	   jurisdiction	  in	  relation	  to,	   firstly,	   the	  narrative	  and	   fictional	   crafting	   of	   the	   common	   law;	   secondly,	   the	   performative	   and	   declaratory	  mode	  of	  jurisdiction;	  and,	  lastly,	  jurisdiction’s	  relation	  to	  community.	  In	  each	  instance	  a	  prior	  register	  of	  sociality	  is	  explored	  that	  exceeds	  the	  limit	  that	  jurisdiction	  inscribes.	  It	  is	  through	  the	  exploration	  of	  this	  other	  register	  to	  jurisdiction,	  a	  mode	  akin	  to	  Blanchot’s	  evocation	   of	   the	   non-­‐dialectical	   and	   poetic	   form	   of	   speech	   above,	   that	   I	   develop	  “juriswriting”	  in	  the	  final	  chapter	  of	  the	  project.	  	  	  Jurisdiction	   is	   commonly	   conceived	   as	   a	   technical	   and	   administrative	   contrivance	  concerned	   with	   the	   proper	   operation	   of	   judicial	   authority.	   Jurisdictional	   questions,	   it	  might	   be	   thought,	   are	   the	   exclusive	   preserve	   of	   professional	   lawyers	   and	   forensic	  technocrats.	   The	   technical	   exigencies	   of	   jurisdiction	   abound	   and	   are	   given	   ample	  attention	   in	   the	  existing	   literature	  on	   the	  conflict	  of	   laws	  and	  public	   international	   law.	  However,	   this	   approach	   only	   tells	   part	   of	   the	   story.	   This	   thesis	   explores	   the	   ways	   in	  which	  the	  expressive	  dimension	  to	  law	  always	  exceeds	  the	  law’s	  impulse	  to	  delimit	  and	  determine.	  Moving	  jurisdiction	  away	  from	  questions	  of	  territorial	  demarcation	  and	  the	  delineation	  of	  juridical	  authority,	  this	  thesis	  inquires	  into	  the	  possibilities	  of	  conceiving	  of	  jurisdiction	  as	  a	  means	  of	  expressing	  an	  inoperative	  law	  of	  social	  relation.	  Here	  I	  want	  to	  briefly	  outline	  the	  argument.	  	  In	   the	   first	   chapter	   I	   introduce	   the	   theoretical	   approach	   that	   informs	   the	   thesis.	  Assessing	   both	   the	   critical	   and	   more	   orthodox	   approaches	   to	   jurisdiction,	   I	   move	  towards	   a	   theory	   of	   jurisdiction	   that	   will	   be	   developed	   throughout	   the	   chapters	   that	  follow.	   In	   sum,	   this	   contends	   that	   jurisdiction	  must	   be	   conceived	   as	   a	   process	   of	   both	  grounding	  and	  reflection.	  Following	  Bradin	  Cormack	  I	  suggest	  that	  jurisdiction,	  beyond	  inscribing	  the	   limits	  of	   formal	   legality,	  reflects	  extant	  but	   informal	  practices	  and	  social	  relations.	   In	   order	   to	   develop	   this	   structure	   to	   jurisdiction	   I	   turn	   to	   deconstructive	  philosophy	  and	  strategies	  of	  interpretation.	  Derrida’s	  account	  of	  legality	  in	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law,”	  in	  particular,	  helps	  undergird	  the	  thinking	  of	  jurisdiction	  outlined	  here.	  Derrida’s	  doubled	  account	  of	  law	  as	  both	  positive	  and	  différantial	  helps	  examine	  the	  two	  registers	  of	  law’s	  speech	  alluded	  to	  above.	  	  	  The	   turn	   to	   deconstruction	   examined	   in	   this	   introductory	   chapter	   also	   develops	   a	  second	   strand	   to	   the	   argument	   pursued	   throughout	   the	   thesis.	   By	   reading	   Derrida	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together	   with	   Nancy,	   I	   seek	   to	   foreground	   a	   political	   strand	   to	   deconstruction,	   often	  overlooked	  in	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  deconstruction	  and	  the	  law.	  The	  political	  aspect	  to	   Derrida’s	   thought	   is	   developed	   by	   drawing	   Derrida’s	   thinking	   of	   différance	   into	  conversation	   with	   Nancy’s	   ontology	   of	   “being-­‐with.”	   Throughout	   the	   thesis	   I	   seek	   to	  demonstrate	   that	  not	  only	  does	  deconstruction	   speak	   to	   the	  political	   (le	  politique)	  but	  can	   also	   directly	   inform	   the	   realm	   of	   politics	   (la	   politique).	   By	   reading	   Nancy	   and	  Derrida	  together	  we	  can	  see	  that	  both	  posit	  a	  bare,	  but	  restless,	  relationality	  that	  works	  as	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   politics,	   but	   also,	   specifically	   through	   Derrida’s	  understanding	  of	  creative	  practices	  of	  writing	  –	  examined	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  five	  –	  can	  inform	  material	  political	  practices	  and	  strategies.	  	  	  By	   focusing	   on	   the	   artifice	   and	   technê	   of	   jurisdictional	   practices,	   the	   second	   chapter	  examines	   how	   the	   structure	   of	   jurisdiction	   outlined	   above	   exposes	   a	   fragility	   and	  contingency	  within	   the	   law.	  Focusing	  on	   the	  narrative	  and	   fictional	  crafting	  associated	  with	   the	   common	   law,	   the	   chapter	   opens	   with	   a	   reading	   of	   Derrida’s	   account	   of	   the	  complicity	  between	  law	  and	  literature	  in	  his	  assessment	  of	  Kafka’s	  Vor	  dem	  Gesetz.	  This	  approach,	   which	   charts	   both	   Kafka	   and	   Freud’s	   ultimately	   failed	   attempt	   to	   offer	   a	  transcendental	  ground	  for	  the	  law,	  suggests	  that	  the	  law	  relies	  on	  fashioning	  a	  narrative	  and	   fiction	   of	   authority	   to	   maintain	   its	   efficacy.	   Derrida’s	   insight	   regarding	   the	   co-­‐appearance	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  the	  literary	  is	  put	  into	  conversation	  with	  the	  constructions	  of	   the	   common	   law	   in	   the	   sixteenth	   and	   seventeenth	   centuries,	   a	   period	  of	   significant	  consolidation	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  England.	  Addressing	  both	  Derrida’s	  identification	  of	  a	  “law	  before	   the	   law”	   and	   the	   ineluctable	   desire	   for	   narrative	   fashioning	   within	   the	   law,	   a	  particular	  focus	  is	  given	  to	  Calvin’s	  Case	  (1608)	  a	  decision	  crucial	  to	  asserting	  the	  limits	  and	   authority	   of	   the	   common	   law	   jurisdiction.	   Bringing	   these	   reflections	   into	  conversation	  with	  Nancy’s	  account	  of	  “juris-­‐fiction,”	  the	  chapter	  concludes	  by	  evaluating	  the	  shift	  in	  register	  from	  jurisdiction	  to	  juris-­‐fiction.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  work	  of	  narrative,	   fiction	  and	   technicity,	   all	  deployed	   to	  mediate	  between	   the	  positive	  law	  and	  the	  différantial	  law	  before	   the	   law,	   the	  contingencies	  and	   fragilities	  of	   the	   law	  are	   revealed.	   In	   this	   sense,	   jurisdiction,	   rather	   than	   marking	   the	   closure	   of	   the	   law’s	  limits,	   represents	   an	   opening	   within	   the	   law,	   suggesting	   that	   through	   jurisdiction	  we	  might	  re-­‐imagine	  the	  law	  otherwise.	  	  	  Chapter	  three	  assesses	  the	  performative	  and	  foundational	  aspect	  of	  jurisdiction.	  Taking	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  J.	  L.	  Austin’s	  speech	  act	  theory	  as	  its	  point	  of	  departure,	  this	  chapter	  reads	   the	   declarative	  moment	   that	   seeks	   to	   ground	   the	   law’s	   authority	   as	   itself	   being	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undone	   by	   the	   very	   movement	   that	   makes	   the	   declaration	   possible.	   I	   focus	   on	   the	  importance	   of	   temporality	   in	   Derrida’s	   critique	   of	   Austin.	   By	   putting	   Derrida’s	  understanding	   of	   the	   performative	   into	   conversation	  with	   his	   broader	   critique	   of	   the	  metaphysics	   of	   presence,	   his	   short	   and	   provocative	   intervention	   on	   the	   American	  Declaration	   of	   Independence,	   as	   well	   as	   notions	   of	   “spectrality”	   and	   “conjuring”	  developed	   in	   Spectres	   of	   Marx,	   I	   assess	   how	   the	   jurisdictional	   moment	   relies	   on	   a	  privileging	  of	  presence	   that	  effaces	   the	  plurality	  of	  voices	  and	   interests	   that	  act	  as	   the	  declaration’s	   condition	   of	   possibility.	   Here	   we	   can	   see	   a	   prior,	   inchoate	   sociality	  overflowing	   jurisdiction’s	   impulse	   to	   contain	   and	   delimit.	   I	   bring	   this	   reading	   of	  Derrida’s	   engagement	   with	   Austin	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   declaration	   made	   by	   the	   National	  Transitional	  Council	  of	  Libya,	  the	  institution	  that	  led	  the	  anti-­‐Gadhafi	  resistance	  in	  Libya	  in	  early	  2011.	  Crucial	  to	  Derrida’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  performative	  is	  that	  it	  calls	  for	  a	  response	  or	  counter-­‐signature.	  Assessing	  the	  politics	  at	  stake	  in	  such	  counter-­‐signing,	  I	  turn	   to	   Nancy’s	   response	   to	   the	   Libyan	   uprising	   published	   in	   Libération	   in	   2011.	   In	  seeking	  to	  account	  for	  Nancy’s	  support	  for	  Western	  intervention	  in	  Libya,	  I	  assess	  how	  Derrida’s	   thinking	   of	   the	   performative	   and	   the	   law’s	   declaratory	  moment,	   shapes	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   responsibility	   owed	   in	   counter-­‐signing	   this	   event.	   The	   jurisdictional	  declaration,	   read	   through	   Derrida	   and	   Nancy,	   engages	   questions	   of	   temporality,	  performativity	   and	   community,	   suggesting	   that	   Derrida	   helps	   identify	   the	   ethico-­‐political	  stakes	  in	  play	  when	  an	  institution,	  or	  community	  declares	  its	  presence.	  	  	  The	  question	  of	   jurisdiction’s	   relation	   to	   community	   is	   taken	  up	   in	   the	   fourth	   chapter	  through	  an	  assessment	  of	  Derrida	  and	  Nancy’s	  apparently	  divergent	  approaches	  to	  this	  notion.	   The	   key	   tasks	   here	   are,	   firstly	   to	   understand	   the	   effect	   that	   jurisdictional	  practices	   have	   on	   shaping	   community	   and,	   secondly,	   to	   examine	   how	   Derrida	   and	  Nancy’s	   approaches	   to	   community	   open	   ethico-­‐political	   possibilities	   of	   thinking	   both	  jurisdiction	  and	  community	  otherwise.	  Though	  apparently	  contradictory	  on	  the	  status	  of	  community,	   I	   identify	   a	   quiet	   solidarity	   between	  Derrida	   and	  Nancy	   on	   this	   question.	  This	  is	  key	  in	  developing	  the	  politically	  sensitive	  reading	  of	  deconstruction	  and	  the	  law	  pursued	   in	   the	   thesis.	   The	   chapter	   proceeds	   by	   firstly	   assessing	   some	   of	   the	   existing	  approaches	   to	  community	  and	   law;	  secondly	   I	  examine	   the	  deconstructive	  accounts	  of	  community	   offered	   by	   Nancy	   and	   Derrida;	   and	   lastly	   I	   bring	   this	   thinking	   to	   bear	   on	  
Mabo	  (No	  2)	   (1992),	   a	   case	   centrally	   important	   to	   the	   supposed	   (re)affirmation	  of	   the	  integrity	  and	  independence	  of	  both	  Australia’s	  common	  law	  and	  its	  political	  community.	  Through	   Derrida,	   I	   develop	   an	   account	   of	   the	   “autoimmune”	   community	   in	   order	   to	  explain	  the	  effect	  that	  jurisdiction	  has	  in	  bringing	  community	  into	  relation	  with	  the	  law.	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Again,	   the	   question	   of	   political	   responsibility	   is	   significant	   here,	   suggesting	   that	   the	  account	  of	  an	  autoimmune	  community,	  set	   in	  motion	  by	   jurisdictional	  practices,	  might	  offer	   a	   corrective	   in	   assessing	   the	   meeting	   place	   between	   different	   laws	   and	   legal	  traditions.	  	  	  The	   final	   chapter	   introduces	   and	   develops	   the	   notion	   of	   juriswriting.	   Drawing	   on	   the	  themes	   of	   temporality,	   political	   responsibility	   and	   a	   re-­‐imagining	   of	   community	   or	  “being-­‐with”	  developed	  in	  the	  thesis	  thus	  far,	  juriswriting	  describes	  particular	  practices	  of	  occupying	   the	   jurisdictional	   form	   in	  a	  mode	   that	   rejects	  many	  of	   the	  characteristics	  usually	   associated	   with	   the	   principle.	   This	   involves	   privileging	   the	   pole	   that	   is	   often	  overlooked	  in	  relation	  to	  jurisdiction:	  the	  second,	  poetic	  and	  indeterminative	  register	  to	  which	  Blanchot	   alludes	   in	   the	  passage	   above.	   Juriswriting	   is	   developed	  by	  putting	   the	  notion	   of	   right-­‐ing,	   developed	   by	   Douzinas	   and	   Wall,	   into	   conversation	   with	   a	  deconstructive	   account	   of	   “writing,”	   broadly	   understood.	  Drawing	   on	  Nancy,	   Blanchot	  and,	  most	  heavily,	  Derrida’s	  approach	  to	  writing,	  I	  highlight	  particular	  political	  practices	  that	   use	   the	   jurisdictional	   form	   to	   express	   another	   shade	   to	   legality.	   The	   concept	   of	  juriswriting,	  developed	  in	  the	  final	  chapter,	  is	  presented	  alongside	  an	  engagement	  with	  the	  various	  political	  eruptions,	  events	  and	  uprisings	  of	  2011,	  particularly	  the	  strategy	  of	  occupying	   public	   space	   to	   affirm	   the	   need	   for	   political	   change.	   I	   suggest	   that	   these	  events	   pose	   challenges	   to	   the	   extant	   account	   of	   jurisdiction,	   arguing	   that	   juriswriting	  comes	  closer	  to	  capturing	  the	  tenor	  and	  force	  of	  these	  events.	  With	  juriswriting	  I	  explore	  the	  notion	  that	  jurisdictional	  practices	  not	  only	  conform	  to	  the	  work	  of	  delimitation	  and	  inscription	  but	  can	  be	  occupied	  to	  express	  the	  open	  potential	  of	  people	  being	  together.	  The	   notion	   of	   juriswriting	   seeks	   to	   rest	   the	   law,	   and	   jurisdiction,	   away	   from	   the	  exclusive	  preserve	  of	   legal	  experts	  and	  technocrats	   into	   the	  more	   fertile	  ground	  of	   the	  creativity	   of	   people	   coming	   together	   to	   perform	   the	   need	   for	   political	   change.	   A	   shift	  from	   jurisdiction	   to	   juriswriting	  does	  not	   escape	   the	   constant	   and	  unbearable	   tension	  that	  Blanchot	  identifies	  between	  the	  demand	  for	  delimitation,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  poetic	   demand,	   on	   the	   other.	   But	   by	   examining	   how	   jurisdictional	   practices	   exceed	  themselves	   in	   their	   very	   inscription,	   I	   hope	   to	   open	   new	   possibilities	   within	   the	  expressive	  and	  performative	  register	  of	  legality:	  the	  stranger	  in	  the	  wings	  is	  waiting	  for	  his	  cue.	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Chapter	  1	  	  
	  
INTRODUCTION:	  JURISDICTION	  AND	  DECONSTRUCTION	  
	  	  The	   secret	   history	   of	   jurisdictional	   authority	   is	   that	   it	   is	   produced	   as	   an	   ongoing,	   serial,	   ad	   hoc	  encounter	  with	  its	  own	  limits	  (Bradin	  Cormack).1	  	  Deconstruction	  is	  neither	  a	  theory	  nor	  a	  philosophy.	  It	  is	  neither	  a	  school	  nor	  a	  method.	  It	  is	  not	  even	  a	  discourse,	  nor	  an	  act,	  nor	  a	  practice.	  It	  is	  what	  happens,	  what	  is	  happening	  today	  in	  what	  they	  call	  society,	  politics,	  diplomacy,	  economics,	  historical	  reality,	  and	  so	  on	  and	  so	  forth	  (Jacques	  Derrida).2	  	  	  
1.1	  Introduction	  The	  American	  legal	  theorist	  Robert	  Cover	  suggests	  that	  the	  only	  way	  a	  judge	  can	  try	  to	  hide	  the	   inherent	   violence	   of	   her	   office	   is	   through	   an	   appeal	   to	   some	   jurisdictional	   text	   or	  principle.	  Such	  jurisdictional	   justifications,	   for	  Cover,	  are	   ‘apologies	  for	  the	  State	   itself	  and	  for	   its	   violence’	  but,	   as	  Cover	   contends,	   these	  more	   fundamental	  questions	  are	  masked	   in	  the	   appeal	   to	   some	   “jurisdictional	   authority.”3	  There	   is,	   then,	   something	   shameful	   about	  jurisdiction.	   If	  we	   look	   too	   closely,	  we	  might	   see	   behind	   a	   façade	   of	   peaceful	   and	   orderly	  administration,	   a	   violent,	   and	   perhaps	   fantastic,	   series	   of	   events,	   myths,	   violations,	  presumptions	   and	   fabrications.	   Jurisdiction	   is	   of	   central	   importance	   to	   the	   law:	   the	  authority	   of	   judicial	   decisions,	   the	   scope	   and	   nature	   of	   the	   law’s	   influence,	   and	   the	  declaration	   and	   institutionalisation	   of	   normative	   orders	   all	   rest	   on	   some	   jurisdictional	  claim.	   In	  accounting	  for	  the	   law,	   its	  practices	  and	  its	   institutions	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  say	  that	  jurisdiction	  “goes	  all	  the	  way	  down,”	  infecting	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  legality.	  However,	  as	  Cover	  intimates	  there	  is	  always	  a	  movement	  at	  work	  before	  any	  assertion	  of	  jurisdiction,	  a	  movement	  that	  an	  appeal	  to	  jurisdictional	  authority,	  to	  some	  constitutional	  text	  or	  practice,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Bradin	  Cormack,	  A	  Power	  to	  do	  Justice:	  Jurisdiction,	  English	  Literature	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  the	  Common	  
Law	  1509-­‐1625	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  222.	  2	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “Some	  Statements	  and	  Truisms	  about	  Neologisms,	  Newisms,	  Postisms,	  Parasitisms,	  and	  Other	  Small	  Seismisms,”	  in	  The	  States	  of	  “Theory”:	  History,	  Art,	  and	  Critical	  Discourse,	  ed.	  D.	  Carroll,	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  85.	  3	  Robert	  Cover,	  “The	  Supreme	  Court,	  1982	  Term	  –	  Foreword:	  Nomos	  and	  Narrative,”	  Harvard	  Law	  
Review	  97(4)	  (1983),	  54.	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seeks	   to	   do	   without.	   By	   bringing	   some	   of	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   jurisdiction	   into	  conversation	   with	   deconstructive	   philosophy	   and	   strategies	   of	   interpretation,	   in	   this	  chapter	   I	   aim	   to	   begin	   to	   examine	   the	   nature	   of	   this	   prior	  movement	   at	  work	   before	   the	  positing	  or	  reliance	  on	  some	   jurisdictional	   text	  or	  principle.	  The	  chapter	  proceeds	  by	   first	  examining	   some	   of	   the	   existing	   approaches	   to	   jurisdiction	   before	   suggesting	   how	  deconstruction	   intervenes	   in	   this	   literature	   and	   helps	   supplement	   the	   existing	   critical	  scholarship	  in	  this	  area.	  
	  
1.2	  Jurisdiction	  Though	   not	   without	   controversy,	   it	   is	   often	   argued	   that	   the	   history	   of	   modernity	   has	  progressed	   hand-­‐in-­‐hand	   with	   an	   increasing	   centralisation	   of	   power	   at	   the	   expense	   of	  provincial	   interests	  and	  practices.4	  The	  modern	  nation	  State	   is,	  perhaps,	   the	  most	  obvious	  product	   of	   this	   work	   of	   centralisation,	   achieved	   through	   a	   variety	   of	   governmental	  techniques	   aimed	   at	   first	   creating	   and	   then	   administering	   authority	   in	   a	   determined	  territory.	   As	  Richard	  T.	   Ford	   has	   argued,	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  modern	   territorially	   integral	  State	   depends	   on	   the	   techniques	   and	   practices	   of	   jurisdiction.5	  In	   the	   classical	   account,	  jurisdiction	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  territorial	  integrity	  of	  a	  particular	  nation.	  The	  connection	  between	  territory	  and	  jurisdiction	  is	  so	  firmly	  embedded	  in	  the	  legal	  and	  political	  psyche	  that	  some	  find	   it	   difficult	   to	   think	   of	   jurisdiction	   as	   being	   anything	   but	   tied	   to	   a	   territorially	  determined	  legal	  order.6	  Jurisdiction	  is	  often	  thought	  to	  be	  exclusively	  a	  matter	  of	  territorial	  delimitation	  and	  control.	  The	  authority	  of	  supra-­‐national	  organisations	  such	  as	   the	  United	  Nations	  and	  European	  Union;	  wars	  conducted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  “global	  influence”	  rather	  than	  (sovereign)	  territorial	  appropriation;	  the	  assassination	  of	  suspected	  criminals	  on	  sovereign	  territory;	  and	   the	   fact	  of	  universal	   jurisdiction	   for	   international	   courts	  all	  point	   to	   certain	  threats	   to	   the	   traditional	   notion	   of	   the	   sovereign	   nation	   State	   as	   well	   as	   the	   territorial	  jurisdiction	  that	  purports	  to	  guarantee	  its	  legal	  authority.	  The	  postmodern	  weakening	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Richard	  T.	  Ford,	  “Law’s	  Territory	  (A	  History	  of	  Jurisdiction),”	  Michigan	  Law	  Review	  97	  (1998-­‐1999),	  889	  and	  909.	  5	  Ford,	  “Law’s	  Territory,”	  866-­‐897.	  Ford	  highlights	  a	  number	  of	  jurisdictional	  devices	  that	  facilitated	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  nation	  state.	  He	  is	  particularly	  interested	  in	  the	  effect	  of	  two	  coincidental	  innovations:	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  science	  of	  cartography	  and	  the	  political	  development	  of	  liberal,	  humanist	  governance.	  See	  in	  particular	  867-­‐880.	  6	  In	  his	  study	  of	  jurisdiction	  in	  international	  law,	  Cedric	  Ryngaert	  excludes	  a	  discussion	  of	  extra-­‐territorial	  jurisdiction	  from	  his	  analysis	  because	  of	  the	  term’s	  ‘connotations	  with	  illegitimacy	  and	  outrageousness’	  see,	  Cedric	  Ryngaert,	  Jurisdiction	  in	  International	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  7-­‐8.	  	  
	   18	  
nation	   State	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   a	   myriad	   of	   jurisdictions	   and	   jurisdictional	   orderings.	  Jurisdictions	   today	   increasingly	   imbricate	   and	   tussle	   for	   position	   against	   a	   backdrop	   of	  global	   or	   universal	   jurisdiction.7	  As	  McVeigh	   and	  Dorsett	   suggest,	   ‘we	  will	   have	   lived	   in	   a	  world	   of	   jurisdiction’,8	  a	  world	  which	   is	   increasingly	   shaped	   and	   given	   voice	   through	   the	  various	  techniques	  and	  practices	  of	  jurisdiction.	  In	  the	  sections	  that	  follow	  I	  want	  to	  assess	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  the	  phenomena	  of	  jurisdiction	  might	  be	  understood.	  In	  assessing	  both	  the	  traditional	   territorial	   understanding	   of	   the	   concept	   as	   well	   as	   more	   critical	   and	   creative	  approaches,	   I	   develop	   an	   understanding	   of	   jurisdiction	   that	   will	   work	   as	   a	   touchstone	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  	  	  
1.2.1	  Territorial	  Jurisdiction	  Notwithstanding	  increasing	  challenges	  to	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  nation	  State	  noted	  above,	  a	  connection	   between	   territory	   and	   jurisdiction,	   at	   first	   blush,	   appears	   natural	   and	  uncontroversial.	  We	  know	   that	  when	  we	   cross	   a	  national	  border,	  we	  will	   be	   governed	  by	  different	   laws	   and	   owe	   a	   different	   set	   of	   legal	   obligations	   as	   a	   result.	  We	   know	   too	   that	  when	  we	  enter	  territorially	  defined	  spaces	  such	  as	  a	  mosque,	  the	  site	  of	  a	  music	  festival	  or	  the	  changing	  rooms	  at	  the	  gym,	  specific	  social	  obligations	  arise.	  As	  we	  move	  from	  one	  space	  or	   territory	   to	   another	   we	   expect	   to	   be	   governed	   by	   different	   (legal)	   norms	   and	   have	  different	   social	   and	   cultural	   expectations.	   Territory	   appears	   to	   be	   inextricably	   bound	   up	  with	  the	  imposition	  of	  normative	  organisation:	  “territory”	  (a	  portmanteau	  of	  terra,	  “land”	  or	  “earth”	  and	  torium,	  “belonging	  to	  or	  surrounding”)	  originally	  referred	  to	  the	  land	  outside	  a	  city	  over	  which	  that	  city	  had	  jurisdictional	  control.9	  	  	  Modern	  examples	  of	   the	  seemingly	  unquestionable	  connection	  between	   land	  or	  space	  and	  legal	   authority	   are	   multifarious.	   One	   particularly	   powerful	   source	   for	   underscoring	   this	  relation	  is	  the	  American	  Western	  genre.	  Set	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  contestations	  between	  state	  and	  federal	  control	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  Westerns	  are	  often	  searching	  meditations	  on	  the	  realities	  of	  territorially	  delimited	  jurisdiction.	  Think	  of	   the	   town	   sheriff	   who	   refuses	   to	   pursue	   an	   outlaw	   who	   escapes	   to	   a	   neighbouring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  “The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Jurisdiction”	  in	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Jurisdiction,	  7.	  8	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  and	  Shaun	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  1.	  9	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction,	  39.	  As	  indicated	  by	  the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary,	  the	  etymology	  for	  territory	  is	  unsettled.	  An	  alternative	  derivation	  can	  be	  found	  through	  terrere,	  “to	  frighten”	  and	  thus	  territory	  would	  name	  a	  place	  from	  which	  one	  is	  warned	  off.	  In	  either	  case,	  territory	  is	  clear	  associated	  with	  a	  capacity	  to	  control	  and	  exercise	  authority.	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jurisdiction,	  or	  the	  persistent	  evocation	  of	  “bandit	  country”	  where	  it	  is	  the	  outlaw	  who	  has	  
de	  facto	   jurisdictional	  control.	  Here	  the	  frontier	  myth	  of	  the	  American	  West	  is	  tied	  directly	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  place	  and	  space:	  jurisdiction	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  declaring	  control	  and	  then	  actually	  controlling	   –	  usually	  by	   excluding	   inconveniences	   like	   current	   inhabitants	   –	  a	  determined	  geographical	  area.10	  All	  this	  seems	  uncontroversial.	  But	  as	  Ford	  points	  out,	  ‘rigidly	  mapped	  territories	  within	  which	  formally	  defined	  legal	  powers	  are	  exercised	  by	  formally	  organised	  governmental	   institutions…	   are	   relatively	   new	   and	   intuitively	   surprising	   technological	  developments’.11	  Notwithstanding	  its	  relatively	  recent	  emergence,	  jurisdiction’s	  function	  in	  delimiting	   territory	   remains	   an	   essential	   aspect	   of	   the	   principle	   and	   cartography	   a	   key	  technique	   in	   determining	   the	   reach	   and	   integrity	   of	   political	   communities.12	  However,	  thinking	  of	   jurisdiction	  as	  a	  being	  exclusively	   a	  matter	  of	  delimiting	  and	  defining	   territory	  creates	   an	   overly	   simplistic	   understanding	   of	   jurisdictional	   effects	   and	   techniques.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  briefly	  noting	  the	  form	  that	  a	  territorial	  understanding	  of	  jurisdiction	  takes.	  	  Following	   Ford’s	   “prototypical”	   definition	   of	   territorial	   jurisdiction13	  we	   might	   make	   the	  following	   observations.	   Territorial	   jurisdiction	   conceives	   jurisdiction	   abstractly	   and	  impersonally,	   jurisdiction	  does	  not	   attend	   to	   actual	  practices	  or	   relations	  between	  people	  and	  things,	  rather	  jurisdiction	  is	  conceived	  independently	  from	  any	  particular	  attributes	  of	  a	   jurisdictional	  space.	   Jurisdiction	  maps	  a	  homogeneous	  and	  conceptually	  empty	  space,	   in	  which	  certain	  practices	  and	  relations	  may	  occur.	  An	  important	  corollary	  to	  this	  view	  is	  that	  jurisdiction	   is	   conceived	   as	   being	   definitely	   bounded:	   jurisdictions	   delimit	   legal	   space	  creating	   a	   contiguous	   network	   of	   areas	   each	   attaching	   to	   a	   particular	   normative	   system.	  This,	  perhaps,	  is	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  a	  territorial	  conception	  of	  jurisdiction:	  it	  establishes	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	  an	  examination	  of	  some	  of	  the	  jurisdictional	  implications	  of	  the	  Western	  genre	  see	  Bill	  Grantham,	  “Embracing	  Jurisdiction:	  John	  Ford’s	  The	  Man	  Who	  Shot	  Liberty”	  in	  Shaun	  McVeigh	  ed.,	  
Jurisprudence	  of	  Jurisdiction	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  225-­‐237.	  For	  a	  contemporary	  example	  of	  the	  relevance	  of	  jurisdiction	  to	  the	  Western	  genre	  see	  Joel	  and	  Ethan	  Coen’s	  True	  Grit	  (Paramount	  Pictures,	  2010)	  where	  a	  bounty	  hunter	  (possessing	  what	  he	  seems	  to	  think	  is	  a	  quasi-­‐universal	  jurisdiction)	  and	  a	  Texas	  ranger	  (possessing	  cross-­‐border	  jurisdictional	  authority)	  compete	  to	  capture	  a	  fugitive	  criminal.	  	  11	  Ford,	  “Law’s	  Territory,”	  843.	  12	  As	  noted	  above	  Ford	  argues	  that	  the	  developments	  in	  modern	  cartography	  were	  crucial	  for	  the	  territorial	  definition	  of	  jurisdiction,	  see	  Ford,	  “Law’s	  Territory,”	  passim	  but	  especially,	  852-­‐855	  and	  868-­‐875.	  Following	  Ford’s	  argument,	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  argues	  that	  the	  technique	  of	  mapping	  is	  central	  to	  the	  question	  of	  common	  law	  jurisdiction	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  the	  common	  law	  in	  Australia	  has	  constructed	  native	  title.	  See	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett,	  “Mapping	  Territories”	  in	  McVeigh	  ed.,	  
Jurisprudence	  of	  Jurisdiction,	  137-­‐157.	  13	  Ford	  “Law’s	  Territory,”	  852-­‐855.	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maintains	   identifiable	   and	   rigid	   lines	   of	   demarcation	  between	   the	   inside	   and	  outside	   of	   a	  zone	  of	   legal	  authority.	  As	  Ford	  suggests	   territorial	   jurisdiction	  posits	   legal	  boundaries	  as	  inflexible	  ‘bright	  lines’14	  that	  cannot	  be	  displaced	  or	  manipulated.	  	  	  For	   Carl	   Schmitt,	   the	   ability	   to	   delimit	   the	   earth	   and	   mark	   out	   a	   territory	   through	  enclosures,	  boundaries	  and	  visible	  divisions	  is	  of	  fundamental	  importance	  to	  understanding	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  law.15	  Schmitt	  follows	  both	  Kant	  and	  Locke	  in	  asserting	  land	   appropriation	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   territorial	   demarcation	   as	   the	   primary	   juridical	  acts.16	  This	  possibility	  of	  delimiting	  the	  earth	  is	  in	  radical	  contrast	  to	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  sea	  where	  ‘firm	  lines	  cannot	  be	  engraved’17	  and,	  consequently,	  no	  jurisdictional	  limit	  is	  possible.	  Such	  a	  territorially	  determined	  conception	  of	  jurisdictional	  ordering	  permeates	  much	  legal	  thinking	   and	   relies	   on	   the	   positing	   of	   strict	   binaries:	   law/non-­‐law;	   common	   law/equity;	  criminal	   law/civil	   law;	   law/fact	   and	   so	   on.	   In	   fact,	   the	   conception	   of	   the	   law	   as	   being	  intrinsically	  territorial	  and	  capable	  of	  maintaining	  itself	  in	  contradistinction	  to	  its	  others	  is	  the	  mainstay	  of	  the	  positivism	  that	  dominated	  jurisprudence	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  H.L.A	  Hart’s	  Concept	  of	   Law	   and	   Kelsen’s	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law	   both	   argue	   for	   the	   existence,	   and	  maintenance,	  of	  a	  strict	  delimitation	  between	  law	  and	  non-­‐law,	  suggesting	  that	  law	  will	  only	  have	   a	   contingent	   relationship	   with	   ethical	   or	   moral	   maxims.18	  Law,	   so	   conceived,	   is	  conceptually	  integral.	  The	  territorial	  inference	  in	  the	  positivists’	  conceptual	  understanding	  perpetuates	   a	   view	   of	   jurisdiction	   being	   a	   matter	   of	   policing	   the	   legal	   limit.	   A	   border	   is	  erected	   that	   separates	   “us”	   within	   a	   jurisdiction	  from	   “them”	   outside	   it;	   “us”	   scholars	   of	  “law”	  properly	  defined	  and	  understood	  and	  “them”	  scholars	  who	  confuse	  law	  with	  society,	  morality	   and	   other	   value	   systems.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   paradigm	   of	   territorial	   jurisdiction	  shapes	   how	   we	   conceive	   of	   law	   more	   generally.	   The	   territorial	   notion	   of	   jurisdiction	   is	  reflected	  in	  a	  positivist	  conception	  of	  law	  predicated	  on	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  binary	  terms.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Ibid.,	  853	  15	  Carl	  Schmitt,	  The	  Nomos	  of	  the	  Earth:	  In	  the	  International	  Law	  of	  the	  Jus	  Publicum	  Europaeum	  (New	  York:	  Telos	  Press	  Publishing,	  2006),	  42-­‐49	  and	  172-­‐175.	  16	  Kant	  suggests	  that	  proprietorship	  of	  the	  soil	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  all	  ownership	  and	  all	  further	  law,	  whether	  public	  or	  private.	  Locke	  claims	  that	  government	  has	  ‘a	  direct	  jurisdiction	  only	  over	  the	  land’.	  See	  Schmitt,	  The	  Nomos	  of	  the	  Earth,	  46-­‐47.	  17	  Schmitt,	  The	  Nomos	  of	  the	  Earth,	  42.	  18	  H.L.A	  Hart,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Law	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  155-­‐212,	  et	  passim;	  also	  on	  Hart’s	  positivism	  see,	  “Positivism	  and	  the	  Separation	  of	  Laws	  and	  Morals”	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  71	  (1958),	  593;	  Hans	  Kelsen,	  The	  Pure	  Theory	  of	  Law	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1967).	  For	  an	  account	  of	  how	  deconstruction	  undoes	  much	  of	  positivism’s	  claims	  see,	  Margaret	  Davies,	  
Delimiting	  the	  Law:	  Postmodernism	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  the	  Law	  (London:	  Pluto	  Press,	  1996).	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  Another,	   and	   perhaps	   clearer,	   example	   of	   the	   how	   a	   jurisdictional	   logic,	   reliant	   on	   strict	  delimitation	   and	   delimitation,	   shapes	   accounts	   of	   law	   comes	   from	   systems	   theory.	   Niklas	  Luhmann’s	   attempt	   to	   account	   for	   the	   complexities	   of	   modern	   society	   posits	   a	   primary	  binary	   at	   the	   root	   of	   all	   social	   systems.19	  Each	   system	   comes	   to	   presence	   through	   some	  fundamental	  differentiation	   that	  works	  as	  an	  orientating	  point	   for	  each	  system’s	   language	  or	   code.	   The	   legal	   system	   encodes	   the	  world	   into	   legal/illegal;	   the	   economic	   system	   into	  profit/loss;	  the	  medical	  system	  into	  healthy/unhealthy	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  Luhman’s	  account,	  one	  event	  or	  set	  of	  circumstances	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  by	  each	  system	  according	  to	  its	  own	  code	  by	  translating	   the	   event	   or	   circumstances	   into	   the	   language	   that	   operates	   in	   one	   particular	  system.	   This	  means	   that	   systems	   only	   speak	   to	   themselves	   in	   the	   their	   own	   language	   by	  referring	  back	  to	  their	  primary	  binary	  or	  differentiation.	  	  	  Jurisdictional	   practices,	   then,	   might	   be	   conceived	   as	   those	   that	   maintain	   such	   binaries,	  policing	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   law.	   In	   what	   follows	   I	   make	   the	   case	   for	   thinking	   beyond	   this	  conception	   of	   jurisdiction	   by	   developing	   a	   theoretical	   account	   that	  moves	   away	   from	   the	  elision	   between	   jurisdiction	   and	   territory.	   This	   allows	   us	   to	   assess	   the	   conditions	   of	  possibility	   of	   the	   jurisdictional	   limit.	   Furthermore,	   asserting	   that	   the	   connection	   between	  territory	   and	   jurisdiction	   is	   natural	   or	   uncontroversial	   ignores	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  alternative	   functions	   that	   jurisdiction	   fulfils,	   both	   historically	   and	   contemporaneously.	  Taking	  my	  cue	  from	  Ford’s	  assertion	  of	  the	  relatively	  novel	  association	  of	  jurisdiction	  with	  territory	   I	  want	   to	   discuss	   accounts	   of	   jurisdiction	   that	   question	   the	   “bright	   lines”	   theory	  associated	   with	   territorial	   jurisdiction.	   To	   be	   clear,	   I	   do	   not	   suggest	   that	   territorial	  jurisdiction	  is	  without	  import	  or	  interest	  –	  given	  its	  ongoing	  political	  and	  legal	  significance	  this	  would	  be	   foolish	   in	   the	   extreme.20	  However,	  my	   endeavour	  here	   is	   to	   suggest	   that	   to	  think	   of	   jurisdiction	   as	   exclusively	   a	   matter	   of	   territorial	   demarcation	   and	   delimitation	  misses	   the	   richness	   of	   the	   concept	   for	   a	   theoretical	   reflection	   on	   the	   law.	   It	   limits	   our	  conceptual	   framework	  and	  ushers	  us	   towards	  a	  simplistic	  understanding	  of	  both	  how	  law	  (in	  general)	  and	  jurisdiction	  (in	  particular)	  operates.	  The	  politics	  of	  border	  disputes	  and	  the	  intricacies	   of	   conflict	   of	   laws	   analysis	   only	   tells	   part	   of	   the	   story	   of	   jurisdiction.	   My	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  See	  Niklas	  Luhmann,	  “Law	  as	  a	  Social	  System”	  Northwestern	  University	  Law	  Review	  83	  (1989),	  136-­‐150.	  20	  For	  a	  thorough	  assessment	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  territory,	  its	  relation	  to	  terrain	  and	  territoriality	  and	  its	  significance	  for	  political	  and	  legal	  thinking	  see	  Stuart	  Elden,	  The	  Birth	  of	  Territory	  (Chicago	  and	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2013),	  1-­‐19,	  et	  passim.	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contention	  is	  that	  more	  fundamental	  jurisprudential	  questions	  are	  at	  stake	  in	  this	  concept,	  an	  attention	  to	  which	  reveals	  something	  of	   the	   logic	   that	  both	  animates	  and	  threatens	  the	  law	   from	  within.	  Of	   central	   importance	   to	  what	   follows	   is	  an	  attentiveness	   to	  what	  comes	  
before	  the	  inscription	  of	  a	  jurisdictional	  line	  that	  determines	  the	  limits	  of	  a	  territory	  or	  legal	  system.	   I	   contend,	   following	   certain	   deconstructive	   insights	   and	   anxieties,	   that	   there	   is	  always	  a	  movement	  that	  precedes	  the	  assertion	  of	  the	  legal/illegal	  binary	  or	  the	  border	  that	  delineates	   the	   form	  of	   contiguous	   legal	   zones.	   It	   is	   this	   prior	  movement	   that	   needs	   to	   be	  brought	  to	  the	  fore.	  To	  start	  with,	  however,	  let’s	  turn	  to	  some	  accounts	  of	  jurisdiction	  that	  think	  beyond	  the	  bright	  lines	  associated	  with	  the	  territorial	  approach.	  	  
	  
1.2.2	  Beyond	  the	  Bright	  Lines	  In	  his	  History	  of	  the	  Common	  Law	  of	  England	   Sir	  Matthew	  Hale	   suggests	   that	   the	   common	  law’s	  diverse	  denominations	  and	  jurisdictions,	  from	  the	  ‘Province	  [or]	  Shire	  [to	  the]	  Island	  [or]	   Country…	   are	   but	   parts	   of	   the	   same	   Ocean’.21	  The	   development	   of	   the	   common	   law	  shares	  modernity’s	  appetite	  for	  centralisation.	  Hale’s	  claim	  that	  the	  common	  law	  subsumes	  all	   diversity	   and	   difference	   into	   a	   single	   “legal	   ocean”	   is	   crucial	   to	   understanding	   how	  common	  law	  jurisdiction	  is	  conceived.	  If	  today	  we	  live	  in	  a	  time	  of	  proliferating	  jurisdictions	  then,	  as	  Peter	  Goodrich	  points	  out,	  then	  ‘the	  premodern	  is	  postmodern	  [and]	  the	  medieval	  is	  contemporary’.22	  The	  history	  of	   the	  common	  law	  charts	  a	  sustained	  effort	   to	  subsume	  and	  silence	  a	  plurality	  of	  legal	  discourses	  that	  lay	  at	  its	  foundations.	  The	  difficulty	  of	  thinking	  of	  jurisdiction	   as	   anything	   other	   than	   territorial	   is	   perhaps	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   this	   very	  strategy	  of	  subsumption.	  As	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  points	  out:	  Until	   the	   18th	   century…	   jurisdiction	   was	   predominantly	   organised	   by	   subject-­‐matter	   or	  personal	   status:	   ecclesiastical	   courts	   determined	  matters	   relating	   to	   church	   law,	  manorial	  courts	  applied	  the	  body	  of	  customary	  law	  known	  as	  manorial	  law,	  courts	  of	  stannary	  decided	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Sir	  Matthew	  Hale,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Common	  law	  of	  England	  [1713]	  (Charles	  Grey	  ed.	  1971),	  quoted	  in	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett,	  “Since	  Time	  Immemorial:	  A	  Story	  of	  Common	  law	  Jurisdiction,	  Native	  Title	  and	  the	  Case	  of	  Tanistry”	  Melbourne	  University	  Law	  Review	  	  26	  (2002),	  32.	  The	  reference	  to	  a	  legal	  “ocean”	  to	  which	  all	  subsidiary	  jurisdictions	  are	  part	  is	  noteworthy	  given	  Schmitt’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  sea	  is	  incapable	  of	  delimitation	  and	  therefore	  fundamentally	  lawless.	  Hale’s	  reference	  to	  the	  “ocean”	  emphasises	  an	  illimitable	  sense	  of	  law	  that	  exceeds	  any	  jurisdictional	  delimitation.	  This	  positing	  of	  an	  illimitable	  substrate	  of	  (common)	  law	  was	  central	  the	  early	  Common	  law’s	  subsequent	  dominance	  of	  the	  legal	  landscape	  of	  England.	  	  22	  Peter	  Goodrich,	  “Visive	  Powers:	  Colours,	  Trees	  and	  Genres	  of	  Jurisdiction,”	  Law	  and	  Humanities	  2	  (2008),	  227.	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issues	   relating	   to	   tin	   mining	   operations,	   and	   forestry	   courts	   oversaw	   the…	   law	   of	   the	  forest’.23	  In	  every	  case,	  the	  question	  of	  jurisdiction	  (that	  is,	  the	  question	  of	  which	  law	  or	  which	  court	  has	   the	   authority	   to	   hear	   a	   case)	   is	   not	   determined	   by	   one’s	   presence	   in	   a	   particular	  geographical	  spot	  but	  by	  the	  profession	  one	  leads,	  the	  status	  one	  has	  acquired	  or	  inherited,	  or	   the	   particular	   activity	   one	   has	   carried	   out.	   While	   certain	   anomalies	   remain,24	  the	  common	  law	  has	  worked	  to	  either	  jettison	  these	  jurisdictions	  all	  together	  or	  subsume	  them	  into	  a	  unified	  whole	  so	  they	  become	  different	  branches	  of	  a	  single	  tree.	  	  	  As	  Peter	  Goodrich	  has	  argued,	  a	  key	  strategy	  in	  fostering	  a	  critical	  approach	  to	  the	  law	  relies	  on	   an	   attentiveness	   to	   the	   “minor	   jurisprudences”	   of	   those	   jurisdictions	   that	   ‘escape	   the	  phantom	  of	   a	   sovereign	   and	  unitary	   law’.25	  Goodrich	  uncovers	   the	  historical	   residues	  of	   a	  time	  when	  jurisdictions	  were	  multiple	  and	  diverse	   in	  an	  effort	  to	  challenge	  and	  displace	  a	  sovereign,	  masculine	  and	  calculating	  conception	  of	  the	  legal	  order.26	  Critical	  legal	  studies	  on	  this	  reading	  seeks	  to	  recover	  the	  law’s	  conscience	  by	  examining	  its	  discarded	  jurisdictions:	  the	   “Courts	   of	   Love”	   in	   medieval	   France,	   the	   “courts	   of	   conscience”	   of	   the	   Ecclesiastical	  tradition	  and	   the	   implicit	   “jurisprudence”	  of	   literature	  and	  aesthetics	   in	   the	  history	  of	   the	  common	   law.	  The	  historical	  orientation	  of	  Goodrich’s	  studies,	  however,	   in	  no	  way	  suggest	  that	   these	  meta-­‐territorial	   jurisdictional	   techniques	  and	  effects	   remain	  anachronistic.	   In	   a	  recent	  critical	  introduction	  to	  jurisdiction,	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  and	  Shaun	  McVeigh	  note	  the	  various	  forms	  that	  jurisdiction	  takes	  and	  the	  variety	  of	  (legal)	  techniques	  that	  are	  deployed	  in	   its	   founding	   and	   maintenance.	   Throughout	   their	   work,	   Dorsett	   and	   McVeigh	   are	  concerned	   with	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   jurisdiction	   creates	   lawful	   relations.	   “Lawfulness”	  concerns	   the	  practice	  of	   living	  with	   the	   law	  and	  questions	  of	   lawful	   relations	   inquire	   into	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett,	  “‘Since	  Time	  Immemorial’:	  	  A	  Story	  of	  Common	  law	  Jurisdiction,	  Native	  Title	  and	  the	  Case	  of	  Tanistry”	  Melbourne	  University	  Law	  Review	  26	  (2002),	  	  34.	  24	  Until	  the	  Judicature	  Acts	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  Equity	  (administered	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Chancery)	  remained	  the	  most	  prominent	  jurisdiction	  other	  than	  the	  common	  law	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  Though	  a	  certain	  jurisdictional	  differentiation	  remains	  between	  equitable	  and	  common	  law	  doctrines,	  both	  bodies	  of	  the	  law	  are	  now	  administered	  in	  common	  law	  courts	  and	  by	  common	  law	  judges.	  However,	  alternative	  jurisdictions	  do	  remain.	  For	  example,	  even	  today	  Ecclesiastical	  Law	  remains	  a	  distinct	  jurisdiction	  alongside	  the	  common	  law	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  though	  with	  limited	  powers	  extending	  only	  to	  church	  buildings,	  certain	  offences	  by	  priests	  in	  relation	  to	  doctrine,	  ritual	  etcetera.	  See	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction,	  44-­‐45.	  25	  Peter	  Goodrich,	  Law	  in	  the	  Courts	  of	  Love:	  Literature	  and	  Other	  Minor	  Jurisprudences	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1996),	  2	  26	  See	  in	  particular,	  Goodrich,	  Law	  in	  the	  Courts	  of	  Love,	  1-­‐8	  and	  more	  generally	  see	  Goodrich,	  Yifat	  and	  Douzinas	  eds.	  Politics,	  Postmodernity	  and	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies:	  The	  Legality	  of	  the	  Contingent	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1994).	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how	   social,	   ethical	   and	   political	   relations	   are	   shaped	   by	   and	   through	   the	   law.27	  Crucial	   to	  Dorsett	   and	   McVeigh’s	   approach	   to	   jurisdiction	   is	   an	   emphasis	   on	   how	   the	   various	  techniques	   of	   jurisdiction	   –	   from	  mapping	   and	   cartography	   to	   the	   doctrine	   of	   precedent,	  from	  writing	   and	   legal	   dissemination	   to	   the	   classification	   of	   legal	   concepts	   like	   “tort”	   or	  “property”	  –	  all	  work	  to	  shape	  lawful	  relations	  and	  are	  thus	  instrumental	  in	  producing	  and	  maintaining	  a	  certain	  sense	  of	  legal	  subjectivity.	  Their	  work	  illustrates	  that	  the	  techniques	  of	   cartography	  associated	  with	   territorial	   jurisdiction	  are	  but	  part	  of	  a	  much	  broader	  and	  diverse	  set	  of	  technologies	  of	  jurisdiction.	  	  	  Dorsett	   and	   McVeigh’s	   approach	   to	   jurisdiction	   sits	   alongside	   a	   number	   of	   recent	  publications	   that	   interrupt	   the	   simple	   elision	   between	   jurisdiction	   and	   territory.28	  All	  suggest	  –	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  particular	  concerns	  –	  that	   jurisdiction	  has	  been	  for	  too	   long	  an	  overlooked	  category	  in	  jurisprudential	  thinking.	  Rather	  than	  dwell	  on	  technical	  exigencies,	  this	   literature	  conceives	   jurisdiction	  broadly	  as	  a	  set	  of	  practices	  and	  techniques	  that	  give	  voice	   to	   legal	   authority.	   Juris-­‐diction	   (ius-­‐dicere),	   after	   all,	   is	   “law’s	   speech”	   the	   oral	   and	  performative	   register	   of	   normativity.	   Following	   this	   literature,	   jurisdiction	   should	   be	  thought	  as	   the	  expressive	   register	  of	   the	   law	  and	  might	   include	   judgment;	  declarations	  of	  law	  or	   independence;	  procedural	  matters	  and	  ordering;	  or	  techniques	  that	  represent	   legal	  space	   such	   as	  mapping	   and	   cartography.	   Questions	   concerning	   a	   court’s	   competencies	   or	  the	   intricacies	   of	   conflict	   of	   laws	   analysis	   are	   given	  minimal	   attention.	  More	   fundamental	  issues	  are	  at	  stake.	  Jurisdiction	  is	  considered	  the	  first	  question	  of	  law	  and	  a	  privileged	  term	  in	  any	   theoretical	   account	  of	  normative	   systems	  and	  structures.	  Much	  of	   the	   literature,	   in	  fact,	   goes	   further	   than	   this,	   suggesting	   that	   by	   attending	   to	   jurisdictional	   techniques	   and	  practices	   a	   series	   of	   jurisprudential	   questions	   emerge	   that,	   rather	   than	   pursue	   a	   purely	  ontological	   inquiry	   into	   legal	   categories,	   assess	   how	   the	   law	   crafts	   and	  manipulates	   legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction,	  1-­‐9.	  28	  See	  in	  particular,	  Edward	  Mussawir,	  Jurisdiction	  in	  Deleuze:	  The	  Expression	  and	  Representation	  of	  
Law	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2011);	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  and	  Shaun	  McVeigh	  Jurisdiction	  (Abingdon:	  Routldege,	  2012);	  Bradin	  Cormack,	  A	  Power	  to	  do	  Justice:	  Jurisdiction,	  English	  Literature	  and	  the	  Rise	  
of	  the	  Common	  Law	  1509-­‐1625	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  2007);	  and	  Jurisprudence	  of	  
Jurisdiction,	  S.	  McVeigh	  ed.	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2007).	  These	  contributions,	  it	  should	  be	  noted,	  owe	  much	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Peter	  Goodrich	  and	  Pierre	  Legendre,	  most	  notably:	  P.	  Goodrich,	  Law	  in	  the	  
Courts	  of	  Love:	  Literature	  and	  Other	  Minor	  Jurisprudences	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1996)	  and	  P.	  Legendre,	  “The	  Judge	  Amongst	  the	  Interpreters:	  Psychoanalysis	  and	  Legal	  Judgment”	  in	  Law	  and	  the	  
Unconscious:	  A	  Legendre	  Reader,	  trans.	  P.	  Goodrich,	  A.	  Pottage	  and	  A.	  Schütz	  (New	  York:	  St	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1997),	  164-­‐210.	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personalities	  and	  concepts	   through	  artifice	  or	   technicity.	   In	   the	   following	  section	   I	  engage	  with	  some	  this	  literature	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  move	  towards	  a	  theory	  of	  jurisdiction.	  	  	  
1.2.3	  Towards	  a	  Theory	  of	  Jurisdiction	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  neither	  Foucault,	  Agamben	  nor	  Derrida	  –	  mainstays	  for	  contemporary	  legal	  thought	  on	  matters	  of	  sovereignty,	  power	  and	  authority	  –	  offers	  any	  sustained	  assessments	  of	   jurisdiction.	   This	   reluctance	   to	   deal	   with	   jurisdiction	   as	   a	   category	   in	   its	   own	   right,	  perhaps,	  signals	  a	  wider	  propensity	  to	  either	  elide	  jurisdiction	  with	  sovereignty,	  suggesting	  that	   jurisdiction	   simply	   describes	   the	  maintenance	   of	   sovereign	   control	   of	   a	   territory,	   or	  avoid	   the	  matter	   altogether,	   leaving	   jurisdiction	   in	   the	  hands	  of	   technicians	   and	  doctrinal	  scholars.29	  However,	  jurisdiction	  –	  which,	  in	  its	  barest	  formulation,	  names	  the	  authority	  to,	  and	  the	  effect	  of,	  speaking	  (in	  the	  name	  of)	  the	  law	  –	  goes	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  most	  important	  jurisprudential	   questions.	   An	   inquiry	   into	   jurisdiction	   might	   attune	   our	   ears	   to	   the	  multifarious	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  law	  controls	  its	  speech.	  	  	  In	   describing	   the	   English	   legal	   system	   to	   his	   host	   and	   master	   in	   the	   Country	   of	   the	  Houyhnhnms,	   Lemuel	   Gulliver	   offers	   the	   following	   example	   of	   jurisdictional	   control	   in	  action:	   If	  my	  Neighbour	  hath	  a	  mind	  to	  my	  Cow,	  he	  hires	  a	  Lawyer	  to	  prove	  that	  he	  ought	  to	  have	  my	  Cow	  from	  me.	  I	  must	  then	  hire	  another	  to	  defend	  my	  Right;	  it	  being	  against	  all	  Rules	  of	  Law	  
that	  any	  Man	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  speak	  for	  himself.30	  The	  law	  maintains	  a	  monopoly	  over	  its	  own	  speech,	  it	  guards	  this	  power	  carefully	  because	  it	  is	  a	  crucial	  means	  of	  the	  law’s	  self-­‐preservation.	  As	  Patrick	  Hanafin	  has	  suggested,	  the	  law’s	  ‘reductive	  violence’	   is	   achieved	   through	   its	   ability	   to	  ventriloquise	  on	  behalf	  of	   those	   that	  come	  before	  it.31	  In	  an	  assessment	  of	  Maurice	  Blanchot’s	  trial	   following	  his	   involvement	  in	  the	  movement	  against	  the	  French	  war	  in	  Algeria,	  Hanafin	  provides	  a	  striking	  example	  of	  one	  of	   many	   jurisdictional	   techniques	   used	   to	   install	   authority	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	   law.	   As	  procedure	   dictates	   in	   many	   civil	   jurisdictions,	   a	   magistrate	   takes	   a	   deposition	   from	   the	  accused	  and	  then	  renders	   this	   in	   the	  magistrate’s	  own	  words	   for	   the	  court	  record.	  During	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Cormack	  suggests	  that	  this	  reluctance	  stems	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  jurisdiction	  is	  viewed	  as	  being	  ‘already	  inside	  the	  discourse	  and	  technology	  that	  critical	  genealogy	  means	  to	  counter’	  (Cormack,	  A	  
Power	  to	  Do	  Justice,	  7).	  	  30	  Jonathan	  Swift,	  Gulliver’s	  Travels	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  231,	  my	  emphasis.	  31	  Patrick	  Hanafin,	  “The	  Writer’s	  Refusal	  and	  the	  Law’s	  Malady”	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Society	  31(1)	  (2004),	  6.	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his	  hearing,	  Blanchot	  refused	  to	  allow	  this	  recapitulation	  to	  take	  place.	  As	  Blanchot	  queries,	  ‘why	  is	  it	  that	  the	  judge	  has	  the	  right	  to	  be	  the	  sole	  master	  of	  language,	  dictating	  (in	  what	  is	  already	  a	  diktat)	  the	  words	  of	  another,	  as	  seem	  appropriate	  to	  him’?32	  Blanchot’s	  refusal	  to	  have	   his	   speech	   controlled	   by	   the	   law	   manifests	   as	   a	   direct	   challenge	   to	   the	   court’s	  authority;	  he	   challenges	  what	  Swifts	   intimates	   is	   the	   law’s	  univocal	  nature.	  Blanchot	  both	  exposes	  and	  attacks	   the	  expressive	   limits	  of	   the	   law.	  The	   law	  maintains	   itself	   through	   the	  denial	   of	   the	   other’s	   speech,	  who	  speaks	   and	  how	   they	   speak	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   law	   –	  the	  magistrate	  warns	  Blanchot,	   ‘there	  are	   things	   that	  you	  do	  not	   say	  here’33	  –	  is	   crucial	   to	   the	  crafting	  of	  law’s	  authority.	  In	  understanding	  how	  these	  questions	  of	  lawful	  speech	  shape	  the	  law	  and	  lawful	  relations,	  three	  recent	  studies	  of	  jurisdiction	  deserve	  particular	  attention.	  A	  brief	   assessment	   of	   their	   approaches	   allows	   us	   to	   situate	   the	   present	   contribution	   in	   the	  existing	  literature.	  	  	  The	   first	   is	   Shaun	  McVeigh’s	   edited	   collection	   Jurisprudence	  of	   Jurisdiction.	   This	   project	   is	  primarily	   concerned	   to	   turn	   the	   attention	   of	   critical	   jurisprudence	   to	   the	   category	   of	  jurisdiction.	  Assessing	  philosophical,	  political	  and	  technological	  aspects	  to	   jurisdiction,	   the	  collected	   essays	   deploy	   a	   variety	   of	   theoretical	   strategies	   to	   develop	   a	   jurisprudential	  reading	  of	  jurisdiction.	  As	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  project	  –	  along	  with	  McVeigh’s	  later	  work	  with	   Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	   –	  makes	   clear,	  McVeigh	   is	   particularly	   interested	   in	   the	  way	   that	  jurisdictional	   practices	   and	   orderings	   shape	   the	   conduct	   of	   those	  who	   appear	   before	   the	  law.	  Jurisdiction,	  for	  McVeigh,	  is	  not	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  pronouncing	  that	  there	  is	  law	  or	  giving	  effect	  to	  certain	  legally	  sanctioned	  orders,	  jurisdiction	  is	  the	  legal	  device	  par	  excellence	  that	  shapes	   our	   decorum	   and	   comportment	   before	   the	   law,	   as	   both	   the	   Swift	   quotation	   and	  Hanafin’s	  assessment	  of	  Blanchot’s	  courtroom	  antics	  makes	  clear.	  McVeigh	  suggests	  that	  the	  project	   is	   ‘not	  so	  much	  a	  critique	  of	   the	   form	  of	   law,	  but	  an	   investigation	  of	   the	  modes	  or	  manners	  of	  coming	  into	  law	  and	  of	  being	  with	  law’.34	  In	  this	  sense,	  jurisdiction	  is	  thought	  as	  a	  practice	  that	  shapes	  our	  responsibility,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  ethical	  responses,	   to	  the	  law.	  We	  should	  read	  McVeigh’s	  focus	  on	  the	  “ethical”	  as	  having	  the	  dual	  sense	  of	  both	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  “Pre-­‐texte:	  Pour	  L’Amite”	  in	  A	  la	  Recherche	  d’un	  communisme	  de	  Pensée,	  ed.	  D	  Mascolo	  (1993)	  quoted	  in	  Patrick	  Hanafin,	  “The	  Writer’s	  Refusal	  and	  the	  Law’s	  Malady”	  Journal	  of	  
Law	  and	  Society	  31(1)	  (2004),	  5.	  	  33	  Patrick	  Hanafin,	  “The	  Writer’s	  Refusal	  and	  the	  Law’s	  Malady”	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Society	  31(1)	  	  (2004),	  5.	  34	  McVeigh	  ed,	  Jurisprudence	  of	  Jurisdiction,	  ix.	  On	  the	  question	  of	  jurisdiction	  and	  responsibility	  and	  conduct	  see	  also,	  S.	  Dorsett	  and	  S.	  McVeigh	  “Conduct	  of	  Laws:	  Native	  Title,	  Responsibility	  and	  Some	  Limits	  of	  Jurisdictional	  Thinking,”	  Melbourne	  Law	  Review	  36(2)	  (2012),	  470.	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set	  of	  moral	  maxims	  concerning	  the	  law’s	  conduct	  and	  an	  ethos	  or	  “dwelling	  with”	  the	  law.	  The	   law,	   in	   this	   account,	   is	   an	   intrinsic	   part	   of	   social	   life	   not	   simply	   and	   instrument	   for	  administrative	  control.	  Acknowledging	  the	  power	  that	  jurisdiction	  has	  beyond	  the	  shaping	  of	   territorial	   borders,	   McVeigh	   presents	   jurisdiction	   as	   a	   craft	   that	   produces	   certain	  relations,	   responsibilities	   and	   allegiances	   to	   the	   law.	   Underlying	   McVeigh’s	   work	   is	   a	  marked	  sense	  of	   responsibility	   to	  and	   for	   the	   law,	  particularly	  pointed	   in	  his	  evocation	  of	  the	  “office”	  of	  the	  jurisprudent	  and	  jurist.35	  For	  McVeigh,	  that	  we	  have	  a	  relation	  to	  law	  is	  a	  given:	  we	   are	   lawful	   beings,	   always	   already	   shaped	   by	   and	   shaping	   lawful	   relations.	   The	  concern	  that	  drives	  his	  work,	  then,	  is	  an	  acute	  sense	  of	  the	  responsibility	  to	  which	  anyone	  engaged	   in	   legal	   scholarship	   and	   practice	  must	   answer.	   Though	   conducted	   in	   a	   different	  register,	   this	   thesis	   follows	   McVeigh’s	   ethico-­‐political	   orientation	   to	   the	   study	   of	  jurisdiction.	  The	  question	  of	  ethico-­‐political	  responsibility	  is	  specifically	  tackled	  in	  chapter	  three	  but	  the	  thesis	  more	  generally	   is	  marked	  by	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  to	  and	  for	  the	  law,	  aspiring	  to	  what	  Derrida	  calls	  a	  “lesser	  violence”	  of	  the	  law.	  As	  will	  become	  clear,	  the	  project	   too	  follows	  McVeigh’s	  understanding	  of	   the	  primary	  role	  of	  a	  certain	  nomos	  or	  “lawfulness”	  to	  human	  relations.	  	  	  Second	   is	   Edward	   Mussawir’s	   study	   Jurisdiction	   in	   Deleuze:	   The	   Expression	   and	  
Representation	  of	  Law.	  Whilst	  the	  Deleuzian	  bent	  to	  his	  study	  is	  of	  limited	  interested	  to	  the	  present	   project,	   Mussawir’s	   insistence	   on	   the	   expressive	   dimension	   to	   jurisdiction	   is	  noteworthy.	   Key	   to	   Mussawir’s	   project	   is	   the	   Deleuzian	   distinction	   between	  “representation”	  and	  “expression.”	  Put	  simply,	  Deleuze	  (following	  Nietzsche)	  suggests	  that	  philosophy	   has	   unduly	   focused	   the	   question	   of	   “what	   is	   x?”	   that	   inquires	   exclusively	   into	  matters	  of	  representation.	  Displacing	  this	  privileged	  form,	  Deleuze	  asks	  questions	  of	  “who?”	  and	  “how?”	  focusing	  instead	  on	  matters	  of	  expression.	  Mussawir	  argues	  that	  an	  examination	  of	   jurisdiction	   likewise	   privileges	   techniques,	   practices	   and	   effects	   (i.e.	   matters	   of	  expression)	   rather	   than	   abstract	   or	   essentialist	   notions	   (i.e.	  matters	   of	   representation).36	  This	   orientation	   is	   helpful	   for	   at	   least	   two	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   by	   emphasising	   the	   law’s	  expressive	   dimension,	   Mussawir	   opens	   an	   inquiry	   into	   jurisdiction	   to	   a	   plurality	   of	  theoretical	  traditions	  and	  concerns	  from	  the	  performative	  to	  the	  narrational,	   the	  aesthetic	  to	   the	   political.	   The	   pressing	   question	   becomes	   how	   does	   law	   express	   itself?	  or	   how	   does	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Shaun	  McVeigh,	  “Law	  as	  (More	  or	  Less)	  Itself:	  On	  Some	  Not	  Very	  Reflective	  Elements	  of	  Law”	  Irvine	  
Law	  Review	  (forthcoming,	  2014)	  and	  S,	  Dorsett	  and	  S.	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction,	  139-­‐141.	  	  36	  Mussawir,	  Jurisdiction	  in	  Deleuze,	  8-­‐10;	  21-­‐23	  et	  passim.	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jurisdiction	  express	   lawfulness?	   Rather	   than	  what	   is	   law?	   or	  what	   is	   jurisdiction?	   Secondly,	  this	   focus	   on	   the	   expressive	   register	   encourages	   a	   technological	   as	  well	   as	   an	   ontological	  inquiry	  into	  jurisdiction.	  In	  addition	  to	  offering	  a	  theory	  of	   jurisdiction,	  Mussawir	  reminds	  us	  that	  jurisdiction	  names	  a	  variety	  of	  practices,	  techniques	  and	  encounters.	  	  	  Last	  is	  Bradin	  Cormack’s	  A	  Power	  to	  Do	  Justice:	  Jurisdiction,	  English	  Literature	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  
the	  Common	  Law	  1509-­‐1625.	  Cormack’s	  expansive	  study	  privileges	   jurisdiction	  as	  a	  cipher	  by	   which	   the	   ideological	   and	   literary	   preoccupations	   during	   England’s	   early-­‐modern	  consolidation	   of	   the	   common	   law	  might	   be	   understood.	   The	   project	   is	   predominantly	   an	  historical	   study	   that	   offers	   close	   readings	   of	   both	   literary	   and	   legal	   texts	   to	   examine	   the	  relation	   between	   power	   and	   sovereignty.	   Key	   to	   Cormack’s	   intervention	   is	   a	   desire	   to	  articulate	  a	  deep	  sympathy	  between	  law	  and	  literature.	  Particularly,	  he	  assesses	  the	  ways	  in	  which	   jurisdictional	  orderings	  and	  practices	   reveal	   the	   law’s	   improvisational	   and	  creative	  streak,	   as	  well	   as	   underlining	   the	   provisional	   nature	   of	   any	   claim	   to	  mark	   the	   legal	   limit.	  This	  insight	  is	  refracted	  through	  a	  variety	  of	  literary	  texts	  that	  question	  the	  nature	  of	  both	  political	  and	   literary	  authority	  and	  authorship.	  As	  Cormack	  puts	   it,	  he	  seeks	   to	   ‘reveal	   the	  jurisdictional	  limit	  at	  law	  as	  a	  place	  where	  legal	  doctrine	  is	  sufficiently	  destabilized	  [sic]	  to	  allow	  us	   to	   see	   the	   two	  discourses,	   law	  and	   literature,	  as	  pertaining	   to	  a	   single	  order	  and	  practice	   of	   imaginative	   thought’.37	  Cormack’s	   project	   engages	   literary,	   legal,	   cultural	   and	  historical	   analysis	   and	   is	   worth	   serious	   consideration	   in	   all	   of	   these	   fields.	   However,	   the	  central	   insight	   of	   the	   book	   is	   of	   key	   importance	   to	   the	   concerns	   of	   the	   present	   thesis.	   By	  assessing	  the	  deep	  connection	  between	  the	  creative	  practice	  of	  literature	  with	  the	  (creative)	  practice	  of	  law,	  Cormack	  underscores	  not	  only	  a	  contingency	  to	  the	  law’s	  limit	  but	  also	  the	  creative	   potential	   within	   the	   form	   of	   jurisdiction	   itself.	   This	   theme	   is	   explored	   most	  thoroughly	  in	  relation	  to	  juriswriting	  in	  the	  final	  chapter.	  	  Cormack’s	  work	  provides	  a	  second	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  theoretical	  commitments	  of	   the	   thesis.	  Recall	   both	  Blanchot	   and	  Swift’s	   assessment	  of	   the	   law’s	   self-­‐reflexive	   logic:	  the	  law	  denies	  the	  other’s	  speech,	  ensuring	  that	  the	  law	  only	  speaks	  to	  itself.	  In	  this	  sense,	  jurisdiction	   is	   a	   performative	   technique	   of	   the	   law’s	   self-­‐preservation,	   a	   comforting	   voice	  that	   reflects	   the	   law’s	   sovereign	   authority	   back	   to	   itself.	   In	   perhaps	   the	  most	   convincing	  elaboration	   of	   this	   jurisdictional	   logic,	   Cormack	   draws	   on	   the	  work	   of	  medieval	   historian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Cormack,	  A	  Power	  to	  Do	  Justice,	  39.	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Pietro	  Costa	  to	  illustrate	  how	  jurisdiction	  works	  to	  create	  juridical	  power.38	  Costa	  describes	  jurisdiction	   as	   the	   process	   by	   which	   an	   informal	   given	   normative	   architecture	   becomes	  formalised.	  Jurisdiction	  is	  a	  technique	  of	  mirroring	  which	  both	  functions	  to	  create	  law	  as	  a	  formal	  system	  of	  rights	  and	  reflect	  a	  pre-­‐existing,	  but	  as	  yet,	  informal	  system	  of	  normativity	  or	   equity.	   Jurisdiction	   is	   both	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   juridical	   ground	   and	   the	   reflection	   of	   a	  juridical	  given.	  As	  Cormack	  puts	  it:	  Jurisdiction	  is	  the	  principle,	  integral	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  law,	  through	  which	  the	  law,	  as	  an	  expression	   of	   its	   order	   and	   limits,	   projects	   an	   authority	   that,	   whatever	   its	   origin,	   needs	  functionally	  no	  other	  ground.	  At	  the	  jurisdictional	  threshold,	  the	  law	  speaks	  to	  itself,	  and	  in	  a	  mirror	  reproduces	  as	  administration	  the	  juridical	  order	  that	  it	  simultaneously	  produces.39	  Jurisdiction’s	  efficacy,	  on	  this	  reading,	  depends	  on	  a	  constitutive	  undecidiability	  between	  a	  creative	  process	   that	   fashions	   formal	   legality	   and	   the	   reproduction	  or	   reflection	  of	   extant	  informal	  practices.	  	  	  The	   etymology	   helps	   on	   this	   point.	   Jurisdiction	   is	   the	   speaking	   of	   ius	   not	   lex.	   Ius	   refers	  precisely	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  unwritten	  normative	  structure.	  As	  Peter	  Goodrich	  suggests,	  ius	  has	  the	  virtue	   of	   having	   already	   been	   said,	   a	   law	   already	   known	   and	   established	   and	   implies	   an	  archaeological	   layer	   of	   communal	   knowledge	   and	   understanding.40	  Ius	   is	   also	   closely	  connected	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  “law”	  as	  a	  body	  of	  norms	  or	  a	  legal	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  rather	  than	  specific	  substantive	  laws	  contained	  in	  statute	  and	  so	  evokes	  law	  in	  the	  general	  rather	  than	  the	  particular.41	  Ius	   refers	   to	   a	   kind	  of	   informal,	   customary	  normative	   architecture	   that	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  See	  Pietro	  Costa,	  Iurisdictio:	  Semantica	  del	  Potere	  Politico	  nel	  Pubblicistica	  Medievale	  (1100-­‐1433)	  (Milan:	  Giuffrè,	  2002).	  39	  Cormack,	  A	  Power	  to	  Do	  Justice,	  9.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  Cormack	  positions	  his	  theoretical	  approach	  against	  the	  thinking	  –	  most	  commonly	  associated	  with	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  –	  that	  posits	  a	  trenchant	  connection	  between	  law	  and	  sovereignty.	  Cormack	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  the	  work	  of	  jurisdiction	  (conforming	  to	  the	  logic	  noted	  above)	  that	  works	  to	  enfold	  the	  zone	  of	  indistinction	  into	  the	  juridical	  order	  and	  allow	  it	  to	  appear	  as	  sovereign.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Cormack	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  within	  law	  that	  we	  can	  find	  something	  of	  the	  dynamism	  and	  political	  ebullience	  that	  Agamben	  situates	  only	  in	  “life”	  beyond	  law.	  Key	  too	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  jurisdiction	  displaces	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  sovereignty	  suggesting	  that	  sovereignty	  is	  itself	  less	  stable	  than	  even	  Agamben’s	  sophisticated	  account	  credits.	  See	  Cormack,	  A	  Power	  to	  Do	  Justice,	  5-­‐10.	  On	  Agamben’s	  “zone	  of	  indistinction”	  and	  the	  logic	  of	  sovereignty	  see,	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  State	  of	  Exception	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  1-­‐31.	  40	  Peter	  Goodrich,	  “Visive	  powers:	  Colours,	  Trees	  and	  Genres	  of	  Jurisdiction,”	  Law	  and	  Humanities	  2	  (2008),	  218.	  41	  Alain	  Supoit,	  Homo	  Juridicus:	  On	  the	  Anthropological	  Function	  of	  Law,	  trans.	  Saskia	  Brown	  (London:	  Verso,	  2007),	  41.	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commonly	   known	   and	   understood	   by	   a	   particular	   community	   or	   collective.42	  Lex,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  is	  generally	  considered	  to	  have	  its	  root	  in	  legere,	  “to	  read”	  and	  so	  is	  associated	  with	   written	   and	   substantive	   law.43	  Lex	   is	   tied	   to	   power	   over	   a	   particular	   community,	  enacted	   and	   written	   either	   by	   the	   community	   itself	   or	   by	   some	   higher	   metaphysical	  authority.	  The	  force	  of	  ius	  being	  spoken	  or	  declared	  is	  to	  transform	  ius	  into	  formal,	  positive	  law.	   The	   speaking	   of	   the	   law,	   the	   announcement	   of	   jurisdiction,	   makes	   present	   the	   legal	  limit	   and	  makes	   the	   unwritten	   informal	   “normative”	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   visible	   and	  “readable”.	   Jurisdiction,	   then,	  straddles	   lex	  and	   ius,	   jurisdiction	  declares	   law	  –	  that	   is,	   fixes	  law	  and	  makes	   it	   readable	  –	  but	   jurisdiction	  also	  names	   the	  discovery	  or	   revelation	  of	  an	  extant	   category	  or	   register	  of	   legality.	   Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	   is	  particularly	  helpful	  on	   this	  point	  suggesting	   that	   in	   dicere	   (the	   diction	   of	   jurisdiction)	   there	   is	   not	   only	   the	   inference	   of	  “saying”	  but	  also	  of	  “showing,”	  “fixing”	  or	  “determining.”	  Nancy	  suggests,	  then,	  that	  dicere	  is	  itself	   constitutively	   juridical:	   fixing	   and	   determining	   are	   all	   necessary	   aspects	   of	   legal	  judgment. 44 	  There	   is	   then	   an	   indeterminacy	   in	   relation	   to	   jurisdiction,	   following	   its	  etymology	   we	   can	   characterise	   it	   as	   appearing	   between	   two	   lawful	   registers,	   both	  grounding	  and	  reflecting	  law.	  	  	  In	  highlighting	  the	  care	  taken	  by	  the	  law	  to	  guard	  its	  own	  speech,	  Blanchot	  takes	  us	  to	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  this	  jurisdictional	  logic.	  His	  refusal	  to	  allow	  the	  magistrate	  to	  speak	  for	  him	  is	  so	  subversive	  because	  it	  interrupts	  the	  economy	  that	  maintains	  the	  law’s	  authority.	  It	  is	  the	  productive	  relation	  between	  the	  performative	  self-­‐grounding	  announcement	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	   given	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   for	   formal	   juridical	   activity	   that	   guarantees	   the	   law’s	  authority.	  Such	  a	  privileging	  of	   jurisdiction	   ‘helps	  counter	   the	  almost	   irresistible	   tendency	  to	  make	  sovereignty	  have	  meaning	  only	  as	  political	  theology’45	  by	  moving	  the	  conversation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  For	  a	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  ius,	  particularly	  in	  early	  Roman	  law,	  see	  Peter	  Stein,	  Regulae	  Iuris:	  
From	  Juristic	  Rules	  to	  Legal	  Maxims	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  1966),	  3-­‐25.	  As	  Stein	  makes	  clear	  ius	  is	  generally	  considered	  to	  be	  unwritten	  and	  tied	  to	  a	  community’s	  shared	  but	  largely	  informal	  sense	  of	  normativity.	  Ius	  names	  both	  this	  communal	  law	  itself	  and	  its	  proper	  discovery	  or	  revelation.	  Importantly,	  ius	  is	  considered	  to	  not	  be	  created	  but	  found.	  Ius,	  in	  Roman	  law	  at	  least,	  is	  a-­‐temporal	  and	  unchanging,	  connected	  to	  the	  divine	  or	  natural	  order	  of	  things.	  	  43	  As	  Stein	  observes,	  there	  are	  three	  possible	  derivations	  of	  lex:	  (i)	  from	  ligare	  meaning	  “that	  which	  binds	  or	  ties;”	  (ii)	  from	  lagh	  meaning	  “that	  which	  lies;”	  or	  from	  legere,	  “to	  read	  out	  or	  declare.”	  Stein	  favours	  the	  latter	  definition	  and	  as	  noted	  above,	  the	  notion	  that	  jurisdiction	  fixes	  or	  determines	  ius	  suggests	  that	  jurisdiction	  has	  an	  undecidable	  relation	  between	  lex	  and	  ius:	  jurisdiction	  seeks	  to	  reflect	  law	  qua	  ius	  and	  fix	  law	  qua	  lex.	  See	  Stein,	  Regulae	  Iuris,	  9.	  	  44	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  “Lapsus	  Judicii”	  in	  A	  Finite	  Thinking,	  ed	  Simon	  Sparks	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  154.	  45	  Cormack,	  A	  Power	  to	  Do	  Justice,	  9.	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away	   from	   an	   inquiry	   into	   origins	   towards	   an	   assessment	   of	   the	   practices	   that	   relate	   the	  juridical	  ground	  to	  the	  juridical	  given.	  As	  Blanchot’s	  courtroom	  intervention	  reminds	  us,	  this	  juridical	  given	  is	  always	  open	  to	  contestation	  and	  political	  dispute.	  The	  claim	  to	  ground	  law	  in	   a	   jurisdictional	   act	   or	   technique	   (such	   as	   marshalling	   the	   speech	   of	   those	   in	   the	  courtroom)	  is	  radically	  contingent:	  it	  is	  the	  positive	  law	  itself	  that	  determines	  the	  particular	  set	  of	  juridical	  preconditions	  to	  which	  it	  chooses	  to	  give	  voice.	  	  	  Like	  Janus	  –	  the	  Roman	  god	  of	  beginnings,	  transitions	  and	  thresholds	  –	  jurisdiction	  is	  two-­‐faced.	   It	  names,	  on	   the	  one	  hand,	   a	   sovereign	  declaration	   that	   law	   is	   law,	  proclaiming	   the	  legal	   limit,	   fixing,	   cutting	   and	   dividing	   law	   form	   non-­‐law.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   names	   a	  process	   of	   reflecting	   an	   extant	   underlying	   but	   informal	   “legal”	   reality.46	  There	   is,	   then,	   an	  openness	  within	  jurisdiction,	  its	  declaration	  of	  law	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  sovereign	  fiat	  or	  official	  order	  but	   engages	   a	  prior	   category	  of	   ius.	   It	   is	  here	   that	  we	   can	   see	   a	  more	   sophisticated	  understanding	   of	   jurisdiction	   than	   the	   territorial	   or	   “bright	   line	   theory”	   credits.	  Jurisdiction’s	  very	  function	  is	  seen	  to	  engage	  and	  reflect	  an	  existing	  informal	  architecture	  of	  relations.	   This,	   in	   turn,	   implies	   that,	   through	   our	   understanding	   of	   this	   prior	   sociality	  we	  might	   formulate	   or	   articulate	   jurisdiction	   otherwise	   by	   recalibrating	   its	   relation	   between	  the	  law	  that	  it	  declares	  and	  the	  law	  that	  it	  reflects.	  Key	  to	  such	  a	  recalibration	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  can	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  law	  beyond	  the	  juridical	  because	  it	  is	  here	  that	  we	  might	  reanimate	  the	  sense	  of	  ius	  that	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  jurisdictional	  moment.	  Through	  a	  study	  of	  jurisdiction,	  then,	  we	  might	  counter	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  encroaching	  juridification	  of	  social	  and	  political	  life	  has	  obscured	  –	  what	  Stone	  et	  al	  describe	  as	  –	  the	  sense	  of	  law	  as	  nomos	  or	  
jus,	   law	   conceived	   as	   ‘a	   social	   bond	   or	   a	   command	   to	   justice’. 47 	  The	   re-­‐working	   of	  jurisdiction	  undertaken	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	  part	  of	  an	  effort	   to	   resist	   this	   juridification	  where	  “law”	   comes	   to	   signify	   nothing	   but	   the	   operations	   and	  manoeuvrings	  within	   courtrooms,	  chambers	  and	  solicitors’	  offices.	  Law	  should	  not	  be	  left	  to	  these	  legal	  technocrats	  alone,	  law	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  the	  theoretical	  account	  of	  jurisdiction	  I	  pursue	  is	  clearly	  at	  odds	  with	  a	  positivist	  account.	  In	  Cover’s	  assessment	  of	  jurisdiction,	  he	  suggests	  that	  judicial	  authority	  is	  ultimately	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  the	  court.	  Cover	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  ‘natural	  law	  of	  jurisdiction	  that	  might	  supplant	  the	  positivist	  version’	  he	  points	  to,	  but	  does	  not	  develop,	  this	  idea	  further.	  The	  contention	  that	  jurisdiction	  relies	  on	  some	  prior	  but	  informal	  set	  of	  obligations	  has	  certain	  resonances	  with	  the	  natural	  law	  account	  towards	  which	  Cover	  gestures.	  However,	  as	  will	  become	  clear	  below	  the	  deconstructive	  strategies	  that	  animate	  this	  project	  work	  to	  displace	  the	  “natural	  law	  /	  positivism”	  distinction,	  opening	  the	  law	  to	  a	  beyond	  of	  these	  either/or	  categories.	  On	  positivist	  jurisdiction	  see	  Robert	  Cover,	  “Nomos	  and	  Narrative,”	  53-­‐60.	  47	  Matthew	  Stone,	  Illan	  rua	  Wall	  and	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  “Law,	  Politics	  and	  the	  Political”	  in	  New	  Critical	  
Legal	  Thinking:	  Law	  and	  the	  Political,	  Stone,	  Wall	  and	  Douzinas	  eds.,	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  2.	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is	  also	  that	  which	  is	  produced	  from	  the	  bottom	  up,	  so	  to	  speak,	  by	  the	  creativity	  of	  people	  coming	   together,	   it	   is	   the	   sharing	   out	   of	   common	   life.	   In	   order	   to	   develop	   this	   sense	   of	  jurisdiction	   as	   having	   an	   intimate	   relation	   with	   a	   prior	   movement	   of	   “law,”	   I	   turn	   to	  deconstructive	  accounts	  of	   legality	  because	   it	   is	   through	  this	   that	  we	  might	  reimagine	  our	  
ius	  commune.	  	  	  
1.3	  Deconstruction	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  my	  engagement	  with	  Derrida	  represents	  a	  second	  strand	  to	  the	  argument	   in	   the	   thesis.	   I	  pursue,	  what	  can	  be	   loosely	  described	  as,	  a	   “political”	   reading	  of	  Derrida’s	  thinking	  by	  moving	  away	  from	  the	  (loosely)	  “ethical”	  readings	  of	  deconstruction	  and	   law	   that	   dominates	   much	   of	   the	   existing	   approach.	   The	   politics	   at	   stake	   in	  deconstruction	   are	   key	   to	   how	   jurisdiction	   is	   re-­‐cast	   as	   “juriswriting”	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  thesis.	  Before	  assessing	  the	  deconstructive	  approach	  to	  law,	  as	  well	  as	  setting	  out	  how	  my	  understanding	   of	   the	   law/deconstruction	   nexus	   develops	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	  jurisdiction,	   I	   want	   to	   put	   this	   material	   in	   some	   context,	   outlining	   some	   of	   the	  deconstructive	  strategies	  and	  approaches	  that	  animate	  my	  understanding	  of	  jurisdiction.	  	  	  
1.3.1	  What	  is	  deconstruction?	  Given	   that	  deconstruction	  disturbs	   the	  very	  notion	  of	  stable	  concepts	  and	  categorisations,	  risking	   a	   definition	   is	   something	   of	   a	   fool’s	   errand.48	  Throughout	   his	   work	   Derrida	   has	  sought	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   concepts	   are	   unstable,	   how	   strict	   determinations	   are	   always	  partial	  and	  how	  definitional	  borders	  and	  distinctions	  are	  porous.	  An	  added	  difficulty	  is	  that	  the	  term	  “deconstruction”	  has	  taken	  on	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own	  far	  beyond	  the	  rather	  limited	  sense	  first	  attributed	  to	  it	  in	  Of	  Grammatology.	  Originally	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  Heidegger’s	  Destruktion	  (or	  Abbau)	  of	  metaphysics,49	  Derrida’s	  “de-­‐construction”	  has	  come	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  particular	  style	   and	   approach	   associated	   with	   Derrida’s	   philosophy	   in	   a	   number	   of	   fields	   and	  disciplines,	  most	  prominently	  in	  literary	  criticism.	  In	  this	  sense,	  “deconstruction”	  refers	  to	  a	  style	   of	   critique	   and	   textual	   analysis	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   specific	   philosophical	   strategy	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  For	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  difficulties	  see:	  Nicholas	  Royle,	  “What	  is	  Deconstruction”	  in	  Deconstructions:	  A	  
User’s	  Guide	  (London:	  Palgrave,	  2000),	  1-­‐13	  and	  Geoffrey	  Bennington	  “Deconstruction	  is	  not	  what	  you	  think,”	  Art	  and	  Design,	  4	  (3/4)	  (1988),	  6-­‐7.	  49	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Of	  Grammatology,	  trans.	  Gayatri	  Spivak,	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  Uniervsity	  Press,	  1997),	  10.	  Interestingly,	  the	  term’s	  first	  usage	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  analogous	  to	  “de-­‐sedimentation”	  emphasising	  the	  relevance	  of	  a	  genealogical	  method	  to	  deconstruction.	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mode	   of	   thinking.	   As	   Derrida	   remarks,	   deconstruction	   is	   ‘an	   ugly	   and	   difficult	   word’.50	  Whilst	  avoiding	  a	  definition,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  important	  to	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  I	  see	  to	  be	  the	   key	   strategies	   in	   Derrida’s	   work,	   especially	   those	   relevant	   for	   legal	   studies,	   before	  discussing	  how	  this	  thinking	  might	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  theory	  of	  jurisdiction	  outlined	  above.	  	  	  In	  the	  film	  Derrida,	  directed	  by	  Kirby	  Dick	  and	  Amy	  Kofman,	  Derrida	  responds	  to	  a	  question	  about	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  term	  deconstruction.	  The	  way	  he	  addresses	  this	  question	  reveals	  a	  number	  of	  his	  overriding	  concerns	  and,	  in	  a	  typically	  performative	  mode,	  manages	  to	  show	  something	   of	   deconstruction	   –	  or	   a	   deconstructive	   attitude	   –	  that	   a	   definitional	   approach	  might	  well	  fail	  to	  capture.	  He	  says:	  	  Before	   I	   answer	   your	   question	   I	   would	   like	   to	   make	   a	   preliminary	   remark	   on	   the	   totally	  artificial	  character	  of	  this	  situation.	  I	  don’t	  know	  who	  is	  going	  to	  be	  watching	  this	  film	  but	  I	  would	  like	  to	  underline	  rather	  than	  efface	  our	  current	  technological	  circumstances	  and	  not	  feign	  a	  naturalness	  that	  does	  not	  exist.	  I	  have	  already	  started	  to	  answer	  your	  question	  about	  deconstruction	   because	   one	   of	   the	   gestures	   of	   deconstruction	   consists,	   particularly,	   in	   not	  naturalising	   what	   is	   not	   natural,	   to	   not	   assume	   that	   what	   is	   conditioned	   by	   history,	   by	  technologies,	  by	  institutions	  or	  by	  society	  is	  a	  natural	  given.51	  	  One	  of	   the	  key	  assertions	  here	   is	   that	  a	  complex	  matrix	  of	   influences	  (history,	   technology,	  society	   etcetera)	   condition	   one’s	   position	   and	   these	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   should	   be	  underscored	   and	   examined	   rather	   than	   dismissed	   as	   “naturally”	   arising.	   In	   this	   sense	  deconstruction	  is	  partly	  genealogical	  and	  is	  concerned	  to	  unearth	  the	  layers	  of	  thinking	  that	  construct	   concepts,	   institutions	   and	   practices.	   Connected	   to	   this	   is	   a	   deep	   sense	   of	  responsibility	   for	   those	   things	   that	   shape	  our	  present	  views	  of,	   and	  capacity	   to	  act,	   in	   the	  world.	   In	   this	   sense,	  Derrida’s	  writing	  has	   an	   acute	   awareness	   of	  what	  comes	  before.	   This	  
before,	  works	  as	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  particular	  issue	  at	  hand.	  Also	  evident	  in	  this	  brief	  excerpt	  –	  and	  connected	  to	  the	  concern	  to	  account	  for	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  –	  is	  Derrida’s	   discomfort	   with	   origins.	   In	   the	   passage	   quoted	   Derrida	   constructs	   a	   strange	  temporal	  logic	  that	  troubles	  the	  stability	  of	  an	  originary	  starting	  point.	  He	  begins	  his	  answer	  by	  not	  beginning:	  he	  says	   ‘before	   I	  answer	  your	  question…’	  and	   then	  midway	   through	  his	  ‘preliminary	   remarks’	   he	   tells	   us	   that	   he	   has	   already	   begun	   to	   answer	   the	   question.	   That	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  “Interview	  with	  Alan	  Montefiore”	  (Oxford	  Amnesty	  Lectures,	  13	  February	  1992).	  Broadcast	  by	  Channel	  4.	  51	  Derrida	  (2002),	  Zeitgeist	  Films,	  translation	  modified.	  	  
	   34	  
which	  appears	  peripheral	  and	  precursory	   is	   in	   fact	  central	  and	  significant.	  When,	   then,	  do	  we	   say	   that	   his	   answer	   began?	   The	   question	   of	   the	   origin	  must	   remain	   ambivalent:	   that	  which	  appears	  present	  or	  original	  is	  never	  present	  or	  original	  as	  such	  but	  is	  dependent	  on,	  not	   only	   a	   prior	   movement	   of	   possibility	   but	   also,	   the	   possibility	   of	   retrospective	  construction	  and	  determination.	  	  	  The	  distrust	  of	  the	  origin	  shown	  in	  his	  answer	  prompts	  a	  wider	  questioning	  of	  foundations	  or	  grounds	  that	  runs	  throughout	  Derrida’s	  work.	  An	  origin	  is	  often	  evoked	  to	  give	  authority	  to	   a	   particular	   position.	   Western	   philosophy	   has	   given	   a	   number	   of	   accounts	   of	   some	  original	  point	  of	  departure	  for	  thinking.	  Famously	  Descartes	  grounded	  his	  inquiries	  into	  the	  world	  and	  our	  perception	  of	  it	  on	  the	  indubitable	  fact	  of	  his	  own	  thought.	  From	  this	  stable	  point	  he	  could	  begin.	  But	  for	  Derrida,	  there	  is	  no	  safe	  or	  stable	  starting	  point.	  “Foundations”	  and	   “origins”	   are	   always	   conditioned	   by	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   influences	   and	   despite	  protestations	  to	  the	  contrary	  are	  always	  temporary,	  partial	  and	  contingent.	  The	  tropes	  that	  can	  be	   teased	  out	  of	   this	  brief	  passage	  run	   through	  much	  of	  Derrida’s	   thought	  and	  are,	   to	  lesser	   or	   greater	   extents,	   privileged	   in	   the	   texts,	   concepts,	   traditions	   and	   institutions	   to	  which	  he	  subjects	  his	  deconstructive	  inquiries.	  However,	  Derrida	  himself	  offers	  two	  specific	  ways	  of	  understanding	  deconstruction	  that	  are	  worth	  some	  attention.	  	  	  As	   is	  well-­‐known,	  one	  of	  Derrida’s	  central	   concerns	   is	   to	  question	   (and	   invert)	   traditional	  binary	  oppositions	  that	  have	  dominated	  Western	  philosophy.	  Perhaps	  most	  famously,	  in	  Of	  
Grammatology	  Derrida	  argues	  that	  writing	  has	  a	  priority	  over	  speech.	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  throughout	   Western	   thought	   writing	   has	   been	   conceived	   as	   secondary	   to	   speech	   and	   of	  lesser	   value.	   The	   suggestion	   traditionally	   made	   is	   that	   speech	   is	   a	   more	   immediate	  representation	   of	   the	   subject’s	   thoughts	   and,	   consequently,	   writing	   is	   essentially	   a	  secondary	  representation	  of	   this	   first	   representation	  of	   the	  subject’s	   thought	  or	   intention.	  This	  makes	  writing	   less	  trustworthy	  as	   it	   is	  predicated	  on	  absence	  and	  difference	  and	  is	  a	  further	  stage	  removed	  from	  the	  subject’s	  present	  thinking.	  As	  writing	  is	  always	  possible	  to	  be	  divorced	  from	  the	  context	  and	  intent	  in	  which	  it	  is	  originally	  given,	  writing	  is	  conceived	  as	   potentially	   corrupt	   and	   open	   to	   confusion.	   Speech	   has	   a	   purity	   and	   immediacy	   that	  writing	   lacks.	   This	   binary	   opposition	   between	   speech/writing	   is	   mirrored	   throughout	  Western	   thought	   in	   any	   number	   of	   concepts	   –	   presence/absence,	   man/woman,	  subject/object,	   black/white	   –	   and	   is	   a	   logic	   crucial	   to	   what	   Derrida	   calls	   metaphysics	   or	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logocentricism.	   In	   reversing	   the	   polarity	   and	   suggesting	   that	   writing,	  conceived	   as	   a	  generalised	   movement	   of	   difference	   and	   deferral,	   is	   in	   fact	   prior	   to	   speech	   Derrida	  undertakes	  a	  double	  movement	  that	  he	  describes	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  	  despite	  the	  general	  displacement	  of	  the	  classical,	  “philosophical,”	  concept	  of	  writing,	  it	  seems	  necessary	   to	   retain,	   provisionally	   and	   strategically,	   the	   old	   name…	   Very	   schematically:	   an	  opposition	   of	  metaphysical	   concepts	   (e.g.	   speech/writing,	   presence/absence	   etc.)	   is	   never	  the	   confrontation	   of	   two	   terms	   but	   a	   hierarchy	   and	   the	   order	   of	   a	   subordination.	  Deconstruction	   cannot	   be	   restricted…	   to	   a	   neutralization	   [sic]:	   it	   must,	   through	   a	   double	  gesture,	   a	   double	   science,	   a	   double	   writing	   –	  put	   into	   practice	   a	   reversal	   of	   the	   classical	  opposition	  and	  a	  general	  displacement	  of	  the	  system.52	  Simply	   reversing	   polarities	   and	   privileging	   a	   term	   that	   has	   traditionally	   been	   secondary,	  remains	  within	  a	  metaphysics	  that	  Derrida	  wants	  to	  think	  beyond.	  Any	  inversion	  of	  binary	  terms	  must	  also	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  second	  move	  that	  displaces	  the	  system	  that	  held	  the	  binary	  in	  stead	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  	  This	  double	  movement	  of	  deconstruction	  is	  given	  a	  slightly	  different	  gloss	  in	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law.”	   Evoking	   the	   genealogical	   approach	   discussed	   above,	   Derrida	   suggests	   that	  deconstruction	   involves	   a	   ‘responsibility	  without	   limits’	   to	   account	   for	   ‘the	   values,	   norms	  [and]	  prescriptions	   that	  have	  been	  sedimented’	   in	   the	  notions	  of	   law	  and	   justice.	  This	   is	  a	  political	  as	  well	  as	   ‘a	  historical	  and	  a	  philologico-­‐etymological	  task’	  and	  involves	  grappling	  with	   the	   legacy	   of	   these	   concepts.53	  Derrida	   suggests	   that	   a	   second	   movement	   is	   also	  required,	   that	   of	   suspending	   the	   very	   axiom	   or	   concept	   that	   one	   is	   discussing.	   It	   is	   this	  gesture	   of	   suspense	   that	   ‘opens	   the	   interval	   of	   spacing	   in	   which	   transformations,	   even	  juridicopolitical	   revolutions,	   take	   place’.54	  Derrida	   argues	   that	   deconstruction	   involves	   a	  doubled	  movement	  of	  critique,	  de-­‐sedimentation	  or	  genealogy	  of	  a	  concept	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  a	  suspense	  of	  that	  very	  concept	  that	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  radical	  change	  on	  the	  other.	  	  	  These	  two	  statements	  on	  deconstruction	  are	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  definitive	  but	  they	  do	  give	  a	  clear	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  a	  deconstructive	  inquiry.	  It	  is	  this	  double	  movement	  that	  the	  present	   thesis	  hopes	   to	   emulate	  by	   at	   once	   excavating	   the	   conditions	  of	   possibility	   of	  jurisdiction	  and	  accounting	  for	  its	  varying	  shades	  of	  meaning	  and	  effects	  but	  also	  displacing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Derrida,	  Limited	  Inc.,	  trans.	  Samuel	  Weber	  (Evanston:	  Northwestern	  University	  Press,	  1988),	  21.	  53	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law:	  The	  ‘Mystical	  Foundation	  of	  Authority,’”	  in	  Acts	  of	  Religion	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2002),	  248.	  54	  Ibid.,	  249.	  
	   36	  
the	  economy	  (and	  metaphysics)	  that	  keeps	  the	  dominant	  conception	  of	  jurisdiction	  in	  place.	  One	  final	  point	  should	  be	  made.	  As	  the	  epigraph	  to	  this	   introduction	  suggests,	  the	  “double	  move	   of	   deconstruction”	   should	   not	   be	   read	   as	   being	   strictly	   methodological.	   A	   method	  suggests	   that	   one	   knows	   how	   to	   proceed,	   that	   certain	   parameters	   of	   inquiry	   are	  presupposed	  and	  the	  ultimate	  aims	  of	  an	  endeavour	  are	  clearly	  defined.	  In	  contrast	  to	  such	  a	   thinking,	  a	  deconstructive	  attitude	   is	  always	  open	  to	   the	  unforeseeable,	  opening	  a	  space	  for	  the	  coming	  –	  and	  thinking	  –	  of	  otherness.	  	  	  
1.3.2	  Deconstruction	  and	  Law	  Since	  Derrida’s	   address	   to	   the	   Cardozo	   Law	  School	   in	   1989	   –	  entitled	   “The	   Force	   of	   Law:	  The	  ‘Mystical	  Foundation	  of	  Authority’”	  –	  the	  literature	  on	  deconstruction’s	  relation	  to	  law,	  justice,	  and	  judgement	  has	  proliferated.	  Derrida’s	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law”	  remains	  an	  essential	  text	  for	  any	  account	  of	  deconstruction	  and	  the	  law	  and	  I	  give	  a	  very	  brief	  reading	  of	  it	  here,	  highlighting	   in	   particular,	   how	   the	   aporetic	   nature	   of	   law/justice	   that	   Derrida	   identifies	  helps	  in	  the	  discussions	  of	  jurisdiction	  that	  follow.	  	  	  The	  approach	   that	   initially	  dominated	  understanding	   the	  deconstruction/law	  nexus	  was	  a	  reading	   of	   Derrida	   that	   dwelt	   on	   his	   sympathy	   for,	   and	   compatibility	   with,	   the	   work	   of	  Emmanuel	   Levinas.	   Throughout	   the	   1990s	   Derrida	   became	   increasingly	   interested	   in	  questions	   of	   ethics,	   politics	   and	   hospitality55	  and	   many	   commentators	   found	   Levinas	   to	  provide	   a	   useful	   supplement	   to	   Derrida’s	   thinking	   in	   this	   area.	   Put	   crudely,	   Levinas	  contends	  that	  ethics	  has	  a	  priority	  over	  ontology;	   that	   is,	  our	   first	  philosophical	  questions	  are	  of	  the	  Other,	  concerned	  with	  addressing	  the	  face	  of	  the	  Other	  and	  with	  a	  responsibility	  to	   account	   for	   the	   singularity	   or	   absolute	   otherness	   of	   each	   Other.	   Levinas	   has	   a	   deep	  suspicion	   of	   ontology	   which,	   he	   claims,	   reduces	   the	   otherness	   of	   each	   singularity	   to	   the	  
Same,	   levelling	   all	   alterity	   to	   a	   homogeneity.56	  With	   a	   focus	   on	   Derrida’s	   later	   work,	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Key	  texts	  from	  this	  period	  include:	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Adieu	  to	  Emmanuel	  Levinas	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1999);	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  A	  Taste	  for	  the	  Secret	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2001);	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  A	  Gift	  of	  Death	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Of	  Hospitality	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2000);	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  The	  Other	  Heading	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1992);	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Politics	  of	  Friendship	  (London:	  Verso,	  1994);	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Rogues:	  Two	  Essays	  on	  Reason	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Spectres	  of	  Marx	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1994).	  	  56	  Levinas’s	  two	  most	  important	  studies	  are:	  Otherwise	  Than	  Being	  (Pittsburgh:	  Duquesne	  University	  Press,	  1998)	  and	  Totality	  and	  Infinity:	  An	  Essay	  on	  Exteriority	  Pittsburgh:	  Duquesne	  University	  Press,	  1969).	  The	  distinction	  between	  the	  Same	  and	  the	  Other	  is	  crucial	  for	  Levinas.	  For	  him	  ontology	  relies	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number	   of	   important	   studies	   explore	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   Derrida’s	   thinking	   of	   law	   and	  justice	  is	  essentially	  ethical	  (in	  a	  Levinasian	  register),	  that	  is,	  Derrida	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	   the	   question	   of	   a	   justice	   to	   and	   for	   otherness.57	  Underscoring	   Derrida’s	   assertion	   in	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law,”	  and	  elsewhere,	  of	  an	  irreducible	  conflict	  between	  the	  generality	  of	  the	  law	   and	   the	   singularity	   of	   the	   subject	   before	   the	   law, 58 	  it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	  deconstruction	  calls	   for	  an	  ethical	   responsibility	   to	  singularity	  before	   the	   law,	   rather	   than	  the	   legal	   system	   as	   a	  whole.	   As	   Cornell	   puts	   it,	   deconstruction	   is	   ‘an	   aspiration	   to	   a	   non-­‐violent	  relationship	  to	  the	  Other’.59	  Some	  have	  felt	  that	  this	  reading	  left	  deconstruction	  with	  only	   ethical	   rather	   than	   a	   truly	   political	   potential60	  whereas	   others	   saw	   this	   thinking	   as	  providing	   a	   necessary	   corrective	   to	   the	   violence	   of	   the	   law.61	  With	   an	   emphasis	   on	   the	  absolute	  singularity	  of	  each	  subject	  and	  the	   impossibility	  of	  ever	   justly	  settling	  competing	  claims	  before	  the	  law,	  some	  have	  even	  given	  this	  a	  gloss	  that	  suggests	  that	  deconstruction	  has	  a	  deep	  sympathy	  with	  liberalism.62	  	  	  The	  ethical	  orientation	  to	  Derrida’s	  later	  writing	  is	  clear	  and	  strong	  resonances	  can	  be	  felt	  between	  Levinas	  and	  Derrida’s	  projects.	  However,	  these	  readings	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	  Derrida’s	  thought.63	  The	  thrust	  of	  this	   literature	  claims	  that	  Derrida’s	  thinking	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  on	  a	  logic	  of	  the	  Same	  and	  perpetuates	  a	  violence	  by	  claiming	  a	  “finite	  totality”	  which	  excludes	  the	  “infinite	  alterity”	  of	  the	  Other.	  	  57	  The	  most	  important	  studies	  in	  this	  regard	  are	  Drucilla	  Cornell,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Limit	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1992)	  and	  Simon	  Critchley,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Deconstruction:	  Derrida	  and	  Levinas	  (Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  1992).	  One	  notable	  exception	  to	  the	  purely	  Levinasian	  reading	  is	  the	  work	  of	  Costas	  Douzinas	  who,	  whilst	  certainly	  engaging	  with	  Levinas	  and	  Derrida’s	  commitments	  to	  alterity,	  also	  holds	  a	  deconstructive	  account	  of	  the	  law	  open	  to	  radical	  political	  potential.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  most	  clearly	  evidenced	  in	  Douzinas’s	  efforts	  to	  bring	  to	  the	  fore	  Derrida’s	  engagement	  with	  Marx	  and	  articulate,	  what	  Douzinas	  refers	  to	  as,	  a	  “cosmopolitanism	  to	  come”.	  See	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Empire:	  The	  Political	  Philosophy	  of	  Cosmopolitanism	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  293-­‐296.	  	  58	  See	  Derrida,	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law,”	  251-­‐258	  and	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law”	  in	  Acts	  of	  Literature	  ed.	  Derek	  Attridge	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1992).	  	  59	  Cornell,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Limit,	  62.	  60	  Critchley,	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Deconstruction,	  189-­‐190.	  Here	  Critchley	  asserts	  that	  ‘deconstruction	  fails	  to	  thematize	  the	  question	  of	  politics	  as	  a	  question…	  the	  rigorous	  undecidiability	  of	  deconstructive	  reading	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  activity	  of	  political	  judgment,	  political	  critique,	  the	  political	  decision’.	  61	  Douzinas	  and	  Geary	  credit	  the	  “Force	  of	  Law”	  as	  instigating	  an	  ‘ethical	  turn	  in	  critical	  legal	  studies’.	  Costas	  Douzinas	  and	  Adam	  Geary,	  Critical	  Jurisprudence	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2005),	  9.	  62	  See	  F.	  Michelman,	  “Postmodernism,	  Proceduralism,	  and	  Constitutional	  Justice:	  A	  Comment	  on	  Van	  der	  Walt	  and	  Botha”	  Constellations	  9	  (2002),	  246-­‐262.	  	  63	  In	  particular	  such	  “ethical”	  readings	  of	  deconstruction	  have	  generally	  failed	  to	  account	  for	  Derrida’s	  early	  engagement	  with	  Levinas	  in	  “Violence	  and	  Metaphysics”.	  Here	  Derrida,	  though	  clearly	  sympathetic	  to	  Levinas,	  makes	  certain	  marked	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  clear.	  For	  a	  thorough	  examination	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  Derrida	  and	  Levinas	  and	  a	  critique	  of	  Critchley	  and	  Cornell	  see	  Martin	  Hägglund,	  Radical	  Atheism:	  Derrida	  and	  the	  Time	  of	  Life	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	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law,	  justice,	  ethics	  and	  politics	  is,	  firstly,	  something	  that	  came	  late	  in	  his	  work	  (evidenced	  in	  what	  some	  call	  an	  “ethical	  turn”	  in	  deconstruction)	  and,	  secondly,	  solely	  influenced	  by,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  synonymous	  with,	  Levinas’s	  philosophy.	  The	  difficulty	  with	  maintaining	  this	  position	   is	   that	  Derrida	  himself	  was	  very	  clear	   that	  his	   thinking	  has	  always	  been	  political:	  ‘the	   thinking	   of	   the	   political	   has	   always	   been	   a	   thinking	   of	  différance	  and	   the	   thinking	   of	  
différance	   always	   a	   thinking	   of	   the	   political,	   of	   the	   contour	   and	   limits	   of	   the	   political,	  especially	   around	   the	   enigma	   or	   the	   autoimmune	   double	   bind	   of	   the	   democratic’.64	  The	  ethical	  reading	  of	  deconstruction	  fails	  to	  account	  fully	  for	  the	  ethico-­‐political	  significance	  of	  Derrida’s	   early	   work,	   partly	   –	  as	   this	   quotation	   suggests	   –	   by	   not	   seeing	   the	   inherently	  political	  nature	  of	  Derrida’s	   infamous	  quasi-­‐concept,	  différance.65	  Furthermore,	   the	   ethical	  reading,	  with	  its	  positing	  of	  an	  “ethical	  turn,”	  fails	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Derrida	  approaches	   the	  notions	  of	   “law”	  and	  “justice”	   throughout	  his	  work.	  Not	  only	  does	  Derrida	  describe	  deconstruction	  as	  justice,66	  but	  he	  also	  describes	  deconstruction	  as	  the	  Law,	  as	  ‘an	  affirmation	  on	   the	  side	  of	   the	  Law’.67	  It	   is	   clear	   that	  Derrida	   is	   concerned	   to	  account	   for	  a	  responsibility	   to	   the	   otherness	   of	   the	   other	   in	   a	   legal	   dispute	   and	   his	   writing	   certainly	  gestures	  towards	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  hospitable	  encounter	  with	  the	  other.	  However,	  much	  of	  this	  early	  scholarship	  on	  deconstruction	  and	  the	  law	  stopped	  short	  of	  giving	  an	  account	  of	   deconstruction	   and	   law,	   in	   the	   round.	   In	   particular,	   by	   thinking	   of	   Derrida’s	   concerns	  with	  ethics	   and	   law	  as	  a	   “turn”	  or	  marked	   shift	   in	  his	  work,	  many	   thinkers	  have	   failed	   to	  account	   for	   the	  doubled	   logic	  of	  deconstruction	  outlined	  above.	  Deconstruction	   involves	  a	  
displacement	   of	   the	   system	   as	   a	   whole,	   not	   simply	   the	   reversal	   of	   particular	   terms	   or	   a	  privileging	   of	   categories	  within	   a	   given	   system.	   If	  we	   take	   this	   as	   our	   point	   of	   departure,	  Derrida’s	  thinking	  –	  if	  it	  is	  to	  match	  up	  to	  his	  declared	  ends	  –	  must	  be	  more	  radical	  than	  the	  ethical	  reading	  of	  deconstruction/law	  credits.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Press,	  2008),	  76-­‐106.	  As	  Hägglund	  demonstrates,	  Derrida	  departs	  from	  Levinas	  in	  that	  Levinas	  retains	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  Other	  as	  absolute,	  as	  somehow	  purely	  and	  totally	  other	  and	  a	  peaceful	  relation	  with	  this	  absolute	  Other	  remains	  a	  regulating	  ideal	  for	  our	  ethics.	  Derrida,	  in	  contrast,	  denies	  that	  such	  a	  peaceful	  relation	  is	  even	  desirable,	  arguing	  that	  there	  is	  a	  more	  radical	  contamination	  of	  “self”	  by	  an	  already	  compromised	  “other.”	  	  64	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Rogues:	  Two	  Essays	  on	  Reason	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  39.	  65	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  tease	  out	  the	  political	  significance	  of	  différance	  by	  connecting	  Derrida’s	  thinking	  to	  Nancy	  assertion	  of	  the	  primary	  communality	  of	  being	  or	  “being	  singular	  plural.”	  This	  is	  developed	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  four.	  	  66	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law,”	  243.	  67	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “Women	  in	  the	  Beehive:	  A	  Seminar	  with	  Jacques	  Derrida,”	  Differences:	  A	  Journal	  of	  
Feminist	  Cultural	  Studies	  (2005),	  149.	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Following	  Derrida’s	  death	  in	  2004	  the	  literature	  on	  deconstruction	  and	  the	  law	  has	  taken	  a	  different	   approach.	   Two	   studies	   are	   worth	   particular	   mention:	   Jacques	   de	   Ville’s	   Law	   as	  
Absolute	  Hospitality	   and	   Catherine	   Kellogg’s	   Law’s	   Trace:	   From	  Hegel	   to	   Derrida.68	  Rather	  than	  focus	  on	  the	  ethical	  writings	  of	  the	  1990s,	  Kellogg	  and	  de	  Ville	  suggest	  that	  Derrida’s	  work	  on	   law	  must	  be	  understood	   in	  relation	   to	  his	  wider	  philosophical	  concerns	  with	   the	  history	   of	   Western	   thought	   and	   the	   so-­‐called	   “metaphysics	   of	   presence”.	   With	   close	  attention	   to	  his	  early	  work	  –	  Kellogg	   is	  particularly	  concerned	  with	  Derrida’s	  engagement	  with	   Hegel	   in	   Glas	   and	   elsewhere	   –	  a	   far	   richer	   understanding	   of	   Derrida’s	   thinking	   of	  law/justice	  emerges.	  In	  particular,	  both	  argue	  against	  the	  ethical/liberal	  reading	  discussed	  above	   and	   position	   Derrida	   as	   a	   radical	   and	   deeply	   political	   thinker.69	  Crucial	   to	   both	   de	  Ville	   and	   Kellogg	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   Derrida’s	   articulation	   of	   an	   encounter	   between	   the	  singularity	  before	  the	  law	  and	  the	  generality	  of	  the	  legal	  system	  which	  aspires	  to	  universal	  application,	   is	   but	   the	   first	   step	   in	   a	   more	   radical	   displacement	   or	   suspension	   of	   the	  economy	  that	  keeps	  the	  law/justice	  binary	  in	  place.	  As	  Derrida	  writes	  in	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law,”	  he	  seeks	   to	   ‘reserve	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	   justice,	   indeed	  a	   law	  [loi]	   that	  not	  only	  exceeds	  or	  contradicts	  law	  but	  also,	  perhaps,	  has	  no	  relation	  to	  law	  or	  maintains	  such	  a	  strange	  relation	  to	  it	  that	  it	  may	  just	  as	  well	  demand	  law	  as	  exclude	  it’.70	  In	  de	  Ville	  and	  Kellogg’s	  readings,	  this	  insistence	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  contradicting	  extant	  law	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  law	  reveals	  a	  radical	  possibility	  within	  deconstruction.	  It	  suggests	  that	  Derrida’s	  critique	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  an	  ethical	  injunction.	  Rather,	  Derrida	  identifies	  a	  site	  for	  political	  struggle	  and	  contestation	  in	  this	  encounter	  between	  law	  and	  justice.	  This	   in	  turn	  opens	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  law	  being	  radically	  otherwise.	  Addressing	  the	  work	  of	  (post)deconstructive	  legal	  philosophers,	  de	   Ville	   suggests	   that,	   ‘their	   task…	  would	   be	   to	   bring	   to	   the	   fore	   the	   aporia	  within	   every	  legal	   concept,	   to	  move	   law	  beyond	  what	   is	   simply	  possible…	  At	  stake	   is	   thus	  a	  movement	  away	  from	  essence,	  consistency	  and	  truth	  towards	  the	  (dangerous)	  logic	  of	  the	  perhaps’.71	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  Jacques	  de	  Ville,	  Law	  as	  Absolute	  Hospitality	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2011)	  and	  Catherine	  Kellogg,	  
Law’s	  Trace:	  From	  Hegel	  to	  Derrida	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2010).	  69	  In	  this	  respect,	  we	  might	  read	  Kellogg	  and	  de	  Ville	  as	  expanding	  on	  Beardworth’s	  early	  account	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  Derrida’s	  thought.	  First	  published	  in	  1996,	  this	  approach	  goes	  somewhat	  against	  the	  grain	  in	  terms	  of	  Derrida	  scholarship	  of	  its	  time,	  giving	  a	  philosophically	  nuanced	  account	  of	  the	  political	  significances	  of	  deconstruction,	  rather	  than	  focus	  on	  ethical	  and/or	  Levinasian	  themes	  and	  concerns.	  This	  study	  has	  largely	  been	  overlooked	  in	  contemporary	  accounts	  of	  Derrida	  and	  the	  political,	  perhaps	  because	  the	  book	  was	  published	  before	  Derrida’s	  more	  explicitly	  political	  writings	  in	  Spectres	  of	  Marx,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Rogues.	  See	  Richard	  Beardsworth,	  Derrida	  and	  the	  
Political	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1996).	  	  70	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law,”	  233.	  71	  De	  Ville,	  Law	  as	  Absolute	  Hospitality,	  199.	  
	   40	  
	  It	  is	  to	  this	  latter	  strand	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  deconstruction	  and	  law	  –	  and,	  in	  part,	  de	  Ville’s	  specific	  provocation	  for	  the	  legal	  philosophers	  of	  tomorrow	  –	  that	  the	  present	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  address.	  Rather	  than	  dwell	  on	  ethical	  imperatives	  and	  sensitivities	  towards	  the	  Other,	  the	  thesis	   assesses	   the	   concept	   of	   jurisdiction,	   what	   we	   might	   refer	   to	   as	   the	   law’s	   liminal	  concept	   par	   excellence,	   in	   order	   to	   expose	   ways	   in	   which	   a	   general	   displacement	   or	  suspension	   of	   extant	   legal	   categories	   and	   thinking	   might	   be	   possible.	   By	   identifying	   the	  aporia	   of	   jurisdiction	   –	   the	   dual	   imperative,	   discussed	   above,	   of	   determination	   and	  reflection	  –	   I	  explore	  openings	  within	   the	   law	  and	  examine	  the	   latent	  potential	  within	   the	  law	   itself	   for	   thinking	   legality	  otherwise.	  To	  expand	  on	   this,	   I	  want	   to	   turn	  briefly	   to	   “The	  Force	  of	  Law”	  to	  illustrate	  how	  Derrida’s	  thinking	  helps	  develop	  a	  deconstructive	  account	  of	  jurisdiction.	  	  	  The	  “law”	  at	  stake	  in	  Derrida’s	  philosophy	  is	  no	  easy	  matter.	  As	  the	  translator	  of	  “The	  Force	  Law”	  notes:	  The	  translation	  of	  the	  word	  droit	  into	  English	  is	  notoriously	  difficult…	  The	  word	  carries	  the	  sense	  of	  “law”	  and	  “code	  of	  law,”	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  “right”	  (as	  in	  “the	  philosophy	  of	  right”	  but	  also	  of	  course	  as	  in	  “the	  right	  to	  strike”	  or	  “human	  rights”).	  The	  word	  law	  has	  seemed	  [in	  this	  translation	   of	   “Force	   of	   Law”]	   the	   most	   economical	   translation,	   even	   if	   not	   entirely	  appropriate	   in	   all	   instances.	   One	   should	   also	   keep	   in	  mind	   that	   this	   choice	   for	   translation	  does	  raise	  the	  problem	  of	  differentiating	  between	  law	  (droit)	  and	  law	  (loi).72	  The	  difference	  between	  loi	  and	  droit	  is	  itself	  not	  insignificant.	  Loi	  can	  refer	  both	  to	  the	  legal	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  “the	  law”	  in	  its	  most	  general	  sense	  as	  in	  “laws	  of	  the	  jungle”	  (la	  loi	  de	  
la	  jungle)	  or	  “being	  a	  law	  unto	  oneself”	  (on	  ne	  connaît	  d’autre	  loi	  que	  la	  sienne)	  whereas	  droit	  (whilst	  also	  capable	  of	  describing	  a	  set	  of	  laws	  or	  norms)	  also	  refers	  to	  specific	  legal/civilly	  sanctioned	   duties	   and	   responsibilities,	   “the	   right	   to	   asylum”	   (droit	   d’asile)	   or	   “copyright”	  (droit	  d’auteur).	   This	   difficulty	   of	   translation	   is	   re-­‐doubled	  because	  Derrida	   has	   a	   specific	  and,	  on	  first	  blush,	  an	  apparently	  contradictory	  usage	  for	  la	  loi.	  As	  Jacques	  de	  Ville	  observes:	  When	   Derrida	   speaks	   about	   law,	   a	   doubled	   law	   is…	   often	   at	   stake,	   for	   example	   “the	  unconditional	  law	  of	  hospitality”	  and	  the	  laws	  which	  in	  a	  concrete	  sense	  regulate	  hospitality	  in	  a	  conditional	  sense.	  In	  Of	  Hospitality	  Derrida	  speaks	  of	  this	  unconditional	  law…	  as	  “above	  the	  laws”	  and	  “thus	  illegal,	  transgressive,	  outside	  the	  law,	  like	  a	  lawless	  law,	  nomos	  anomos,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  Translator’s	  note,	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law,”	  230,	  n.	  1.	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law	   above	   the	   laws	   and	   law	   outside	   the	   law”…	   Deconstruction,	   the	   law	   (itself),	   absolute	  hospitality	  and	  justice	  can	  thus	  be	  said	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  same	  “thing”.73	  Derrida,	  it	  seems,	  uses	  a	  particular	  rendering	  of	  Law	  (Loi)	  rather	  than	  droit	  because	  of	  the	  broader	   connotations	   associated	   with	   the	   former	   term.74	  This	   insight	   complicates	   the	  encounter	  between	  law	  and	  justice	  that	  Derrida	  describes	  in	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law”.	  As	  is	  well-­‐known,	   Derrida	   characterises	   law	   as	   “calculable,”	   determinative	   and	   ‘essentially	  
deconstructible’.75	  Justice,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	   ‘incalculable’	  and	  described	  alternatively	  as	  the	  ‘experience	  of	  absolute	  alterity’.76	  It	  is	  this	  encounter	  between	  an	  essentially	  calculating	  and	  deconstructible	  law	  and	  an	  incalculable	  and	  undeconstructible	  justice	  that	  gives	  rise	  to,	  what	   the	   “ethical	   reader”	   of	   “Force	   of	   Law”	   would	   describe	   as	   an	   injunction	   to	   be	   just	  (however	   impossible	   that	  may)	  with	   the	   absolute	   otherness	   of	   the	   singularity	   before	   the	  law.	  However,	  such	  a	  reading	  does	  not	  address	  Derrida’s	  insistence	  on	  ‘a	  law	  [loi]	  that	  not	  only	  exceeds	  or	  contradicts	  law	  but…	  [has]	  such	  strange	  relation	  to	  it	  that	  it	  may	  just	  as	  well	  demand	   law	   as	   exclude	   it’.77	  How	   does	   this	   “other	   law”	   fit	   with	   this	   seemingly	   binary	  opposition	  between	  law	  and	  justice?	  	  	  It	   is	   here	   that	   I	  would	   suggest	   something	   of	   a	   tripartite	   structure	   to	   the	   law	   in	   “Force	   of	  Law.”	  We	  have	  the	  law	  –	  usually	  rendered	  droit	  –	  as	  positive,	  determined	  and	  violent.	  This	  law	   is	  bound	   to	   calculation	  and	  delimitation,	   to	   a	   strong	   sense	  of	   community,	   to	   the	   laws	  that	  enforce	  conditional	  hospitality	  and	  so	  on.	  Then	  we	  have	  another	  law	  –	  usually,	  le	  loi	  in	  French	  and	  frequently	  capitalised	  –	  as	  unconditional,	  wholly	  inoperative,	  and	  ungrounded.	  This	   is	   the	   “other	   law”	   that	   de	   Ville	   describes,	   it	   is	   a	   law	   akin	   to	   absolute	   hospitality,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  De	  Ville,	  Law	  as	  Absolute	  Hospitality,	  39.	  	  74	  We	  should	  note	  here	  that	  Derrida’s	  use	  of	  droit	  and	  loi	  does	  not	  directly	  correspond	  to	  the	  ius	  /	  lex	  distinction.	  As	  Hobbes	  points	  out	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  natural	  right	  and	  natural	  law	  (chapter	  14	  of	  
Leviathan),	  ius	  	  –	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  sense	  ascribed	  to	  it	  above	  –	  is	  associated	  with	  “right,”	  that	  is	  the	  right	  do	  something	  or	  forebear	  from	  doing	  it.	  Lex	  is	  “law”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  binds	  and	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  command.	  Though	  I	  may	  have	  a	  “right”	  (ius)	  to	  something,	  I	  am	  not	  necessarily	  obligated	  by	  law	  (lex)	  to	  do	  it.	  See	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  Leviathan	  (Indianapolis,	  Hackett	  Publishing,	  1994),	  79-­‐81.	  The	  French	  loi	  is	  an	  inheritance	  of	  lex	  and	  so	  might	  naturally	  thought	  to	  refer	  to	  positive	  law.	  Droit	  comes	  from	  ius,	  and	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  lore	  of	  a	  community.	  However,	  the	  confusion	  is	  redoubled	  because	  the	  French	  droit	  has	  its	  root	  in	  the	  Latin	  directus	  referring	  to	  correction,	  alignment	  or	  distribution	  and	  so	  too,	  has	  an	  inference	  with	  that	  which	  binds	  or	  delimits.	  Derrida’s	  use	  of	  the	  droit	  /	  loi	  distinction	  is,	  perhaps,	  idiosyncratic.	  Nonetheless,	  in	  both	  the	  ius	  /	  lex	  division	  and	  that	  (as	  used	  by	  Derrida	  at	  least)	  of	  droit	  /	  loi	  we	  have	  a	  the	  sense	  of	  law	  as,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  positive	  and	  formal,	  found	  in	  written	  or	  positive	  law,	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  informal,	  unwritten	  law	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  first	  category.	  	  	  75	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law,”	  242	  76	  Ibid.,	  244	  and	  257.	  77	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law,”	  233.	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différance,	   iterability	  and	  even	   justice.	  Lastly,	   and	  most	   importantly,	   there	   is	   a	   third	   term,	  still	   that	  we	  could	   identify	  as	   “a	   law,”	   that	   is	   the	  generative	  encounter	  between	   these	   two	  poles.	  We	  might	   frame	   this	   in	   terms	   of	   aporia	   but	   so	   too	  might	  we	   connect	   this	   to	  what	  Derrida	   describes	   as	   the	   necessary	   second	   gesture	   in	   any	   deconstruction:	   that	   of	   the	  
displacement	  of	   the	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	   This	   third	   term	  of	   the	   law	  names	   the	   site	   at	  which	  both	  terms	  exceed	  the	  other	  and	  the	  system	  of	  metaphysical	  oppositions	  on	  which	  the	  two	  terms	  depends	  is	  displaced,	  however	  fleeting	  and	  chimerical	  that	  experience	  might	  be.	  That	  there	   is	   a	   structural	  possibility	  of	   this	   encounter	   is	   “a	   law.”	  But	   this	   is	   a	   law	   that	   exceeds	  both	   law	   and	   justice,	   it	   is	   a	   law	   that	   instigates	   the	   suspension	   or	   displacement	   of	   the	  economy	  that	  keeps	  the	  law	  (or	  droit)	  /	  justice	  (or	  loi)	  binary	  in	  place.	  	  	  This	  is	  all	  rather	  abstract	  and	  remains	  at	  a	  cursory	  stage.	  To	  understand	  how	  this	  tripartite	  structure	  helps	  with	  the	  present	  concerns	  with	  jurisdiction	  let	  us	  turn	  back	  to	  some	  of	  our	  comments	   above.	   Following	   Cormack	   and	   Costa	   we	   can	   assert	   a	   doubled	   logic	   to	  jurisdiction.	   Jurisdiction	   reflects	   an	   existing	   informal	   “legality”	   but	   also	   announces	   law	   as	  such,	   giving	   voice	   to	   positive	   law.	   The	   thesis	   develops	   the	   notion	   that	   we	   can	   think	   of	  jurisdiction	   as	   being	   the	   third	   space	   of	   law,	   naming	   the	   site	   of	   a	   generative	   encounter	  between	   law	   as	   formal,	   calculable	   and	   determinate	   and	   law	   as	   informal,	   incalculable	   and	  indeterminate.	   It	   is	   in	   this	   space	   that	   the	   work	   of	   jurisdiction	   takes	   place.	   By	   putting	   a	  number	   of	   Derrida’s	   texts	   on	   the	   law	   in	   conversation	   with	   jurisdictional	   techniques	   and	  events,	   the	   thesis	   expands	   on	   this	   structure	   to	   jurisdiction.	   Crucial	   for	   this	   reading	   of	  jurisdiction	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   jurisdictional	   techniques	   and	  practices	   are	   sites	   that	   not	   only	  inscribe	   positive	   law	   and	  make	   visible	   certain	   divisions	   and	   distinctions,	   jurisdiction	   is	   a	  site	   open	   to	   critical	   intervention	   and	   occupation.	   In	   attending	   to	   jurisdiction’s	   role	   as	   a	  mediator	  between	  two	  lawful	  registers,	  possibilities	  open	  for	  thinking	  and	  writing	  the	  law	  otherwise.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  space	  that	  we	  might	  sense	  the	  promise	  of	  deconstruction,	  opening	  the	  law	  to	  the	  “dangerous	  logic	  of	  the	  perhaps”.	  	  
	  
1.3.3	  Why	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy?	  Throughout	  the	  thesis,	  in	  addition	  to	  Derrida,	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy.	  Nancy	  provides	   a	   useful	   supplement	   to	   Derrida’s	   thinking	   by	   giving	   a	   detailed	   account	   of	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community	   and	   the	   bare	   fact	   of	   our	   “being-­‐with”	   in	   the	   world.78	  Nancy’s	   philosophy	   is,	  perhaps	   primarily,	   concerned	   with	   a	   critique	   of	   the	   liberal,	   monadic	   subject.	   Tackling	   a	  staggeringly	  diverse	  set	  of	  problems	  and	  areas	  –	  from	  readings	  of	  classical	  philosophers	  to	  comments	   on	   visual	   arts,	   from	   explicitly	   political	   concerns	   (indeed	   the	   nature	   of	   “the	  political”	   as	   such)	   to	   innovative	   renderings	   of	   canonical	   terms	   such	   as	   “freedom,”	   “being”	  and	  “space”	  –	  Nancy	  develops	  a	  thinking	  of	  multiplicity,	  sharing	  and	  fracture	  rather	  than	  a	  thinking	  of	  oneness,	  integrity	  or	  the	  absolute.	  As	  Ian	  James	  suggests,	  Nancy’s	  heterogeneous	  corpus	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  ‘a	  response	  to	  a	  fragmentary	  demand,	  or	  rather	  to	  a	  demand	  made	  by	   the	   fragmentary’.79	  Nancy’s	   thinking	   in	   this	   sense	   represents	   a	   direct	   challenge	   to	  traditional	   conceptions	   of	   sovereignty.	   The	   indivisible,	   self-­‐referential,	   transcendent	  sovereign	  is	  anathema	  to	  Nancy’s	  philosophy.	  As	  already	  suggested,	  jurisdiction,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  often	   thought	   to	  be	   intimately	  bound	  up	  with	   the	   logics	  of	   sovereignty,	   instrumental	   in	  maintaining	  the	  sovereign	  integrity	  of	  a	  territory	  or	  community.	  By	  drawing	  recent	  critical	  reflection	   on	   jurisdiction	   towards	   Nancy’s	   thinking	   of	   sharing,	   fragmentation	   and	  inoperativity,	   I	   hope	   to	   expose	   the	   fragility	   of	   jurisdiction’s	   claim	   to	   determine	   the	   limits	  and	  possibilities	  of	  the	  law.	  	  Jurisdiction	  is	  always	  a	  matter	  of	  jurisdiction	  of	  or	  jurisdiction	  over	  somewhere,	  someone	  or	  something.	   Jurisdiction	  cannot	  exist	  as	  a	  pure	  abstraction,	  rather	   jurisdiction	  always	  takes	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  subjects,	  territory	  or	  community.	  Territorial	  jurisdiction	  ties	  jurisdiction	  to	   the	   land	   and	   to	   the	   ability	   to	   demarcate	   and	   delimit	   space.	   Moving	   away	   from	   this	  territorial	   paradigm,	   I	   explore	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   jurisdiction	   can	   be	   also	   seen	   to	   have	   a	  constitutive	  relation	  with	  community.	  Traditionally	  conceived,	  community	  might	  be	  thought	  to	   conform	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   binary	   distinctions	   with	   which	   we	   took	   issue	   earlier	   when	  discussing	  territorial	  jurisdiction.	  Community	  is	  usually	  thought	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  ability	  to	  exclude	  some	  and	  admit	  others.	  However,	  Nancy’s	  account	  of	  community	  as	  “inoperative”	  or	  “un-­‐working”	   provides	   a	   deconstructive	   account	   of	   community,	   suggesting	   that	  “community”	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   restless	   “being-­‐together”	   that	   resists	   both	   the	  immanence	   and	   transcendence	  of	   traditional	   conceptions	  of	   the	  principle.	   This	   is	   no	   easy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  See	  in	  particular	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  The	  Inoperative	  Community,	  trans.	  Peter	  Connor,	  Lisa	  Garbus,.	  Michael	  Holland,	  and	  Simona	  Sawhney	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota,	  2003)	  and	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  Being	  Singular	  Plural,	  tans.	  Robert	  D	  Richardson	  and	  Anne	  E	  O’Byrne	  (Stanford	  :	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2000).	  79	  Ian	  James,	  The	  Fragmentary	  Demand:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  2.	  
	   44	  
matter	  and	  understanding	  Nancy’s	  account	  of	  community	  and	  his	  ontology	  of	  “being-­‐with”	  forms	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  fourth	  chapter	  so	  I	  will	  not	  go	  further	  here.	  The	  key	  thing	  that	  Nancy	  provides,	  however,	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  jurisdiction’s	  role	  in	  both	  creating	  and	  disrupting	  legal	  and	  political	  communities	  and	  collectives.	  	  	  Nancy’s	   thinking,	   with	   its	   emphasis	   on	   an	   originary	   co-­‐implication	   of	   self	   and	   other,	  provides	   a	   useful	   supplement	   to	   Derrida	   throughout	   the	   project.	   Derrida	   was	   deeply	  suspicious	   of	   notions	   of	   “community,”	   conscious	   always	   of	   the	   very	  worst	   connotations	   –	  fraternalism,	   nationalism	   and	   totalitarianism	   –	   that	   have	   often	   been	   associated	   with	   the	  term.	   Nonetheless,	   deep	   sympathies	   run	   between	  Nancy	   and	  Derrida’s	  work	   and	   reading	  Derrida	  with	   an	   eye	   to	   Nancy	   reveals	   another	   shade	   to	   Derrida’s	   thinking.	   As	   the	   ethical	  readings	  of	  deconstruction	  in	  the	  1990s	  turned	  to	  Levinas,	  I	  turn	  to	  Nancy	  to	  expand	  on	  a	  political	  current	  within	  Derrida’s	  work	  and	  to	  explore	  the	  politics	  at	  stake	  in	  jurisdictional	  practices	  and	  techniques.	  	  	  
1.4	  Conclusion	  Deconstruction	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  an	  inquiry	   into	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  texts,	  institutions	  and	  life.	  By	  refusing	  to	  treat	  particular	  phenomena	  as	  “naturally”	  arising,	  deconstruction	   insists	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   unpicking	   that	   which	   precedes,	   and	   thus	  shapes,	   particular	   texts,	   concepts	   and	   practices.	   Deconstruction	   contends	   that	  understanding	   this	   prior	  movement	   not	   only	   accounts	   for	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	  things	   but	   also	   explains	   how	   determinations	   always	   undo	   themselves,	   how	   things	   are	  exceeded	   and	   disrupted	   by	   the	   very	  movement	   that	   allows	   them	   to	   come	   to	   presence.	   In	  assessing	  the	  law,	  deconstruction	  suggests	  that	  the	  strict	  delimitations	  and	  determinations	  associated	   with	   the	   positive	   law	   obscure	   an	   other	   law	   at	   work,	   a	   law	   of	   différance	   or	  inoperativity	  that	  exceeds	  the	  positive	   law’s	  appetite	  to	  cut,	  demark	  and	  divide.	  Following	  Pietro	  Costa	  and	  Bradin	  Cormack	  –	  along	  with	  Blanchot	  and	  Swift’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  law’s	  desire	   to	  marshal	   its	   speech	  –	  we	   can	  assert	   similar	   concerns	  at	  work	   in	   jurisdiction.	  The	  territorial,	   and	   territorially	   inspired,	   conceptions	   of	   jurisdiction	   present	   jurisdiction	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   binary	   delimitation,	   leaving	   little	   or	   no	   room	   to	   reflect	   on	   the	   conditions	   of	  possibility	  at	  work	  before	  jurisdictional	  practices,	  events	  or	  procedures.	  But	  juris-­‐diction	  –the	  speaking	  of	  ius	  –	  is	  dependent	  precisely	  on	  an	  informal	  architecture	  of	  social	  relations,	  it	  is	   this	   that	   provides	   its	   conditions	   of	   possibility.	   Following	   the	   deconstructive	   suggestion	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that	   this	   sense	   of	   ius	   not	   only	   precedes	   but	   overflows	   and	   disturbs	   jurisdiction’s	   line	  drawing	   obsessions,	   the	   following	   chapters	   assess	   privileged	   moments	   in	   which	   this	  movement	  can	  be	  observed.	  	  This	  is	  done	  first,	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  by	  examining	  how	  narrative,	  fiction	  and	  technicity	  are	  put	  to	  work	  in	  constructions	  of	  the	  common	  law.	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Chapter	  2	  
	  
FROM	  JURISDICTION	  TO	  JURIS-­‐FICTION	  
	  
	  As	  a	  system…	  the	  common	  law	  is	  a	  thing	  merely	  imaginary	  (Jeremy	  Bentham)1	  	  Could	  any	  law	  put	  into	  being	  something	  that	  did	  not	  before	  exist?	  It	  could	  not.	  Law	  can	  only	  modify	  the	  conditions,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  of	  that	  which	  already	  exists	  (D.H.	  Lawrence)2	  
	  
	  
2.1	  Introduction	  That	   jurisdiction	   gives	   shape	   to	   legality	   and	   lawful	   relations	   may	   appear	   obvious.	   The	  demarcations	   between	   criminal	   and	   civil	   law,	   tort	   and	   contract,	   or	   between	   two	   or	  more	  territories	   is	   commonly	   associated	   with	   the	   work	   of	   jurisdiction.	   It	   is	   jurisdiction	   that	  delimits	   the	   scope	   and	   nature	   of	   legal	   authority,	   it	   is	   jurisdiction	   that	   produces	   the	   law’s	  determinate	   form.	   As	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   much	   of	   our	   thinking	   of	   this	  function	  of	  jurisdiction,	  however,	  rests	  on	  a	  territorial	  paradigm	  that	  associates	  this	  work	  of	  shaping	   and	   forming	   with	   delimitation	   and	   division	   alone.	   Such	   a	   conception	   presents	  jurisdiction	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  binary	  constructions:	  you	  are	  either	  inside	  or	  outside	  a	  particular	  jurisdiction.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  want	  to	  explore	  another	  aspect	  to	  jurisdiction’s	  ability	  to	  shape	  the	   law.	  Taking	  as	   its	  point	  of	  departure	  Derrida’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  co-­‐appearance	  of	  the	  literary	   and	   the	   legal	   in	   “Before	   the	   Law,”	   I	   argue	   that	   jurisdiction	   creatively	   fashions	   a	  narrative	  impression	  of	  the	  law.	  Rather	  than	  being	  purely	  associated	  with	  the	  line-­‐drawing	  obsessions	   of	   the	   cartographer,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	   creative	   work	   of	   jurisdiction	   might	   also	  evoke	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  poet	  or	  storyteller.	  This	  process	  of	  creative	  jurisdictional	  fashioning,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Jeremy	  Bentham,	  A	  Comment	  on	  the	  Commentaries,	  ed.	  C.	  W.	  Everett	  (Oxford:	  Clarenden	  Press,	  1928),	  125.	  Famously,	  Bentham	  was	  a	  vociferous	  critique	  of	  the	  common	  law.	  Bentham	  argued	  that	  the	  common	  law’s	  avowed	  connection	  to	  Natural	  Law	  prevented	  the	  law	  being	  subject	  to	  progressive	  change	  and	  obscured	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  law	  itself,	  which	  for	  Bentham	  was	  purely	  positive.	  See	  Jeremy	  Bentham,	  A	  Fragment	  on	  Government	  with	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Principles	  of	  Morals	  and	  Legislation	  (Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  1948),	  3-­‐8.	  2	  D.	  H.	  Lawrence,	  Study	  of	  Thomas	  Hardy	  and	  Other	  Essays	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  10.	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I	  suggest,	  takes	  place	  in	  an	  aporetic	  encounter	  between	  two	  legal	  registers:	  the	  positive	  law	  and	  	  (following	  Derrida’s	  terminology)	  “the	  law	  before	  the	  law”.	  Jurisdiction	  on	  this	  reading	  is	  process	  of	  technê	   that	  creates	  a	  contingent	  impression	  of	  the	  law.3	  I	  trace	  this	  argument	  through	   the	  constructions	  of	   the	  common	   law	   in	   the	   sixteenth	  and	  seventeenth	  centuries,	  giving	   a	   particular	   focus	   to	   Calvin’s	   Case	   (1608),	   a	   decision	   that	   determined	   the	  jurisdictional	   reach	   of	   English	   common	   law	   to	   Scottish	   subjects.	   Through	   this	   historical	  study	   I	   suggest	   that	   an	   analogous	   structure	   can	  be	  drawn	  between	   the	   early	  modern	  and	  postmodern	   conceptions	   of	   law	   that,	   in	   turn,	   exposes	   jurisdiction’s	   art	   or	   technicity.	   The	  chapter	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  characterise	  this	  conception	  of	  jurisdiction	  –	  following	  a	  term	  coined	   by	   Nancy	   –	   as	   “juris-­‐fiction”.	   A	   shift	   in	   register	   from	   jurisdiction	   to	   juris-­‐fiction	  exposes	  the	  contingencies	  on	  which	  the	   law	  rests	  and	   invites	  a	  critical	  opening	  within	  the	  law.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Before	  the	  Law	  Kafka’s	  parable	  Vor	  dem	  Gesetz,	   first	  published	   in	  1915	   in	   its	  own	  right,	   forms	  part	  of	  The	  
Trial	  where	  it	  is	  recounted	  to	  Joseph	  K	  by	  a	  priest	  as	  K	  tours	  a	  cathedral.4	  As	  is	  well	  known,	  the	   story	   tells	   of	   a	  man	   from	   the	   country	  who	   seeks	   admittance	   to	   the	   Law	   (das	  Gesetz).	  Before	   the	   Law	   stands	   a	   doorkeeper,	   attending	   a	   gate	   that	   stands	   open,	   as	   usual.	   The	  countryman	  heeds	  the	  doorkeeper’s	  advice	  to	  defer	  entry	  “at	  the	  moment,”	  hoping	  that	  the	  veto	  will	  be	  lifted	  in	  the	  future.	  Such	  difficulties	  the	  man	  did	  not	  expect	  as	  he	  thought	  that	  the	   Law	   was	   accessible	   at	   all	   times,	   to	   everyone.	   The	   man’s	   waiting	   continues	   for	   years	  throughout	  which	  time	  he	  begs	  the	  doorkeeper	  for	  admittance.	  He	  offers	  all	  his	  possessions	  to	  bribe	  the	  doorkeeper	  and	  even,	  in	  his	  childlike	  old	  age,	  begs	  the	  fleas	  on	  the	  doorkeeper’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Technê	  is	  usually	  translated	  as	  craft,	  skill	  or	  art.	  This	  term	  has	  an	  ancient	  heritage	  and	  is	  central	  to	  many	  classical	  philosophical	  concerns	  form	  Plato,	  Aristotle	  and	  the	  Stoics	  to	  Heidegger,	  Nancy	  and	  –	  most	  recently	  –	  Bernard	  Stiegler.	  The	  present	  chapter	  does	  not	  engage	  with	  the	  numerous	  interpretations	  offered	  in	  Western	  thought	  on	  the	  question	  of	  technê	  especially	  its	  ambivalent	  and	  complex	  relation	  to	  epistêmê.	  The	  important	  thing	  for	  our	  present	  concerns	  is	  that	  jurisdiction	  conceived	  as	  a	  species	  of	  technê	  emphasises	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  jurisdiction	  produces	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  law,	  lawful	  relations	  and	  the	  legal	  limit.	  This	  production	  is	  not	  necessary	  but	  contingent	  on	  a	  number	  of	  competing	  factors.	  Jurisdiction	  is	  here	  conceived	  as	  technological	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  fashions	  and	  forms	  a	  sense	  of	  legality	  in	  a	  “third	  space”	  between	  to	  two	  separate,	  though	  connected,	  registers	  of	  law.	  4	  The	  priest	  claims	  that	  the	  story	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  “the	  writings	  that	  preface	  the	  Law”	  and	  suggests	  that	  the	  tale	  illustrates	  K’s	  delusion	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  court.	  See	  Franz	  Kafka,	  The	  Trial,	  trans.	  W.	  Muir	  and	  E.	  Muir	  (London:	  Everyman’s	  Library,	  1992),	  234-­‐236.	  The	  chaplain	  who	  is	  the	  first	  to	  interpret	  Kafka’s	  tale	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  the	  prison	  chaplain	  and	  therefore	  a	  member	  of	  the	  court	  and	  in	  cahoots	  with	  the	  law.	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collar	  for	  help	  in	  his	  cause.	  The	  countryman’s	  final	  request	  is	  to	  know	  why	  for	  all	  the	  years	  that	   he	   has	   waited	   for	   admittance	   no	   one	   else	   has	   ever	   sought	   entry	   to	   the	   Law.	   The	  doorkeeper	  bends	  down	  to	  roar	  in	  the	  man’s	  ear:	  “No	  one	  else	  could	  ever	  be	  admitted	  here,	  since	  this	  gate	  was	  made	  only	  for	  you.	  I	  am	  now	  going	  to	  shut	  it”.5	  	  	  One	   of	   the	   tropes	   that	   has	   produced	   much	   comment	   is	   the	   confrontation	   in	   the	   story	  between	  the	  singularity	  of	  the	  man	  who	  comes	  before	  the	  Law	  and	  the	  generality	  of	  the	  Law	  that	  he	  encounters.	  This	  is	  made	  all	  the	  clearer	  by	  the	  man’s	  humble	  origins	  as	  a	  “man	  from	  the	  country”	  and	  the	  generality	  of	  Gesetz	  (referring	  to	  law	  in	  general	  rather	  than	  particular	  laws	  (Recht)	  that	  confronts	  him;	  Gesetz	  is	  helpfully	  capitalised	  as	  “Law”	  in	  translation.	  The	  failure	  of	   the	   countryman	   to	   access	   the	  Law	   is	   a	   constitutive	   failure	  of	   the	  Law	   to	  be	   just	  with	   the	   singularity	   of	   the	   those	   that	   appear	   before	   it.	  Whilst	   this	   analysis	   forms	   part	   of	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  the	  text,	  the	  aspect	  of	  his	  interpretation	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  focus	  on	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  tale	  tells	  of	  the	  countryman’s	  ultimately	  failed	  attempt	  locate	  the	  origin	  of	  the	   law.	   In	  exploring	   this	   ineluctable	  desire	   to	  enter	   the	  Law,	  Derrida	  puts	  Kafka	   story	   in	  conversation	   with	   Freud’s	   fable	   of	   the	   founding	   of	   the	   moral	   law	   in	   Totem	   and	   Taboo.	  Freud’s	   own	   narrative	   is	   dictated,	   likewise,	   by	   a	   certain	   failure:	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   fix	   and	  determine	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   law	   and	   identify	   a	   stable	   and	   transcendental	   referent	   about	  which	   the	   law	   can	   orientate,	   Freud	   manifestly	   fails.	   As	   Derrida	   comments,	   Freud’s	   fable	  recounts	  a	  “non-­‐event”	  where	  nothing	  happens,	  no	  (transcendental)	  origin	  is	  located.6	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick	   argues	   that	   the	   power	   of	   Freud’s	   myth	   of	   foundation	   is	   to	   reveal	   the	  impossibility	  of	  maintaining	  a	  stable	  origin	  and	  the	  efficacy	  of	  Freud’s	  tale	  is	  to	  put	  modern	  law’s	  grounds	  in	  question.	  This	  failure	  to	  locate	  the	  law’s	  origin	  ‘proves	  to	  be	  a	  productive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Franz	  Kafka,	  “Before	  the	  Law”	  in	  The	  Complete	  Short	  Stories	  of	  Franz	  Kafka	  (London:	  Vintage,	  1999),	  3-­‐4.	  Kafka’s	  tale	  has	  become	  a	  canonical	  text	  in	  critical	  legal	  studies	  and	  the	  philosophy	  of	  law	  and	  has	  provoked	  a	  number	  of	  readings.	  I	  found	  the	  following	  particularly	  helpful:	  Costas	  Douzinas	  and	  Adam	  Gearey,	  Critical	  Jurisprudence	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2005),	  336-­‐362;	  Elena	  Loizidou,	  “Before	  the	  Law,	  encounters	  at	  the	  borderline”	  in	  New	  Critical	  Legal	  Thinking	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  181-­‐197;	  Hélène	  Cixous,	  Readings:	  The	  Poetics	  of	  Blanchot,	  Joyce,	  Kafka,	  Kleist,	  Lispector,	  and	  
Tsvetayeva	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1991),	  14-­‐19;	  Jacques	  de	  Ville,	  “Before	  the	  Law”	  in	  Jacques	  Derrida:	  Law	  as	  Absolute	  Hospitality	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2011),	  74-­‐94;	  George	  Dargo,	  “Reclaiming	  Franz	  Kafka,	  Doctor	  of	  Jurisprudence”	  Brandies	  Law	  Journal	  45	  (2006-­‐7),	  495;	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  Homo	  Sacer:	  Sovereign	  Power	  and	  Bare	  Life	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  49-­‐62.	  	  6	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  199	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failure’7	  that	  exposes	  a	  non-­‐transcendental	   referent	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	   law.	   It	   is	   this	  prior	  work	  before	  the	  law	  that	  Derrida	  explores	  in	  his	  reading	  of	  Kafka	  and	  Freud.	  	  Originally	  given	  as	  a	  lecture	  in	  London,	  an	  expanded	  version	  of	  Derrida’s	  text	  was	  presented	  at	   the	   Colloquium	   at	   Cerisy	   on	   Jean-­‐Francois	   Lyotard	   in	   1982	   and	   later	   published	   in	   the	  conference	   proceedings	   as	   Préjugés:	   Devant	   la	   loi	   (“prejudices,”	   “pre-­‐judgment”	   or	  “precedent”	   before	   –	   as	   in,	   in	   front	   of 8 	  –	   the	   law).	   This	   earlier	   title	   stresses	   the	  manoeuvrings	   at	   work	   before	   one	   finds	   oneself	   before	   the	   law.	   There	   are	   not	   only	  precedents	  but	  prejudices	  that	  dictate	  who	  appears,	  and	  how	  and	  why	  one	  appears,	  before	  the	  law.	  Derrida	  was	  all	  too	  aware	  of	  such	  prejudices.	  In	  1981	  he	  was	  arrested	  in	  Prague	  on	  trumped-­‐up	   charges	   of	   producing,	   trafficking	   and	   transferring	   drugs.	   The	   arrest	   followed	  his	  involvement	  in	  an	  outlawed	  seminar	  with	  Czech	  dissident	  intellectuals	  organised	  by	  the	  Jan	  Hus	  Educational	  Foundation	  that	  sent	  money	  and	  books	  and	  hosted	  events	  in	  solidarity	  with	   those	  opposing	   the	   then,	   totalitarian,	  Czech	  government.9	  Alluding	   to	   these	  events	   in	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  Derrida	  mentions	  that	  his	  lawyer	  appointed	  by	  officials	  in	  Prague,	  said	  to	  him	   “You	  must	   feel	   that	   you	   are	   living	   a	   story	  by	  Kafka”	   and	  urged	  him	   “not	   to	   take	   [the	  situation]	  too	  tragically,	  live	  it	  as	  a	  literary	  experience”.10	  It	  is	  precedents	  –	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  –	   that	   determine	   a	   certain	   logic	   to	   the	   law	   that	   is	   Derrida’s	   focus	   in	   his	   reading	   of	  Kafka’s	   tale.	   Derrida	   identifies	   this	   prior	   work	   before	   (juridical)	   law,	   as	   itself	   a	   “law.”	  However,	  before	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  might	  characterise	  this	  “law	  before	  the	  law,”	   I	   want	   to	   attend	   to	   the	   jurisdictional	   orderings	   implicit	   in	   both	   Kafka’s	   story	   and	  Derrida’s	   reading.	   Such	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   jurisdictional	   provokes	  questions	   that	   are	  pursued	  throughout	  this	  chapter,	  particularly	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  connection	  between	  jurisdiction	  and	   the	   fictional	   or	   literary.	   On	   his	   return	   to	   France	   after	   the	   brief	   but	   undoubtedly	  unpleasant	   experience	   in	   Ruzyne,	   Prague’s	   prison,	   Derrida	   was	   interviewed	   about	   his	  misadventure	  for	  television	  but	  immediately	  felt	  stymied	  by	  the	  medium.	  He	  later	  reflected	  that	  what	  he	  wished	  to	  say	  was	  that	  “what	  I	  really	  lived	  through…	  would	  demand	  a	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick,	  Modernism	  and	  the	  Grounds	  of	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  12.	  8	  Unlike	  the	  German	  vor	  (“before”)	  the	  French	  devant	  does	  not	  suggest	  the	  doubled	  meaning	  of	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  priority.	  Devant	  refers	  to	  a	  spatial	  priority	  (being	  before	  or	  up	  in	  front	  of	  the	  law)	  whereas	  avant	  refers	  to	  a	  temporal	  priority,	  a	  time	  before	  which	  the	  law	  has	  been	  established.	  See	  the	  translator’s	  note,	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  200,	  n.	  13.	  9	  For	  an	  account	  of	  Derrida’s	  time	  in	  Prague	  see,	  Benoît	  Peeters,	  Derrida:	  A	  Biography,	  trans.	  A.	  Brown	  (Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press,	  2013),	  332-­‐341.	  10	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  218	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form	  of	  narration,	  another	  poetics	  than	  that	  of	  the	  evening	  news”.11	  It	  is	  such	  a	  yearning	  for	  a	  different	  narration	  and	  poetics	  of	  the	  law	  that	  animates	  the	  present	  chapter.	  	  	  
2.2.1	  The	  jurisdiction	  of	  Before	  the	  Law	  In	   one	  sense,	   Kafka’s	   tale	   is	   quintessentially	   jurisdictional.	   A	   border	   is	   erected	   that	  determines	   the	   legal	   limit	  and	  this	  border	   is	  policed	  by	  an	  agent	  of	   the	   law	  who	  prohibits	  entry	   into	   the	   law’s	   jurisdiction.	   In	   its	   elliptical	   narration	   the	   story	   captures	   something	  fundamental	   to	   a	   juridical	   conception	   the	   law:	   the	   law	   determines,	   cuts	   and	   divides,	   it	  demarcates	   in	   visible	   ways	   that	   which	   is	   within	   and	  without	   its	   borders.	   This	   legal	   line-­‐drawing	  is	  achieved	  through	  jurisdictional	  techniques	  and	  practices	  that	  make	  determinate,	  visible	  and	  knowable	  the	  legal	  limit.	  But	  Kafka’s	  tale	  complicates	  the	  inside/outside	  binary	  on	  which	  jurisdiction	  seems	  to	  depend.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  man	  from	  the	  country	  is	  excluded	  from	  the	  Law	  but	  in	  his	  exclusion	  he	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  Law,	  held	  in	  place	  at	  its	  outermost	  limit:	  the	  countryman	  is	  outside	  the	  law	  but	  still	  under	  its	  sway.	  As	  is	  clear,	  the	  gatekeeper	  protects	   the	  Law’s	   interiority	  and	   the	  countryman	   is	  kept	  outside	   the	   law.	  But	   the	   limit	   is	  not	  a	  strict	  delimitation,	  the	  interiority	  of	  the	  law	  reaches	  out	  to	  its	  outside	  and	  has	  an	  effect	  beyond	  its	  borders.	  Without	  this	  reaching	  out	  –	  without	  an	  even	  limited	  permeability	  of	  the	  limit	  –	  the	  countryman	  could	  not	  have	  his	  oblique	  encounter	  with	  the	  Law.	  Following	  Nancy	  and	  Agamben	  we	  can	  characterise	  this	  as	  a	  logic	  of	  “abandonment”	  by	  which	  that	  which	  is	  seemingly	   excluded	   by	   law	   is	   nonetheless	   captured	   by	   law.12	  As	   Motha	   has	   pointed	   out	  ‘abandonment	   involves	   being	   banished	   form	   a	   particular	   jurisdiction…	   [but]	   to	   be	   cast	  outside	  a	  certain	  order	  is	  in	  another	  sense	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  an	  order’.13	  Kafka’s	  tale	  hones	  in	  on	  the	  ambivalent	  nature	  of	  the	  legal	  exclusion	  revealing	  a	  force	  to	  the	  law	  both	  within	  and	  without	  its	  borders.	  	  	  It	  is	  an	  ambivalent	  relation	  between	  the	  inside	  and	  outside	  that	  animates	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  Vor	  dem	  Gestez.	   I	   read	  Derrida’s	   analogy	   between	   the	   text’s	   subject	  matter	   and	   formal	  structure,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  external	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  the	  text’s	  existence	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Quoted	  in	  Catherine	  Malabou	  and	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Counterpath:	  Travelling	  with	  Jacques	  Derrida	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  174.	  12	  For	  Agamben’s	  discussion	  of	  Nancy’s	  notion	  of	  the	  “ban”	  and	  “abandonment”	  see,	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  Homo	  Sacer:	  Sovereign	  Power	  and	  Bare	  Life,	  trans.	  D.	  Heller-­‐Roazen	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  58-­‐59.	  13	  Stewart	  Motha,	  “Guantanamo	  Bay,	  Abandoned	  Being	  and	  the	  Constitution	  of	  Jurisdiction”	  in	  	  
Jurisprudence	  of	  Jurisdiction,	  ed.	  Shaun	  McVeigh	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  78-­‐79.	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as	  a	  work	  of	  “literature,”	  on	  the	  other,	  as	  a	  meditation	  on	  jurisdiction.	  Derrida	  argues	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	   the	   “internal	  geography”	  of	   the	   text,	  as	  well	  as	   its	   relation	  with	  external	  axiomatic	   presumptions	   is	   key.	   Firstly	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   in	   confronting	   this	   text	   we14	  immediately	  presuppose	  that	  it	  represents	  a	  closed	  or	  unified	  whole:	  there	  are	  ‘boundaries	  or	   limits	   [that]	   seem	   guaranteed	   by	   a	   set	   of	   established	   criteria	   –	   established,	   that	   is,	   by	  positive	   rules	   and	   conventions’.15	  For	   our	   purposes,	   it	   is	   significant	   that	   the	   established	  criteria	   for	   judging	   this	   text	   are	   themselves	   assured	   by	   the	   law.	   The	   supposed	   unity	   and	  delimitation	  of	  the	  text	  depends	  on	  a	  series	  of	  legal	  norms	  asserting	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  author,	   a	   natural	   connection	   (‘rooted	   in	   natural	   law’)	   between	   the	   author’s	   intention	   and	  the	  work,	  the	  veracity	  of	  claims	  to	  intellectual	  property	  and	  so	  on.16	  	  	  	  	  We	  can	  see,	  then,	  that	  Derrida	  presents	  Kafka’s	  tale	  as	  having	  a	  jurisdictional	  determination	  in	  two	  senses.	  Firstly,	  a	  quasi-­‐territorial	  jurisdiction	  is	  posited	  that	  supposedly	  delimits	  the	  text’s	   borders	   and	   posits	   the	   text	   as	   having	   an	   identity	   and	   unity	   free	   from	   external	  corruption	   or	   interference.	   Secondly,	   this	   unity	   is	   guaranteed	   by	   a	   wider	   jurisdictional	  framing	   in	  which	   a	   number	   of	   established	   conventions	   concerning	   copyright,	   authorship,	  the	  effect	  of	  signature	  etcetera	  all	  circulate.	  These	  two	  senses	  of	  the	  jurisdictional	  nature	  of	  the	   text	   are	   mutually	   constitutive	   and	   are	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   the	   “prejudices”	   or	  “precedents”	  that	  are	  presupposed	  before	  we	  find	  ourselves	  before	  this	  (or	  any	  other)	  text.	  There	  is	  then	  what	  we	  might	  call	  an	  “internal	  jurisdiction”	  to	  the	  text	  that	  delimits	  its	  own	  borders	   and	   works	   to	   guarantee	   its	   unity	   and	   an	   “external	   jurisdiction”	   (ultimately	  enforceable	   in	   courts	   of	   law)	   that	   gives	   such	   claims	   force.	   This	   play	  between	   the	   internal	  and	  external	  jurisdictional	  orderings	  on	  which	  Kafka’s	  text	  depends	  is	  given	  particular	  focus	  in	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  the	  function	  of	  the	  title	  of	  the	  piece.	  Here	  Derrida	  notes	  a	  topology	  to	  the	  story,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  title	  occupies	  an	  anomalous	  space	  at	  once	  outside	  and	  inside	  the	   text’s	   borders	  which	   troubles	   the	   story’s	   supposed	   integrity.	   The	   title	  Vor	  dem	  Gesetz	  stands	   outside	   the	   text’s	   internal	   geography,	   outside	   its	   jurisdiction.	   But	   the	   very	   same	  expression	  forms	  the	  first	  line	  of	  the	  story:	  Vor	  dem	  Gesetz	  steht	  ein	  Türhürter	  (“Before	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Derrida	  is	  an	  unlikely	  candidate	  to	  evoke	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  “we,”	  if	  this	  is	  supposed	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  stable	  or	  determined	  collectivity.	  As	  Derrida	  makes	  clear	  in	  the	  opening	  lines	  of	  his	  analysis,	  he	  refers	  to	  a	  community	  of	  readers	  (‘a	  little	  rashly	  perhaps’)	  who	  share	  a	  similar	  set	  of	  inherited	  conventions	  in	  approaching	  a	  text	  that	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  “literary”.	  It	  is	  submitted	  that	  the	  invocation	  of	  the	  “we”	  is	  purely	  strategic	  because	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  presuppositions	  that	  supposedly	  undergird	  the	  community	  of	  readers	  that	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  Kafka	  puts	  in	  question.	  	  15	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  185.	  16	  Ibid.,	  185	  and	  215.	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Law	  stands	  a	  doorkeeper”).	  But,	  Derrida	  suggest,	  these	  two	  phrases	  are	  ‘homonyms	  rather	  than	  synonyms,	  for	  they	  do	  not	  name	  the	  same	  thing’.17	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  the	  text	  itself	  is	  named	   and	   this	   naming	   takes	   place	   from	   outside	   the	   text’s	   internal	   logic,	   geography	   and	  sense.	   In	   the	   second	   instance,	   the	   phrase	   names	   a	   space	   that	   the	   man	   from	   the	   country	  occupies	  within	  (the	  geography	  of)	  the	  story	  itself,	  a	  location	  before	  the	  law.	  These	  first	  few	  words	  of	  the	  story	  are	   in	  a	  sense	  still	  before	  the	  story,	  at	   least	  before	  the	  story’s	  narrative	  proper.	  Equally,	  the	  title	  itself	  is	  not	  cut	  off	  from	  the	  story	  tout	  court,	  it	  is	  held,	  like	  the	  man	  from	   the	   country,	   in	   suspense	   outside-­‐inside	   the	   text’s	   jurisdiction.	   And	   all	   this	   happens	  within	   the	   “internal	   jurisdiction”	   of	   the	   text.	   The	   title	   is	   also	   subject	   to	   an	   “external	  jurisdiction”	   that	   gives	   it	   legal	   authority:	   ‘the	   title	   of	   a	   book	   allows	   us	   to	   classify	   it	   in	   a	  library,	  to	  attribute	  to	  it	  rights	  of	  	  authorship,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  trials	  and	  judgments	  which	  can	  follow’.18	  But	  as	   is	  clear,	   the	   two	   jurisdictional	  zones	  posited	  here	  are	   in	  no	  sense	  stable	  –	  the	  external	  legal	  logic	  infects	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  internal	  jurisdictional	  ordering	  and	  
vice	  versa.	  	  	  Following	  Derrida’s	  identification	  of	  a	  doubled	  legal	  logic	  at	  work	  both	  within	  and	  without	  the	   text,	  we	  can	   read	   “Before	   the	  Law”	  as	  a	  performance	  and	  narration	  of	   a	   jurisdictional	  encounter.	  A	  complex	  internal	  jurisdictional	  ordering	  is	  set	  in	  motion	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  presupposition	  of	  an	  external	  jurisdictional	  ordering	  that	  hopes	  to	  guarantee	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  text	  itself.	  It	  is	  at	  this	  level	  that	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  quiet	  complicit	  between	  law	  and	  literature:	   the	   literary	   “internal	   jurisdiction”	  of	  Kafka’s	   tale	  has	  a	  constitutive	  relationship	  with	  the	  legal	  “external	  jurisdiction”.	  The	  identification	  of	  this	  ordering,	  however,	  does	  not	  address	  the	  question	  of	  the	  “law”	  that	  precedes	  such	  jurisdictional	  presumptions	  and	  it	  is	  to	  this	  that	  we	  should	  now	  turn.	  	  	  
2.2.2	  The	  Law	  before	  the	  law	  Derrida	  sees	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  the	  law	  (the	  question	  of	  what	  comes	  before	  the	  law)	   as	   revealing	   itself	   by	   attending	   to	   the	   law’s	   relation	   to	   literature.	   The	   law	   and	  literature,	   for	  Derrida,	   share	   the	   same	  conditions	  of	  possibility;	  both	   share	  a	  kind	  of	  non-­‐origin,	  an	  “origin”	  that	  resists	  being	  determined,	  located	  or	  contained.	  The	  lawfulness	  of	  law	  (the	   law	   of	   the	   law)	   and	   the	   literariness	   of	   literature	   are	   both	   conditioned	   by	   a	   certain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid.,	  189.	  18	  Ibid.,	  189.	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aporia	   or	   undecidiability	   that	   both	   Kafka’s	   tale	   of	   the	  man	   from	   the	   country	   and	   Freud’s	  myth	  of	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  moral	  law	  in	  Totem	  and	  Taboo,	  show.	  I	  want	  to	  stress	  showing	  here	  because	   it	   is	   precisely	   in	  what	   these	   two	   “literary	   texts”	   show	  rather	   than	   tell	  that,	   I	  think,	  is	  crucial	  for	  Derrida.19	  Both	  stories	  in	  Derrida’s	  reading	  are	  strange	  non-­‐events,	  they	  are	  relations	  or	  stories	  where	  nothing	  really	  happens.	  The	  murder	  of	  the	  primordial	  father	  in	  Freud’s	   fable	  of	   the	  origin	  of	   the	   law	   is	  only	  effective	  because	  of	   the	  guilt	   that	   the	  sons	  feel.	  The	  supposed	  founding	  event	  of	  the	  law,	  then,	  must	  depend	  on	  a	  prior	  moral	  law	  that	  enables	  the	  sons	  to	  feel	  guilt	  and	  remorse.	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  prohibition	  of	  murder	  and	   incest,	   the	  very	   things	   that	   the	   sons	  desire	  before	   the	  murder,	   the	   father’s	  power	  over	  the	  community	  is	  maintained	  from	  beyond	  the	  grave.	  The	  father’s	  death,	  in	  fact,	  changes	   nothing.	  Derrida	   suggests	   that	   this	   is	   a	   tale	   that	   tells	   of	   ‘an	   event	  without	   event,	  pure	  event	  where	  nothing	  happens’.20	  Kafka’s	  tale	  of	  the	  man	  who	  seeks	  admittance	  to	  the	  Law,	  similarly	  tells	  of	  a	  manifest	  failure.	   Just	   like	  Freud	  in	  his	  attempt	  to	  find	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  law,	  the	  man	  from	  the	  country	  is	  unable	  to	  reach	  the	  Law,	  he	  cannot	  even	  come	  close,	  he	  is	   stymied	   by	   the	   first	   of	  what	  we	   are	   told	   are	  many	   doorkeepers.	  What	   both	   Freud	   and	  Kafka	  show	  is	  the	  impossibility	  of	  access	  to	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  law	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  both	  reveal	  a	  certain	  space	  “before,”	  or	  prior	  to,	  the	  law	  as	  the	  law’s	  condition	  of	  possibility.	  This	  failure	  to	   tell	   of	   the	   access	   to	   the	   law	   itself	   is	   conditioned	   by	   différance,	   a	   perpetual	   play	   of	  difference	  and	  deferral.	  That	  the	  law	  cannot	  itself	  be	  approached	  or	  determined	  is	  the	  law	  of	  the	  law.	  As	  Derrida	  says:	  What	   is	  deferred	   forever	   till	  death	   is	   entry	   into	   the	   law	   itself,	  which	   is	  nothing	  other	   than	  that	   which	   dictates	   the	   delay…	  What	  must	   not	  and	   cannot	  be	   approached	   is	   the	   origin	   of	  
différance:	  it	  must	  not	  be	  presented	  or	  represented	  and	  above	  all	  not	  penetrated.	  That	  is	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  I	  take	  this	  sense	  of	  “showing”	  rather	  than	  “telling”	  or	  “saying”	  from	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  Tractatus	  
Logico	  Philosophicus,	  trans.,	  C.	  K.	  Ogden	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2005),	  5.62:	  ‘what	  solipsism	  means	  is	  quite	  correct,	  only	  it	  cannot	  be	  said,	  but	  it	  shows	  itself’	  and	  at	  2.172	  ‘the	  picture…	  cannot	  represent	  its	  form	  of	  representation;	  it	  shows	  it	  forth’.	  A	  not	  dissimilar	  distinction	  is	  made	  by	  Benjamin	  who	  describes	  his	  method	  in	  the	  Acarde	  Project	  as	  “literary	  montage;”	  he	  suggests	  that	  he	  ‘needn’t	  say	  anything,	  merely	  show’.	  See	  W.	  Benjamin,	  The	  Arcades	  Project,	  trans.	  H.	  Eiland	  (New	  York:	  Belknap	  Press,	  2002),	  1,	  n.	  2.	  The	  notion	  that	  I	  want	  to	  pursue	  here	  is	  that	  a	  “sense”	  is	  revealed	  irrespective	  of	  that	  saying’s	  content.	  To	  emphasise	  “showing”	  in	  the	  present	  context	  is	  to	  underscore	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  both	  Kafka	  and	  Freud	  reveal	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  law	  without	  being	  able	  to	  render	  that	  origin	  into	  a	  definable	  or	  presentable	  formula.	  Echoing	  Fitzpatrick’s	  discussion	  of	  Freud’s	  “productive	  failure”	  to	  locate	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  law	  in	  Totem	  and	  Taboo,	  we	  might	  suggest	  that	  Freud’s	  failing	  to	  “tell”	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  law	  nonetheless	  allows	  him	  to	  “show”	  such	  an	  (non)origin.	  	  20	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  199.	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law	  of	  the	  law,	  the	  process	  of	  a	  law	  of	  whose	  subject	  we	  can	  never	  say,	  “There	  it	  is,”	  “it	  is	  here	  or	  there.”21	  Freud’s	   text	   in	   particular	   is	   driven	   by	   a	   desire	   to	   narrate	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   law	   but	   this	  narration	   itself	  annuls	  or	   interrupts	   the	  myth	  of	   the	   law’s	  origin.	  We	  are	   left	  with	  nothing	  but	  this	  non-­‐event	  where	  no	  origin	  is	  revealed.	  	  	  But	   it	   is	   precisely	   in	   this	   relation	   of	   a	   “non-­‐event”	   that	   something	   is	   shown.	   That	   which	  instigates	  Freud’s	  failure	  to	  tell	  us	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  law	  is	  also	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  the	  man	   from	   the	   country	  who	   is	  held	   in	   check	  at	   the	  Law’s	  outer-­‐most	   threshold.	  Both	   texts	  describe	   a	   certain	   aporetic	   experience	   of	   being	   before	   the	   law.	  And	   this	   is	   the	   very	   same	  condition	  of	  being	  before	  a	  literary	  text.	  Let	  us	  dwell	  for	  a	  moment	  longer	  on	  the	  connection	  that	  Derrida	  suggests	  between	  the	  law	  and	  literature.	  It	  is	  the	  literariness	  of	  these	  two	  texts	  that	   enables	   them	   to	   show	   the	   impossibility	   of	   accessing	   the	   law’s	   origin	   or	   condition	   of	  possibility.	  The	  literary	  text	  holds	  us	  in	  a	  certain	  state	  of	  non-­‐knowing,	  of	  undecidiability	  or	  aporia	  between	  readability	  and	  unreadability22	  and	  this	  condition	  is	  precisely	  the	  condition	  of	  being	  before	  the	   law.	   In	  Kafka’s	   tale,	   the	  Law	  (das	  Gesetz)	   is	  unknown,	   it	   is	  rendered	   in	  the	  neuter	  gender	  and	  so	  cannot	  even	  be	  given	  a	  feminine	  or	  masculine	  identity.	  As	  Derrida	  says,	   ‘we	   neither	   know	  who	   nor	  what	   is	   the	   law’.	   And	   it	   is	   in	   this	   space	   of	   non-­‐knowing,	  Derrida	   suggests,	   ‘is,	  perhaps,	  where	   literature	  begins’.23	  Literature	  becomes,	   in	  a	   sense,	   a	  witness	  to	  the	   law’s	  non-­‐origin:	   it	   is	  able	  to	  show	   the	   law’s	  différance.	  Literature	  performs	  the	  deferral	   that	  Kafka’s	   tale	   relates,	   the	  potency	  of	   literature	   is	   located	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  depends	  on	  this	  very	  deferral	  for	  its	  efficacy.	  Our	  encounter	  with	  literature	  must	  take	  place	  between	   the	   readable	   and	   unreadable,	   the	   translatable	   and	   untranslatable,	   the	   knowable	  and	  unknowable:	   literature	  holds	  us	  at	   the	   threshold	  of	   these	   two	  poles.	  Significantly,	   the	  play	  between	  these	  poles	  is	  constitutive	  of	  the	  medium	  itself.	  The	  literariness	  of	  literature	  is	  revealed	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  resist	  becoming	  totally	  transparent,	  knowable	  or	  readable,	  its	  very	  “essence”	  is	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  escape	  any	  crude	  essentialism.	  This	  fact	  endows	  literature	  with	  privileged	  capacities	   to	  precisely	   show,	   in	   its	   resistance	   to	   final	  determination,	   that	  which	  makes	  the	  law,	  the	  law.	  And	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  resistance	  to	  any	  final	  determination	  that	  is	  the	  law	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  law	  of	  literature.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Ibid.,	  205.	  22	  Ibid.,	  196.	  23	  Ibid.,	  207	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The	  Law,	   in	  Kafka’s	  tale,	   is	   itself	  silent	  and	  unknowable.	  As	  Derrida	  ponders,	   is	   the	  Law	  ‘a	  thing,	  a	  person,	  a	  discourse,	  a	  voice,	  a	  document,	  or	  simply	  a	  nothing	  that	  incessantly	  defers	  access	  to	  itself,	  thus	  forbidding	  itself	  in	  order	  to	  thereby	  become	  something	  or	  someone?’24	  For	  our	  purposes,	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  Law	  is	  revealing.	  If,	  as	  we	  suggested	  earlier,	  “Before	  the	  Law”	   both	   narrates	   and	   performs	   a	   jurisdictional	   encounter,	   it	   is	   a	   strange	   kind	   of	  jurisdiction	  because	  it	  is	  a	  jurisdiction	  without	  voice.	  Of	  course,	  the	  countryman’s	  abeyance	  at	   the	   gate	   is	   maintained	   by	   the	   doorkeeper’s	   injunction	   to	   refrain	   from	   entry	   “at	   the	  moment”	  but	  this	  is	  a	  voice	  of	  the	  Law’s	  representative	  not	  the	  Law	  itself.	  This	  silence	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  law	  –	  the	  law	  of	  the	  law	  as	  silent	  –	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  how	  we	  might	  tease	  apart	  the	   juris	  and	  the	  diction	  of	  jurisdiction.	  The	  law	  of	  the	  law,	  in	  Derrida’s	  reading	  does	  not	   speak,	   it	   does	   not	   announce	   itself,	   rather	   it	   shows	   itself	   in	   its	   resistance	   to	   being	  announced	  or	  determined.	  It	  is	  this	  silent	  “law”	  that	  precedes	  the	  law’s	  announcement	  that	  Derrida	  identifies.	  This	  silence,	  however,	  is	  not	  some	  pure	  outside	  that	  cannot	  be	  accessed	  but	  as	  the	  law’s	  very	  condition	  of	  possibility	  shows	  itself	  in	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  law.	  As	  Derrida	  suggests	  in	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law”:	  There	   is	   here	   a	   silence	  walled	  up	   in	   the	   violence	  of	   the	   founding	   act;	  walled	  up,	  walled	   in	  because	   this	   silence	   is	   not	   exterior	   to	   language.	   Here	   is	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   I	   would	   be	  tempted	  to	  interpret…	  what	  Montaigne	  and	  Pascal	  call	  the	  mystical	  foundation	  of	  authority.25	  	  It	  is	  this	  silence	  walled	  up	  within	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  law	  itself	  that	  Derrida	  suggests	  is	  that	  which	  precedes	   the	   law	  as	   its	   condition	  of	  possibility.	  But,	   as	   should	  be	  clear,	  precedence	  here	  cannot	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  temporal:	  this	  silent	  “law”	  that	  exceeds	  the	  announcement	  of	  jurisdiction	   will	   show	   itself	   in	   the	   announcement	   itself.	   Such	   a	   law	   would	   immediately	  efface	   itself	   if	   it	  were	   located	  or	  determined.	  Derrida,	   then,	  points	   to	  a	  plane	  of	  difference	  and	  deferral	  that	   lies	  before	  the	   law	  as	  the	   law’s	  condition	  of	  possibility.	  This	  différance	   is	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	   for	   the	   law	  and	   for	   literature	  but	   itself	   (as	   the	   law	  of	   the	   law)	  cannot	  be	  said,	  rather	  it	  shows	  itself.	  	  	  In	  Hélène	  Cixous’s	  reading	  of	   the	  Kafka	   tale,	   she	  suggests	   that	   the	   law’s	  secret	   is	   that	   it	   is	  nothing.	  The	  law	  hides	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  nothing	  to	  hide:	  	  The	  secret	  of	  the	  law	  is	  that	  it	  has	  no	  material	  inside.	  The	  text	  is	  diabolical	  and	  puts	  down	  the	  law	  of	  the	  reader.	  One	  cannot	  contest	  that	  on	  is	  before	  the	  law,	  even	  if	  one	  does	  not	  know	  it.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Ibid.,	  208	  25	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law,”	  242	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The	   law	   cannot	   be	   defined…	   [it]	   defends	   its	   own	   secret,	  which	   is	   that	   it	   does	   not	   exist.	   It	  exists	  but	  only	  through	  its	  name.26	  Cixous	  suggests	  that	  the	  force	  of	  law	  is	  maintained	  by	  its	  very	  absence	  and	  that	  the	  power	  of	  Kafka’s	   story	   is	   to	   reveal	   this	   nothingness	   or	   emptiness	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   law.	  Derrida’s	  reading	  suggests	  something	  different.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  law	  (the	  Law	  of	  the	  law)	  there	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  absence	  or	  negation,	  rather	  there	  is	  a	  negative	  that	   is	   itself	  constitutive	  of	  the	   law,	   there	   is	   a	   différance	   that	   shows	   itself	   in	   the	   positing	   of	   law	   or	   right.	   This	   law	  “before”	   the	   law	   is	  not	  and	  cannot	  be	  presented	  or	  delimited	  but	   is	   far	   from	  being	  a	  pure	  absence	  or	  a	  nothingness.	  We	  can	  turn	  to	  Nancy’s	  evocation	  of	  being	  in	  “abandonment”	  to	  flesh	   out	   this	   suggestion.	   As	   already	   noted,	   to	   be	   abandoned	   is	   to	   be	   excluded	   from	   a	  jurisdiction	  but	   still,	   tacitly	  perhaps,	   subject	   to	   the	   law.	  For	  Nancy	   “abandonment”	   	   infers	  more	  than	  a	  troubling	  of	  the	  inside/outside;	  it	  is	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  existence.	  Assuming	  an	  ontological	   register	   of	   which	   Derrida	   would	   undoubtedly	   have	   been	   suspicious,	   Nancy	  asserts	  that	  being	  is,	  before	  all	  else,	   in	  abandon:	   ‘the	  ontology	  that	  summons	  us	  will	  be	  an	  ontology	   in	  which	   abandonment	   remains	   the	   sole	   predicament	   of	   being’.27	  As	   is	   explored	  more	  thoroughly	   in	  the	  chapters	  that	   follow,	   for	  Nancy,	   “being”	   is	  always	  “being-­‐with.”	  He	  maintains	   an	   ontology	   in	   which	   others	   (and	   otherness	   more	   generally)	   are	   necessarily	  implicated	   in	   any	   claim	   “to	   be”.	   Being	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   being-­‐singular-­‐plural	   whereby	  singularity	   is	   only	   revealed	   through	   a	   co-­‐implication	   of	   self	   and	   other.	   Crucially	   this	  relationality	  with	  others	  cannot	  be	  presented	  or	  determined,	  rather	  it	  will	  always	  escape	  or	  withdraw.	  Echoing	  the	  discussion	  above	  concerning	  showing	  and	  saying,	  Pryor	  suggests	  that	  abandonment	  is	  revealed	  in	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  ontic	  and	  the	  ontological,	  arguing	  that,	  ‘in	  the	   difference	   between	   Being	   and	   being,	   between	   what	   appears	   and	   what	   gives	   itself	   to	  appearance,	  as	  it	  were,	  what	  is	  –	  whatever	  shows	  itself	  such	  and	  such	  –	  is	  in	  abandonment’.28	  In	   this	  sense,	  abandonment	  refers	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  being	  will	  never	  be	  present	  as	  such	  but	  will	  only	  show	  itself	  in	  its	  withdrawal	  or	  exposure	  to	  otherness.	  To	  “be”	  is	  to	  be	  abandoned	  to	   others	   or,	  more	   simply,	   to	   be	   is	   to	   “be-­‐with”	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   cannot	   be	   presented.	  Crucially	   for	   the	   current	   suggestion,	  Nancy	   asserts	   that	   ‘one	   always	   abandons	   to	  a	   law’.29	  The	  law	  here	  should,	  like	  abandonment,	  be	  understood	  ontologically:	  we	  are	  abandoned	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Hélène	  Cixous,	  Readings:	  The	  Poetics	  of	  Blanchot,	  Joyce,	  Kafka,	  Kleist,	  Lispector,	  and	  Tsvetayeva	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1991),	  18	  27	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  A	  Finite	  Thinking	  trans.,	  Simon	  Sparks	  (Stanford:	  	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  36.	  28	  Benjamin	  Pryor,	  “Law	  in	  Abandon:	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  and	  the	  Critical	  Study	  of	  Law.”	  In	  Law	  and	  
Critique	  15(3)	  (2004),	  283,	  emphasis	  added.	  	  29	  Ibid.,	  44,	  emphasis	  added.	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“a	  law	  of	  being	  singular	  plural”	  that	  is	  beyond	  our	  control	  and	  that	  will	  have	  pre-­‐existed	  our	  being	  thrown	  into	  the	  world.	  As	  Nancy	  suggests:	  Turned	  over	  to	  the	  absolute	  of	  the	  law,	  the	  banished	  one	  is	  thereby	  abandoned	  completely	  outside	   its	   jurisdiction…	  the	   law	  of	  abandonment	   is	   the	  other	  of	   the	   law,	  which	  constitutes	  the	   law.	   Abandon	   being	   finds	   itself…	   remitted,	   entrusted,	   or	   thrown	   to	   this	   law	   that	  constitutes	  the	  law…	  Abandonment	  respects	  the	  law;	  it	  cannot	  do	  otherwise.30	  There	   is	   a	   “law”	   in	   such	   a	   reading	   that	   precedes	   and	   is	   the	   condition	  of	   possibility	   of	   the	  juridical	  law.	  This	  law,	  for	  Nancy,	  is	  an	  ontological	  assertion	  of	  abandonment	  in	  which	  one	  is	  always	  already	  cast	  outside	  oneself	  and	  exposed	  to	  others.	  This	  other	  law	  that	  precedes	  the	  law	   is	   revealed	   through	  a	  withdrawal	  of	   fixity	  or	  determinacy.	   In	  Nancy’s	   formulation	  we	  are	  not	  abandoned	  to	  a	  particular	  place	  or	  space,	  rather	  there	  is	  abandonment.	  And	  this	  is	  the	  law.	  	  	  Let	  me,	   then,	  draw	  out	  two	  tentative	  and	  temporary	  consequences	  from	  this	  discussion	  of	  Derrida	   and	   Kafka	   which	   will	   be	   pursued	   in	   the	   two	   sections	   that	   follow.	   Firstly,	   the	  jurisdictional	   orderings	   implicit	   in	   Derrida’s	   reading	   of	  Vor	  dem	  Gesetz	   trouble	   a	   present	  and	   stable	   delimitation	   of	   the	   legal	   limit.	   Derrida	   illustrates	   a	   contamination	   at	   the	   law’s	  outer	   limit:	   that	   which	   is	   outside	   a	   particular	   jurisdictional	   order	   effects	   and	   infects	   the	  inside	   of	   a	   jurisdictional	   order.	   This	   leads	   to	   a	   broader	   point	   about	   how	   we	   theorise	  jurisdiction	  itself.	  The	  territorial	  definition	  of	  jurisdiction	  conceives	  jurisdiction	  as	  a	  visible	  line	  of	  demarcation	  between	  territorially	  integral	  spaces	  only	  captures	  part	  of	  jurisdiction’s	  efficacy.	  By	  underscoring	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  a	  demarcation	  is	  not	  wholly	  effective	  (that	  is,	  the	  inside	  always	  already	  has	  effects	  outside)	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  Vor	  dem	  Gestez	  invites	  us	   to	   re-­‐think	   jurisdiction.	   Secondly,	   Derrida	   points	   to	   a	   silent,	   différantial	   law	   at	   work	  before	   the	   law.	   This	   “law”	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   juridical	   law	   but	   only	   shows	  itself	  in	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  legal	  limit	  itself.	  Strangely,	  this	  différantial	  “origin”	  of	  the	  law	  is	  also	  the	  origin	  of	  literature.	  This	  is	  a	  provocative	  but	  somewhat	  abstract	  contention	  that	   deserves	   further	   elaboration.	   In	   an	   effort	   to	   pursue	   such	   an	   elaboration,	   I	   explore	  Derrida’s	  suggestion	  by	  tracing	  this	  silent	  or	  “other”	  law	  through	  some	  historical	  instances,	  significant	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   common	   law	   in	   the	   sixteenth	   and	   seventeenth	  centuries.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Ibid.,	  44	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2.3	  (De)constructions	  of	  the	  Common	  Law	  Derrida’s	   reading	   of	   “Before	   the	   Law”	   suggests,	   firstly,	   that	   law	   shares	   the	   same	   “non-­‐originary	  origin”	  as	   literature	  and	  secondly,	   there	   is	  some	  “law”	  of	  difference	  and	  deferral	  before	   juridical	   law	   is	  pronounced.	   In	   this	  section	   I	  want	   to	   trace	  both	  of	   these	  assertions	  through	  the	  efforts	  made	  to	  strengthen	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  common	  law	  in	  England	  in	  the	  sixteenth	   and	   seventeenth	   centuries.	   The	   period	   1550-­‐1630	   marks	   a	   point	   of	   transition	  from	  medieval	  legal	  orderings	  towards	  putatively	  modern	  conceptions	  of	  legality.	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  modern	  nation	  state	  came	  a	  concomitant	  desire	  for	  centrally	  administered	  legal	  systems	   that	   guaranteed	   the	  normative	  homogeneity	  of	  political	   space.	   In	  England,	   it	  was	  the	  common	   law	   that	  emerged	  as	   the	  dominant	   legal	   force,	   supplanting	  or	   subsuming	   the	  plurality	   of	   jurisdictions	   typified	   by	   the	   medieval	   period.	   In	   an	   effort	   to	   expand	   on	   the	  complicity	   of	   the	   literary	   and	   the	   legal	   discussed	   above,	   this	   section	   inquires	   into	   how	   a	  fictional	   or	   poetic	   sense	   along	  with	   a	   particular	   narrative	   construction	   helped	   secure	   the	  dominance	  of	  the	  common	  law	  in	  this	  period.	  	  	  Sir	   Edward	   Coke’s	   seventeenth	   century	   Institutes	   of	   the	   Laws	   of	   England	  and	   his	   Reports	  chart	  the	  first	  steps	  in	  efforts	  to	  consolidate	  the	  laws	  of	  England	  and	  assert	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  common	  law	  jurisdiction	  over	  revival	  claims	  to	  legal	  authority.	  Before	  Coke’s	  Reports,	  which	  follow	  the	  style	  and	  rigour	  of	  Edmund	  Plowden’s	  Commentaries	  (published	  between	  1550	  and	  the	  1570s),	  the	  English	  law	  reports	  comprised	  of	  disorganised	  notes	  and	  sketches	  that	   were	   often	   of	   ‘appallingly	   poor	   quality’	   containing	   anachronisms	   and	   erroneous	  authorial	  attributions.31	  While	  the	  Institutes	  were	  of	  less	  practical	  use	  (Baker	  comments	  that	  Coke	  ‘wrote	  like	  a	  helpful	  old	  wizard,	  anxious	  to	  pass	  on	  all	  his	  secrets	  before	  he	  died,	  but	  not	   quite	   sure	   where	   to	   begin	   or	   end’)32	  they	   cleared	   the	   ground	   for	   Sir	   Matthew	   Hale’s	  efforts	   to	   formulate	   the	   first	  modern	   accounts	   of	   the	   common	   law.33	  Plowden,	   Coke,	  Hale	  and,	  much	  later,	  Blackstone	  chart	  a	  shift	  from	  the	  medieval	  to	  the	  modern	  and	  from	  a	  legal	  pluralism	   of	   overlapping	   and	   competing	   jurisdictions	   to	   a	   centralisation	   and	  standardisation	   of	   legal	   authority	   vested	   in	   the	   common	   law.	   Famously,	   for	   Coke	   this	  consolidation	  was	  achieved	   through	  an	  appeal	   to	   the	  ancient	  heritage	  of	   the	  common	   law	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  J.	  H.	  Baker,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  English	  Legal	  History,	  4th	  ed.	  (London:	  Butterworths,	  2002),	  182.	  32	  Ibid.,	  189.	  33	  Hale’s	  contributions	  were	  all	  published	  posthumously:	  History	  of	  the	  Common	  Law	  (1713);	  Analysis	  
of	  the	  Laws	  of	  England	  and	  History	  of	  the	  Pleas	  if	  the	  Crown	  (1736);	  Prerogatives	  of	  the	  King	  (1976).	  As	  Baker	  comments	  Hale	  managed	  to	  ‘organise	  and	  present…	  arcane	  material	  in	  thoughtful	  and	  analytic	  treatises’.	  See	  Baker,	  An	  Introduction	  to	  English	  Legal	  History,	  190.	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and	   to	   the	   “artificial	   reason”	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   Briefly,	   I	   want	   to	   assess	   this	   relation	   of	  common	   law	   history,	   putting	   it	   in	   conversation	   with	   Derrida’s	   contention	   of	   a	   co-­‐appearance	  of	  the	  law	  and	  the	  literary	  discussed	  above.	  	  	  
2.3.1	  Mythologies	  of	  the	  common	  law	  Crucial	  to	  the	  common	  law’s	  claim	  to	  authority	  is	  its	  supposed	  antiquity,	  traceable	  to	  a	  time	  before	  legal	  history,	  to	  ‘time	  out	  of	  mind’.34	  Coke	  and	  his	  contemporaries	  were	  concerned	  to	  present	  the	  common	  law	  as	  pre-­‐dating	  not	  only	  the	  Norman	  Conquest	  but	  also	  the	  Roman	  invasion	   of	   Britain	   in	   the	   first	   century	   A.D.	   As	   Sir	   John	   Davies	   (writing	   in	   the	   mid-­‐seventeenth	   century)	  claims,	   ‘the	   laws	   of	   any	   other	   kingdom	   in	   the	   world…	   [are	   not]	   so	  venerable	  for	  their	  antiquity’	  as	  the	  common	  law	  of	  England.35	  One	  significant	  effect	  of	  this	  construction	  of	  the	  law	  as	  reaching	  into	  an	  ancient	  past	  is	  to	  posit	  legal	  authority	  as	  having	  a	  prerogative	  over	  and	  above	  that	  of	  the	  monarch.	  As	  Coke	  was	  keen	  to	  remind	  James	  I,	  it	  was	  Bracton	  –	  writing	   in	  the	  thirteenth	  century	  –	  who	  asserted	  that	   the	  King	   is	  under	  no	  man,	  but	  under	  God	  and	  the	  law.36	  Key	  for	  these	  common	  law	  advocates,	  then,	  was	  to	  present	  the	  common	   law	   as	   an	   authority	   beyond	   reproach,	   with	   a	   quasi-­‐mystical	   justification	   that	  silences	   criticism	   or	   challenge	   to	   its	   authority	   ab	   initio.	   Goodrich	   suggests	   that	   such	  constructions	  are	  works	  of	   ‘common	  law	  theology’,	  arguing	  that	  by	  endowing	  the	  common	  law	  with	   a	   divine	   status,	   early	  modern	   thinkers	   sought	   to	   guarantee	   the	   ‘infallibility	   and	  unquestionable	  authority	  of	  an	  indigenous	  English	   law’.37	  Even	  a	  cursory	  glance	  at	  English	  history	  would	  suggest	  that	  this	  was	  always	  going	  to	  be	  difficult.	  	  	  Such	  difficulties	  come	  into	  particular	  focus	  in	  the	  attempts	  made	  to	  explain	  away	  the	  fact	  of	  the	   Norman	   Conquest	   of	   England.	   Clearly,	   the	   favoured	   narrative	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Edward	  Coke,	  The	  Second	  Part	  of	  the	  Reports	  of	  Sir	  Edward	  Coke	  (1826),	  xi-­‐xii.	  Quoted	  in	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett,	  “Native	  Title,”	  37.	  The	  notion	  of	  “time	  out	  of	  mind”	  has	  two	  meanings.	  Firstly,	  it	  evokes	  an	  ancient	  and	  quasi-­‐mystical	  heritage	  stretching	  back	  to	  beyond	  the	  Roman	  invasion	  of	  Britain.	  Secondly,	  it	  is	  a	  legal	  term	  of	  art	  that	  classifies	  the	  status	  of	  the	  lex	  non	  scripta	  of	  the	  common	  law.	  Matthew	  Hale	  suggests	  that	  statutes	  made	  ‘before	  the	  Time	  of	  Memory’	  are	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  unwritten	  rules	  of	  the	  common	  law.	  For	  Hale,	  ‘Time	  within	  Memory’	  begins	  with	  the	  reign	  of	  Richard	  I,	  i.e.	  6	  July	  1189.	  See	  M.	  Hale,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  Common	  Law	  of	  England	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1971),	  3-­‐4.	  35	  Quoted	  in	  Peter	  Goodrich,	  “Eating	  Law:	  Commons	  Common	  Land,	  Common	  Law”	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  
History	  12	  (1991),	  259.	  	  	  36	  Edward	  Coke,	  Prohibitions	  del	  Roy	  12	  Co	  Rep,	  65,	  quoted	  in	  Margaret	  Davies,	  Asking	  the	  Law	  
Question:	  The	  Dissolution	  of	  Legal	  Theory,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Sydney:	  Lawbook,	  2002),	  45.	  	  37	  Peter	  Goodrich,	  “Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  in	  England:	  Prospective	  Histories,”	  Oxford	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  
Studies,	  12(2)	  (1992),	  205-­‐206.	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common	  law	  of	  England	  stretching	  to	  time	  immemorial,	  is	  abruptly	  challenged	  by	  the	  fact	  of	  William	  Duke	  of	  Normandy’s	  seizure	  of	  the	  English	  throne	  in	  1066.	  The	  ‘great	  catastrophe’	  of	   the	   Norman	   Conquest,38	  irrespective	   of	   the	   substantive	   changes	   to	   the	   English	   legal	  system	   (which,	   arguably,	   were	   slight)	   presents	   the	   common	   law	   narrative	   with	   a	   grave	  difficulty.	  Pocock	  puts	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  If	  Duke	  William,	  even	  for	  a	  single	  instant,	  had	  been	  absolute	  ruler	  –	  if	  he	  had	  been	  king	  by	  jus	  
conquestus	  –	  then	  it	  did	  not	  matter	   if	  he	  had	  maintained	  English	  law	  instead	  of	   introducing	  French,	   and	   it	   did	   not	   matter	   what	   charters	   and	   grants	   of	   liberties	   he	   had	   subsequently	  made…	   all	   that	   had	   been	   done…	   by	   virtue	   of	   his	   unfettered	   will,	   on	   which	   his	   grants	  depended	  and	  on	  which…	  the	  laws	  and	  liberties	  of	  England	  for	  ever	  afterwards	  must	  depend	  likewise.39	  Early	   modern	   legal	   luminaries	   like	   Coke	   and	   Davies	   set	   out	   to	   disavow	   the	   Norman	  influence	  on	  the	  English	  common	  law	  in	  effort	  to	  cling	  on	  to	  their	  narrative	  of	  an	  unbroken	  lineage	   of	   authority.	   One	   seemingly	   insurmountable	   challenge	   was	   the	   presence	   of	   the	  French	   language	   in	   the	   common	   law’s	   lexicon.	   Following	   the	   conquest	   a	   linguistic	   shift	  occurred	  away	  from	  a	  predominance	  of	  Latin	  to	  French.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  unique	  legal	   dialect	   known	   as	   “law	   French”	   being	   used	   in	   English	   courts.	   A	   hybrid	   of	   Norman	  French,	   (Parisian)	   French	   and	   English,	   law	   French	   was	   initially	   used	   orally	   but	   later	  confined	  to	  a	  written	  form.	  Cases	  were	  reported	  in	  law	  French	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  sixteenth	  century.40	  As	  himself	  a	  legal	  reporter,	  Coke	  was	  undoubtedly	  acutely	  aware	  of	  this	  threat	  to	  the	  narrative	  of	  English	  legal	  history	  that	  he	  was	  instrumental	  in	  establishing.	  Writing	  in	  the	  fifteenth	   century,	   Sir	   John	   Fortescue	   explicitly	   linked	   the	   existence	   of	   law	   French	   to	   the	  Norman	  conquest.41	  In	  a	  wonderfully	   inventive	   turn	  Coke	   ignores	  Fortescue’s	  –	   seemingly	  obvious	  –	  account	  of	  the	  heritage	  of	  law	  French	  and	  locates	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  dialect	  in	  the	  Plantagent	  claims	  to	  France	  in	  the	  fourteenth	  century.	  Somewhat	  brazenly,	  Coke	  recasts	  the	  mark	  left	  by	  the	  Norman	  invasion	  and	  conquest	  of	  England	  to	  be	  assertions	  of	  English	  claims	   over	   land	   in	   France.	   Coke	   suggests	   that	   the	   law	   reports	   were	   penned	   in	   French,	  rather	   than	  English	   (‘the	   vulgar	   tongue’)	   because,	   owing	   to	  Edward	   III’s	   claim	   to	   lands	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  F.	  W.	  Maitland	  and	  F.	  C.	  Montague,	  A	  Sketch	  of	  English	  History	  (Clark:	  The	  Lawbook	  Exchange,	  2010),	  3.	  39	  J.	  G.	  A.	  Pocock,	  The	  Ancient	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Feudal	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1957),	  53.	  40	  See,	  F.	  W.	  Maitland	  and	  F.	  C.	  Montague,	  A	  Sketch	  of	  English	  History	  (2010),	  32-­‐39	  and	  B.	  Cormack,	  A	  
Power	  to	  do	  Justice	  (2007),	  177-­‐223.	  41	  Sir	  John	  Fortescue,	  De	  laudibus	  legum	  Anglie,	  ed.	  and	  trans.,	  S.	  B.	  Chrimes	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1942),	  114-­‐117	  quoted	  in	  B.	  Cormack,	  A	  Power	  to	  Do	  Justice,	  185-­‐186.	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France,	  French	  represented	  a	  more	  widely	  understood	  idiom	  in	  which	  to	  record	  the	  law.42	  As	   Cormack	   points	   out,	   Coke’s	   reversal	   of	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐French	   conquest	  reveals	  ‘a	  struggle	  for	  control	  of	  a	  story	  or	  a	  structure…	  fundamental	  to	  national	  identity’.43	  	  	  The	   common	   law’s	   jurisdiction	   is	   established	   and	   reiterated	   through	   a	   fashioning	   and	  figuration	  that	  silences	  and	  excludes	  the	  heterogeneity	  out	  of	  which	  it	  emerges.	  The	  erasure	  of	   the	  French	   influence	  on	  English	   law	   reveals	   a	   broader	   concern	   for	   the	   common	   law	   to	  define	   itself	   against	   continental	   legal	   forms.44	  Such	   a	   quest	   for	   a	   unitary	   legal	   order	   –	  coupled	  with	  the	  political	  centralisation	  of	  the	  period	  –	  produces	  a	  narrative	  that	  edits	  out	  the	  ‘unholy	  mixture	  of	  Anglo-­‐Saxon,	  Danish,	  Roman	  and	  French	  law’	  that	  provides	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  institution.45	  Crucial	  for	  our	  present	  concerns	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  this	  narrative	  was	  achieved.	  In	  charting	  the	  putative	  “origins”	  of	  the	  common	  law,	  Coke	  et	  al	  were	  engaged	  in	  a	  practice	  of	  artifice	  or	  figuration	  that	  evidences	  the	  co-­‐appearance	  of	  the	  legal	  and	  the	  fictive	  for	  which	  Derrida	  argues.	  The	  common	  law	  narrative	  is	  one	  of	  an	  ancient	  purity,	  achieved	  through	   the	   crafting	   of	   legal	   history	   that	   posits	   various	   othernesses	   as	   its	   constitutive	  outside.	  As	  Derrida	  would	  be	  quick	  to	  remind	  us,	  such	  an	  outside	  cannot	  be	  fully	  excluded	  but	   rather	   haunts	   the	   inside,	   appearing	   in	   spectral	   forms,	   disturbing	   the	   binary	   that	   is	  supposedly	   erects.	   This	   jurisdictional	   technicity	   works	   to	   obscure	   the	   common	   law’s	  inchoate	  foundations.	  We	  must	  approach	  the	  common	  law	  as	  if	  it	  had	  always	  been	  thus,	  as	  if	  it	  existed	  before	  the	  Norman	  Conquest,	  as	  if	  	   the	  mythology	  told	  by	  the	  early	  common	  law	  thinkers	  was	  the	  end	  of	  the	  matter.	  	  This	   retrospective	   construction	  of	   the	  history	  of	   the	   common	   law	   that	   erases	   its	  plurality	  through	  an	   assertion	  of	   a	   legal	   history	   that	   is	   “time	  out	  of	  mind”	   reveals	   the	   centrality	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Cormack,	  A	  Power	  to	  Do	  Justice,	  189.	  For	  an	  account	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  law	  French	  and	  the	  early	  modern	  accounts	  to	  explain	  away	  its	  presence	  see	  Cormack,	  182-­‐199.	  43	  Ibid.,	  190.	  44	  Peter	  Goodrich,	  “Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  in	  England:	  Prospective	  Histories,”	  Oxford	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  
Studies,	  12(2)	  (1992),	  202	  –	  204,	  et	  passim.	  Following	  a	  psychoanalytic	  approach,	  Goodrich’s	  argues	  here	  that	  the	  exclusion	  of	  European	  and	  Roman	  legal	  heritage	  from	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  common	  law	  marks	  a	  decisive	  trauma	  in	  English	  legal	  history	  that	  has	  continuing	  effects.	  Following	  Freud’s	  assessment	  that	  the	  traumatic	  event	  returns	  to	  haunt	  and	  disturb	  the	  psyche,	  Goodrich	  contends	  that	  the	  exclusion	  of	  critical	  voices	  in	  the	  common	  law	  narrative	  –	  often	  with	  evidenced	  by	  an	  interest	  in	  continental	  scholarly	  traditions	  –	  has	  returned	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  in	  Britain.	  For	  Goodrich,	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  common	  law	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  prospective	  efforts	  of	  the	  “BritCrit”	  movement,	  but	  so	  too	  does	  the	  history	  of	  the	  common	  law,	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  its	  dissenting	  voices	  (Fraunce,	  Bentham	  et	  al)	  offer	  resources	  and	  a	  heritage	  for	  legal	  critique	  of	  the	  common	  law.	  	  45	  Goodrich,	  “Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  in	  England:	  Prospective	  Histories,”	  217.	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crafting	  and	  figuration	  for	  the	  common	  law	  jurisdiction.	  As	  Peter	  Goodrich	  has	  argued	  the	  exclusions	  and	  omissions	  evidenced	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  common	  law	  remind	  us	  that	  ‘fiction…	   image	   and	  myth	   have	   always	   been	   essential	   elements	   in	   the	   rhetorical	   armoury	  and	  identity	  of	  the	  institution’.46	  Coke,	  his	  contemporaries	  and	  followers	  develop	  a	  “history”	  of	  the	  common	  law	  is,	  in	  an	  important	  sense,	  an	  effacement	  of	  history.	  In	  evoking	  a	  history	  that	   traces	   its	   origins	   to	   “time	   out	   of	  mind,”	   these	   early	   common	   law	   thinkers	   develop	   a	  sense	   of	   the	   law	   without	   “before”	   or	   “after”.	   The	   law	   in	   this	   reading	   is	   always	   already	  existent	  but	  also	  always	  already	  open	  and	   ready	   to	  accommodate	   the	   singularity	  of	   every	  case	  that	  appears	  before	  it.47	  This	  is	  the	  supposed	  power	  of	  the	  common	  law	  but,	  as	  Derrida	  has	  noted,	  the	  effacement	  of	  any	  history	  or	  narrative	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  law’s	  very	  logic:	  The	  law,	  intolerant	  of	  its	  own	  history,	  intervenes	  as	  an	  absolutely	  emergent	  order,	  absolutely	  detached	   from	   any	   origin…	  To	   be	   invested	  with	   its	   categorical	   authority,	   the	   law	  must	   be	  without	  history,	  genesis,	  or	  any	  possible	  derivation.	  That	  would	  be	  the	   law	  of	  the	  law.	  Pure	  morality	  has	  no	  history	  as	  Kant	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  first	  to	  remind	  us,	  no	  intrinsic	  history.48	  The	   law	   in	   such	   a	   reading	   appears	   as	   both	   transcendent	   and	   immanent.	   The	   law	   can	   be	  traced	  to	  a	  time	  immemorial	  and	  is	  thus	  thought	  to	  have	  has	  always	  existed.	  In	  the	  common	  law	  context,	  clearly	  this	  transcendentalism	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  a	  transcendental	  referent	  of	  any	  sort	  –	  the	  law	  is	  not	  referred	  back	  to	  a	  particular	  founding	  moment	  or	  declarative	  act	  –	  but	  the	  law	  is	  presented	  as	  always	  already	  extant.	  However,	  the	  law	  must	  be	  immanent	  to	  the	  particularities	   that	   come	   before	   it.	   It	   is,	   in	   fact,	   precisely	   the	   law’s	   claim	   to	  transcendentalism	  that	  allows	  the	  law	  to	  appear	  as	  “absolutely	  emergent”	  and	  immanent	  to	  a	  particular	  situation.	  The	  law’s	  effacement	  of	  its	  own	  history	  allows	  it	  to	  be	  always	  already	  presenting	  itself.49	  	  The	  constructions	  of	  the	  modern	  common	  law	  that	  we	  have	  –	  very	  briefly	  –	  observed,	  reveal	  a	  kind	  of	  non-­‐originary	  origin	  that	  cannot	  be	  directly	  approached	  or	  entered.	  At	  bottom,	  we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Ibid.,	  201.	  47	  See	  J.	  G.	  A.	  Pocock,	  The	  Ancient	  Constitution	  and	  the	  Feudal	  Law	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1957),	  36-­‐37	  48	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  194	  and	  191.	  49	  The	  suggestion	  made	  here	  of	  a	  simultaneously	  immanent	  and	  transcendent	  inference	  within	  the	  law	  is	  shared	  (to	  a	  certain	  degree	  at	  least)	  by	  the	  “constitutive	  theory	  of	  law”	  pursued	  by	  Paul	  Kahn	  
et	  al,	  see	  P.	  W.	  Kahn,	  The	  Cultural	  Study	  of	  Law	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  37-­‐40,	  et	  
passim.	  Benjamin	  Prior	  suggests	  that	  a	  helpful	  corrective	  to	  the	  constitutive	  hypothesis’s	  positing	  of	  an	  autonomous	  sphere	  of	  social	  knowledge	  and	  action	  can	  be	  	  found	  in	  Nancy’s	  work	  on	  community	  and	  the	  attendant	  logic	  of	  abandonment.	  See	  Benjamin	  Pryor,	  “	  Law	  in	  Abandon:	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  and	  the	  Critical	  Study	  of	  Law,”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  (2004)	  14:	  259-­‐285.	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find	  figuration	  and	  artifice;	  an	  account	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  common	  law	  that	  returns	  us	  to	  Derrida’s	   concerns	  with	   the	   co-­‐appearance	   of	   the	   legal	   and	   the	   literary	   discussed	   above.	  Like	  the	  man	  from	  the	  country,	  we	  are	  abandoned	  at	  the	  gates	  of	  the	  common	  law.	  We	  hover	  at	  the	  threshold,	  left	  only	  with	  a	  fictive	  narration	  of	  a	  history	  without	  historicity.	  Without	  a	  transcendent	  referent	  around	  which	  the	  law	  can	  orientate,	  the	  early	  modern	  account	  of	  the	  common	   law	   is	   produced	   through	   artifice	   and	   technicity	   and	   leaves	   us	   only	  with	   fictions.	  But,	  as	  Derrida	  notes	   in	  relation	  to	  Freud’s	   foundation	  myth,	  such	  fictions	  are	  not	  without	  effects.	   It	  matters	   little	   if	  we	  believe	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   common	   law	   that	   stretches	   to	   a	  time	   out	   of	   mind	   to	   be	   true,	   the	   force	   of	   the	   narrative	   is	   to	   give	   a	   particular	   shape	   and	  impression	  of	  the	  law,	  to	  show	  us	  something	  of	  the	  law,	  rather	  than	  to	  tell	  it	  straight.	  Coke	  and	  his	  fellows	  gives	  us	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  common	  law	  can	  claim	  an	  unbroken	  lineage,	  like	  the	  blood	  lines	  of	  an	  ancient	  family,	  to	  a	  time	  so	  distant	  it	   is	  otherworldly.	  By	  evoking	  such	  a	  narrative,	   Coke	  and	  others	  present	   the	   law	  as	   that	  which	   cannot	  be	  questioned	  or	  finally	  determined;	  as	  Derrida	  comments,	  the	  story	  of	  law	  is	  a	  story	  of	  prohibition	  that	  itself	  is	  a	  prohibited	  story.50	  	  	  This	  emphasis	  on	  fictionality	  and	  the	  work	  of	  crafting	  the	  law	  reveals	  a	  significant,	  and	  often	  overlooked,	   aspect	   to	   jurisdiction.	   The	   narrative	   that	   the	   early	   common	   law	   thinkers	  constructed	  was	  clearly	  a	  jurisdictional	  matter.	  The	  task	  was	  to	  establish	  the	  proper	  limits	  of	   legal	   authority	   and	   annul	   the	   medieval	   plurality	   of	   jurisdictions	   that	   immediately	  preceded	  the	  modern	  efforts	  to	  centralise	  and	  unify.	  Beyond	  the	  staking	  out	  of	  legal	  ground	  –	  either	  physically	  or	  conceptually	  –	  jurisdiction	  is	  also	  bound	  up	  with	  practices	  of	  narration	  and	   formation	   that	   craft	   the	   limits	  of	   legal	   authority.	   Jurisdiction,	   in	   this	   sense,	   should	  be	  properly	   understood	   as	   technê:	   a	   practice	   that	   produces	   something	   both	   artificial	   (rather	  than	   natural)	   and	   contingent	   (rather	   than	   necessary).	   Thinking	   of	   jurisdiction	   as	   a	   craft	  might	  provoke	  an	  analogy	  with	  a	   craftsman	   like	  a	   carpenter	  who	   fashions	  material	   into	  a	  practical	  and	  usable	   form.51	  However,	   following	  Derrida’s	  elision	  of	   literature	  and	   law,	  we	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  200.	  51	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh	  consider	  the	  technological	  implications	  of	  jurisdiction.	  As	  they	  suggest	  technê	  is	  concerned	  with	  knowledge	  or	  practice	  engaged	  in	  the	  production	  of	  something.	  For	  them,	  jurisdictional	  technologies	  include	  mapping,	  writing	  and	  precedent	  as	  well	  as	  procedural	  organisational	  matters.	  It	  is	  through	  these	  techniques	  that	  the	  law	  can	  take	  shape.	  The	  figure	  of	  the	  carpenter	  is	  associated	  with	  Lon	  Fuller,	  who	  suggests	  that	  certain	  moral	  and	  practical	  skills	  were	  necessary	  to	  fulfil	  one’s	  duties	  as	  a	  lawyer.	  See	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  54-­‐59	  and	  Lon	  Fuller,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Law	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	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might	  favour	  an	  analogy	  with	  the	  storyteller	  or	  poet.	   Jurisdiction	  on	  such	  a	  reading	  would	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  giving	  form	  and	  shape	  to	  the	  law,	  both	  prospectively	  and	  historically,	  offering	  a	  narrative	  impression	  of	   legality,	  showing	  rather	  than	  strictly	  telling	  of	  the	  law’s	  limits.	  In	  the	   efforts	   to	   consolidate	   the	   common	   law	   and	   guarantee	   its	   authority,	   a	   narrative	   was	  necessary.	   This	   narrative	   –	   as	   do	   all	   –	  excludes	   particular	   voices,	   images,	   tropes	   and	  concerns	  whilst	   privileging	   others.	   By	   attending	   to	   the	   art	   of	   this	   narrative	   form	  we	   can	  sense	  something	  of	  the	  contamination	  of	  the	  literary	  and	  the	  legal	  that	  Derrida	  identifies	  in	  his	  reading	  of	  Kafka:	  the	  origin	  of	  (the)	  literature	  (of	  the	  common	  law)	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	   origin	   of	   the	   (common)	   law.52	  We	   return	   to	   the	   significance	   of	   fictionality	   for	   our	  thinking	   of	   jurisdiction	   in	   the	   final	   section	   of	   this	   chapter.	   Before	   returning	   to	   these	  concerns,	   and	   remaining	   within	   the	   historical	   mode,	   I	   want	   to	   assess	   Derrida’s	   second	  assertion	  in	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  that	  of	  a	  “law”	  before	  the	  law.	  	  	  	  
2.3.2	  	  Calvin’s	  Case	  and	  the	  law	  before	  the	  law	  The	   sixteenth	   century	   justifications	   for	   the	   common	   law’s	   authority	   rest	   primarily	   on	   the	  claim	   that	   it	   expresses	  ancient	   customs	  and	  practices	   rather	   than	  monarchical	  dictates	  or	  esoteric	  conceptions	  of	  equity	  or	  justice.	  As	  Postema	  comments	  the	  common	  law	  theory	  of	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  ‘reasserted	  the	  medieval	  idea	  that	  law	  is	  not	  something	  made	  either	  by	  king,	  Parliament	  or	  judges,	  but	  rather	  is	  the	  expression	  of	  a	  deeper	  reality	  which	  is	  merely	  discovered	  and	  publicly	  declared	  by	   them’.53	  This	  notion	  gives	   rise	   to	  Blackstone’s	  famous	   characterisation	   of	   judges	   as	   the	   “living	   oracles”	   of	   the	   law;	   the	   judge,	   on	   this	  reading,	  is	  a	  contingent	  and	  immanent	  mouthpiece	  for	  a	  transcendent,	  pre-­‐existing	  juridical	  reality.54	  As	  we	   have	   noted,	   the	   construction	   of	   this	   ‘deeper	   reality’	  was	   shaped	   by	   those	  that	  consolidated	   the	  common	   law	  and	  must	  be	  seen	   to	  be	  radically	  contingent,	  produced	  through	  a	  figuration	  that	  reflected	  the	  political	  –	  particularly	  nationalistic	  –	  concerns	  of	  the	  time.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  ready	  acceptance	  of	  a	  pre-­‐legal	  “lawful”	  reality	  is	  key	  to	  the	  common	  law.	   Blackstone	   suggests	   that	   absurd	   or	   unjust	   law	   is	   not	  bad	   law,	   rather	   it	   is	   simply	  not	  
law55	  because	   such	   pronouncements	   fail	   to	   attend	   to	   the	   underlying	   lawful	   order.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1969),	  96.	  In	  the	  present	  chapter	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  developing	  an	  account	  of	  jurisdictional	  technê	  closely	  tied	  with	  the	  work	  of	  literary	  crafting.	  	  52	  See,	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  199.	  53	  Gerald	  Postema,	  Bentham	  and	  the	  Common	  Law	  Tradition	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1989),	  3-­‐4.	  54	  William	  Blackstone,	  Commentaries	  on	  the	  Laws	  of	  England	  (London:	  T	  Cadell	  and	  W	  Davies,	  1809),	  volume	  I,	  68.	  55	  Ibid.,	  70.	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question	  of	   the	   legal	  or	  quasi-­‐legal	  obligations	  owed	  prior	   to	   formal	   legality	   comes	   into	  a	  sharpened	  focus	  in	  Calvin’s	  Case	  (1608).56	  Five	  years	  after	  James	  VI	  of	  Scotland	  inherited	  the	  English	   Crown	   in	   1603,	   this	   State-­‐sponsored	   test	   case	   determined	   that	   Scottish	   subjects	  born	   after	   James’s	   succession	   (the	   so-­‐called	  post-­‐nati)	   could	   inherit	   land	   in	   England.	   The	  question	  of	   that	  which	  comes	  before	   formal	  or	  positive	   legality	   is	  paramount	   for	  both	   the	  postmodern	  and	  early	  modern	  conception	  of	  the	  law.	  By	  attending	  to	  the	  court’s	  reasoning	  in	  Calvin’s	  Case	  we	  can	  assess	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Derridian	  –	  and	  Nancean	  –	  assertion	  of	  the	   law	   before	   the	   law	   discussed	   above.	   I	   argue	   that	   a	   structural	   analogy	   can	   be	   drawn	  between	  the	  early	  modern	  and	  postmodern	  conceptions	  of	  law	  that,	  in	  turn,	  reveals	  a	  logic	  crucial	  to	  the	  legal	  crafting	  that	  jurisdiction	  achieves.	  	  	  The	   claim	  before	   the	   court	  was	   initiated	  on	  behalf	   of	  Robert	   Calvin	   (or	  Colville),57	  a	   child	  born	  in	  Scotland	  after	  1603.	  Calvin	  claimed	  that	  he	  had	  been	  forcefully	  disposed	  of	  land	  that	  he	  had	  lawfully	  inherited	  in	  Haggerston,	  Shoreditch.	  Those	  newly	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  land	  argued	  that	  Calvin’s	  claim	  was	  inadmissible	  because,	  as	  an	  alien,	  he	  was	  bared	  from	  being	  a	  freeholder	   of	   land	   in	   England.58	  The	   case	   was	   of	   huge	   political	   significance,	   evidenced	   in	  part	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  Francis	  Bacon	  –	  the	  King’s	  Solicitor	  General	  –	  argued	  the	  case	  on	  behalf	  of	  Calvin	  and	  the	  Crown.	   It	  was	  seen	  by	  James	  I	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  achieve,	   through	  the	  courts,	   a	   stronger	   union	   between	   the	   two	   kingdoms	   and	   thus	   secure	   the	   Stuart	   dynasty.	  Significantly,	  James	  had	  failed	  to	  achieve	  this	  endeavour	  by	  an	  Act	  of	  Parliament	  in	  1607.59	  If	  Calvin	  were	  an	  alien	  and	  unable	  to	  inherit	  land	  in	  England	  it	  followed	  that	  James’s	  Scottish	  subjects	   had	   no	   concomitant	   claim	   to	   English	   status.	   Alternatively,	   if	   the	   court	   found	   in	  favour	  of	  Calvin,	  Scottish	  subjects	  were	  –	  at	  least	  those	  born	  after	  James’s	  succession	  –	  also	  to	  be	  considered	  subjects	  of	  the	  English	  Crown.	  In	  1608,	  an	  “alien”	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  one	  born	  outside	  of	  England	  or,	  more	  accurately,	  one	  born	  outside	  the	  allegiance	  of	  the	  English	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  (1608)	  7	  Co	  Rep	  1a,	  77	  E.R.	  377.	  I	  have	  found	  Polly	  Price’s	  extensive	  assessment	  of	  the	  legal,	  political	  and	  historical	  issues	  at	  play	  in	  the	  decision	  particularly	  helpful.	  See	  Polly	  Price,	  “Natural	  Law	  and	  Birthright	  Citizenship	  in	  Calvin’s	  Case	  (1608),”	  Yale	  Journal	  for	  Law	  and	  the	  Humanities	  9	  (1997),	  73-­‐	  145.	  Price	  argues	  that	  the	  case	  –	  which	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  modern	  conceptions	  of	  birthright	  citizenship	  –	  is	  a	  foil	  which	  presents	  a	  series	  of	  wider	  considerations.	  For	  Price,	  the	  decision	  in	  
Calvin’s	  Case	  was	  produced	  by	  a	  confluence	  of	  natural	  law,	  feudal	  law	  and	  early	  modern	  conceptions	  of	  sovereignty,	  particular	  that	  of	  Jean	  Bodin	  the	  significance	  of	  which	  are	  still	  be	  felt	  today	  in	  contemporary	  debates	  –	  particularly	  in	  the	  United	  States	  –	  around	  (natural)	  citizenship,	  the	  status	  of	  “aliens”	  and	  the	  jus	  soli	  claim	  to	  birthright	  citizenship.	  	  57	  See	  Polly	  Price,	  “Natural	  Law	  and	  Birthright	  Citizenship,”	  81	  and	  B.	  Galloway,	  The	  Union	  of	  England	  
and	  Scotland,	  1603-­‐1608	  (Edinburgh:	  John	  Donald,	  1986),	  148.	  58	  Calvin’s	  Case	  77	  E.R.	  377,	  378-­‐379.	  59	  Cormack,	  A	  Power	  to	  Do	  Justice,	  243.	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monarch	  and	  therefore	  owing	  allegiance	  to	  another.60	  It	  was	  accepted	  that	  the	  place	  of	  one’s	  birth	  was	  not	  decisive	  on	   this	  question	  –	   those	  born	  at	   sea	  or	   in	   a	   colony	   could	  also	  owe	  allegiance	   to	   the	   Crown61	  –so	   the	   case	   really	   turned	   on	   the	   meaning	   of	   “allegiance”	   at	  common	   law.	   If	   it	   could	   be	   shown	   that	   Calvin’s	   allegiance	   to	   James	   VI	   of	   Scotland	   was	  homologous	  with	  allegiance	  to	   James	  I	  of	  England,	   then	  Calvin	  could	  not	  be	  considered	  an	  alien	  and	  the	  claim	  to	  his	  patch	  of	  Shoreditch	  would	  succeed.	  Beyond	  the	  prosaic	  nature	  of	  Calvin’s	  particular	  difficulty	  lay	  serious	  political	  implications.	  If	  Scots	  were	  no	  longer	  aliens	  in	  England,	  the	  (partial)	  union	  of	  the	  two	  kingdoms62	  had	  taken	  place	  when	  James	  took	  the	  throne.	  	  	  The	  debate	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  allegiance	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  a	  more	  fundamental	  concern	  over	  the	   characterisation	   of	   the	   doctrine	   of	   the	   “King’s	   Two	   Bodies”.	   The	   theory	   –	   detailed	   in	  Kantorowicz’s	  seminal	  study63	  –	  posits	  a	  duality	  to	  the	  monarch’s	  bodily	  form	  to	  account	  for	  the	  problem	  of	   the	  succession	  of	  sovereignty	  at	   the	   instant	  of	   the	  monarch’s	  death.	   It	  was	  accepted	   that	   the	  monarch	  should	  be	   conceived,	  much	   like	  Christ	  who	  was	  both	  man	  and	  God,	  to	  have	  a	  biological	  body	  (the	  body	  natural)	  and	  a	  symbolic	  body	  (the	  body	  politic).	  On	  the	  death	  of	  the	  monarch,	  sovereignty	  is	  thought	  to	  subsist	  in	  the	  body	  politic	  guaranteeing	  no	  break	  in	  the	  chain	  of	  succession.	  The	  theory	  of	  the	  two	  bodies	  was	  significant	  because	  it	  seemed	  to	  work	  against	  the	  post-­‐nati	  claim.	  Following	  Herbert	  Broom’s	  account	  of	  the	  trial,	  Price	  suggests	  that	  a	  key	  plank	  in	  the	  defence’s	  argument	  was	  that	  allegiance	  is	  owed	  not	  to	  the	  King’s	  body	  natural	  but	  to	  his	  body	  politic.64	  As	  Price	  puts	  it,	  the	  defence	  argued	  that	  ‘the	  allegiance	  due	  to	  a	  King’s	  subject…	  is	  several	  and	  divided	  between	  the	  two	  kingdoms…	  the	  allegiance	   due	   by	   Scots	   to	   James’s	   Scottish	   body	   politic	   does	   not	   establish	   that	   Scots	   are	  subjects	  of	  the	  King	  of	  England’.65	  The	  argument	  suggests,	  then,	  that	  James	  had	  a	  tripartite	  bodily	  division:	   firstly	  a	  body	  politic	   for	  Scotland,	  secondly	  a	  body	  politic	   for	  England	  and	  thirdly	   a	   body	   natural,	   which	   happened	   to	   hold	   the	   two	   former	   offices.	   If	   allegiance	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  For	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  the	  terminology	  used	  in	  the	  case	  see	  Price	  “Natural	  Law	  and	  Birthright	  Citizenship,”	  86-­‐89.	  See	  also	  Cormack	  A	  Power	  to	  Do	  Justice,	  243.	  	  61	  See	  Price,	  “Natural	  Law	  and	  Birthright	  Citizenship,”	  106.	  62	  Note	  that	  Scotland	  and	  England	  were	  not	  united	  as	  one	  kingdom	  until	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Union	  in	  1707.	  	  63	  Ernst	  Kantorowicz,	  The	  King’s	  Two	  Bodies:	  A	  Study	  in	  Medieval	  Political	  Theology	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1957).	  	  64	  Price	  follows	  the	  points	  set	  out	  in	  Herbert	  Broom,	  Constitutional	  Law	  Viewed	  in	  Relation	  to	  Common	  
Law	  (London:	  W.	  Maxwell	  and	  Sons,	  1885),	  6-­‐7.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  here	  that	  much	  of	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  arguments	  for	  and	  against	  the	  post-­‐nati	  claim	  is	  deduced	  from	  the	  Parliamentary	  debates	  concerning	  the	  naturalisation	  of	  Scottish	  subjects	  in	  1607.	  	  65	  Price,	  “Natural	  Law	  and	  Birthright	  Citizenship,”	  98	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owed	  to	   the	  body	  politic	  alone	   then	  there	  was	  no	  difficulty	   in	  rejecting	  Calvin’s	  claim.66	  In	  effect,	   the	  defence	  argued	   that	  Calvin’s	  position	  rested	  on	  a	  category	  mistake:	  he	   failed	   to	  understand	   that	   his	   allegiance	   was	   to	   a	   symbolic	   body	   rather	   than	   a	   natural	   one.	   This	  interpretation	   of	   the	   division	   between	   the	   symbolic	   and	   biological	   lives	   of	   the	  King	   came	  with	  an	  additional,	  but	  not	  unrelated	  claim,	  that	  allegiance	  was	  fundamentally	  a	  legal	  matter	  not	  a	  natural	  one.	  Allegiance	  on	  such	  a	  reading	  ‘proceeded	  from	  the	  laws	  of	  England	  and	  not	  the	  person	  of	   the	  king’.67	  In	   this	   sense,	  allegiance	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  positive	   law,	  emanating	  either	   from	   the	   legal	   obligations	   that	   subjects	   owed	   or	   to	   the	   obligation	   owed	   to	   the	  symbolic	  authority	  of	  the	  Crown.	  	  	  Rejecting	   this	   characterisation,	   Coke	   argued	   that	   allegiance	   was	   not	   owed	   to	   the	   king’s	  symbolic	  body	  but	  to	  his	  natural	  one	  and,	  furthermore,	  that	  allegiance	  was	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  positive	  law	  but	  of	  divine	  law	  or	  the	  laws	  of	  nature.	  For	  Coke,	  the	  allegiance	  owed	  by	  each	  subject	  to	  the	  monarch	  was	  a	  personal	  matter	  of	  fealty	  akin	  to	  the	  feudal	  obligations	  owed	  by	   vassals	   to	   a	   lord.68	  This	   position	   is	   supported	   by	   Coke’s	   characterisation	   of	   the	   king’s	  authority	  ultimately	  emanating	  from	  his	  bloodline	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  symbolic	  vestiges	  that	  are	  bestowed	  upon	  him:	  ‘[the	  King]	  holdeth	  the	  kingdom	  of	  England	  by	  birth	  right	  inherent,	  by	  descent	  from	  the	  blood	  Royal,	  whereupon	  succession	  doth	  attend’.69	  The	  body	  politic	  on	  this	  reading	   is	  only	  something	  appended	  to	  the	  body	  natural	  after	   the	  event	  of	  succession	  and	   from	   this	  moment	   the	   body	   politic	   becomes	   co-­‐extensive	  with	   the	   body	   natural.	   For	  Coke	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  suggest	  that	  allegiance	  could	  be	  owed	  to	  the	  symbolic	  body	  alone;	  as	  Coke	  claims,	  ‘the	  politic	  capacity	  is	  invisible	  and	  immortal,	  nay,	  the	  politic	  body	  hath	  no	  soul,	  for	  it	  is	  framed	  by	  the	  policy	  of	  man’.70	  The	  allegiance	  that	  subjects	  owe	  to	  the	  monarch	  then	  was	  to	  the	  person	  himself,	  an	  obligation	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  nature.	  Allegiance	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  This	  reading	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  two	  bodies	  rested	  on	  the	  civil	  law	  maxim	  of	  cum	  duo	  jura	  
concurrunt	  in	  una	  persona	  aequum	  est	  ac	  si	  essent	  in	  diversis	  (when	  two	  rights	  meet	  in	  one	  person,	  it	  is	  the	  same	  as	  if	  they	  were	  in	  different	  persons).	  See	  Price,	  “Natural	  Law	  and	  Birthright	  Citizenship,”	  102-­‐	  105.	  Coke’s	  reluctance	  to	  accept	  this	  principle	  might	  be	  ascribed	  –	  partially	  at	  least	  –	  to	  his	  avowed	  commitment	  to	  a	  “pure”	  and	  non-­‐European	  heritage	  to	  the	  common	  law	  discussed	  above.	  	  67	  Price,	  “Natural	  Law	  and	  Birthright	  Citizenship,”	  101.	  68	  As	  Price	  discusses	  the	  feudal	  heritage	  of	  Coke’s	  position	  is	  significant.	  Writing	  in	  1605	  Thomas	  Craig	  reached	  the	  same	  conclusion	  as	  Coke	  et	  al	  on	  the	  question	  of	  the	  post-­‐nati	  claim	  but	  rather	  than	  basing	  his	  conclusions	  on	  natural	  law,	  argued	  that	  allegiance	  was	  owed	  because	  of	  the	  jus	  feudale,	  a	  body	  of	  secular	  law	  that	  governed	  lord-­‐vassal	  relations	  throughout	  Europe.	  See	  Price,	  “Natural	  Law	  and	  Birthright	  Citizenship,”	  128-­‐135.	  69	  77	  Eng.	  Rep.	  389.	  70	  Edward	  Coke,	  Reports,	  VII,	  10-­‐10a,	  quoted	  in	  Kantorowicz,	  The	  King’s	  Two	  Bodies:	  A	  Study	  in	  
Medieval	  Political	  Theology	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1957),	  15.	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“before,”	  “after”	  and	  “beyond”	  positive	  law,	  constituted	  by	  the	  ‘ligaments	  that	  connect	  minds	  and	   souls	   to	   one	   another’,71	  binding	   subjects	   to	   the	   sovereign.	   A	   community	   that	   comes	  together	  and	  appoints	  a	  sovereign	  leader	  owes	  allegiance	  to	  that	  leader	  quite	  apart	  from	  the	  proclamation	   of	   any	   formal	   laws	   or	   statute.	   In	   Douzinas’s	   formulation	   this	   originary	  sociability	   is	   an	   expression	   of	   ‘bare	   sovereignty,’	   it	   is	   the	   ground	   that	   makes	   a	   political	  declaration	   possible.72	  The	   originary	   social	   tie	   provides	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   for	   a	  later	  declarative	  act	  and	  the	  instantiation	  of	  formal	  legality.	  It	  was	  through	  an	  appeal	  to	  this	  category	   of	   allegiance	   that	   the	   court	   justified	   the	   post-­‐nati	   claim.	   As	   Cormack	   suggests,	  allegiance	   binds	   subjects	   to	   the	   State’s	   body	  but	   this	   body	   is	   ‘something	   other	   than	   the	   a	  body	  politic,	  since	  it	   is	  a	  body	  made	  up	  of	  radically	  personalized	  [sic]	  bodies’	  that	  subsists	  independent	  of	  formal	  legality.73	  This	  matrix	  of	  personal	  connectivity	  is	  the	  juridical	  given	  –	  or	   a	   fact	   of	   “bare	   sovereignty”	   –	  that	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   positive	   law.	   In	  
Calvin’s	  Case,	  then,	  allegiance	  is	  before	  the	  law	  but	  also	  that	  which	  is	  “walled	  up”	  within	  the	  law	  as	  a	  presupposition	  that	  silently	  shows	  itself	  in	  formal	  legality.	  That	  allegiance	  is	  at	  once	  “before,”	  “after”	  and	  “beyond”	  law	  is	  key	  because	  it	  mirrors	  Derrida’s	  characterisation	  of	  the	  law	  before	  the	  law	  as	  that	  which	  overflows	  or	  exceeds	  the	  law	  itself.	  	  	  Following	  the	  reasoning	  in	  Calvin’s	  Case	  we	  can	  identify	  an	  equivalent	  structure	  in	  Coke	  and	  Derrida’s	   characterisation	   of	   the	   law	   before	   the	   law.	   In	   this	   regard	   we	   are	   following	  Goodrich’s	   contention	   that	   ‘the	   premodern	   is	   postmodern	   [and]	   the	   medieval	   is	  contemporary’.74	  Whereas	  the	  early	  modern	  assertion	  of	  quasi-­‐legality	  before	  the	  law	  rests	  on	   the	   category	   of	   “allegiance”	   and	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   natural	   law,	   Derrida’s	   postmodern	  assessment	  of	   that	  which	  precedes	   the	   law	  offers	  no	   such	   stable	  ground.	  For	  Derrida,	   the	  before	   of	   the	   law	   cannot	   be	   approached	   or	   confined	   because	   in	   the	   end	   it	   is	  différance,	   a	  poetic	   or	   literary	   differing	   and	   deferral	   that	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   the	   law.	  Certain	   similarities	   between	   the	   early	   modern	   and	   postmodern,	   however,	   do	   remain.	  Allegiance	   names	   a	   social	   bond	   that	   precedes	   and	   exceeds	   the	   obligations	   guaranteed	   by	  positive	  law;	  Derrida	  makes	  a	  strikingly	  similar	  observation	  in	  The	  Politics	  of	  Friendship:	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  B.	  Howell	  (London:	  Longman,	  1809-­‐26),	  2:614	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  in	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  (2008),	  246.	  72	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  (2008),	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  74	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We	  are	  caught	  up,	  one	  and	  another,	  in	  a	  sort	  of	  heteronomic	  and	  dissymmetrical	  curving	  of	  social	   space	   –	  more	  precisely,	   a	   curving	   of	   the	   relation	   to	   the	   other:	   prior	   to	   all	   organised	  
socius,	  all	  politeia,	  all	  determined	  “government,”	  before	  all	  “law”.	  Prior	  to	  and	  before	  all	  law,	  in	  Kafka’s	  sense	  of	  being	  “before	  the	  law”.	  Let’s	  get	  this	  right:	  prior	  to	  all	  determined	  law,	  qua	  natural	  law	  or	  positive	  law,	  but	  not	  law	  in	  general.	  For	  the	  heteronomic	  and	  dissymmetrical	  curving	  of	  a	  law	  of	  originary	  sociability	  is	  also	  a	  law,	  perhaps	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  law.75	  Clearly,	   Coke	   would	   baulk	   at	   such	   a	   suggestion.	   For	   him	   the	   law	   of	   originary	   sociability	  resides	  in	  feudal	  orderings	  of	  a	  supposedly	  divine	  origin.	  However,	  an	  analogous	  structure	  between	  the	  early	  modern	  and	  postmodern	  positions	  is	  clear:	  a	  “law”	  of	  originary	  sociability	  must	  precede	  and	  exceed	  positive	  or	  formal	   law,	  following	  Derrida	  we	  might	  contend	  that	  this	  originary	  sociability	  is	  the	  “very	  essence	  of	  the	  law”.	  	  	  What,	   then,	   of	   the	   relation	  between	  positive	   law	   and	   the	   law	   that	   precedes	   it?	   In	  Calvin’s	  
Case	  the	  issue	  in	  question	  concerned	  precisely	  this	  question,	  the	  court	  was	  concerned	  with	  trying	   to	   navigate	   a	   path	   between	   extant	   formal	   law	   and	   the	   law	   before	   the	   law.	   In	   “The	  Force	  of	  Law”	  Derrida	  offers	  us	  an	  intriguing	  characterisation	  that	  returns	  us	  to	  questions	  of	  fashioning	  and	  technê	  discussed	  above.	  Here,	  discussing	  the	  relation	  between	  justice	  (which	  for	  Derrida	  is	  incalculable)	  and	  the	  law	  (which	  is	  calculable),	  Derrida	  asserts	  that	  one	  must	  ‘(il	   faut)	   negotiate	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   calculable	   and	   the	   incalculable’.76	  On	   the	  question	  of	  where	  this	  imperative	  il	  faut	  (“one	  must”)	  originates,	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  ‘this	  
il	  faut	  does	  not	  properly	  belong	  to	  either	  justice	  or	  to	  law…	  it	  only	  belongs	  to	  either	  realm	  by	  exceeding	  each	  one	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  other’.77	  We	  might	  make	  a	  similar	  assertion	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  law	  before	  the	  law	  and	  positive	  law.	  The	  two	  exist	  in	  an	  aporetic	   double	   bind,	   both	   exceeding	   each	   other	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   other.	   Such	   an	  aporia,	   however,	   cannot	   remain	   foreclosed.	   As	   Derrida	   indicates,	   we	  must	   negotiate	   and	  calculate.	  The	  law’s	  imperative,	  it	  seems,	  is	  to	  fashion	  the	  law	  out	  of	  this	  aporetic	  encounter,	  craft	  a	  legality	  in	  the	  space	  between	  these	  two	  registers	  whilst	  not	  falling	  wholly	  into	  either.	  This	   task	   of	   legal	   fashioning	   is	   evidenced	   in	   Coke’s	   decision	   in	   Calvin’s	   Case:	   it	   is	   in	   this	  liminal	   encounter	   between	   the	   two	   registers	   of	   allegiance	   and	   positive	   law	   that	   the	  jurisdictional	  line	  between	  alien	  and	  non-­‐alien	  is	  drawn.	  Jurisdiction	  is	  a	  technique	  –	  in	  the	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sense	  of	  an	  art	  or	  practice	  –	  that	  fashions	  law	  from	  the	  aporetic	  encounter	  between	  the	  law	  before	  the	  law	  and	  positive	  law.	  	  
	  
2.4	  Juris-­‐fiction	  As	   we	   have	   suggested,	   the	   constructions	   of	   the	   common	   law	   in	   the	   sixteenth	   and	  seventeenth	   centuries	   turns	   our	   attention	   to	   the	   fictional	   and	   figurative	   work	   in	   the	  formation	   of	   legality.	   Jurisdiction,	   thought	   as	   both	   the	   inauguration	   of	   the	   law	   and	   the	  ongoing	  reiteration	  of	  the	  legal	  limit,	  depends	  on	  a	  constitutive	  fictionality	  –	  an	  “as	  if”	  –	  that	  allows	  the	  law	  to	  appear	  devoid	  of	  any	  transcendent	  referent.	  As	  Hans	  Vaihinger	  –	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  philosopher	  who	  pursued	  the	  notion	  that	  all	  human	  systems	  of	   thought	  were	  comprised	  of	  fictions	  –	  comments:	  ‘fictio	  means,	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  an	  activity	  of	  fingere	  that	   is	   to	  say	  of	  constructing,	   forming,	  giving	  shape’.78	  We	  have	  suggested	  that	   jurisdiction	  fulfils	   this	   function:	   it	   is	   the	   giving	   shape	   to	   law,	   the	   technê	   required	   to	   give	   the	   law	   a	  determinable	   form.	   This	   shaping	   and	   forming	   of	   the	   law	   takes	   place	   in	   an	   aporetic	  encounter	   between	   two	   legal	   registers:	   the	   positive	   law	   and	   the	   law	   before	   the	   law.	  Following	   Derrida’s	   insistence	   on	   the	   coincidence	   of	   the	   literary	   and	   the	   legal,	   as	   I	   have	  already	   suggested,	   this	   technicity	  might	   be	   best	   thought	   as	   being	   akin	   to	   the	  work	   of	   the	  poet	   or	   storyteller.	   I	   want	   to	   pursue	   this	   thought	   further	   through	   Nancy’s	   assertion	   that	  fiction	  lies	  at	  the	  root	  of	  jurisdiction,	  especially	  through	  his,	  rather	  playfully	  coined,	  notion	  of	  “juris-­‐fiction.”	  	  	  In	   A	   Finite	   Thinking,	   Nancy	   pursues	   the	   question	   of	   philosophy’s	   own	   juridical	   sense.79	  Nancy	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  juridical	  discourse	  –	  which	  he	  characterises	  as	  being	   essentially	   Roman	   or	   Latinate	   –	  has	   become	   synonymous	   with	   philosophy.	   This	  inclination	  towards	  a	  juridical	  thinking	  of	  philosophy	  reaches	  its	  height	  in	  Kant’s	  “tribunal	  of	   reason”	   where,	   ‘philosophy	   becomes	   legalism,	   an	   entirely	   formal,	   formalist,	   and	  procedural	  discourse’.80	  In	  this	  move	  towards	  a	  philosophical	  legalism,	  where	  philosophy	  is	  conceived	  along	  strictly	  juridical	  lines,	  the	  question	  of	  the	  basis	  for	  philosophy’s	  authority	  is	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  ways	  in	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  philosophy	  has	  taken	  the	  juridical	  as	  one	  of	  the	  its	  objects	  of	  study,	  rather	  the	  essay	  –	  Lapsus	  Judicii	  –	  assess	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  juridical	  has	  infected	  the	  philosophical,	  whereby	  philosophy	  apes	  the	  juridical	  form.	  	  80	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paramount.	   In	   this	   sense,	   Nancy	   enquires	   into	   philosophy’s	   own	   jurisdiction.	   As	   is	   well	  known,	   Kantian	   critique	   is	   a	   foundationalist	   endeavour:	   The	   Critique	   of	   Pure	   Reason	  attempts	   to	   offer	   the	   secure	   conditions	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   knowledge.	   Philosophy’s	  jurisdiction	   over	   knowledge,	   in	   the	   Kantian	   formulation,	   would	   be	   grounded	   on	  fundamental	   and	   immutable	   principles.	   Nancy,	   focusing	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   jurisdiction,	  pursues	   an	   anti-­‐foundationalist	   critique	   of	   Kant.	   He	   suggests	   that	   the	   quasi-­‐juridical	  foundations	  of	  philosophy	  are	  themselves	  no	  more	  than	  fictions;	  for	  Nancy	  ‘juris-­‐diction	  is	  or	  makes	  up	  juris-­‐fiction’.81	  	  	  As	  we	  suggested	  above,	  jurisdiction	  works	  to	  give	  shape	  to	  legality	  between	  the	  registers	  of	  formal	   and	   informal	   law.	   Crucial	   for	   Nancy’s	   assertion	   of	   the	   constitutive	   fictionality	   of	  jurisdiction	   is	   the	  notion	  of	   “the	   case.”	  The	   law	   is	   crafted	   through	   and	   in	   relation	   to	   each	  case	  and	  for	  Nancy	  this	  reveals	  a	  contingency	  in	  the	  claim	  made	  by	  law	  (or	  philosophy)	  to	  have	  a	   secure	   foundation.	  The	   judge	  –	  who	  holds	   the	  office	  of	   jurisdiction	  and	   is	   invested	  with	  the	  authority	  to	  speak	  the	  law	  –	  pronounces	  the	  law	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  contingent	  case.	  “Case”	  here	  has	  its	  root	  in	  casus	  meaning	  the	  fall	  through	  chance,	  accident	  or	  contingency.82	  The	  law	  is	  spoken	  and	  established	  through	  the	  contingency	  of	  the	  case	  and	  thus	  depends	  on	  a	   radical	   indeterminacy.	   As	   Nancy	   suggests,	   ‘the	   persona	   of	   the	   judge	   and	   his	   edictum	  [judgement]	  are	  forged	  by	  the	  same	  fictitious	  gesture:	  right	  is	  said	  here	  of	  the	  case	  for	  which	  there	  can	  be	  no	  prior	  right’.83	  The	  (contingent	  and	  constructed)	  case	  is	  the	  vehicle	  through	  which	   the	   law	  announces	   itself.	   The	   law,	   if	   it	   speaks	   through	   the	   contingency	  of	   the	   case,	  must	  itself	  by	  equally	  contingent.	  This	  insight	  underscores	  a	  fundamental	  juridical	  logic:	  the	  judgment,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  law,	  is	  only	  required	  when	  there	  can	  be	  no	  determination	  of	  fact.	   A	   case	   is	   heard	   and	   judgment	   given	  because	   it	   is	   unforeseen	   and	   represents	   a	   novel	  contingency.	   There	   is	   a	   ‘creative	   reaching	   out	   to	   a	   possibility	   beyond	   [the	   law’s]	  determinate	  existence’84	  that	  in	  being	  folded	  back	  into	  the	  interiority	  of	  the	  law	  creates	  the	  norm.	  There	   is,	   then,	  an	  essential	  need	   for	   technicity	  and	   figuration	   in	   the	  encounter	  with	  each	  case.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Ibid.,	  157	  82	  Ibid.,	  155	  83	  Ibid.,	  157.	  84	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick,	  “Juris-­‐fiction:	  Literature	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Law”	  Ariel:	  A	  Review	  of	  International	  
English	  Literature	  35(1-­‐2)	  (2004),	  221.	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This	  insistence	  on	  fictionality	  in	  the	  law’s	  operation	  is	  redoubled	  in	  the	  suggestion	  that	  the	  sovereign	   person	   who	   announces	   the	   law	   (and	   persona	   means	   “mask”)	   does	   so	   through	  artifice	  and	  theatre	  and	  significantly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  constitutive	  fiction:	  as	  if	  the	  speaker	  has	  authority	  to	  declare	  the	  law.	  Nancy	  argues:	  This	   (juridical)	   person,	   this	   persona	   is	   still	   one	   who	   formulates…	   the	   mask,	   personat,	   it	  amplifies	  the	  voice	  [of	  the	  law]	  and	  lets	  it	  be	  heard	  from	  afar…	  This	  power	  itself	  is	  artificial	  and	  theatrical:	  (the	  subject	  of)	  right	  is	  established	  –	  or	  stated	  –	  on	  a	  nothingness	  of	  being	  and	  nature.85	  The	  proclamation	  of	  law	  relies	  on	  a	  “fiction”	  of	  authority,	  a	  crafting	  and	  technicity	  that	  gives	  shape	   to	   its	   sovereign	   claim.	   By	   attending	   to	   the	   fictions	   and	   contingencies	   that	   are	  necessary	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   law	   a	   further	   fiction	   is	   revealed.	   Taken	   in	   its	   literal	  sense,	   jurisdiction	   suggests	   that	   the	   law	   speaks.	   A	   speaking	   entity	   is	   presumed	   to	   have	   a	  mouth	   and	   bodily	   integrity	   and	   so	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   a	   law	   that	   speaks	   presupposes	   a	  particular	  construction	  of	  the	  law	  as	  having	  a	  singular	  essence.	  As	  Douzinas	  suggests,	  ‘only	  a	  unique	  individual	  can	  speak	  the	  law…	  [and]	  it	  is	  because	  the	  law	  must	  have	  a	  mouth	  and	  a	  body	   that	   the	   great	   legislators	   –	   Moses,	   Solo,	   Lycurgus,	   Plato,	   Zarathustra	   –	   enter	   the	  stage’.86	  The	  law	  needs	  to	  co-­‐opt	  the	  mouth	  of	  the	  legislator	  and	  through	  artifice	  and	  theatre	  appear	  as	   if	   it	   is	  the	  law	  itself	  that	  speaks.	  But,	  of	  course,	  the	  law	  has	  no	  face,	  no	  body,	  no	  mouth.	  In	  appearing	  as	  if	  it	  does,	  the	  law	  seems	  to	  have	  a	  oneness	  and	  an	  integrity	  that,	  in	  fact,	   is	  a	   figuration	  made	  possible	  by	   the	  happenstance	  of	   the	  persona	  who	  speaks	  on	   the	  law’s	  behalf.	  	  	  	  The	   central	   importance	  of	   “the	   case”	   reveals	   a	   groundlessness	   to	   any	   jurisdictional	   claim.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  philosophy’s	  critical	  endeavour	  to	  account	  for	  the	  secure	  conditions	   of	   possibility	   for	   knowledge.	   By	   attending	   to	   the	   fiction	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  philosophy’s	  jurisdiction,	  Nancy	  reveals	  the	  non-­‐foundation	  at	  its	  heart.	  At	  bottom	  –	  as	  we	  have	   already	   asserted	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   common	   law	   –	  we	   are	   left	   only	   with	   fictions	   and	   the	  necessary	  work	  of	   fashioning	  meaning	   from	   the	   contingencies	   that	  befall	  us.	   Significantly,	  this	  fashioning	  itself	  is	  without	  foundation,	  rather	  it	  is	  guaranteed	  by	  artifice	  and	  theatre.	  	  	  All	   of	   this	   infers	   a	   restlessness	   to	   jurisdictional	   technê.	   Jurisdictional	   fashioning	   does	   not	  produce	   something	   final	   or	   integral,	   the	   focus	   on	   the	   case	   reminds	   us	   that	   the	   law	   is	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Nancy,	  A	  Finite	  Thinking,	  155.	  86	  Douzinas,	  “Metaphysics	  of	  Jurisdiction,”	  25	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matter	  of	  ongoing	  narration,	  there	  is	  an	  ineluctable	  desire	  for	  plot	  and	  narrative	  form	  in	  the	  law.	   As	   we	   saw	   in	   our	   earlier	   discussions,	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   common	   law	   jurisdiction	  depended	  –	   in	  part	  at	   least	  –	  on	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  historical	  narrative	   that	  posited	   the	  law’s	  origins	  in	  “time	  out	  of	  mind.”	  The	  notion	  of	  “plotting”	  is	  perhaps	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  our	  current	  concerns.	  A	  “plot”	  carries	  a	  number	  of	  meanings:	  a	  small	  piece	  of	  measured	  land	  with	  a	  specific	  purpose;	  a	  representation	  of	  such	  space,	  as	  in	  a	  plan,	  chart	  or	  diagram	  of	  a	  building	  or	  area;	   the	  events	   that	   constitute	   the	  action	  of	   a	  narrative	  drama;	  or	  a	   furtive	  scheme	  designed	  to	  accomplish	  a	  particular	  end.87	  We	  can	  conceive	  jurisdiction’s	  “plotting”	  in	   all	   of	   these	   respects.	   Jurisdiction	   plots	   out	   legal	   space	   and	   lays	   claim	   to	   territory	   but	  jurisdiction	   too	   is	   the	   name	   given	   to	   the	   resulting	   representation	   of	   such	   space.	   In	   our	  discussions	  of	  the	  narrative	  ambition	  of	  Coke	  et	  al	  the	  latter	  two	  senses	  of	  plotting	  are	  also	  revealed,	   in	   their	   quest	   to	   guarantee	   the	   supremacy	   of	   the	   common	   law,	   a	   narrative	  was	  needed,	   a	   plot	   was	   hatched	   and	   a	   narrative	   (plot)	   created	   to	   serve	   its	   ends.	   For	   literary	  theorist	  Peter	  Brooks,	  plot	  is	  ‘the	  organising	  line	  and	  intention	  of	  narrative…	  best	  conceived	  as	  an	  activity,	   a	   structuring	  operation	  elicited	   in	   the	  reader	   trying	   to	  make	  sense	  of	   those	  meanings	  that	  develop	  only	  through	  textual	  and	  temporal	  succession’.88	  In	  this	  sense,	  plot	  is	  not	  given	  by	  the	  narrative	  but	  constructed	  by	  the	  reader	  in	  a	  constitutive	  relation	  with	  the	  text.	  Plotting,	  then,	  is	  itself	  fictional	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  a	  process	  of	  fashioning	  meanings	  and	  significances:	  plot	  turns	  happenstance	  and	  coincidence	  into	  a	   logical	  and	  recognisable	  form.	  The	  aspect	  to	  jurisdiction	  that	  I	  have	  charted	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  aptly	  captured	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  plot	  and	  give	  shape	  to	  time,	  text	  and	  lawful	  life.	  Jurisdiction	  attempts	  to	  plot	  out	  a	  course	  for	  the	  law.	  But	  this	  plotting	  is	  without	  fixed	  foundation.	  As	  Brooks	  suggests,	  the	  plot	  is	  constructed	  by	  the	  reader	  of	  events,	  it	  is	  not	  presented	  a	  priori.	  The	  notion	  of	  juris-­‐fiction	  developed	   by	   Nancy	   reminds	   us	   that	   the	   plot	   constructed	   by	   jurisdiction	   could	   be	  otherwise,	  it	  is	  itself	  but	  part	  of	  the	  law’s	  ongoing	  construction.	  	  	  Jurisdiction	   names	   the	   artifice	   required	   to	   fashion	   a	   convincing	   and	   expedient	   narrative	  from	   a	   contingent	   set	   of	   circumstances	   and	   practices.	   The	   contingent	   act	   of	   creation	   in	  jurisdiction	   –	   particularly	   evidenced	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   common	   law	   –	   makes	  jurisdiction	  a	  privileged	  category	  in	  examining	  the	  ‘legitimate	  fictions’89	  that	  law	  evokes	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  The	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary.	  88	  Peter	  Brooks,	  Reading	  for	  the	  Plot:	  Design	  and	  Intention	  in	  Narrative	  (Cambridge	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1984),	  37.	  	  89	  Montaigne,	  Essays	  II,	  12	  quoted	  in	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law”	  (2009),	  183.	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guarantee	   its	  authority.	  Significantly,	   too,	   jurisdiction	  so	  conceived	  openly	  admits	   that	   the	  law	   is	   shaped	   by	   fictions	   and	   given	   voice	   through	   a	   creative	   processes	   of	   figuration	   and	  artifice.	  Juris-­‐fiction	  opens	  the	  law	  from	  within.	  As	  Fitzpatrick	  suggests,	  to	  abjure	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  law	  has	  a	  fully	  determinate	  content	  and	  is	  produced	  through	  figurative	  and	  fictional	  practices	   calls	   for	   ‘the	   responsive	   opening	   of	   that	   content	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   being	  otherwise’.90	  In	   the	   move	   from	   jurisdiction	   to	   juris-­‐fiction,	   a	   fragility	   to	   the	   law’s	   limit	  appears	   but	   this,	   in	   turn,	   opens	   the	   law	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   critical	   intervention	   and	  occupation.	  Juris-­‐fiction	  calls	  for	  us	  to	  plot	  the	  law	  anew.	  	  
	  
2.5	  Conclusion	  	  The	   journey	   from	   jurisdiction	   to	   juris-­‐fiction	   shift	   registers	   in	   at	   least	   two	   senses.	   Firstly,	  juris-­‐fiction	  privileges	  a	   relation	  between	   law	  and	   literature	  and	  underscores	   the	  creative	  work	   that	   the	   positing	   and	   consolidation	   of	   a	   jurisdiction	   requires.	  With	   the	   category	   of	  juris-­‐fiction	  we	  shift	  emphasis	  from	  the	  calculating	  precision	  of	  the	  inscription	  of	  the	  legal	  limit	  to	  a	  literary,	  poetic	  and	  consequently	  less	  stable	  mode.	  This	  in	  itself	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  law.	  The	   law	  endeavours	   to	  present	   its	  authority	  as	   the	  product	  of	  careful	  calculation	  and	  deduction,	  the	  law’s	  limits	  appear	  to	  be	  inscribed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  logical	  inference	  and	  precise	  mapping.	  This	  side	  to	  jurisdiction’s	  technê	  obscures	  another	  life	  to	  jurisdiction,	  its	  reliance	  on	  literary	  and	  narrative	  modes	  to	  craft	  legal	  authority.	  Secondly,	  juris-­‐fiction	  privileges	  the	  technological	  over	  the	  ontological.	  An	  inquiry	  into	  the	  practices	  of	  juris-­‐fiction	  is	  concerned	  less	  with	  what	  jurisdiction	  is	  and	  more	  with	  how	  jurisdiction	  goes	  about	  giving	  shape	  to	  the	  law.	   Such	   a	   shift	   away	   from	   ontology	   to	   technology	   embraces	   plurality	   and	   avoids	   the	  essentialist	  or	  overly	  abstracted;	  there	  are,	  as	  the	  saying	  goes,	  many	  ways	  to	  skin	  a	  cat.	   In	  this	   chapter	   I	   have	   charted	   one	   aspect	   of	   jurisdiction’s	  work,	   that	   of	   literary	   crafting	   and	  “fictioning”.	  	  	  A	   further	   claim	   that	   the	   chapter	  makes	   concerns	   the	   space	   in	  which	   this	   fashioning	   takes	  place.	   Following	   the	   structural	   analogy	   identified	   between	   the	   early	   modern	   and	  postmodern	  conceptions	  of	  law,	  I	  argued	  that	  jurisdiction’s	  technê	  takes	  place	  between	  two	  legal	   registers:	   the	   différantial	   law	   before	   the	   law	   and	   the	   positive	   law.	   Following	   both	  Nancy	  and	  Derrida	  we	  can	  characterise	  this	  prior	  law	  as	  an	  unstable	  and	  shifting	  matrix	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  Fitzpatrick,	  “Juris-­‐fiction:	  Literature	  and	  the	  Law	  of	  the	  Law”	  Ariel:	  A	  Review	  of	  International	  
English	  Literature	  35(1-­‐2)	  (2004),	  225.	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(social)	   relations	   that	   cannot	   be	   fully	   determined	   or	   defined.	   In	   the	   early	   modern	  characterisation,	   this	   originary	   sociability	  was	  defined	  by	   reference	   to	  divine	   law	  and	   the	  category	  of	   allegiance.	   In	  both	   cases	   the	  work	  of	   jurisdiction	   takes	  place	   in	   the	  encounter	  between	   this	   register	   and	   the	   calculating	   and	  determinate	   imperative	   of	   the	  positive	   law.	  The	  encounter	  between	  these	  two	  legal	  registers	  is	  aporetic	  in	  nature,	  it	  blocks	  a	  route	  and	  denies	   a	   resolution.	  However,	   this	   encounter	   demands	   negotiation,	  we	  must	   –	   as	  Derrida	  reminds	   us	   –	  calculate	   with	   the	   incalculable.	   Juris-­‐fiction	   might	   be	   the	   most	   apt	   term	   to	  capture	  this	  impossible	  task.	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Chapter	  3	  
	  
JURISDICTION:	  PERFORMATIVITY	  AND	  RESPONSIBILITY	  	  	  Nancy	  doesn’t	  say	  much	  about	  “betting”…	  yet	  I	  perceive	  him	  as	  a	  thinker	  of	  the	  bet	  and	  a	  player	  –	  or	  rather	  like	  a	  bettor,	  a	  desperate	  bettor,	  that	  is:	  he	  never	  stops	  stalking,	  committing,	  committing	  himself,	  and	  doing	  anything	  to	  calculate	  some	  hyperbolic	  odds	  with	  exactitude	  as	  well	  as	  exaggeration.	  He	  does	  this	  without	  any	  expectations,	  counting	  neither	  on	  the	  gains	  of	  some	  Pascalian	  “wager”	  nor	  on	  any	  salvation.	  (Jacques	  Derrida)1	  	  	  
3.1	  Introduction	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  assessed	  the	  way	  in	  which	  jurisdiction	  crafts	  a	  sense	  of	  legality	  through	   the	   use	   of	   narrative	   and	   fictional	   devices.	   Derrida’s	   assessment	   of	   the	   co-­‐appearance	   of	   the	   literary	   and	   the	   legal	   prompted	   a	   characterisation	   of	   jurisdiction	   as	   a	  creative	  and	  technological	  practice	  that	  gives	  shape	  to	  the	  law.	  Though	  not	  without	  its	  own	  force	   and	   efficacy,	   such	   jurisdictional	   technê	   was	   presented	   as	   being	   radically	   contingent	  and	   therefore	   open	   to	   intervention	   and	  disruption.	   In	   this	   chapter	  we	   explore	   a	   different	  aspect	  to	  –	  and	  bring	  a	  different	  set	  of	  deconstructive	  strategies	  and	  concepts	  to	  bear	  on	  –	  jurisdiction.	  Here	  the	  coup	  de	  force	  of	  a	  jurisdictional	  moment	  is	  assessed.	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  pursue	   the	   notion	   that	   jurisdiction	   is	   a	   foundational	   moment,	   a	   declaration	   of	   law	   and	  authority	   that	  establishes	  a	  political	   and	   legal	   community.	   In	   this	   sense	   jurisdiction	   is	   the	  law’s	   originary	  moment,	   the	   performative	   rupture	   that	   declares	   legal	   authority	   and	   gives	  voice	   to	   a	   particular	   community.	  As	   such,	  we	  might	   not	   only	   cast	   jurisdiction	   as	   ‘the	   first	  question	  of	  law’2	  but	  also	  the	  originary	  legal	  speech	  act	  that	  declares	  that	  there	  is	  law	  at	  all.	  Thinking	  of	   jurisdiction	  in	  this	  mode	  prompts	  –	  at	   first	  blush	  –	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  and	  concerns:	  who	  speaks	  and	  thus	  founds	  the	  law?	  How	  and	  why	  does	  such	  a	  declaration	  have	  the	   efficacy	   to	   found	   the	   law?	  On	  whose	  behalf	   does	   such	   a	  declaration	   speak	   and	  whose	  voices	   might	   be	   obscured	   or	   ignored	   in	   this	   founding	   moment?	   It	   is	   through	   Derrida’s	  understanding	   of	   the	   performative	   speech	   act	   and	   his	   short	   text	   on	   the	   American	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  On	  Touching	  –	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  309.	  2	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction,	  5.	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Declaration	  of	  Independence	  that	  I	  address	  some	  of	  these	  issues.	  However,	  the	  chapter	  also	  inquiries	   into	   an	  ethics	   and/or	  politics	  of	   responsibility	   that	   such	  a	   foundational	  moment	  might	  engender.	  Through	  Derrida’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  performative	  utterance,	  I	  suggest	  that	   the	   foundational	   declaration	   is	   always	   calling	   for	   a	   response,	   counter-­‐signature	   or	  (re)affirmation.	   The	   foundational	   speech	   act	   of	   jurisdiction,	   then,	   infers	   questions	   of	  responsibility.	  The	  task	  of	  assessing	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  responsibility	  is	  taken	  up	  in	  the	  latter	  parts	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  The	   chapter	   brings	   these	   theoretical	   preoccupations	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   founding	   declaration,	  made	   by	   the	   anti-­‐Gaddafi	   movement	   in	   Libya	   in	   February	   2011,	   that	   established	   the	  National	  Transitional	  Council	   for	  Libya	  (NTC).	   I	   turn	  to	  this	  event	   for	  two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  this	  declaration	  is	  a	  means	  through	  which	  we	  can	  assess	  the	  theoretical	  claims	  developed	  in	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  the	  performative.	  Secondly,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  this	  declarative	  act	  engendered	   responses	   from	   a	   number	   of	   leading	   continental	   intellectuals	   including	   Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  name	  of	  “political	  responsibility”	  that	  Nancy	  makes	  his	  intervention	  in	  response	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Libya.	  The	  declaration	  and	  the	  subsequent	  response	  it	  provoked	  are	  a	  privileged	  series	  of	  events	  through	  which	  we	  can	  assess	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  declarative	  act	   that	   lays	  claim	  to	   found	   legal	  and	  political	  authority	  and	   the	  responsibility	  that	  such	  a	  claim	  might	  inspire.	  	  	  In	  accounting	  for	  the	  “metaphysics	  of	  jurisdiction,”	  Douzinas	  suggests	  that	  jurisdiction	  –	  in	  its	   foundational	   mode	   –	   elides	   two	   distinct	   speaking	   voices:	   the	   voice	   of	   the	   subject	   of	  enunciation	  and	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  subject	  of	  statement.	  Most	  clearly	  identified	  in	  constitution-­‐making,	  jurisdiction	  confuses	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  constitution	  (the	  legislative	  or	  administrative	  body	  that	  writes	  the	  constitution	  itself)	  and	  the	  voice	  of	  some	  higher	  entity	  for,	   or	   on	   whose	   behalf,	   the	   declaration	   is	   made	   (“all	   men,”	   “God”	   or	   “the	   people”	   of	   a	  particular	  nation).	  We	  can	   refer	   to	   the	  actual	   authors	  of	   the	   constitution	  as	   the	   subject	  of	  enunciation	   and	   the	   higher	   authority	   (God	   or	   the	   people)	   as	   the	   subject	   of	   statement.	  Douzinas	   argues	   that	   crucial	   to	   the	   structure	   of	   jurisdiction	   is	   a	   constitutive	   confusion	  between	  these	  two	  voices.	  In	  particular	  this	  manifests	  as	  a	  commingling	  of	  the	  universal	  and	  the	  particular:	  the	  universal	  “All	  men	  are	  born	  free	  and	  equal”	  of	  the	  French	  Declaration	  of	  the	  Rights	  of	  Man	  and	  Citizen	  are	  rights	  that	  are	  only	  applicable	  in	  the	  particular;	  that	  is,	  to	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the	  French	  citizens	  to	  whom	  the	  declaration	  refers.3	  This	  coming	  together	  of	   the	  universal	  and	  the	  particular,	  along	  with	  the	  simultaneously	  descriptive	  and	  performative	  utterance,	  is	  what	  produces	  jurisdiction’s	  sort	  after	  effect.	  In	  unpicking	  the	  confusions	  and	  synecdoches	  that	  jurisdiction	  performs	  Douzinas	  underscores	  the	  aurality	  of	  jurisdiction.	  In	  attending	  to	  jurisdiction’s	  acoustic	  effects,	  Douzinas	  counsels	  attentive	  listening:	  ‘we	  must	  open	  our	  ears,	  prick	   up	   our	   ears,	   develop	   an	   active	   hearing	   when	   listening	   to	   the	   law’. 4 	  A	   critical	  engagement	  with	  the	  law	  must	  involve	  an	  attempt	  to	  hear	  through	  ‘the	  ear	  of	  the	  other	  and	  confront	  the	  community	  of	  the	  sovereign	  One	  and	  All	  with	  the	  plurality	  of	  many	  ears’.5	  This	  chapter	  hopes	   to	   listen	  with	   the	  ear	  of	   the	  other,	  always	  with	   the	  purpose	  of	   interrupting	  the	  sovereign	  claim	  to	  unity	  and	  essentialism	  that	  declarative	  foundations	  so	  often	  reveal.	  	  	  
3.2	  The	  Performative	  Speech	  Act	  and	  the	  Declarative	  Foundation	  Speaking	  in	  1976	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Virginia	  in	  Charlottesville	  Derrida	  prefaced	  a	  lecture	  on	   Nietzsche	   with	   some	   remarks	   on	   The	   American	   Declaration	   of	   Independence.	   In	   this	  brief	   text	   –	  subsequently	   published	   in	   Negotiations	   (2002)	   as	   “Declarations	   of	  Independence”	  –	  Derrida	  assesses	  the	  status	  of	  “the	  people”	  as	  the	  sovereign	  guarantor	  of	  the	   constitution.	   Derrida	   asserts	   that	   the	   people	   is	   not	   only	   indeterminate	   and	   internally	  differentiated	   but	   also	   temporally	   deferred	   and	   so	   can	   never	   be	   presented	   as	   such.	   This	  clearly	  troubles	  the	  narrative,	  so	  beloved	  by	  constitutionalists,	  that	  State	  law	  is	  legitimated	  by	   the	  people’s	   authority	   as	  pouvoir	  constituant.	   But	  Derrida	   is	   not	   exclusively	   concerned	  with	  disavowing	  the	  putative	  “foundations”	  of	  the	  state	  or	  state	  institutions.	  His	  reading,	  by	  excavating	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  on	  which	  these	  “foundations”	  rest,	  seeks	  to	  displace	  the	  economy	  which	  keeps	  them	  in	  place.	  The	  timing	  of	  the	  text’s	  presentation	  is	  significant.	  Not	   only	   is	   1976	   the	   bicentenary	   of	   the	   American	   Declaration	   of	   Independence	   but	   also	  comes	  only	  a	  year	  before	  Derrida’s	  infamous,	  and	  extensive,	  rejoinder	  to	  (American	  analytic	  philosopher	   of	   language)	   John	   Searle’s	   criticisms	   of	   Derrida’s	   essay	   on	   J.	   L.	   Austin,	  “Signature	   Event	   Context”.6	  It	   is	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Derrida’s	   engagement	   with	   speech	   act	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Douzinas,	  “Metaphysics	  of	  Jurisdiction,”	  24	  4	  Ibid.,	  31.	  5	  Ibid.	  6	  Derrida’s	  “Signature	  Event	  Context”	  was	  first	  presented	  in	  1971	  at	  a	  conference	  on	  the	  theme	  of	  “communication”	  and	  later	  published	  in	  Marges	  de	  la	  Philosophy	  (1972).	  The	  first	  English	  translation	  appeared	  in	  Glyph	  in	  1977.	  In	  a	  second	  volume	  of	  Glyph	  from	  1977	  John	  R.	  Searle	  published	  a	  response	  to	  Derrida’s	  essay	  entitled	  “Reiterating	  the	  Differences:	  A	  Reply	  to	  Derrida”.	  Derrida	  countered	  Searle’s	  salvo	  with	  a	  70	  page	  essay:	  “Limited	  Inc	  a	  b	  c…”.	  Derrida’s	  two	  essays	  are	  collected	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theory	   that	   “Declarations”	   should	   be	   read.7	  I	   want	   to	   put	   these	   concerns	   in	   conversation	  with	   aspects	   of	   Spectres	   of	   Marx,	   Derrida’s	   most	   explicitly	   politically	   text	   written	   fifteen	  years	  or	   so	   later.	  Here,	  Derrida	   returns	   to	   the	  performative	  utterance	   –	   a	   term	  coined	  by	  Austin	   –	   connecting	   it	   to	   his	   (Derrida’s)	   own	   deconstruction	   of	   metaphysics.	   Key	   to	   his	  thinking	  of	  the	  performative	  in	  Spectres	  of	  Marx	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  “conjuration”	  or	  “conjuring”	  and	  it	  is	  to	  this	  motif	  that	  we	  shall	  also	  attend.	  	  	  In	  a	  reading	  of	  these	  three	  texts,	  then,	  I	  pursue	  two	  concerns.	  Firstly	  the	  inscription	  of	  the	  à	  
venir	   into	   the	   performative	   utterance	   and,	   secondly,	   the	   effect	   of	   conjuration	   in	   the	  performative	   declarative	   act.	   Derrida	   maintains	   a	   strict	   distinction	   between	   the	   à	   venir	  (literally	  “the	  to	  come”)	  and	  the	  future:	  the	  former	  is	  unpredictable	  and	  unprogrammable,	  naming	  the	  unforeseen	  coming	  of	   the	  other;	   the	   latter	   is	  understood	  as	  a	  re-­‐casting	  of	   the	  present,	   the	   projection	   of	   present	   thinking	   into	   a	   future	   that	   is	   nothing	   more	   than	   a	  “present-­‐future”.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   à	   venir	   calls	   forth	   a	   certain	   impossibility	   and	  unkowability.	  The	  notion	  of	   “conjuration”	   is	   something	   that	  Derrida	   focuses	  on,	  and	  plays	  with,	   throughout	   Spectres	   of	   Marx.	   “Conjuration”	   invokes	   multiple	   senses	   but	   most	  significant	   for	   our	   current	   discussion	   is	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   the	   performative	   declaration	  
conjures	   entities	   such	   as	   “the	   people”	   or	   “nation”	   that,	   because	   they	   are	   temporally	  ambiguous,	   have	   a	   ghostly	   or	   spectral	   form.	   The	   key	   issue	   that	   I	   pursue	   here	   is	   that	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  the	  American	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  depends	  on	  understanding	  a	  wider	  concern	  with	  an	  underlying	  temporal	  logic.	  Both	  the	  à	  venir	  and	  “conjuration”	  work	  to	  displace	  an	  economy	  of	   time	  that	   is	  predicated	  on	  the	  presence	  of	   the	  speaking	  subject	  (whether	   collective	   or	   individual)	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   law	   created	   by	   the	   subject’s	  enunciation	  in	  a	  jurisdictional	  moment.	  It	  is	  this	  concern	  to	  disrupt	  an	  economy	  of	  presence	  that	   is	  crucial	   to	  understanding	   the	  scope	  of	  responsibility	   that	  a	   founding	  moment	  might	  provoke.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  in	  Limited	  Inc,	  ed.	  Gerald	  Graff	  (Evanston:	  Northwestern	  University	  Press,	  1988).	  Searle	  declined	  to	  have	  his	  essay	  included	  in	  the	  collection.	  	  7	  In	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  assessment	  of	  “Declarations”	  Jacques	  de	  Ville	  pursues	  this	  same	  route,	  offering	  a	  close	  reading	  of	  this	  essay	  in	  relation	  to	  “Signature	  Event	  Context”.	  The	  reading	  I	  develop	  here	  differs	  from	  de	  Ville	  in	  at	  least	  two	  important	  respects:	  firstly,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  temporal	  category	  of	  the	  à	  venir	  is	  absent	  from	  de	  Ville’s	  reading;	  and	  secondly,	  the	  relevance	  of	  Spectres	  of	  
Marx	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  “conjuration”	  is	  not	  discussed.	  See	  Jacques	  de	  Ville,	  Jacques	  Derrida:	  Law	  as	  
Absolute	  Hospitality	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2011),	  43-­‐73.	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3.2.1	  The	  performative:	  Derrida	  reading	  Austin	  J.	   L.	   Austin’s	  How	  To	  Do	  Things	  With	  Words	   –	   posthumously	   reproducing	   a	   lecture	   series	  delivered	  in	  1955	  at	  Harvard	  –	  develops	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  performative	  utterance.	  Austin’s	  deceptively	   simple	   assertion	   that	   utterances	   have	   effects	   beyond	   describing	   facts	   in	   the	  world	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   a	   wealth	   of	   literature.	   Most	   notably	   the	   development	   of	   Austin’s	  notion	  of	  the	  performative	  utterance	  in	  relation	  to	  gender	  and	  performance	  studies.8	  Whilst	  intriguing	   connections	   remains	   in	   the	   various	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   performative	   has	   been	  taken-­‐up	  and	  re-­‐worked,	  the	  fortunes	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “performativity”	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	   the	  present	  chapter.9	  Here	  we	  should	   limit	  ourselves	   to	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  How	  To	  Do	  
Things	  With	  Words	   before	   we	   bring	   this	   thinking	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   jurisdictional	   founding	  moment.	  	  	  The	  performative	  utterance,	  by	  being	  spoken,	  does	  something,	  it	  performs	  something	  in	  its	  being	  spoken.	   In	   the	   first	   lecture	  of	   the	  series,	  Austin	  distinguishes	   the	  performative	   from	  the	  constantive	  utterance,	  the	  latter	  being	  the	  paradigmatic	  utterance	  of	  analytic	  philosophy	  and	   science	   that	   makes	   truth	   claims	   about	   things	   in	   the	   world.	   Austin’s	   examples	   of	  performatives	   include:	   “I	  do”	   in	  a	  marriage	   ceremony;	   “I	  name	   this	   ship	  Queen	  Elisabeth”	  when	  the	  bottle	  is	  smashed	  against	  the	  stern;	  “I	  bequeath	  my	  brother	  my	  watch”	  in	  a	  will;	  and	  “I	  bet	  you	  sixpence	   it	  will	   rain	   tomorrow.”10	  In	  all	   instances,	   the	  utterances	  cannot	  be	  assessed	  for	  validity	  –	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  these	  statements	  are	  “true”	  or	  ”false”	  –rather	   Austin	   suggests	   that	   we	   can	   only	   assert	   the	   “felicity”	   or	   “infelicity”	   of	   such	  statements.	  The	  felicity	  of	  a	  statement	  depends	  on	  the	  context	  in	  which	  a	  statement	  is	  made,	  for	  a	  performative	  utterance	  to	  have	  its	  proper	  effect	  six	  criteria	  must	  be	  met:	  (i)	  there	  must	  be	  a	  certain	  convention	  surrounding	  the	  use	  of	  the	  words;	  (ii)	  the	  appropriate	  persons	  and	  circumstances	  must	  be	  present	  in	  a	  particular	  case;	  (iii)	  the	  procedure	  must	  be	  executed	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  It	  is	  perhaps	  Judith	  Butler’s	  work	  in	  this	  area	  that	  has	  gained	  most	  currency.	  Butler	  takes	  up	  the	  notion	  of	  performativity,	  suggesting	  (to	  put	  things	  crudely)	  that	  the	  construction	  of	  gender	  is	  achieved	  through	  a	  performance	  of	  a	  particular	  gender	  role.	  For	  Butler	  “performativity”	  refers	  both	  to	  the	  theatrical	  inference	  of	  the	  term	  and	  the	  Austinian	  notion	  discussed	  here.	  Through	  particular	  gestures	  and	  acts,	  a	  gender	  identity	  is	  performed	  much	  like	  an	  actor	  performs	  a	  role	  in	  a	  play,	  but	  so	  too	  does	  the	  performativity	  of	  gender	  suggest	  that	  gender	  is	  not	  some	  fact	  in	  the	  world	  that	  can	  be	  described	  in	  a	  constative	  statement	  but	  is	  achieved	  through	  a	  performativity	  that	  has	  effects.	  See	  Judith	  Butler,	  Gender	  Trouble:	  Feminism	  and	  the	  Subversion	  of	  Identity	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2008)	  and	  Judith	  Butler,	  Bodies	  That	  Matter:	  On	  The	  Discursive	  Limits	  of	  Sex	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993).	  	  9	  For	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  performative	  in	  Derrida,	  Austin,	  Butler	  and	  performance	  studies	  see	  J.	  Hillis	  Miller,	  For	  Derrida	  (New	  York:	  Fordham	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  133-­‐173.	  	  10	  J.	  L.	  Austin,	  How	  to	  Do	  Things	  with	  Words,	  2nd	  Edition,	  ed.	  J.	  O.	  Urmson	  and	  Marina	  Sbisà	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1980),	  5.	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all	  participants	  correctly	  and	  (iv)	  completely;	  (v)	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  participants	  must	  be	  commensurate	   with	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   procedure;	   and	   (vi)	   the	   participants	   must	   act	   in	  accordance	   with	   these	   intentions. 11 	  The	   performative,	   for	   Austin,	   is	   tied	   to	   these	  conventions	   and	   infers	   a	   degree	   of	   seriousness	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   speaker:	   an	   actor	  performing	  on	  stage,	  for	  example,	  nullifies	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  a	  performative	  because	  of	  its	  non-­‐serious	   character.12	  As	   should	   be	   clear,	   the	   felicity	   of	   a	   performative	   is	   importantly	  connected	  to	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  speaker.	  	  	  Austin’s	   key	   insight,	   and	   one	   to	   which	   Derrida	   subscribes,	   is	   that	   language	   has	   effects	  beyond	   the	   dissemination	   of	   truths	   of	   falsities:	   language	   performs	   and	   produces	   affects.	  Furthermore,	   Austin’s	   theory	   of	   performative	   utterances	   suggests	   that	   meaning	   can	   be	  context-­‐dependent:	   the	   felicity	   of	   a	   performative	   depends	   on	   the	   presence	   of	   certain	  circumstantial	   conditions.	   This	   suggests	   that	  meaning	   is	   not	   attached	   in	   an	   intractable	   or	  permanent	  way	  to	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  signs,	  marks	  or	  sounds.	  The	  meaning	  and	  effect	  of	  an	  Austinian	  performative	  depends	  on	  the	  context	  in	  which	  an	  utterance	  is	  made.	  In	  “Signature	  Event	  Context”	  Derrida	  argues,	  through	  the	  examination	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  “iterability”	  of	  language,	   that	   this	   context-­‐dependence	   is	   a	   constitutive	   feature	   of	   all	   utterances.	   For	  Derrida,	   iterability	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   all	   communication.	  We	  might	   define	  iterability	   as	   repetition	   in	   difference	   or,	   perhaps	   more	   accurately,	   the	   possibility	   of	  repetition	  in	  alterity.	  As	  Derrida	  suggests,	  iterability	  (probably)	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  ‘itara,	  other	  in	  Sanskrit	  and…	  [“Signature	  Event	  Context”]	  can	  be	  read	  as	  the	  working	  out	  of	  the	  logic	  that	  ties	  repetition	  to	  alterity’.13	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  the	  repetition	  in	  alterity	  of	  an	  utterance	  in	  the	  (necessarily)	  possible	  absence	  of	  the	  speaker	  or	  author	  of	  that	  utterance	  is	  what	  makes	  meaningful	   communication	   possible.	   If	   I	   repeat	   the	   same	   word	   twice,	   for	   example,	   the	  second	   iteration	   is	   necessarily	   altered	   by	   the	   first,	   so	  whilst	   the	   repetition	   of	   exactly	   the	  same	  word	  must	   be	   conditioned	   by	   repeatability	   in	   general,	   the	   repetition	   is	   also	   tied	   to	  difference	  for	  in	  being	  repeated	  the	  word	  is	  altered	  through	  the	  changed	  context	  in	  which	  it	  is	   situated.	   This	   possibility	   of	   both	   repeating	   and	   differing	   is,	   for	   Derrida,	   what	   makes	  communication	  possible;	  and	  this	  is	  iterability.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Austin,	  How	  to	  Do	  Things	  With	  Words,	  14-­‐15.	  12	  Ibid.,	  22.	  13	  Derrida,	  Limited	  Inc,	  7.	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Derrida	  argues	  that	  in	  his	  examination	  of	  performatives	  Austin	  touches	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  this	  fundamental	  structure	  but	  then	  dismisses	  its	  importance,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  falls	  outside	  the	  proper	  bounds	  of	  his	  study.	  Austin	  suggests	  that	  a	  performative	  will	  only	  have	  effect	  if	  the	  six	  conditions	  outlined	  above	  are	  met.	  Derrida	  argues	  that,	  though	  Austin	  acknowledges	  that	  there	  is	  a	  possibility	  that	  a	  performative	  might	  not	  conform	  to	  such	  a	  schema,14	  Austin	  fails	   to	   see	   the	   radical	   consequences	   of	   this	   insight.	   Contra-­‐Austin,	   Derrida	   argues	   that	  infelicity	  must	  be	  a	  (necessary)	  possibility	  of	  all	  performative	  utterances:	  	  Austin’s	  procedure	  is	  rather	  remarkable…	  it	  consists	  in	  recognizing	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  negative	   (in	   this	   case,	   of	   infelicities)	   is	   in	   fact	   a	   structural	   possibility,	   that	   a	   failure	   is	   an	  essential	   risk	   of	   the	   operations	   under	   consideration;	   then	   in	   a	   move	   which	   is	   almost	  
immediately	  simultaneous,	  in	  the	  names	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  ideal	  regulation,	  it	  excludes	  that	  risk	  as	  accidental,	   exterior,	   one	   which	   teaches	   us	   nothing	   about	   linguistic	   phenomenon	   being	  considered.15	  Derrida	   suggests	   that	   the	   risk	   that	   a	   performative	   is	   not	   felicitous	   must	   be	   structurally	  
integral	   to	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   for	   the	   felicitous	   speech	   act.	   Austin	   dismisses	   the	  infelicitous	   performative	   as	   an	   aberration,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   use	   of	   a	   performative	   in	   a	  non-­‐serious	   way	   (such	   as	   in	   a	   play	   or	   as	   a	   joke)	   is	   ‘parasitic	   upon	   its	   normal	   usage’.16	  Significantly	  Austin	  excludes	  this	  parasitic	  form	  of	  the	  performative	  from	  consideration.	  For	  Derrida	  that	  which	  Austin	  excludes	  is	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	   any	   utterance,	   whether	   a	   performative	   or	   not.	   Derrida	   suggests	   that	   what	   Austin	  excludes	   as	   ‘anomaly,	   exception	   [or]	   “non-­‐serious	   citation’	   is	   precisely	   what	   reveals	   a	  ‘general	   citionality	   –	  or	   rather,	   a	   general	   iterability	   –	   without	   which	   there	   could	   be	   no	  “successful”	   performative’.17	  For	   Austin’s	   operative	   distinction	   between	   the	   felicitous	   and	  the	  infelicitous	  to	  hold	  there	  must	  be	  a	  presupposition	  of	  a	  prior	  movement	  –	  or	  iterability	  –	  that	  makes	  such	  distinctions	  possible.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  key	  consequences	  of	  this	  reading	  is	  the	  privilege	  that	  is	  afforded	  to	  “context”	  and	  the	   process	   of	   “contextualisation”	   in	   the	   determination	   of	  meaning.	   Iterability	   infers	   that	  every	   utterance	   can	   be	   re-­‐inscribed	   in	   a	   potentially	   infinite	   number	   of	   contexts.	   But	   for	  Derrida	   these	   contexts	   are	   devoid	   of	   any	   orientating	   centre.	   In	   this	   sense,	   Derrida	  radicalises	  Austin	  and	  rather	  than	  determining	  the	  strict	  criteria	  that	  properly	  contextualise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Austin,	  How	  to	  Do	  Things	  With	  Words,	  19-­‐19.	  15	  Derrida,	  Limited	  Inc,	  15.	  16	  Austin,	  How	  to	  Do	  Things	  With	  Words,	  22.	  	  17	  Derrida,	  Limited	  Inc,	  17.	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a	   performative,	   asserts	   that	   all	   contexts	   are	   themselves	   contingent.	   There	   are,	   Derrida	  maintains,	  ‘only	  contexts	  without	  any	  centre	  or	  absolute	  anchoring’.18	  This	  focus	  on	  context	  removes	   the	  dominance	  of	   intention	   in	   the	  production	  of	  meaning.	   Iterability	   forces	  us	   to	  construct	  a	  new	  schema	  where	  ‘the	  category	  of	  intention	  will	  not	  disappear;	  it	  will	  have	  its	  place,	  but	  from	  that	  place	  it	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  govern	  the	  entire	  scene	  and	  system	  of	  utterance’.19	  The	   context-­‐dependent	   nature	   of	   the	   performative	   is	   maintained	   by	   Derrida	  but	  the	  sovereign	  power	  of	  intention	  is	  removed.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  most	  clearly	  illustrated	  in	  the	  following	  example:	  
At	  the	  very	  moment	  “I”	  make	  a	  shopping	  list,	  I	  know…	  that	  it	  will	  only	  be	  a	  list	  if	  it	  implies	  my	  absence,	   if	   it	  already	  detaches	   itself	   from	  me	   in	  order	   to	   function	  beyond	  my	  “present”	  act	  and	  if	  it	  is	  utilizable	  at	  another	  time,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  my	  being-­‐present-­‐now…	  in	  a	  moment,	  but	  one	  which	  is	  already	  the	  following	  moment,	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  now	  of	  writing.20	  Communicable	   utterances	   (whether	   written	   or	   spoken)	   have	   a	   life	   outside	   that	   in	   which	  they	   were	   originally	   circumscribed.	   Intention	   is	   traditionally	   tied	   to	   a	   metaphysics	   of	  presence:	  intention	  is	  privileged	  because	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  statement	  is	  generally	  thought	  to	  be	  connected	  to	  the	  present	  thoughts	  of	  a	  speaker	  or	  author.	  But,	  as	  Derrida’s	  description	  of	  writing	  the	  shopping	  list	   illustrates,	  presence	  is	  always	  divided.	  The	  written	  mark,	  even	  in	  the	  very	  (“present”)	  moment	  in	  which	  it	  is	  written,	  must	  be	  able	  to	  function	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  author.	  Intention,	  though	  relevant,	  cannot	  be	  the	  centre	  point	  around	  which	  meaning	  orientates,	  rather,	  meaning	  is	  produced	  through	  a	  context	  that	  is	  without	  centre.	  It	  is,	  in	  fact,	  the	   absence	   of	   a	   centre	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   present	   ground	   that	   is	   the	   condition	   of	  possibility	   for	   any	   meaningful	   communication	   at	   all.	  21	  As	   will	   be	   clear,	   in	   the	   context	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Derrida,	  Limited	  Inc,	  12	  	  19	  Ibid.,	  18.	  20	  Ibid.,	  Limited	  Inc,	  49.	  21	  In	  a	  critique	  of	  Derrida’s	  notion	  of	  performatvity,	  Elena	  Loizidou	  suggests	  that	  Derrida	  remains	  bound	  within	  an	  intentional	  structure	  where	  the	  performative	  is	  only	  given	  effect	  through	  the	  presupposition	  of	  a	  present	  speaking	  subject.	  For	  Loizidou,	  it	  is	  Butler’s	  notion	  of	  performativity	  that	  escapes	  this	  paradigm:	  in	  Butler	  there	  is	  no	  subject	  prior	  to	  the	  performative,	  rather	  it	  is	  the	  performative	  that	  itself	  creates	  the	  subject.	  Whilst	  Loizidou	  points	  to	  many	  important	  developments	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  performativity	  pursued	  by	  Butler	  –	  especially	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Butler	  radicalises	  and	  expands	  Derrida’s	  thinking,	  moving	  the	  performative	  beyond	  speech	  and	  writing	  to	  a	  performativity	  of	  the	  body	  –	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  submitted,	  misses	  the	  mark.	  Loizidou’s	  reading	  fails	  to	  account	  for	  the	  significance	  of	  Derrida’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  subject	  holds	  a	  de-­‐centred,	  non-­‐sovereign	  position	  because	  of	  the	  iterability	  of	  utterances.	  Furthermore,	  as	  we	  will	  discuss	  below,	  Derrida	  makes	  the	  very	  point	  attributed	  here	  to	  Butler,	  that	  the	  performative	  (declaration)	  is	  precisely	  what	  creates	  the	  (collective)	  subject	  in	  the	  American	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.	  In	  short,	  Loizidou	  fails	  to	  put	  Derrida’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  performative	  in	  a	  wider	  context	  of	  Derrida’s	  displacement	  of	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  presence	  that	  conditions	  Austin’s	  text.	  See	  Elena	  Loizidou,	  Judith	  Butler:	  Ethics,	  Law,	  
Politics	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  30-­‐42.	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constitutionalism	   or	   in	   terms	   of	   broader	   questions	   of	   foundational	   or	   declarative	   acts	   in	  general,	  Derrida’s	   insistence	   on	   the	   iterability	   of	   language	   suggests	   that	   the	  meaning	   of	   a	  performative	   declaration	   (that	   founds	   an	   institution	   or	   even	   the	   law	   itself)	   cannot	   be	  	  exclusively	   tied	   to	   the	   present	   intentions	   of	   the	   speakers	  who	  make	   the	   declaration.	   The	  meaning	  and	  effect	  of	  a	  declaration	   is	  not	  closed	  or	  unified	  but	  opens	   itself	   to	  a	  response.	  Every	   utterance	   conforms	   to	   this	   same	   logic:	   because	   of	   the	   necessarily	   open	   nature	   of	  every	  utterance,	  each	  utterance	  calls	  for	  a	  response	  ad	  infinitum	  that	  tries,	  in	  vain,	  to	  affirm	  the	  unity	  of	  each	  utterance.	  	  Derrida’s	   suggestion	   is	   that	   a	   close	   reading	   of	   Austin	   reveals	   the	   need	   to	   account	   for	   a	  “general	  citionality”	  or	  “general	  iterability”	  as	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  all	  utterances.	  Austin	   dismisses	   this	   possibility	   because	   such	   an	   iterability	   undermines	   the	   sovereign	  intention	  of	   the	  present	   speaker	  of	   an	  utterance.	   If	   every	  utterance	   is	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  general	  possibility	  of	  iteration	  in	  infinite	  contexts	  then	  any	  absolute	  claim	  to	  the	  propriety	  of	  an	  utterance	   is	  meaningless.	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	  Austin	   is	  grounded	  on	  a	  disquiet	  with	  the	  temporal	  economy	  that	  Austin	  readily	  –	  perhaps	  unthinkingly	  –	  accepts.	  The	  presence	  of	  the	   speaking	   subject	  with	  her	  present	  intention	   is	  privileged	  over	   the	  absent,	  differed	  and	  deferred	   iterability	   that	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   such	   “presence.”	   Clearly,	   this	  “presence”	   is	   compromised	   by	   the	   iterability	   that	   Derrida	   identifies;	   some	   purported	  “presence”	  can	  offer	  no	  absolute	  ground	  or	  centre	  for	  a	  context.	  Iterability	  leaves	  utterances	  anchored	  only	   in	  contexts	  without	  absolute	  grounding.	  Let	  us	  pursue	  the	  consequences	  of	  this	  reading	  a	   little	   further	   in	  relation	  to	  Derrida’s	  reading	  of	   the	  American	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.	  	  	  
3.2.2	  Declarations	  to	  come	  (à	  venir)	  “Declarations	   of	   Independence”	   (hereafter	   “Declarations”)	   turns	   on	   two	   questions	   that	  centre	  on	  law’s	  foundational	  moment:	  ‘who	  signs,	  and	  with	  what	  so-­‐called	  proper	  name,	  the	  declarative	   act	   that	   founds	   an	   institution?’22	  The	   signature	   is	   crucial	   for	   the	   efficacy	   of	   a	  performative	  –	  in	  Austin’s	  terms	  –	  because	  it	  is	  this	  that	  guarantees	  the	  requisite	  intention	  and	  contextual	  schema	  are	  in	  place.	  Clearly,	  a	  forged	  signature	  or	  a	  signature	  offered	  by	  the	  wrong	   party	   will	   void	   the	   effect	   of	   a	   performative.	   Unlike	   the	   truth	   of	   a	   scientific	   (or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Derrida,	  “Declarations	  of	  Independence”	  in	  Negotiations:	  Interviews	  and	  Interventions	  1971-­‐2001,	  trans.	  Elizabeth	  Roudinesco	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  47.	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constantive)	  statement,	  the	  value	  and	  effect	  of	  a	  performative	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  author	  and	  signer	  of	   that	  statement.	  The	  signature,	   then,	   is	   that	  which	  anchors	   the	  context	  of	   the	  performative	  and	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  founding	  act.	  The	  signature	  fulfils	  the	  same	   effect	   of	   guaranteeing	   the	   authority,	   unity	   and	   legitimacy	   of	   an	   utterance	   as	   the	  
presence	  of	  a	  speaker	  does	  in	  the	  case	  of	  oral	  utterances.23	  The	  signature,	  then,	  identifies	  the	  “source”	  of	  an	  utterance.	  But	  Derrida	  argues	  that	  the	  signature	  is	  not	  immune	  from	  the	  logic	  of	   iterability	   that	   “Signature	   Event	   Context”	   develops.	   The	   signature’s	   effect	   lies	   in	   its	  iterability	   and	   therefore	  must	   imply	   the	   ‘actual	   or	   empirical	   nonpresence	   of	   the	   signer’.24	  The	  repeatability	  of	  a	  signature,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  signature	  must	  be	  repeatable	   in	  order	   to	  function,	  disrupts	  the	  presence	  and	  authority	  of	  a	  “present”	  signature.	  	  	  Turning	   to	   The	   American	   Declaration	   of	   Independence	   itself,	   this	   is	   signed	   by	   the	  representatives	  of	  the	  United	  States	  of	  America	  in	  General	  Congress;	  they	  sign,	  ‘in	  the	  name	  
and	  by	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   good	  people…	  of	   these	   united	   states’.25	  The	   signature,	   however,	  bears	   a	   trace	   of	   some	   other	   name	   or	   collective.	   The	   “good	   people”	   must	   exist	   in	   the	  signature	  of	  the	  representatives;	  it	  is	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  good	  people	  that	  the	  representatives	  sign.	  This	   trace,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   “good	  people”	  must	   in	   some	  sense	   inhabit	   the	   signature,	  presents	  a	   confusion.	  Derrida	  asks	  whether	   the	  declaration	  suggests	   that	   the	  good	  people	  are	  free	  (have	  freed	  themselves)	  and	  are	  now,	  by	  signing	  –	  or	  at	  least	  having	  others	  sign	  on	  their	  behalf	  –	  simply	  describing	  their	  freedom?	  Or	  is	  it	  that	  in	  the	  very	  act	  of	  signature	  their	  freedom	   is	   established?	   The	   former	   is	   a	   constative	   statement,	   a	   description	   of	   a	   state	   of	  affairs,	   whereas	   the	   latter	   is	   a	   performative	   act	   that	   ‘does	   what	   is	   says	   it	   does’.	   Derrida	  suggests,	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  his	  rejection	  of	  Austin’s	  strict	  categorization,	  that	  both	  are	  at	  work:	  ‘this	  obscurity,	  this	  undecidiablity	  between,	  let	  us	  say,	  a	  performative	  structure	  and	  a	  constative	  structure,	  is	  required	  to	  produce	  the	  sought-­‐after	  effect’.26	  	  	  The	  signature	  is	  paradoxically	  both	  descriptive	  (of	  an	  already	  existing	  state	  of	  affairs)	  and	  performative	  (establishing	  a	  state	  of	  affairs).	  The	  sort-­‐after	  effect	  of	  the	  declaration	  lies	   in	  the	   instability,	   or	   undecidibility,	   between	   the	   performative	   and	   constative	   initiated	   by	  iterability.	  As	  Derrida	  strikingly	  puts	  it,	  before	  the	  representatives	  sign,	  “the	  people,”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Austin,	  How	  to	  Do	  Things	  with	  Words,	  60-­‐61.	  24	  Derrida,	  Limited	  Inc,	  20.	  25	  Derrida,	  “Declarations,”	  49.	  26	  Ibid.	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Do	  not	   exist	   as	   an	  entity,	   the	  entity	  does	  not	   exist	  before	   this	  declaration,	  not	  as	  such.	   If	   it	  gives	  birth	  to	  itself,	  as	  free	  and	  independent	  subject,	  as	  possible	  signer,	  this	  can	  hold	  only	  in	  the	  act	  of	  the	  signature.	  The	  signature	  invents	  the	  signer.27	  This	  suggests	  that,	  though	  there	  may	  be	  a	  primary	  affirmation	  of	  an	  already	  existing	  unity	  and	  freedom,	  it	  is	  only	  in	  the	  act	  of	  signature	  that	  that	  existence	  and	  freedom	  can	  be	  said	  to	  exist	   as	   such.	   Derrida	   leaves	   us	  with	   an	   aporia:	   the	   representatives	   sign	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	  people	  but	  “the	  people”	  does	  not	  exist	  before	  the	  signature.	  The	  representatives	  can	  only	  be	  thought	  to	  represent	  something	  after	  the	  signature	  itself.	  Everything	  happens	  ex	  post	  facto.	  The	  authority	  of	  the	  people	  is	  conjured	  through	  a	  retroactive	  affirmation	  and	  so	  the	  people	  as	   guarantor	   of	   the	   constitution	   is	   caught	   in	   temporal	   flux.	   Like	   Derrida	   as	   he	   pens	   his	  shopping	   list,	   the	   people,	   at	   the	  moment	   they	   are	   supposedly	   present	   in	   the	   declaration,	  necessarily	  infer	  their	  radical	  absence;	  they	  are	  only	  able	  to	  persist	  as	  a	  spectral	  trace	  of	  a	  future	   affirmation.	  Derrida	   expresses	   a	   similar	   sentiment	   in	   his	   later	  work	   on	  democracy	  and	  sovereignty	  where	  he	  suggests	  that:	  Before	  any	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  state,	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  of	  the	  monarch,	  or	  in	  democracy,	  of	  the	  people,	  ipseity	  names	  a	  principle	  of	  legitimate	  sovereignty,	  the	  accredited	  or	  recognized	  supremacy	  of	  a	  power	  or	  a	  force,	  a	  kratos	  or	  cracy.28	  
Devant	  le	  mot,	   there	  is	  a	  certain	  origniary	  affirmation	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  people	  that	  then	  persists	  as	  a	  trace	  in	  the	  later	  performative	  that	  claims	  to	  establish	  that	  sovereignty	  as	  such.	   The	   signature	   evokes	   a	   strange	   temporal	   play	   where	   we	   become	   aware	   of	   the	  existence	  of	  the	  capacity	  to	  sign	  –	  the	  capacity	  that	  gives	  the	  people	  the	  ability	  to	  nominate	  representatives	   capable	   of	   signing	   on	   their	   behalf	   –	   only	   ever	   retrospectively.	   This	  retroactivity,	   calls	   for	   a	   response,	   the	   unsigned	   primary	   affirmation	   of	   sovereign	   ipseity	  
devant	  le	  mot	  (itself	  a	  “signature”	  of	  sorts)	  desires	  to	  be	  acknowledged	  by	  the	  other.	  	  The	  primary	  affirmation	  of	  “we	  are	  the	  people	  and	  we	  are	  free	  to	  nominate	  representatives”	  is	   clearly	  prior	   to	   the	   signature	   that	   performs	   that	   affirmation	   and	   establishes	   it	   as	   such.	  This	   prior	   affirmation,	   however,	   is	   always	   to	   come	   –	   it	   can	   only	   be	   considered	   to	   be	   a	  primary	  affirmation	  if	  mediated	  through	  a	  secondary	  statement	  of	  a	  signature.	  But	  in	  order	  to	   have	   its	   desired	   effect,	   this	   future	   perfect,	   Derrida	   writes,	   ‘should	   not	   be	   declared,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Ibid.	  28	  Derrida,	  Rogues:	  Two	  Essays	  on	  Reason,	  trans.	  Pascale-­‐Anne	  Brault	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  13.	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mentioned,	  taken	  into	  account…	  it	  is	  as	  though	  it	  did	  not	  exist’.29	  The	  formal	  structure	  of	  the	  foundational	  event,	  necessarily	  (re)inscribing	  a	  primary	  affirmation,	  inscribes	  the	  “to-­‐come”	  into	  fabric	  of	  that	  moment	  and	  thus	  displaces	  that	  moment’s	  pure	  presence.	  The	  signature,	  as	  the	  performative	  par	  excellence,	  puts	  time	  out	  of	  joint,	  it	  creates,	  as	  J.	  Hillis	  Miller	  has	  put	  it,	   ‘an	   absolute	   rupture	   between	   the	   present	   and	   the	   past…	   [it]	   inaugurates	   a	   future	   that	  Derrida	   calls	   a	   future	   anterior…	   an	   unpredictable	   à-­‐venir’.30	  The	   signature,	   then,	   has	   a	  simultaneous	   forward	   and	   backward	   pull.	   Implicit	   in	   this	   understanding	   of	   the	   signature	  (that	  is,	  that	  it	  at	  once	  belies	  a	  trace	  and	  holds	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  à	  venir)	  is	  that	  it	  calls	  for	  a	  response.	  If	  the	  written	  sign	  is	  inscribed	  with	  a	  certain	  “to-­‐come-­‐ness”	  then	  it	  calls	  for	  us	  to	  come	  to	  it	  and	  affirm	  it.	   In	  short,	  the	  signature	  calls	  for	  a	  countersignature.	  Hillis	  Miller	  refers	   to	   this	  as	  a	   ‘co-­‐performative…	  [that	  validates]	  a	  performative	  command	   that	  comes	  from	   outside	   me’	   illustrating	   how	   the	   one	   performative	   engenders	   another. 31 	  This	  requirement	   of	   the	   countersignature	   is	   inferred	   by	   the	   essential	   iterability	   of	   language.	  Iterability	   guarantees	   the	   necessary	   possibility	   of	   the	   radical	   absence	   of	   the	   author	   in	   an	  utterance	   and	   this	   necessary	   possibility	  means	   that	   the	   unity	   of	   every	   utterance	  must	   be	  affirmed	  by	  the	  other	  in	  an	  act	  of	  countersignature.32	  This	  process,	  however,	  cannot	  stop	  at	  one	   countersignature.	   Each	   countersignature’s	   unity	  must	   be	   affirmed	   and	   guaranteed	  by	  an	  other’s	  countersignature	  and	  this	  process	  can	  run,	  as	  Derrida	  says	  of	   the	  countryman’s	  interminable	  delay	  in	  Kafka’s	  parable	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  until	  the	  end	  of	  (the)	  man.33	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  countersignature	  is	  always	  to	  come	  and	  thus	  is	  an	  opening	  of	  the	  future	  itself.	  The	  iterability	   of	   the	  written	   or	   spoken	   sign	   that	   guarantees	   the	   necessary	   possibility	   of	   that	  sign’s	   infinite	   re-­‐inscription	   in	   infinite	   contexts	   also	  means	   that	   the	   countersignature	   that	  affirms	  the	  sign	  must	  open	  itself	  to	  infinite	  re-­‐inscription	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  	  	  This	  interminable	  chain	  of	  signification	  is	  acknowledged	  by	  Derrida	  in	  the	  final	  passages	  of	  “Declarations	  of	  Independence”:	  It	   is	   still	   “in	   the	   name	   of”	   that	   “the	   good	   people”	   of	   America	   call	   themselves	   and	   declare	  
themselves	   independent	   at	   the	   moment	   at	   which	   they	   invent	   (for)	   themselves	   a	   signing	  identity.	  They	  sign	   in	   the	  name	  of	   the	   laws	  of	  nature	  and	   in	   the	  name	  of	  God.	  They	  posit…	  their	   institutional	  Laws	  on	   the	   foundation	  of	  natural	   laws	  and	  by	   the	  same	  “coup”…	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Derrida,	  “Declarations,”	  50.	  	  30	  J.	  Hillis	  Miller,	  For	  Derrida,	  152.	  31	  Ibid.,	  153.	  	  32	  Geoffrey	  Bennington,	  Jacques	  Derrida	  (Chicago,	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  55-­‐56	  33	  Derrida,	  “Before	  the	  Law,”	  204.	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name	  of	  God,	  creator	  of	  nature.	  He	  comes…	  to	  guarantee	  the	  rectitude	  of	  popular	  intentions…	  He	  founds	  natural	  laws.34	  The	  representatives	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States	  sign	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  people	  but	  the	  people	  themselves	  claim	  the	  authority	  to	  sign	  in	  the	  name	  of	  natural	  laws	  and	  in	  the	  name	  of	  God.	   The	   representative’s	   signature	   (or	   should	   we	   say	   countersignature)	   is	   made	   in	   the	  name	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States	  but	  the	  people	  themselves	  sign	  their	  claim	  to	  rights	  and	   freedom	   etcetera	   in	   the	   name	   of	   God,	   thus	   making	   their	   signature,	   in	   turn,	   a	  countersignature.	  We	   can	   begin	   to	   see	   the	   impact	   of	   Derrida’s	   claim	   that	   ‘there	   are	   only	  countersignatures	  in	  this	  process’35.	  Every	  signature	  is	  signed,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  an	  other	  –	  the	  signature	   is	  made	   in	   the	   name	  of	   the	   people,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   representatives,	   or	   in	   the	  name	  of	  God,	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	  people.	  As	  every	  signature	  becomes	  countersignature,	   the	  proper	  names	  of	  “the	  people,”	  “the	  representatives,”	  “Jefferson”	  et	  al	  disappear.	  The	  name	  is	  no	   longer	   proper	   (from	   the	   Latin	  proprius	   “own”)	   because	   the	   name	  belongs	   to	   an	   other,	  written	  in	  the	  name	  of	  an	  other.	  God,	  then,	  stands	  as	  the	  only	  proper	  name	  guaranteeing	  all	  the	  (counter)signatures	  that	  have	  been	  given	  in	  the	  process.	  	  	  This	   chain	   of	   multiple	   representations,	   where	   countersignature	   is	   written	   onto	  countersignature,	  ad	   infinitum,	   all	   the	  way	   to	   God,	   echoes	   the	   infinite	   deferral	   implicit	   in	  Kafka’s	   “Before	   the	   Law”.36	  Who	   signs?	   A	   signer	   is	   possible,	   but	   not	   yet.	   The	   end	   of	  “Declarations	  of	  Independence”	  casts	  Jefferson	  as	  the	  countryman	  who,	  rather	  than	  wanting	  entrance	   to	   the	   law,	   desires	   to	   sign	   the	   law	   in	   his	   own	   name.	   These	   are	   difficulties	   that	  Jefferson	  had	  not	  expected,	  surely	  everyone	  can	  sign	  in	  their	  own	  name?	  Jefferson’s	  desire	  to	   found	   the	   institution	   in	  his	  own	  name,	   is	   forever	  deferred	  because	  he	   is	  only	  capable	  of	  signing	  as	   a	   representative	  –	  he	   is,	   as	  Derrida	  writes,	   ‘a	   representative	  of	   representatives	  who	   themselves	   represent	   to	   infinity,	   up	   to	   God,	   other	   representative	   instances’.37	  This	  infinite	  deferral	  speaks	  of	  desire	  itself	  because	  it	   is	   in	  the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  “to	  come”	  that	  we	  experience	  desire	  as	  such;	  in	  this	  sense	  the	  sexual	  inference	  of	  the	  “to	  come”	  should	  not	  be	   overlooked.	   As	   Derrida	   acknowledges	   in	   “Signature	   Event	   Context,”	   ‘desires	   and	  phantasms’38	  are	  clearly	  at	  stake	  in	  a	  signature,	  a	  proper	  name,	  or	  a	  copyright.	  The	  signature	  speaks	   of	   the	   desire	   to	   name,	   the	   desire	   to	   secure	   a	   source,	   to	   found	   in	  my	  own	  name	   an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Ibid.	  	  35	  Ibid.	  36	  Franz	  Kafka,	  “Before	  the	  Law”	  in	  The	  Complete	  Short	  Stories	  (London:	  Vintage,	  1999),	  3-­‐4.	  37	  Derrida,	  “Declarations,”	  52.	  	  38	  Derrida,	  Limited	  Inc,	  36.	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institution,	  but	  Derrida’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  signature	  in	  “Declarations	  of	  Independence”	  also	  forecloses	  that	  possibility,	  leaving	  us	  only	  with	  the	  infinite	  deferral	  of	  the	  doorkeeper’s	  	  “not	  yet.”	  	  As	  I	  have	  been	  suggesting,	  this	  desire	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  demand	  of	  the	  signature	  is	  tied	  to	  the	   structural	   conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	   the	  performative.	  Derrida’s	   claim	   that	   ‘there	  are	  only	   countersignatures	   in	   this	   process’	   rings	   true	   because	   of	   the	   disruptive	   force	   of	  iterability	   that	   structures	   the	   performative.	   The	   primary	   affirmation	   is	   an	   unwritten,	   un-­‐enunciated	  signature	  but	  a	  signature	  nonetheless.	  This	  “signature”	  can	  only	  be	  seen	  as	  such	  when	  a	  written	  signature	  is	  made.	  But	  this	  second	  signature	  cannot	  be	  fully	  present	  and	  so	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  countersignature,	   the	   trace	  of	   the	  primary	  signature	   then	   lives	   through	  this	  countersignature	  and	  each	  countersignature	  calls,	  in	  turn,	  for	  another	  countersignature	  thus	  opening	  the	  signature	  to	  the	  à	  venir.	  The	  signature,	  then,	  belies	  the	  à	  venir:	  in	  the	  very	  moment	  of	  foundation	  there	  must	  be	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  “to	  come”	  that	  is	  not	  predictable	  or	  programmable	  but	  wholly	  other.	  Because	  of	  the	  persistence	  of	  a	  more	  primary	  affirmation,	  because	  of	  the	  necessary	  implication	  of	  a	  countersignature	  in	  the	  signature,	  because	  of	  the	  ‘absolute	   rupture	   between	   past	   and	   present’ 39 	  that	   the	   performative	   engenders,	   the	  institution	  belies	  the	  “to	  come”	  in	  its	  very	  moment	  of	  foundation.	  	  	  One	  consequence	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  that	  the	  supposed	  presence	  of	  the	  jurisdictional	  moment	  that	   founds	   the	   law	   and	   gives	   voice	   to	   a	   political	   community	   is	   a	   myth	   created	   by	  metaphysics.	   The	   founding	   moment	   is	   conditioned	   by	   a	   prior	   generalised	   movement	   of	  iterability	   that	  disrupts	   the	  sovereign	   intention	  of	  declaration’s	  authors	  or	  signers.	  Rather	  than	  providing	  an	  anchor	  for	  a	  particular	  community,	  the	  jurisdictional	  declaration	  reveals	  the	   groundlessness	   to	   that	   community’s	   claim.	   The	   foundation,	   however,	   is	   not	   without	  effects.	  There	   is	  a	   rent	   in	   temporal	   succession	   that	   is	   created	  by	  such	  a	  moment,	  one	   that	  opens	   the	   community	   or	   order	   that	   the	   foundation	   hopes	   to	   secure	   to	   an	   unpredictable	  future	  that	  calls	  for	  response	  and	  responsibility.	  	  	  	  
3.2.3	  Conjuring	  the	  declaration	  Let	   us	   turn	   back	   to	   the	   strange	   effect	   that	   the	   declarative	   speech	   act	   has;	   let	   us	   note	   the	  conjuring	  trick	  it	  performs.	  As	  Patrick	  Hannafin	  has	  noted,	  the	  author	  of	  the	  constitution	  –	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  J.	  Hillis	  Miller,	  For	  Derrida,	  152.	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like	  the	  author	  of	  a	  novel	  –	  ‘endeavours	  to	  create	  an	  image	  of	  something	  that	  does	  not	  really	  exist’.40	  Be	  it	  “the	  people”	  or	  “the	  nation,”	  the	  performative	  act	  of	  declaration	  creates,	  as	  if	  by	  magic,	   an	   entity	   that	   does	   not	   exist	   before	   the	   declaration	   is	   made.	   In	   the	   American	  Declaration	   of	   Independence,	   “the	   people”	   is	   created	   as	   if	   it	   were	   a	   unified	   totality:	   “the	  people”	  that	  express	  their	  freedom	  from	  British	  colonial	  rule	  are	  conjured	  into	  being	  by	  this	  performative	   act.	   Conjuration	   here	   has	   multiple	   senses	   to	   which	   Derrida	   himself	   pays	  particular	   attention	   in	   Spectres	   of	   Marx.41	  The	   word’s	   earliest	   known	   usage	   in	   English	  reflects	  its	  Latin	  etymology,	  conjurare,	  meaning	  to	  “swear	  together	  or	  make	  an	  oath”	  (com-­‐	  “together”	  and	   jurare	   “to	  swear”).	  Conjuration	  might	  suggest	  conspiracy,	  magic	  and	  tricky.	  But,	   as	   the	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  points	   out,	   it	   also	  means	   the	   ‘effecting	   of	   something	  supernatural	   by	   the	   invocation	   of	   a	   sacred	   name	   or	   by	   the	   use	   of	   some	   spell…	   the	  performance	  of	  magical	  art	  or	  sleight	  of	  hand’.42	  Conjuring	  also	  summons	  a	  devil	  or	  spirit	  to	  appear	   to	   do	   one’s	   bidding.	   In	   Spectres	   of	   Marx	   Derrida	   summons	   the	   ghosts	   of	   Marx	  himself.	  The	  conjuration	  (or,	  conspiracy)	  against	  Marxism	  and	  Marxian	  dogma	  engenders	  a	  conjuration	  of	  Marxism,	  of	  a	  certain	  spirit	  of	  Marxism.43	  It	  is	  a	  ghostly	  Marxism	  that	  Derrida,	  the	  conjurer,	  himself	   creates.	  As	  Derrida	  says,	   the	   thing	   that	   this	  conjuration	  summons	   is,	  ‘neither	   living	   nor	   dead,	   present	   nor	   absent:	   it	   spectralizes’.44	  This	   ghostly	   impression	   of	  Marx	  does	  not	  submit	  to	  ontology	  but	  must	  be	  thought,	  in	  Derrida’s	  formulation,	  in	  terms	  of	  
hauntology.	  Derrida	   calls	   this	   spectralizing	  work	  a	   ‘performative	   interpretation,	   that	   is,	   an	  interpretation	   that	   transforms	   the	   very	   thing	   that	   it	   interprets’	   and,	  perhaps	  understating	  things	   somewhat,	   notes	   that	   this	   understanding	   of	   the	   performative	   is	   ‘unorthodox	   with	  regard	   to	   speech	   act	   theory’.45	  The	   conjuring	   trick	   that	   Derrida	   performs:	   summoning	   a	  ghostly	   impression	   of	   the	   spirit	   of	   Marx	   that	   is	   neither	   living	   nor	   dead,	   is	   a	   constitutive	  element	  of	  the	  Derridian	  performative.	  Derrida	  as	  conjurer:	  perhaps	  we	  have	  a	  sense	  here	  of	  why	  deconstruction	  might	  refer	  to	  a	  certain	  sense	  of	  the	  impossible.46	  The	  swearing	  of	  an	  oath,	   the	   promissory	   statement	   that	   calls	   for	   affirmation,	   conjures	   ghosts	   and	   spirits	   for	  which	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  account.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Patrick	  Hanafin,	  “Constitutive	  Fiction:	  Postcolonial	  Constitutionalism	  in	  Ireland”	  Penn	  State	  
International	  Law	  Review,	  20	  (2001),	  343.	  	  41	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Spectres	  of	  Marx:	  The	  State	  of	  Debt	  and	  the	  Work	  of	  Mourning,	  Trans.,	  Peggy	  Kamuf	  (Oxford:	  Routledge,	  1994),	  62-­‐63.	  	  42	  The	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary.	  	  43	  Derrida,	  Spectres	  of	  Marx,	  62.	  44	  Ibid.,	  63.	  45	  Ibid.,	  63	  (my	  emphasis).	  	  46	  Nicholas	  Royle,	  “What	  is	  Deconstruction?”	  in	  Deconstructions:	  A	  User’s	  Guide,	  ed.	  Nicholas	  Royle	  (London:	  Palgrave,	  2000),	  11.	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  The	  first	  chapter	  of	  Spectres	  of	  Marx	  opens	  with	  the	  final	  passages	  of	  Act	  I,	  scene	  v	  of	  Hamlet	  where	  Hamlet	  forces	  Horatio	  and	  Marcellus	  to	  swear	  to	  remain	  silent	  about	  the	  apparition	  of	   the	   ghost	   of	   Hamlet’s	   father	   to	   which	   they	   just	   borne	   witness.	   The	   status	   of	   their	  obligation	  as	  an	  oath	  –	  as	  something	  that	  is	  guaranteed	  by	  swearing	  –	  is	  crucial	  for	  Hamlet:	  	   Hamlet:	  Never	  make	  known	  what	  you	  have	  seen	  tonight.	  	   Horatio	  and	  Marcellus:	  My	  lord,	  we	  will	  not	  	   Hamlet:	  Nay,	  but	  swear’t	  	   Horatio:	  In	  faith,	  my	  lord,	  not	  I	  	   Marcellus:	  Nor	  I,	  my	  lord,	  in	  faith	  	   Hamlet:	  Upon	  my	  sword	  	  	   Marcellus:	  We	  have	  sworn,	  my	  lord,	  already.	  	   Hamlet:	  Indeed,	  upon	  my	  sword,	  indeed	  	   Ghost	  (crying	  from	  under	  the	  stage):	  Swear47	  The	  oath	  (‘never	  to	  speak	  of	  this	  that	  you	  have	  seen’)	  is	  read	  and	  they	  swear	  to	  keep	  their	  promise,	  they	  swear	  again	  before	  Hamlet	  dismisses	  them.	  Derrida	  let’s	  the	  oath	  hang	  over	  
Spectres	   of	  Marx,	   standing	   as	   a	   reminder	   of	   the	   very	   promise	   that	   Derrida’s	   engagement	  with	  Marx	  intends	  to	  break.	  There	  is	  always	  a	  threat	  associated	  with	  speaking	  of	  the	  ghost	  but	  Derrida’s	  injunction	  to	  the	  scholar	  of	  today	  is	  to	  let	  the	  ghost	  speak,	  to	  live	  with	  ghosts	  and	  to	  be	  just	  with	  that	  which	  is	  ‘beyond	  the	  living	  present	  in	  general’.48	  In	  letting	  the	  ghost	  speak	   and	   in	   his	   refusal	   to	   be	   silent	   on	   the	   question	   of	   the	   ghost	   throughout	   Spectres	   of	  
Marx,	  Derrida	  is	  breaking	  this	  oath	  of	  silence.	  	  	  The	  conjuring	  performative	  that	  summons	  the	  ghost	  always	  wishes	  to	  remain	  silent	  about	  its	  conjuring:	  the	  ghost	  ‘seeks	  an	  essentially	  blind	  submission	  to	  his	  secret’.49	  This	  enforced	  silence	   that	   the	   ghost	   demands	   –	   remember	   that	   it	   is	   the	   ghost,	   speaking	   from	  under	   the	  stage,	  who	  echoes	  Hamlet’s	  demand	  to	  swear	   the	  oath	  of	  silence	  –	   is	  not	  dissociated	   from	  the	  work	  of	  mourning.	  Derrida	  reminds	  us	  that	  in	  unearthing	  ghosts	  and	  in	  accounting	  for	  them	  we	  are	  ‘first	  of	  all,	  mourning’	  and	  throughout	  Spectres	  of	  Marx	  ‘we	  will	  be	  speaking	  of	  nothing	   else’.50	  Mourning	   for	   Derrida	   is	   impossible	   work,	   it	   is	   the	   attempt	   to	   ontologise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  William	  Shakespeare,	  The	  Tragedy	  of	  Hamlet	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  Act	  I,	  scene	  v,	  149-­‐157.	  48	  Derrida,	  Spectres	  of	  Marx,	  xix	  49	  Ibid.,	  8.	  50	  Ibid.,	  9	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remains,	  the	  impossible	  attempt	  to	  make	  present	  a	  lost	  object.	  The	  silence	  that	  accompanies	  the	   work	   of	   mourning	   is	   part	   of	   the	   logic	   of	   mourning	   –	   as	   Derrida	   comments	   in	   his	  introduction	  to	  Nicholas	  Abraham	  and	  Maria	  Torok’s	  celebrated	  work	  on	  the	  subject,51	  the	  topographical	  structure	  of	  mourning	  is,	  	  Disposed	   as	   to	   disguise	   and	   to	   hide:	   something,	   always	   a	   body	   in	   some	   way.	   But	   also	   to	  disguise	  the	  act	  of	  hiding…	  the	  crypt	  [that	  place	  Abraham	  and	  Torok	  identify	  as	  the	  mourned	  object’s	  location	  within	  the	  psyche]	  hides	  as	  it	  holds.52	  	  We	  are	  never	  too	  far	  away	  from	  an	  awareness	  of	  this	  structure	  of	  mourning	  in	  Spectres	  of	  
Marx.	   As	   Derrida	   argues,	   the	   triumphalism	   of	   Fukuyama’s	   The	   End	   of	   History	   and	   the	  celebrations	  associated	  with	  the	  so-­‐called	  “death”	  of	  Marxism	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  conform	  to	  what	  Freud	  assigned	  to:	  The	   so-­‐called	   triumphant	   phase	   of	  mourning	  work.	   The	   incantation	   repeats	   and	   ritualizes	  itself…	   Marx	   is	   dead,	   communism	   is	   dead,	   and	   along	   with	   it	   its	   hopes,	   its	   discourse,	   its	  theories,	  and	  its	  practices.53	  Derrida	  is	  constantly	  shaking	  Marx’s	  crypt,	  calling	  out	  the	  ghost	  of	  Marxism	  or	  summoning	  the	  ghosts	  of	  a	  certain	  promise	  within	  Marxism.	  Undoing	  the	  silencing	  work	  associated	  with	  mourning	  is	  essential	  to	  Derrida’s	  work	  here.	  I	  would	  add	  that	  deconstruction	  in	  general	  (if	  we	   can	   think	   of	   such	   a	   thing)	   is	   always	   bound	   up	   with	   the	   strange	   fact	   of	   mourning:	  deconstruction	  gives	  voice	  to	  traces	  and	  spectres,	  working	  through	  what	  gets	  left	  behind	  by	  people,	  utterances	  and	  institutions.	  Deconstruction	  is	  always	  disturbing	  the	  silence	  of	  that	  the	  crypt	  demands.54	  	  Derrida	  is	  all	  too	  aware	  of	  the	  demand	  that	  the	  ghost	  makes	  for	  silence	  but	  he	  is	  unwilling	  to	  kowtow	   to	   the	   threat	   that	   ghost	   makes.	   This	   demand	   for	   silence	   about	   the	   ghost	   is	   not	  absent	  from	  the	  American	  Declaration	  of	  Independence.	  As	  Derrida	  suggests,	  the	  logic	  that	  animates	  the	  declaration,	  that	  summons	  up	  an	  image	  of	  “the	  people,”	  instigated	  by	  the	  self-­‐authorizing	  power	  of	   the	  signature,	   ‘should	  not	  be	  declared,	   taken	   into	  account…	  [it]	   is	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Nicholas	  Abraham	  and	  Maria	  Torok,	  The	  Wolf	  Man’s	  Magic	  Word:	  A	  Cryptonymy	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1986).	  52	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Fors:	  The	  Anglish	  Words	  of	  Nicolas	  Abraham	  and	  Maria	  Torok.	  A	  Foreword	  to,	  Nicolas	  Abraham	  and	  Maria	  Torok,	  The	  Wolf	  Man’s	  Magic	  Word:	  A	  Cryptonymy	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1986),	  xiv	  (my	  emphasis).	  53	  Derrida,	  Spectres	  of	  Marx,	  64.	  54	  Derrida	  notes	  in	  his	  essay	  “The	  Time	  is	  Out	  of	  Joint”	  that	  ‘the	  question	  of	  mourning…	  is	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  deconstruction’.	  See	  Deconstruction	  is/in	  America:	  A	  new	  Sense	  of	  the	  Political,	  (New	  York,	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  21.	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though	  it	  did	  not	  exist’.55	  The	  American	  Declaration	  of	  Independence,	  structured	  by	  the	  logic	  of	   the	   à	   venir,	   makes	   a	   pledge	   or	   an	   oath	   and	   this	   oath	   conjures	   into	   being	   a	   ghostly	  apparition	  of	  “the	  people”.	  But	  this	  fact	  must	  remain	  silent	  –	  the	  declarative	  act	  is	  structured	  by	  the	  as	  if	  that	  we	  cannot	  question:	  as	  if	  by	  declaring	  or	  writing	  a	  people	  become	  free,	  as	  if	  “the	  people”	  as	  a	  unified	  entity	  exists	  at	  all.	  This	  silencing	  of	  the	  ghost	  effect	  is	  partly	  what	  gives	  the	  foundation	  its	  “mystical”	  character:	  we	  are	  left	  thinking	  that	  the	  conjuration	  of	  the	  people	   is	   something	   that	   we	   cannot	   speak	   of	   and	   therefore	   about	   which	   must	   remain	  silent.56	  As	   an	   antidote	   to	   this	   thinking,	   deconstruction	   undoes	   the	   structures	   that	   create	  this	  silence	  and	  tries	  to	  give	  voice	  to	  that	  of	  which	  we	  are	  told	  we	  cannot	  speak.	  	  	  The	   ghostly	   impression	   of	   “the	   people”	   feigns	   a	   unity	   that	   does	   not	   exist.	   Derrida’s	  suggestion	  in	  “Declarations	  of	  Independence”	  is	  that	  “the	  people”	  that	  are	  summoned	  by	  the	  conjuring	  trick	  of	  the	  performative	  declaration	  are	  but	  traces	  of	  a	  more	  primary	  expression	  of	  freedom	  and	  independence.	  The	  declarative	  act	  hides	  this	  ghost	  –	  ‘it	  hides	  as	  it	  holds’57	  –	  or,	  perhaps,	  we	  should	  say	  that	  the	  declarative	  act	  hides	  these	  ghosts	  (in	  the	  plural)	  of	  the	  people.	   It	   is	   after	   all,	   claims	   to	   unity	   and	   essentialism,	   that	   Derrida’s	   hauntology,	   aims	   to	  undermine.	  What	  the	  declaration	  attempts	  to	  do	   is	  establish	  a	  unity	  of	  voice	  and	  purpose:	  
we,	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  declare	  that	  these	  colonies	  are	  and	  
ought	   to	   be	   free	   and	   independent.	   But	   this	   gesture	   creates	   an	   essensialised	   “people”	   that	  does	  not	  exist.	  It	  is	  a	  “people”	  made	  up	  of	  infinite	  othernessess	  and	  a	  myriad	  of	  voices	  that	  do	   not	   speak	   in	   unison.	   An	   essentialised,	   unitary,	   singular	   “people”	   is	   the	   image	   that	   the	  declaration	  creates	  but	  as	  we	  have	  noted	  above,	  this	  fictional	  singularity	  can	  only	  come	  into	  existence	  through	  the	  work	  of	  countersignature.	  The	  swearing	  together	  that	  the	  Declaration	  evidences	   is	   what	   conjures	   the	   “people”	   into	   “existence.”	   The	   countersignatures	   of	   the	  representatives	   sign	   the	   primary	   affirmation	   of	   “the	   people”	   and	   these	   signatures	   are	  guaranteed	  by	  further	  countersignatures,	  all	  the	  way	  up	  to	  God.58	  “The	  people”	  is	  thus	  both	  differed	  and	  deferred	  by	  the	  declarative	  act	  and	  as	  a	  unified	  object,	  therefore,	  is	  inaccessible	  as	  such.	  This	  returns	  us	  to	  some	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  Recalling	  Freud’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Derrida,	  “Declarations,”	  50.	  56	  Implicitly	  referring	  to	  the	  final	  proposition	  of	  The	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus	  –	  ‘whereof	  one	  cannot	  speak,	  thereof	  one	  must	  be	  silent’	  –	  Derrida	  himself	  suggests:	  ‘I	  take	  the	  use	  of	  the	  word	  
mystical	  in	  a	  sense	  that	  I	  would	  venture	  to	  call	  rather	  Wittgensteinian’,	  see	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law,”	  242.	  See,	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  The	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus,	  trans.	  Ogden	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2005),	  189.	  	  57	  Derrida,	  Fors,	  xiv.	  58	  Derrida,	  “Declarations,”	  51.	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founding	   myth	   in	   Totem	   and	   Taboo,	   we	   might	   note	   that	   once	   the	   sons	   have	   killed	   the	  primordial	  father	  they	  swear	  to	  outlaw	  the	  crime	  they	  have	  just	  committed.	  This	  swearing	  of	  an	  oath	   (this	  conjuring)	   summons	   the	  ghost	  of	   the	  dead	   father	  and	   institutionalises	  his	  effect	  beyond	  the	  grave.	  Freud’s	  fable	  associates	  the	  birth	  of	  law	  –	  the	  prohibition	  of	  murder	  and	  incest,	  the	  two	  interdictions	  of	  totemism	  –	  with	  the	  conjuring	  of	  a	  ghost.	  The	  sons	  swear	  together,	   making	   an	   oath	   not	   to	  murder	   or	   commit	   incest	   because	   of	   the	   guilt	   the	   ghost	  instils	   in	   them.	   The	   sons’	   oath	   conjures	   the	   ghost	   of	   their	   father	   in	   the	   same	  way	   as	   the	  representatives’	  oath	  conjures	  the	  ghost	  of	  “the	  people”.	  	  I	   want	   to	   turn	   now	   to	   assess	   how	   this	   analysis	   of	   the	   performative	   speech	   act	   can	   help	  unpick	  a	  recent	  founding	  declaration.	  This	  case	  study	  serves	  as	  a	  vehicle	  through	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  nature	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  ethico-­‐political	  responsibility	  that	  the	  founding	  jurisdictional	  moment	  provokes.	  	  
3.3	  Conjuring	  the	  National	  Transitional	  Council	  for	  Libya	  	  Opposition	  to	  the	  Gaddafi	  regime	  began	  to	  coalesce	  in	  early	  2011,	  with	  February’s	  protests	  in	   Benghazi	   providing	   the	   focal	   point	   for	   the	   movement.	   One	   key	   event	   was	   the	  demonstration	  organised	  to	  take	  place	  on	  17	  February.	  This	  date	  marks	  the	  anniversary	  of	  the	  demonstrations	   against	   the	  Danish	   cartoons	   of	   the	  Prophet	  which	   took	  place	   in	   2006	  and	  degenerated	   into	  riots	   in	  which	   ten	  demonstrators	  were	  killed	  by	  security	   forces	  and	  many	  more	   injured.	   Pre-­‐emptive	   suppression	   of	   the	   protests	   in	   February	   by	   the	   Gaddafi	  regime	  escalated	  anti-­‐Gaddafi	  sentiment.59	  The	  protests	  were	  most	  active	  in	  the	  east	  of	  the	  country	  but,	  unlike	  many	  Western	  media	  reports,	  Libyan	  sources	  at	  the	  International	  Crisis	  Group	  note	  that	  ‘the	  online	  protest	  calls	  originated	  from	  Libyans	  abroad,	  in	  Switzerland	  and	  the	   United	   Kingdom’.60	  Inevitably,	   these	   calls	   for	   protest	   were	   inspired	   by	   the	   events	   in	  Egypt	  and	  Tunisia	  where	  popular	  demonstrations	  had	  toppled	  the	  regimes	  there.61	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  See	  International	  Crisis	  Report,	  “Popular	  Protest	  in	  North	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  (V):	  Making	  Sense	  of	  Libya,”	  page	  8.	  Published,	  6th	  June	  2011,	  available	  online	  at	  http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-­‐east-­‐north-­‐africa/north-­‐africa/libya.aspx.	  Accessed	  online	  21	  May	  2012.	  	  60	  Ibid.	  61	  The	  Libyan	  uprising	  against	  Gadhafi	  differed	  significantly	  from	  the	  events	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt.	  As	  Alain	  Badiou	  has	  pointed	  out	  the	  mass	  occupations	  of	  public	  space	  by	  heterogeneous	  groups	  that	  were	  seen	  in	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  were	  absent	  from	  the	  uprising	  in	  Libya.	  In	  Tunisia	  and	  Egypt	  no	  representatives	  of	  these	  movements	  emerged,	  rather	  they	  were	  –	  as	  Illan	  rua	  Wall	  suggests	  –expressions	  of	  an	  inoperative	  or	  un-­‐worked	  constituent	  power,	  without	  centralised	  authority	  or	  designated	  leadership.	  Libya,	  in	  contrast	  very	  quickly	  saw	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  rebel	  council	  that	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  These	   protests	   against	   the	   Gaddafi-­‐led	   regime,	   which	   spread	   to	   Tripoli,	   were	   quickly	  suppressed	   by	   the	   Libyan	   military.	   Misrata	   was	   shelled	   by	   artillery	   and	   Benghazi	   was	  threatened	  with	  equally	  severe	  treatment.	  There	  was	  a	  consensus	  within	  the	  parliaments	  of	  most	  European	  countries	  that	  the	  threat	  to	  civilians	  posed	  by	  Gaddafi’s	  forces	  was	  serious.	  In	   response	   to	   this	   threat,	   and	   the	   many	   reported	   civilian	   deaths	   attributed	   to	   violent	  suppression	  by	  Gaddafi’s	  forces,	  the	  UN	  security	  council	  passed	  resolution	  1970	  (2011)	  and,	  after	   Gaddafi	   refused	   to	   comply	   with	   its	   demands,	   1973	   (2011).	   UNSCR	   1973	   (2011)	  establishes	  a	  “no-­‐fly	  zone”	  over	  Libya	  which:	  Authorizes	  Member	  States…	  to	  take	  all	  necessary	  measures…	  to	  protect	  civilians	  and	  civilian	  populated	   areas	   under	   threat	   of	   attack	   in	   the	   Libyan	  Arab	   Jamahiriya,	   including	  Benghazi,	  while	  excluding	  a	  foreign	  occupation	  force	  of	  any	  form	  on	  any	  part	  of	  Libyan	  territory.62	  Air	  strikes,	  led	  by	  NATO	  countries,	  were	  carried	  out	  in	  Libya	  supposedly	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  powers	  laid	  out	  in	  UNSCR	  1973	  (2011).	  	  	  On	  27	  February	  –	  remarkably	  only	  10	  days	  after	  the	  protests	  in	  Benghazi	  had	  erupted	  –	  an	  opposition	  council	  emerged	  describing	  itself	  as	  the	  ‘face	  of	  the	  revolution’	  against	  Gaddafi.63	  Having	  posited	  (or	   fashioned)	   the	   face	  of	   the	  revolution,	  a	  mouth	  and	  voice	  were	   inferred	  which,	  in	  turn,	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  jurisdictional	  declaration.	  After	  a	  meeting	  in	  Al	   Bayda	   on	   24	   February,	   a	   formal	   founding	   statement	   was	   issued	   by	   the	   NTC	   on	   the	   5	  March.	   The	   group	   comprised	   academics,	   local	   politicians	   disaffected	   former	   government	  ministers	   and	   tribal	   leaders	   and	  was	   at	   its	   inception	   led	   by	   Abdul	   Jalil	   a	   former	   Gaddafi	  Justice	  Minister	  and	  Judge.	  The	  founding	  statement	  issued	  on	  5	  March	  established	  the	  roles	  of	  its	  members,	  set	  out	  the	  Council’s	  objectives	  and	  called	  for	  the	  international	  community	  to	   protect	   the	   Libyan	   people	   against	   ‘any	   further	   genocide	   and	   crimes	   against	   humanity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  purported	  to	  represent	  the	  Libyan	  people.	  Weapons	  were	  circulated	  among	  the	  population	  with	  the	  resistance	  assumed	  a	  militarised	  stance	  quite	  distinct	  from	  largely	  peaceful	  uprisings	  elsewhere	  in	  North	  Africa.	  See,	  Alain	  Badiou,	  “Open	  Letter	  Reply	  to	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy’s	  ‘What	  the	  Arab	  Peoples	  Signify	  to	  Us’”	  (2011).	  http://www.criticallegalthinking.com/?p=2899.	  Accessed	  online	  21	  May	  2012.	  And	  Illan	  rua	  Wall,	  “Tunisia	  and	  the	  Critical	  Legal	  Theory	  of	  Dissensus”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  (2012)	  23:	  219-­‐236.	  62	  UN	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  1973	  (2011)	  see	  http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution.	  Accessed	  online	  21	  May	  2012.	  63	  Reuters	  report:	  “Anti-­‐Gadhafi	  Figures	  Form	  National	  Council:	  http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/27/libya-­‐council-­‐revolution-­‐idUSWEB194120110227	  (2011)	  Accessed	  online	  May	  2012.	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without	  any	  direct	  military	  intervention	  on	  Libyan	  soil’.64	  The	  NTC	  handed	  its	  authority	  to	  govern	  Libya	  to	  a	  newly	  elected	  assembly	  on	  8	  August	  2012,	  until	   this	  point	  the	  NTC	  held	  jurisdictional	  control	  over	  of	  the	  Libyan	  territory.	  	  	  	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  at	  this	  stage	  how	  the	  NTC	  legitimated	  its	  foundation.	  Part	  of	  what	  makes	  the	  foundation	  to	  authority,	  in	  Derrida’s	  terms,	  “mystical”	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  an	  institution	  is	  self-­‐authorizing.	  The	  foundation	  of	  the	  legal	  order,	  for	  example,	  rests	  on	  nothing	  but	  laws	  themselves.	  As	  Derrida	  carefully	  argues	  in	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law,”	  at	  its	  very	  founding	  moment	  the	  law	  is	  without	  law:	  incapable	  of	  judging	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  its	  founding	  acts.	  The	   law’s	   foundation	   is	  an	   instance	  of	  non-­‐law	  that	   transcends	   legality.	  Laws	  are	  not	  legal:	   their	  authority	  comes	   from	  an	  a-­‐legal	  coup	  de	  force,	  neither	   legal	  nor	   illegal.65	  As	  we	  have	   seen	   in	   our	   discussion	   of	   Derrida’s	   reading	   of	   the	   American	   Declaration	   of	  Independence,	   this	   performative	   act	   of	   foundation	  manages	   to	   conjure	   into	   being	   a	   State,	  people	   and	   laws	   that	   do	   not	   exist	   before	   the	   declarative	   act	   itself.	   The	   NTC’s	   founding	  statement,	  however,	  differed	  in	  a	  striking	  regard	  from	  this	  tradition	  of	  the	  self-­‐authorizing	  and	   self-­‐legitimating	   performative	   coup	   de	   force	   that	   founds	   the	   institution.	   Rather	   than	  claiming	   the	  authority	   to	   found	   itself	   from	  “the	  people	  of	  Libya”	  or	   from	  God,	   in	   the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  American	  Declaration	  derives	  its	  authority	  from	  the	  “good	  people	  of	  the	  United	  States,”	   the	   NTC’s	   legitimacy	  was,	   in	   a	   strange	  way,	   indebted	   to	   the	   Gaddafi	   regime.	   The	  Council’s	  first	  Chairman,	  Abdul	  Jalil,	  was	  a	  former	  government	  minister	  and	  his	  authority	  to	  chair	   the	  NTC	  appeared	  to	  be	  derived	   from	  his	   former	  position	  of	  seniority	   in	   the	  Gaddafi	  regime.	   The	   old	   regime’s	   complicity	   with	   the	   NTC	   goes	   further	   than	   this,	   the	   founding	  statement	  declares	  that:	  	  All	  Libyan	  delegations	  to	  the	  UN,	  Arab	  League,	  International	  and	  regional	  organizations	  and	  members	   of	   all	   the	   Libyan	   embassies	  who	   joined	   the	   revolution	   are	   considered	   legitimate	  representatives	  of	  the	  Council.66	  The	  declaration	  went	  on	  to	  urge	  the	  current	  international	  representatives	  who	  had	  not	  yet	  defected	  to	  do	  so.	  As	  the	  ‘sole	  representatives	  of	  Libya’	  and	  the	  clear	  revolutionary	  aims	  of	  the	  movement	   it	   represented,	   the	  council	  patently	   rejected	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  Col	  Gaddafi’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  The	  Founding	  Statement	  of	  the	  Interim	  Transitional	  National	  Council,	  accessed	  online	  6	  April	  2011,	  http://ntclibya.org/english/founding-­‐statement-­‐of-­‐the-­‐interim-­‐transitional-­‐national-­‐council/.	  65	  Derrida,	  “The	  Force	  of	  Law,”	  238-­‐242.	  66	  The	  Founding	  Statement	  of	  the	  Interim	  Transitional	  National	  Council,	  http://ntclibya.org/english/founding-­‐statement-­‐of-­‐the-­‐interim-­‐transitional-­‐national-­‐council/.	  Accessed	  online	  6	  April	  2011.	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governance	  of	  the	  country.	  Those	  members	  of	  Gaddafi’s	  regime,	  however,	  who	  defected	  to	  the	  NTC	  were	  told	  that	  they	  would	  retain	  their	  status	  as	  an	  international	  representative	  but	  would,	   form	  the	  point	  of	   their	  defection	  onwards	  be	  carrying	  out	   their	  duties	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  NTC	  rather	  than	  Gaddafi.	  This	  makes	  the	  foundation	  to	  the	  NTC’s	  authority,	  in	  a	  sense,	  doubly	  mystical.	  Rather	  than	  even	  feigning	  a	   legitimacy	  that	   is	  derived	  from	  the	  people	  or	  from	  God,	   the	  representatives	  of	   the	  NTC	  derived	  their	   legitimacy	   from	  the	  mere	   fact	   that	  they	  are	  member	  of	  the	  NTC.	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  international	  representatives,	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  old	  regime’s	  appointments	  was	  appropriated	  by	  the	  council	  and	  then	  served	  as	  the	  basis	  by	  which	  those	  international	  representatives	  could	  claim	  to	  legitimately	  represent	  the	  NTC.	  The	  “doubly	  mystical”	  nature	  of	  the	  NTC’s	  foundation	  relies	  on	  the	  simultaneous	  inference	  of	  a	  self-­‐founding	  legitimacy	  –	  the	  legitimacy	  that	  based	  its	  authority	  on	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	   fact	   that	   it	  made	   such	   a	   claim	  –	   and	   the	   legitimacy	   that	  derived	   its	   authority	   from	  an	  external	   source	   of	   power.	   Ironically,	   in	   this	   case	   the	   external	   power	   source	  was	   the	   very	  regime	  against	  which	   the	  NTC	   is	   campaigning.	  The	  Council’s	   authority	  belied	   a	   “mystical”	  foundation,	   either	  deriving	   its	   legitimacy	   from	  a	  dubious	   self-­‐founding	   circularity	  or	   from	  the	   very	   regime	   that	   it	   claimed	   to	   be	   illegitimate.	   This	   double	   gesture,	   whilst	   seemingly	  contradictory,	  does	  have	  some	  political	  purchase:	  the	  NTC	  offered	  an	  olive	  branch	  to	  those	  members	   of	   the	   old	   regime	   who	   were	   toying	   with	   defection	   but,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   it	  managed	   to	   claim	   a	   modicum	   of	   independence	   and	   set	   itself	   up	   in	   direct	   opposition	   to	  Gaddafi’s	   regime.	   The	   paradox	   of	   the	  NTC’s	   foundation	   is	   perhaps	  what	   gave	   the	   Council	  such	   political	   pull.	   Its	   paradoxical	   double	   gesture	   was	   perhaps	   what	   gave	   the	   NTC	   its	  ‘sought	  after	  effect’.	  	  The	   NTC’s	   founding	   statement,	   conforming	   to	   the	   quasi-­‐logic	   of	   the	   simultaneously	  constative	  and	  performative	  speech	  act,	  declares	  that:	  It	  [the	  NTC]	  is	  the	  sole	  representative	  of	  all	  Libya	  with	  its	  different	  social	  and	  political	  strata	  and	  all	  its	  geographical	  sections.	  Its	  membership	  is	  open	  to	  all	  Libyans.	  The	  council	  is	  waiting	  for	  the	  delegations	  from	  Tripoli,	  the	  south	  Areas	  and	  Middle	  areas	  of	  Libya	  to	  join	  it.67	  In	  an	  accompanying	  document	  to	  the	  official	  declaration,	  the	  NTC	  stated	  that	  it	  ‘calls	  on	  all	  the	   countries	   of	   the	   world	   to	   recognize	   it	   and	   deal	   with	   it	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   international	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  The	  Founding	  Statement	  of	  the	  Interim	  Transitional	  National	  Council,	  http://ntclibya.org/english/founding-­‐statement-­‐of-­‐the-­‐interim-­‐transitional-­‐national-­‐council/.	  Accessed	  online	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  April	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legitimacy’.68	  The	   declaration	   instigated	   a	   strange	   temporal	   disjointure	   that	   echoes	   our	  discussion	   of	  Derrida’s	   reading	   of	   The	  American	  Declaration	   of	   Independence	   above.	   The	  NTC’s	  founding	  signature	  calls	  for	  countersignature:	  it	  claims	  to	  be	  legitimate	  but	  can	  only	  be	  considered	  such	  once	  other	  nations	  acknowledge	  that	  legitimacy;	  it	  needed	  the	  fabulous	  retroactive	   affirmation	   of	   a	   response.	   Moreover,	   the	   declaration	   itself	   can	   only	   be	  considered	  a	  countersignature	   to	  a	  broad	  and	  diverse	  expression	  of	  anger	  and	   frustration	  that	   the	   anti-­‐Gaddafi	   movement	   expresses.	   The	   content	   of	   the	   declaration	   simply	  acknowledges	   (and	   thus	   countersigns)	   the	   anti-­‐government	   protests	   that	   erupted	   in	  February	  2011.	  As	  “Declarations	  of	  Independence”	  suggests,	  the	  signature	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  trace	  of	  more	  primary	  affirmations	  so,	  as	  we	  suggested	  above,	   the	  founding	  statement	  conjures	  into	  being	  a	  unity	  that	  does	  not	  exist.	  In	  becoming	  “the	  voice	  of	  the	  rebels”	  the	  NTC	  necessarily	   silences	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   voices	   that	   constitutes	   the	   rebellion	   itself.	   And	   the	  response	  made	  by	  the	  international	  community	  to	  the	  NTC’s	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  sole	  legitimate	  representative	   of	   Libya	  went	   a	   long	  way	   in	   ensuring	   that	   that	   silence	  was	   complete.	   The	  NTC	  was	  formally	  recognized	  as	  the	  government	  of	  Libya	  by	  32	  countries.	  The	  NTC	  called	  for	   a	   response	   and	   many	   countries	   answered.	   These	   responses	   themselves	   were	  performative	  utterances:	  British	  foreign	  secretary	  William	  Hague’s	  declaration	  that	  the	  NTC	  is	   now	   recognized	   as	   a	   legitimate	   government	   by	   the	   British	   government	   is	   the	   co-­‐performative	   that	   responds	   to	   the	   foundational	   (counter)signature.	   These	   counter-­‐signatures	   that	   recognized	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   revolutionary	  movement	   affirmed	   a	   conjured	  assemblage	   and	   effaced	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   voices	   that	   was	   the	   rebellion’s	   condition	   of	  possibility.	  	  	  The	   performative	   declaration	   transforms	   a	   plurality	   of	   speakers	   and	   actors	   that	   swear	  together	  (con	   jurare)	   into	  a	  unified	  “we”	  of	  “the	  people.”	  Following	  Austin’s	  account	  of	  the	  performative	   outlined	   above,	   we	   can	   see	   that	   the	   declaration	   is	   conditioned	   by	   a	  paradigmatic	   privileging	   of	   intention	   and	   presence.	   The	   absent	   voices	   and	   unarticulated	  gestures	  represent	  a	  general	  possibility	  of	  there	  being	  a	  declaration	  at	  all.	  It	  is	  this	  general	  possibility	   that	   is	   dismissed	   when	   the	   jurisdictional	   moment	   is	   announced.	   From	   this	  informal	  articulation	   is	   conjured	  a	   formal	   face	  and	  mouthpiece	   that	   can	  claim,	  at	   the	  very	  present	   moment	   it	   speaks,	   to	   represent	   the	   Libyan	   people.	   This	   presence,	   however,	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  “Introducing	  the	  Council”	  accessed	  online	  6th	  April	  2011,	  http://ntclibya.org/english/about/.	  Accessed	  online	  6	  April	  2011.	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predicated	  on	  a	  prior	  movement,	  akin	  to	   iterability,	   that	   the	  metaphysics	  of	  presence	  (the	  temporal	  paradigm	  in	  which	  the	  declaration	  is	  caught)	  seeks	  to	  efface.	  These	  other	  voices,	  spectral	   though	   they	  may	  be,	   interrupt	   the	  proclaimed	   sovereign	  unity	  of	   the	  declaration,	  they	   interrupt	   the	   purity	   of	   the	   jurisdictional	   moment.	   I	   suggest	   that	   responsibility,	   in	   a	  deconstructive	   register,	   infers	   a	   response	   to	   the	   absences	   which	   make	   a	   purported	  “presence”	   possible.	   Assessing	   the	   nature	   of	   this	   responsibility	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  performative	  speech	  act	  is	  the	  task	  to	  which	  we	  now	  turn.	  	  	  
3.4	  Responsibility	  	  By	  putting	  Derrida’s	  account	  of	  the	  performative	  in	  a	  wider	  context,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	   his	   displacement	   of	   a	   temporal	   economy	   that	   maintains	   a	   privileged	   position	   for	   the	  present	   speaking	   subject,	  we	  have	   suggested	   that	   a	   performative	   speech	   act	   represents	   a	  rupture	  that	  opens	  itself	  to	  an	  unpredictable	  future	  or	  à	  venir.	  Jurisdiction	  (the	  performative	  speech	  act	  of	  the	  law)	  seeks	  to	  ground	  the	  law	  and	  determine	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  community.	  But,	  as	  we	  have	  suggested	  with	  Derrida,	  this	  presence	  is	  illusory.	  The	  performative	  creates	  but	  a	  ghostly	  presence,	  caught	  between	  the	  past	  and	  future:	  the	  unity	  and	  sovereignty	  that	  the	   performative	   proclaims	   can	   only	   appear	   in	   spectral	   form.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   force	   and	  effect	   of	   the	   declaration	   is	   undeniable;	   the	   ghostly	   is	   not	   without	   affects.	   Crucial	   to	   our	  present	  concern	   is	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  responsibility	   that	  such	  a	  declaration	  engenders.	  The	  argument	   pursued	   here	   is	   that	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	   the	   declaration	   discussed	  above	   provide	   the	   very	   same	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   for	   a	   deconstructive	   account	   of	  responsibility.	   Derrida’s	   concern	   to	   expose	   the	   absence	   that	   underpins	   a	   purported	  presence	  in	  his	  reading	  of	  Austin	  sets	  a	  marker	  for	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  responsibility	  for	  which	  such	  a	  performative	  calls.	  	  	  For	   a	   term	   with	   such	   strong	   contemporary	   import,	   the	   notion	   of	   “responsibility”	   has	   a	  relatively	   recent	   heritage.	   Emerging	   hand-­‐in-­‐hand	   with	   (human)	   rights	   discourses,	  responsibility	   is	  most	  commonly	  associated	  with	  a	   typically	  modern,	   liberal	   conception	  of	  the	   subject.	   As	   a	   category,	   responsibility	   appeared	   in	   post-­‐Enlightenment	   thinking	   (the	  term’s	  earliest	  known	  usage	  in	  English	  is	  1787)69	  and,	  as	  Scott	  Veitch	  suggests,	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	   ‘the	   notion	   of	   the	   autonomous	   individual,	   in	   theory	   equal	   (or	   equalized)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  The	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary.	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with	   his	   or	   her	   others,	   and	   having	   the	   equal	   capacity	   for	   mental	   knowledge	   and	   will’.70	  Responsibility	  attaches	  to	  an	  individual	  for	  acts	  done	  or	  crimes	  committed,	  but	  so	  too	  does	  responsibility	  look	  to	  the	  future,	  conditioning	  decisions	  to	  come.71	  The	  plurality	  of	  registers	  on	  which	   responsibility	   operates	   –	   from	   the	  moral	   to	   the	   political,	   the	   prospective	   to	   the	  retrospective,	   civil	   to	   the	   criminal	   –	   calls	   not	   for	   some	   essentialised	   definition	   but	   an	  openness	   to	   competing	  modes	   and	   techniques	   of	   responsibility.	   Veitch	   suggests	   that	   any	  account	   of	   responsibility	   must	   contend	   with	   a	   plurality	   of	   “responsibility	   practices”	   or	   a	  variety	  of	  “technologies	  of	  responsibility.”72	  Following	  this	  approach,	  what	  follows,	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  provide	  a	  comprehensive	  or	  determinative	  account	  of	  responsibility,	  rather,	  it	  is	  suggested	   that	   by	   assessing	   the	   structural	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	   the	   declarative	  jurisdictional	  moment,	  we	  can	  understand	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  events	  condition	  responsibility	   to	   them.	   It	   is,	   then,	   the	  question	  of	  how	  we	  respond	  to	   the	  claim	  to	   found	  a	  community,	  institution	  or	  law	  that	  is	  discussed	  here.	  How	  do	  we	  counter-­‐sign	  jurisdiction?	  	  	  Iris	  Marion	  Young	  observes	   that	  political	   responsibility	   is	   ‘something	  essentially	   forward-­‐looking’,	   concerned	   with	   the	   prospective	   decision	   rather	   than	   the	   guilty	   deed	   already	  committed.73	  In	   this	   sense,	   we	   too	   are	   concerned	   with	   “political	   responsibility.”	   Young	  suggests	   that	   political	   responsibility	   presses	   upon	   one	   ‘always	  now	   in	   relation	   to	   current	  events	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  future	  consequences’.74	  It	  is	  an	  acceptance	  of	  the	  urgency	  of	  responsibility	   with	   which	   this	   current	   discussion	   tries	   contend,	   however,	   the	   implicit	  temporal	   structuring	   evidenced	   in	   Young’s	   characterisation	   of	   responsibility	   is	   put	   into	  question.	  The	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  developed	  here	  rejects	   the	   idea	   that	  one	  can	  ever	  be	  
essentially	   forward	   looking	   in	   assessing	   responsibility.	   Responsibility	   will	   always	   be	  conditioned	  by	  the	  past	  and	  hold	  open	  a	  promise	  of	  the	  future	  in	  precisely	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	   performative	   speech	   act	   discussed	   above.	   It	   is	   the	   structural	   isomorphism	   of	  responsibility	   and	   the	   performative	   that	   puts	   the	   traditional	   notion	   of	   individual	  responsibility	   out	   of	   joint	   and	   reveals	   a	   particular	   deconstructive	   mode	   of	   (political)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Scott	  Veitch,	  Law	  and	  Irresponsibility	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2007),	  35.	  	  71	  As	  Alan	  Norrie	  suggests,	  “responsibility”	  involves	  both	  answerability	  and	  culpability,	  both	  being	  
called	  to	  respond	  to	  something	  and	  being	  held	  responsible	  for	  something.	  See	  Alan	  Norrie,	  “‘Simulacra	  of	  Morality’?	  Beyond	  the	  Ideal/Actual	  antinomies	  of	  Criminal	  Justice”	  in	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Criminal	  
Law	  ed.	  A	  Duff	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  114.	  	  72	  Veitch,	  Law	  and	  Irresponsibility,	  37-­‐42.	  73	  Iris	  Marion	  Young,	  Responsibility	  for	  Justice	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  92	  	  74	  Ibid.	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responsibility.	   This	   notion	   of	   responsibility	   is	   discussed	   in	   relation	   to	   Jean-­‐Luc	   Nancy’s	  response	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Libya	  in	  2011.	  	  	  
3.4.1	  Inheritance	  and	  (ir)responsibility	  Unlike	  Young,	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  responsibility	  is	  at	  once	  forward	  and	  backward	  looking,	  caught	  in	  a	  temporal	  flux	  that	  makes	  the	  truly	  (or	  purely)	  responsible	  decision	  impossible.	  As	   has	   been	   our	   concern	   throughout,	   this	   notion	   of	   responsibility	   contends	   with	   an	  understanding	   of	   temporality	   without	   a	   privileged	   notion	   of	   presence.	   Responsibility	  thought	   as	   that	  which	   is	   owed	   by	   and	   attributable	   to	   a	  monadic	   liberal	   subject	   conforms	  precisely	   to	   such	   a	  privileging	  of	  presence	   that,	   through	  Derrida,	   I	  want	   to	   interrupt.	  The	  (traditional)	   notion	   of	   individual	   responsibility	   effaces	   that	   which	   is	   not	   present:	  circumstances	  and	  histories	  that	  condition	  one’s	  “present”	  acts	  for	  which	  one	  is	  supposedly	  responsible.	   Derrida’s	   reading	   of	   metaphysics	   challenges	   this	   thinking	   and	   –	   in	   a	  quintessentially	   deconstructive	  move	   –	  privileges	   that	  which	   is	   traditionally	   ignored.	   The	  absent,	   rather	   than	   the	   present,	   becomes	   the	   lodestar	   which	   should	   guide	   our	   sense	   of	  responsibility.	  	  	  This	   privileging	   of	   the	   absent	   –	   the	   spectral	   pasts	   and	   othernesses	   that	   constitute	   the	  present	   –	  is	   perhaps	   most	   clearly	   discernable	   in	   Derrida	   characterization	   of	   ontology	   as	  
hauntology.75	  Hauntology	  would	  favour	  (spectral)	  absence	  over	  presence	  and	  difference	  and	  plurality	   over	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   same.76	  The	   subject	   for	   Derrida	   is	   itself	   constituted	   by	  spectres:	   ‘ego	  =	  ghost…	   therefore	   “I	   am”	  would	  mean	   “I	   am	  haunted”’.77	  Hauntology,	   then,	  compromises	   the	   presence	   of	   ontology,	   inscribing	   a	   differential	   temporality	   into	   every	  “present”	   instance.	  This	  hauntology,	  Derrida	  tells	  us,	   is	   ‘larger	  and	  more	  powerful	   than	  an	  ontology	   or	   a	   thinking	   of	   Being…	   of	   the	   “to	   be,”	   assuming	   that	   it	   is	   a	  matter	   of	   Being	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Hauntology	  (homophonic	  in	  the	  French	  with	  ontologie)	  is	  a	  term	  developed	  in	  Spectres	  of	  Marx.	  Like	  many	  of	  the	  terms	  that	  Derrida	  deploys,	  hauntology	  supplements	  (in	  a	  doubled	  sense	  of	  standing	  in	  for	  and	  enhancing)	  the	  notion	  of	  différance.	  That	  Derrida	  is	  happy	  to	  shift	  between	  the	  various	  concepts	  (autoimmunity,	  iterability,	  hauntology	  and	  so	  on)	  to	  tackle	  particular	  concerns	  performs	  the	  very	  indeterminacy	  that	  these	  concepts	  try	  to	  capture.	  Significantly,	  Derrida	  does	  not	  allow	  one	  concept	  –	  différance	  or	  even	  “deconstruction”	  –	  to	  become	  central	  or	  orientating	  principle	  for	  his	  thinking.	  	  76	  That	  ontology	  reduces	  difference	  by	  levelling	  out	  all	  things	  is	  key	  to	  Derrida’s	  deconstruction.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Derrida	  is	  indebted	  to	  Emmanuel	  Levinas.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  Levinas	  and	  Derrida’s	  deconstruction	  of	  ontology	  see	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “Violence	  and	  Metaphysics”	  in	  Writing	  and	  
Difference,	  trans.	  Alan	  Bass	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2008).	  77	  Derrida,	  Spectres	  of	  Marx,	  166.	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[Shakespeare’s]	  “to	  be	  or	  not	  to	  be,”	  but	  nothing	  is	  less	  certain’.78	  If	  the	  “I”	  itself	  is	  haunted,	  a	  subject	  more	  spectral	   than	  present,	   the	  discourse	  of	   responsibility	  changes	   tenor.	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  such	  a	  responsibility	  involves	  a	  thinking	  beyond	  all	  living	  present,	  suggesting	  that	  we	  are	  called	  to	  be	  responsible:	  	  before	  those	  who	  are	  not	  yet	  born	  or	  who	  are	  already	  dead,	  be	  they	  victims	  of	  wars,	  political	  or	   other	   kinds	   of	   violence,	   nationalist,	   racist,	   colonialist,	   sexist,	   or	   other	   kinds	   of	  exterminations…	  Without	   this	  non-­‐contemporaneity	  with	   itself	  of	  the	   living	  present,	  without	  that	   which	   secretly	   unhinges	   it,	   without	   this	   responsibility	   and	   this	   respect	   for	   justice	  concerning	  those	  who	  are	  not	  there,	  what	  sense	  would	  there	  be	  to	  ask	  the	  question	  “where?”	  “where	  tomorrow?	  “whither?”.79	  Such	  a	  responsibility	  is	  impossible.	  It	  is	  a	  wildly	  exaggerated	  responsibility,	  a	  responsibility	  to	  and	  for	  that	  which	  we	  do	  not	  and	  cannot	  yet	  know,	  a	  responsibility	  for	  acts	  done	  without	  our	  knowledge,	  a	  responsibility	  beyond	  the	  living,	  beyond	  those	  present,	  beyond	  –	  surely	  –the	  human	  too.	  Where	  does	  one	  start	  with	  such	  responsibility?	  For	  Derrida	  the	  answer	  lies	  in	  inheritance.	  We	  are,	  from	  the	  off,	  burdened	  with	  a	  responsibility	  with	  and	  for	  the	  ghosts	  that	   we	   inherit	   simply	   by	   our	   being	  who	  we	   are:	   ‘one	   is	   responsible	   before	  what	   comes	  before	   one	   but	   also	   before	   what	   is	   to	   come	   and	   therefore	   before	   oneself’.80	  We	   are	  encumbered	   by	   our	   ghostly	   inheritance	   and	   this	   inheritance	   prompts	   and	   conditions	   our	  responsibility.	  Evoking	  a	  doubled	  sense	  of	  “before”	  –	  meaning	  both	  “prior	  to”	  and	  “in	  front	  of”	   –	   responsibility	   is	   always	   doubled,	   one	   is	   not	   only	   responsible	   to	   our	   history	   (‘what	  comes	   before	   one’)	   but	   also	   to	   what	   is	   to	   come	   (‘what	   is	   before	   one’).	   Our	   inheritance	  prompts	  a	  simultaneous	  obligation	  to	  the	  past	  and	  to	  the	  future;	  it	  invokes	  –	  or	  conjures,	  we	  might	  say	  –	  a	  “spectral	  responsibility”:	  a	  responsibility	  to	  the	  ghosts	  of	  the	  past	  that	  figure	  in	  the	  “present”	  and	  to	  the	  ghosts	  to	  come	  that	  will	  be	  effected	  by	  our	  actions	  in	  the	  here-­‐and-­‐now.	  This	  thinking	  of	  responsibility	  disturbs	  the	  liberal	  monadic	  notion	  of	  the	  self	  that	  is	   frequently	   associated	  with	   term.	  The	   subject	   cannot	  be	   the	  ultimate	   guarantor	   of	   one’s	  responsibility,	   rather	   every	   singularity	   is	   radically	   exposed	   to	   a	   responsibility	   beyond	  themselves.	   In	   relation	   to	   jurisdiction’s	   claim	   to	   found	   a	  political	   institution	   like	   the	  NTC,	  such	  a	   thinking	  opens	   responsibility	   to	  a	  necessary	  attentiveness	   to	   that	  which	   is	  effaced,	  consolidated	  or	  elided	  in	  the	  declaration,	  to	  that	  plurality	  of	  voices	  which	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  of	  the	  declaration	  itself.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Ibid.,	  63.	  79	  Ibid.,	  xviii.	  80	  Jacques	  Derrida	  and	  Elisabeth	  Roudinesco,	  For	  What	  Tomorrow...	  :	  A	  Dialogue	  (Stanford,	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  5-­‐6.	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  How	   can	   we	   be	   responsible	   when	   the	   stakes	   have	   been	   raised	   so	   high?	   Even	   with	   a	  sensitivity	   to	   inheritance,	   can	   we	   ever	   contend	   with	   this	   wild,	   spectral,	   hyperbolic	  responsibility?	   We	   must,	   it	   seems,	   answer	   this	   in	   the	   negative.	   All	   we	   are	   left	   with	   are	  degrees	   of	   irresponsibility.81	  With	   responsibility	   given	   such	   an	   expansive	   scope,	   we	   are	  bound	  to	  fail.	  But	  this	   impossible	  responsibility	   is	   itself	   the	  condition	  of	  possibility	   for	  the	  “responsible”	   decision.	   The	   decision,	   though	   never	   capable	   of	   contending	   with	   this	  exaggerated	   responsibility,	   must	   pass	   through	   it,	   responsibility	   must	   negotiate	   with	   the	  incalculable	  and	  pass	  through	  this	  aporetic	  experience.82	  As	  should	  be	  clear,	  however,	   this	  “decision”	   cannot	   be	   the	   subject’s	   alone	   rather	   it	   appears	   from/within	   a	   play	   between	  autonomy	  and	  heteronomy.	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  decision	   is	  made	  by	   the	  subject	  or	  produced	   through	  an	  encounter	  with	  a	  particular	   situation	  must	  be	   left	  unanswered:	   it	   is	  this	   experience	   of	   the	   undecidiable	   with	   which	   the	   (always	   partial,	   always	   already	  irresponsible)	   “responsible	   decision”	   must	   contend.	   As	   Derrida	   suggests	   in	   relation	   to	   a	  responsibility	   for	   a	   new	   thinking	   of	   European	   identity:	   ‘the	   condition	   of	   this	   thing	   called	  responsibility	   is	   a	   certain	   experience	   and	   experiment	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   impossible:	  the	   testing	  of	   the	   aporia’.83	  I	  want	   to	  put	   this	   conception	  of	   responsibility	   in	   conversation	  with	   Nancy,	   assessing	   how	   he	   tests	   the	   aporia	   that	   Derrida	   evokes	   in	   relation	   to	   his	  response	  to	  the	  Libyan	  declarative	  act	  discussed	  earlier.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  The	  notion	  of	  responsibility	  being	  essentially	  irresponsible	  is	  developed	  most	  clearly	  in	  The	  Gift	  of	  
Death.	  In	  a	  reading	  of	  Kierkegaard’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  akedah	  (the	  binding	  of	  Isaac	  in	  Genesis	  chapter	  22)	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  Abraham’s	  impossible	  decision	  to	  kill	  his	  son	  at	  God’s	  command	  is	  analogous	  with	  every	  confrontation	  with	  the	  responsible	  decision.	  Derrida’s	  point	  is	  that	  the	  responsibility	  to	  the	  absolute	  Other	  of	  God	  (analogous	  in	  our	  discussion	  with	  the	  impossible	  and	  expansive	  responsibility	  to	  spectrality)	  will	  always	  infer	  the	  need	  for	  sacrifice.	  Putting	  the	  difficulty	  more	  prosaically,	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  in	  doing	  his	  work	  as	  a	  philosopher	  –	  writing	  and	  speaking	  in	  public	  and	  so	  on	  –	  he	  might	  be	  thought	  to	  be	  doing	  his	  duty	  or	  fulfilling	  his	  responsibilities.	  But,	  Derrida	  notes,	  ‘I	  am	  sacrificing	  and	  betraying	  at	  every	  moment	  all	  my	  other	  obligations	  to	  the	  others	  whom	  I	  know	  or	  don’t	  know,	  the	  billions	  of	  my	  fellows	  (without	  mentioning	  animals	  that	  are	  even	  more	  other	  others	  than	  my	  fellows)	  my	  fellows	  who	  are	  dying	  of	  starvation	  or	  sickness.’	  Every	  seemingly	  “responsible	  decision”	  will	  involve	  a	  sacrifice	  of	  some	  other,	  a	  sacrifice	  (importantly)	  for	  which	  there	  can	  be	  no	  absolute	  justification.	  See	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  The	  Gift	  of	  Death,	  trans.	  David	  Wills	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1995),	  69	  and	  more	  generally,	  53-­‐81	  82	  See	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law,”	  257.	  83	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  The	  Other	  Heading,	  trans.,	  Pierre	  Brault	  and	  Michael	  Naas	  (Bloomington:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1992),	  41.	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3.4.2	  Nancy	  and	  the	  leap	  of	  political	  responsibility	  Initially	  published	  in	  Libération	  under	  the	  title	  “Ce	  que	  les	  peuples	  Arabes	  nous	  signifient,”	  (28th	  March	  2011)84	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy’s	  response	  to	  the	  situation	  in	  Libya,	  and	  implicitly	  the	  foundation	   of	   the	   NTC,	   was	   to	   support	   NATO-­‐led	   military	   intervention.	   The	   rebels	   in	  Benghazi,	  Nancy	  argues,	  are	  calling	  for	  help	  and,	  in	  order	  to	  fulfil	  our	  political	  responsibility,	  we	   must	   make	   a	   decision,	   we	   must	   deal	   with	   the	   situation	   that	   confronts	   us.	   Political	  responsibility,	  for	  Nancy,	  entails	  ‘weighing	  up	  and	  dealing	  with	  the	  circumstances’85.	  Whilst	  conceding	  that	  this	  is	  a	  ‘delicate	  task’,	  Nancy	  argues	  that	  the	  ‘collateral	  risks	  and	  suspicions	  of	  hidden	  interests’86	  along	  with	  the	  heavy	  guilt	  associated	  with	  a	  colonial	  past	  in	  the	  region	  are	  no	   longer	  chief	  concerns	   in	  our	  contemporary,	  globalized	  world	  where	  sovereignty	  no	  longer	  belies	  the	  cachet	  it	  once	  did.	  Nancy	  is	  not	  so	  naïve	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  globalisation	  signals	  a	   turning	  point	   for	   the	  West	  –	  as	   if	   it	  had	  somehow	   ‘cleaned	  up	   its	  act’	   –	   rather	   it	  prompts	  a	  new	  thinking	  of	  our	  responsibility	  and	  a	  renewed	  awareness	  of	  our	  being-­‐with	  others.	  He	  writes:	  We	   are	   no	   longer	   just	   simply	   in	   the	   world	   of	   Western	   arrogance,	   self-­‐confidence	   and	  imperialism…	   [the	   world	   is]	   in	   the	   process	   of	   melting	   in	   the	   fusion	   that	   begets	   another	  world,	  without	  sunrise	  or	  sunset,	  a	  world	  where	  it	  is	  day	  and	  night	  everywhere	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  where	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  reinvent	  the	  act	  of	  living	  together	  and,	  before	  all	  else,	  the	  act	  of	  living	  itself.87	  The	   fact	   of	   this	   changing	   geo-­‐political	   landscape	  prompts	   a	   responsibility	   that	   none	  of	   us	  can	  turn	  away	  from:	  Gaddafi,	  ‘the	  vile	  assassin	  of	  the	  people’88	  must	  be	  confronted.	  	  Echoing	  Derrida’s	  desire	  ‘to	  learn	  how	  to	  live	  finally,’89	  Nancy	  suggests	  that	  our	  responsibility	  to	  act	  speaks	  directly	  to	  what	  we	  want	  to	  live	  and	  how	  we	  want	  to	  live	  it.	  	  As	  Stewart	  Motha	  has	  rightly	  pointed	  out,90	  underpinning	  Nancy’s	  response	  to	  the	  situation	  in	   Libya	   is	   his	   understanding	   of	   how	   sovereignty	   has	   become	   emptied	   of	  meaning	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  This	  text	  was	  subsequently	  translated	  by	  Gilbert	  Leung	  and	  posted	  on	  the	  “Critical	  Legal	  Thinking	  Website”	  as	  “What	  the	  Arab	  Peoples	  Signify	  to	  Us”.	  See	  http://www.criticallegalthinking.com/?p=2793.	  Accessed	  online	  21	  May	  2012.	  	  85	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  “What	  the	  Arab	  Peoples	  Signify	  to	  Us.”	  86	  Ibid.	  87	  Ibid.	  88	  Ibid.	  89	  Derrida,	  Spectres,	  xvi.	  90	  Stewart	  Motha,	  “The	  End	  of	  Sovereignty,	  in	  North	  Africa,	  in	  the	  World”	  published	  in	  response	  to	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy’s	  article.	  Published	  online,	  19	  April	  2011,	  see	  http://www.criticallegalthinking.com/?p=3007.	  Accessed	  online	  21	  May	  2012.	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monde	  mondialisé	   or	   globalized	  world.	   The	   (globalized)	  world,	   for	  Nancy,	   is	   one	   in	  which	  transcendent	  sources	  of	  authority	  –	  the	  Christian	  deity	  or	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  privileged	  Western	  civilization	   –	   no	   longer	   have	   purchase.	  We	   are	   instead	   confronted	   by	   the	   problematic	   of	  “globalized”	   or	   “worldwide”	   authority.	   The	   very	   notion	   of	   such	   authority,	   Nancy	   argues,	  rests	   on	   a	   “sovereignty	   without	   sovereignty”	   or,	   following	   Bataille’s	   formulation,	   a	  conception	  of	  “sovereignty	  as	  nothing”.	  Such	  a	  thinking	  of	  “nonsovereignty”	  or	  “sovereignty	  without	   sovereignty”	   involves	   thinking	   beyond	   the	   association	   of	   sovereignty	   with	   “the	  people”	  or	  “the	  nation”	  but	  so	  too	  does	  it	  put	  into	  question	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  I,	  ipse	  or	  
autos.	   Without	   the	   (sovereign)	   subject	   orientating	   our	   conception	   of	   the	   world,	   Nancy	  affirms	  our	  always	  already	  co-­‐implication	  with	  others.	  We	  are	  beings,	  Nancy	  insists,	  who	  are	  intractably	  with	  others,	  always	   ‘exposed	  to	  others,	  always	  turned	  toward	  an	  other…	  never	  facing	  myself’.91	  This	  “with-­‐ness”	  cannot	  be	  essentialised,	  named	  or	  identified,	  for	  in	  naming	  or	   essentialising	  we	  are	   returned	   to	   the	   logic	   of	   sovereignty	   that	  Nancy	   is	   trying	   to	   think	  beyond.	  Indeed,	  naming	  or	  symbolizing	  as	  such,	  comes	  only	  after	  the	  originary	  condition	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐common:	   ‘before	  the	  symbolic,	  there	  is	  this	  spacing	  out	  without	  which	  no	  symbol	  could	   symbolise:	   there	   is	   being-­‐in-­‐common,	   the	   world’.92	  All	   this	   is	   significant	   because	   it	  provides	   a	   frame	   through	   which	   we	   should	   understand	   Nancy’s	   thinking	   in	   relation	   to	  Libya.	  We	  are	  responsible	  because	  we	  are	  always	  already	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  suffering	  and	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  that	  suffering.	  We	  owe	  a	  responsibility	  because	  of	  our	  bare	  fact	  of	  being-­‐with.93	  There	   is	   no	   safe	   place,	   no	   sovereignty	   which	   will	   guarantee	   our	   righteousness	   in	  either	  action	  or	  inaction.	  	  	  It	   is	   in	   the	   name	   of	   political	   responsibility	   that	   Nancy	   makes	   his	   intervention	   regarding	  Libya.	  If	  we	  are	  to	  address	  the	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  at	  stake	  here	  we	  must	  first	  assess	  the	  sense	  of	   “the	  political”	  he	  evokes.	   I	  want	   to	   suggest	   that	  Nancy’s	  distinction	  between	   “the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  The	  Inoperative	  Community	  (Minneapolis,	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2008),	  xxxvii-­‐xxxviii.	  92	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  The	  Sense	  of	  the	  World	  (Minneapolis,	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1997),	  48.	  93	  As	  Vikki	  Bell	  points	  out,	  Judith	  Butler	  draws	  on	  Nancy	  to	  develop	  a	  similar	  ethio-­‐political	  responsibility.	  Writing	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  9/11,	  Bell	  argues	  that	  we	  should	  read	  Butler’s	  engagement	  with	  Nancy	  as	  underscoring,	  along	  very	  similar	  lines	  to	  those	  sketched	  here,	  the	  politics	  at	  stake	  in	  marinating	  a	  fundamental	  plurality	  to	  individuality.	  See,	  Vikki	  Bell,	  Culture	  and	  Performance:	  The	  
Challenge	  of	  Ethics,	  Politics	  and	  Feminist	  Theory	  (Oxford:	  Berg,	  2007),	  20-­‐25.	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political”	   (le	   politique)	   and	   ‘politics’	   (la	   politique)94	  is	   key	   to	   understanding	   his	   thinking	  here.	  Commenting	  on	  Nancy’s	  ‘War,	  Law	  Sovereignty	  –	  Techne’,	  Ian	  James	  suggests	  that:	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  is	  the	  empirical	  and	  immediate	  realm	  of	  politics,	  of	  our	  events	  and	  our	  responsibility	   to	   them.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  and	  perhaps	  prior	   to	   this	   first	  moment,	   there	   is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  thought,	  which	  leads	  Nancy	  to	  consider	  the	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  sense	  of	  war,	  law,	  or	  sovereignty	  in	  a	  philosophical	  idiom.95	  	  In	   Nancy’s	   Libération	   article	   we	   seem	   to	   be	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   politics	   –	   of	   events	   and	   our	  responsibility	  to	  them	  –	  rather	  than	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  historical	  or	  philosophical	  reflection	  on	  “the	   political.”	   However,	   the	   decision,	   with	   its	   directedness	   towards	   events	   and	  responsibility	  (la	  politique)	  is	  always	  already	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  political	  (le	  politique),	  that	  is,	   with	   a	   responsibility	   to	   the	   ontological	   determination	   of	   how	   we	   are	   “with	   others.”	  Nancy’s	   characterisation	  of	   responsibility	   is	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  universal,	   owed	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	   “with”	   that	   is	   or	  makes	   up	   being	   but	   on	   the	   other	   is	   directed	   to	   the	   particular,	   quite	  specifically	   to	   ‘the	   Benghazi	   insurgents	   are	   asking	   for	   help’.	   We	   might	   think	   of	   Nancy’s	  responsibility	   in	   ethical	   terms:	   a	   response	   sensitive	   to	   the	   immediacy	   of	   a	   situation	   and	  addressing	   the	  urgency	  of	   a	   call.	  We	   are	   responsible	   through	  our	   ontological	   exposure	   to	  others	  and	  we	  are	  guided	  by	  the	  immediacy	  of	  the	  call	  this	  makes.	  As	  Ian	  James	  points	  out,	  Nancy’s	   ontology	   ‘enacts	   itself	   as	   an	   ethics	   of,	   and	   an	   address	   to,	   the	   singular-­‐plural	   of	  being’96	  	  In	   a	   recent	   essay,	   ‘The	   Political	   and/or	   Politics’,97	  Nancy	   returns	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	  
différantial	   relationship	   between	   politics	   and	   the	   political.	   Referring	   to	   his	   work	   with	  Philippe	  Lacoue-­‐Larbarthe	   in	   the	  1980s,	  Nancy	  affirms	   the	  obscurity	  of	   the	   localisation	  of	  politics	  suggesting	  that,	  ‘it	  is…	  a	  question	  of	  ‘place’:	  we	  need	  the	  right	  place	  for	  politics’;98	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  This	  distinction	  is	  seen	  in	  the	  German	  das	  politische	  and	  die	  Politik	  and	  the	  Italian	  il	  politico	  and	  la	  
politica	  (Christodoulidis	  2008,	  p.	  192).	  Since	  founding	  the	  Centre	  de	  Réchereches	  Philosophiques	  sur	  
Le	  Politique	  Nancy’s	  thinking	  has	  been	  concerned	  with	  a	  certain	  ‘withdrawal	  from	  politics’	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  philosophical	  thinking	  of	  the	  political.	  For	  commentary	  and	  critique	  on	  this	  distinction	  see	  S.	  Critchley	  The	  Ethics	  of	  Deconstruction	  (Oxford:	  Blackwell,	  1992),	  200-­‐219.	  	  95	  Ian	  James,	  The	  Fragmentary	  Demand:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  154.	  96	  Ibid.,	  113,	  my	  emphasis.	  Nancy’s	  ontology	  is	  ethical	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  appeals	  to	  “ethics”	  as	  ethos	  or	  dwelling.	  Our	  ethical	  obligations	  are	  born	  out	  of	  the	  fact	  of	  our	  dwelling	  with	  others.	  Like	  ontology,	  ethics	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  something	  with	  which	  we	  must	  always	  already	  be	  grappling.	  This	  sense	  of	  ethics	  as	  ethos	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  ontology	  is	  discussed	  in	  Martin	  Heidgger,	  “Letter	  on	  Humanism”	  in	  
Basic	  Writings	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2011),	  173-­‐176.	  	  	  97	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  “The	  political	  and/or	  politics,”	  trans,	  Christopher	  Saunder.	  This	  text	  was	  distributed	  at	  the	  ‘Derrida-­‐Konferenz,’	  Frankfurt	  Germany,	  14	  March	  2012.	  	  98	  Ibid.,	  2.	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place,	  Nancy	  suggests,	  that	  would	  be	  neither	  apolitical	  nor	  totalising.	  But	  the	  very	  fact	  of	  the	  obscurity	  of	  this	  placing	  of	  politics	  reveals	  the	  differential	  logic	  that	  structures	  the	  concept.	  Nancy	  distinguishes	  between	   two	  accounts	   of	   politics:	   ‘politics	   understood	   as	   taking	  over	  [comme	  assumption	  de]	  the	  ‘being	  of	  man	  in	  his	  relation	  to	  beings’	  and	  politics	  understood	  as	  the	  particular	  sphere	  designated	  to	  hold	  open	  the	  access	  to	  such	  a	  relation’.99	  For	  Nancy,	  politics	  –	  the	  question	  of	  events	  and	  our	  responsibility	  to	  them	  –	  remains	  alive	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	   a	   question	   of	   holding	   open	   the	   various	   possibilities	   of	   our	   being	   together	   rather	   than	  determining	   those	   relations	   in	   advance.	  Nancy’s	   conception	  of	   the	   ‘(k)not’	   in	  The	  Sense	  of	  
the	  World	  vividly	  illustrates	  this	  point.	  The	  sense	  of	  communality	  that	  underpins	  the	  truth	  of	  democracy,	   for	  Nancy,	   is	  expressed	   in	  the	  tying	  of	   the	   ‘(k)not’.100	  The	  relevance	  of	  Nancy’s	  ontology	  of	  being	  singular	  plural	  is	  clear	  here.	  The	  (k)not	  refers	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  communality	  that	   resists	   the	   destructive,	   totalitarian	   consequences	   of	   communion.101	  The	   knot	   of	   the	  ‘(k)not’	   indicates	   our	   being-­‐in-­‐common,	   the	   bare	   (ontological)	   political	   fact	   of	   our	  communality.	   But	   the	   not	   of	   the	   ‘(k)not’	   refers	   to	   the	   inoperativity	   of	   this	   communality,	  implying	   an	   unworking	   and	   unravelling	   that	   prevents	   the	   knot	   being	   tied.	   We	   can	  distinguish	  between	  a	  politics	  that	  keeps	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  (k)not	  from	  a	  politics	  of	  the	  knot,	  already	  tied	  –	  a	  politics	  that	  determines	  our	  relationality	  in	  advance.	  	  	  In	  this	  way	  Nancy’s	  intervention	  should	  be	  properly	  conceived	  in	  terms	  of	  Derrida’s	  aporia.	  Following	  Nancy	  and	  Derrida,	  we	  might	  suggest	  that	  political	  responsibility	  calls	  at	  once	  for	  a	  negative	  gesture	  of	  patient	  critique,	   reading	  and	  deconstruction	  whilst	  at	   the	  same	  time	  calls	   for	   the	   positive	   effort	   of	   decision	   and	   intervention.	   But	   these	   dual	   imperatives	   are	  irreconcilable,	  one	  cannot	  win	  out	  in	  the	  end.	  	  Responsibility	  lies	  in	  an	  ongoing	  but	  always	  partial	   negotiation	   between	   the	   not	   of	   deconstruction	   and	   critique	   and	   the	   knot	   of	   the	  decision,	   position	   and	   intervention.	   If	   we	   follow	   Nancy	   and	   Derrida	   we	   are	   left	   in	   a	  somewhat	   disquieting	   predicament.	   If	   the	   decision	   appears	   in	   this	   aporetic	   negotiation	  between	  the	  registers	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  political	  we	  can	  never	  know,	  absolutely,	  whether	  the	  right	  decision	  has	  been	  made	  for	  every	  decision	  will	  always	  already	  be	  compromised	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Ibid.,	  8	  100	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  The	  Sense	  of	  the	  World	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota,	  1997),	  111.	  101	  Nancy	  distinguishes	  between	  ‘communion’	  –	  a	  being-­‐together	  conceived	  as	  a	  unity	  –	  and	  ‘(inoperative)	  community’	  –	  a	  being-­‐together	  orientated	  around	  difference	  that	  does	  not	  posit	  a	  unitary	  sense	  of	  togetherness.	  For	  Nancy,	  what	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘community’	  reveals	  the	  totalising	  and	  unifying	  work	  of	  ‘communion’.	  The	  Inoperative	  Community	  works	  to	  reveal	  the	  constitutive	  sense	  of	  inoperative	  community	  covered	  over	  by	  communion’s	  unifying	  logic.	  See	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  The	  Inoperative	  Community,	  12.	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advance	   by	   the	   expansive	   spectral	   (or	   political)	   responsibility	   that	   is	   its	   condition	   of	  possibility.	  Rather	  than	  offering	  normative	  guidance	  or	  assurance,	  both	  Nancy	  and	  Derrida	  locate	  the	  site	  and	  space	  of	  responsibility	  but	  do	  no	  more.	  From	  this	  site	   lies	  both	  the	  risk	  and	   the	  promise	  of	   the	  decision.	  We	  are	   left	   to	   gamble	  on	  our	   luck	  but	   –paraphrasing	   the	  epigraph	  to	  the	  present	  chapter	  –	  we	  gamble	  with	  odds	  beyond	  measure.	  The	  decision,	  then,	  as	   Nancy	   says	   of	   freedom,	   comes	   in	   leaping.102	  Not	   that	   the	   leap	  will	   lead	   us	   to	   the	   right	  decision,	   or	   that	   if	  we	   leap	   correctly	   through/from	   the	   aporia	  we	  will	   have	   access	   to	   the	  responsible	  decision.	  Rather,	   it	   is	   the	  knowledge	   that	  we	   cannot	   guarantee	   a	   safe	   landing	  from	  our	  leaping	  that	  makes	  a	  responsible	  decision	  worthy	  of	  the	  name.	  	  	  
3.5	  Conclusion	  	  Let	  me	  conclude	  by	  drawing	  the	  discussion	  back	  to	  jurisdiction	  and	  suggest	  how	  the	  notion	  of	   responsibility	   outlined	  here	   helps	   us	   think	   about	   the	   law’s	   founding	  moment.	   Through	  Derrida’s	   reading	   of	   Austin	   we	   suggested	   that	   the	   performative	   jurisdictional	   moment	   is	  conditioned	   on	   a	   prior	   movement	   (or	   iterability).	   The	   jurisdictional	   declaration	   seeks	   to	  efface	  this	  prior	  movement	  in	  its	  reliance	  on	  a	  metaphysics	  that	  privileges	  the	  presence	  of	  the	   speaking	   subject	   and	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   community	   that	   that	   jurisdiction	   proclaims.	  The	  unity	  and	  presence	  of	  the	  community	  –	  the	  people,	  the	  NTC	  or	  whatever	  –	  is	  conjured	  by	  the	  performance	  of	  jurisdiction.	  Such	  presence	  and	  unity	  is	  predicated	  on	  a	  prior	  absence	  and	   difference	   and	   it	   is	   this	   prior	   différantial	   space	   that	   conditions	   our	   responsibility	   to	  jurisdiction;	   that	  which	   is	   absent	   conditions	   our	   countersignature	   of	   the	   declaration.	   The	  Libyan	   declaration	   discussed	   in	   this	   chapter	   serves	   to	   illustrate	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   the	  negotiations	  prompted	  by	  the	  jurisdictional	  declaration.	  The	  declaration	  itself	  evidences	  the	  theoretical	   position	   outlined	   here.	   And,	   following	   Nancy,	   we	   can	   get	   a	   sense	   of	   a	  deconstructive	  mode	  of	  action	  and	  decision.	  	  	  As	   I	   suggested	  above	   there	   is	   a	   structural	   analogy	   to	  be	  drawn	  between	   the	  performative	  speech	   act	   that	   announces	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   political	   and	   legal	   community	   and	   the	  responsibility	   that	   such	   a	   pronouncement	   engenders.	   Both	   represent	   a	   rupture	   that	  displaces	   a	   temporal	   economy	   in	  which	   the	   presence	   of	   the	   speaking,	   acting,	   responsible	  subject	   is	   privileged.	   It	   is	   absence	   rather	   than	   presence	   that	   has	   been	   privileged	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  The	  Experience	  of	  Freedom,	  trans.	  B.	  McDonald	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  58.	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foregoing	   discussion.	   This	   absence	   is	   key	   to	   understanding	   the	   risk	   and	   promise	   of	   the	  responsible	  decision.	  Just	  as	  responsibility,	  in	  the	  end,	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  leaping	  –	  a	  risk	  of	  intervention	   and	   decision	   without	   any	   sovereign	   principle	   or	   ground	   to	   guarantee	   one’s	  righteousness	  –	  so	  too	  is	  the	  performative	  act	  of	  jurisdiction	  a	  leap	  that	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  best	  and	  the	  worst.	  Jurisdiction,	  in	  the	  foundational	  mode	  discussed	  here,	  announces	  both	   the	   threat	   and	   promise	   of	   a	   community:	   the	   possibility	   of	   solidarity	   and	   security	   as	  well	   as	   exclusion	   and	   suppression.	  The	   responsibility	   to	   the	  declaration,	   then,	  works	   as	   a	  persistent	   reminder	   of	   the	   risk	   of,	   and	   the	   inherent	   compromise	   walled	   up	   within,	   this	  jurisdictional	   moment.	   Both	   the	   declaration	   and	   responsibility	   to	   it	   will	   be	   violent,	   both	  necessarily	   infer	  certain	  exclusions.	  The	  task,	   it	  seems,	   lies	   in	  a	  striving	   for	   lesser	  violence,	  not	  an	  absence	  of	  violence	  or	  exclusion	  (as	  we	  said,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  the	  expansive	  notion	  of	  responsibility	  is	  itself	  impossible)	  but	  a	  striving	  towards	  an	  accommodation	  of	  otherness	  that	  both	  acknowledges	  the	  violence	  inherent	  in	  the	  jurisdictional	  gesture	  but	  also	  seeks	  to	  minimise	  its	  force.	  The	  question	  of	  how	  community	  is	  brought	  to	  presence	  by	  jurisdictional	  practices	   (like	   the	   declaration	   discussed	   here)	   is	   picked	   up	   in	   the	   discussions	   in	   the	  following	   chapter.	   The	   ethico-­‐political	   imperative	   for	   a	   lesser	   violence	   is	   central	   to	  understanding	  how	  we	  might	  re-­‐imagine	  both	  jurisdiction	  and	  community.	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Chapter	  4	  	  
JURISDICTION	  (UN)GROUNDING	  LAW:	  FRATERNITY,	  COMMUNITY	  AND	  
BEING	  IN	  COMMON	  	  	  Are	  we	  Greeks?	  Are	  we	  Jews?	  But	  who,	  we?	  (Jacques	  Derrida)1	  
	  
	  
4.1	  Introduction	  Jurisdiction	  is	  not	  only	  a	  question	  of	  performative	  declaration	  or	  narrative	  fashioning.	  If	   it	  were,	  any	  group,	  party	  or	  institution	  could	  declare	  its	  jurisdictional	  authority	  in	  the	  sort	  of	  event	   discussed	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter	   or	   fashion	   a	   narrative	   that	   seeks	   to	   justify	   a	  particular	   order	   in	   the	   ways	   assessed	   in	   the	   second.	   Jurisdiction	   is	   not	   simply	   theatre,	  artifice	   and	   technicity,	   it	  must	   involve	   some	   constitutive	   relation	  with	   community.	   In	   the	  territorial	  mode,	   jurisdiction	  is	  conceived	  as	  being	  constituted	  by	  reference	  to	  a	  particular	  geographical	  area	  and,	  consequently,	  to	  those	  that	  happen	  to	  fall	  within	  this	  legally	  defined	  zone.	   The	   “community”	   that	   is	   subject	   to	   a	   jurisdictional	   authority,	   on	   this	   account,	   is	   a	  pretty	   vacuous	   affair	   that	   we	   would	   be	   hard	   pushed	   to	   describe	   as	   community	   at	   all.	  Community	   involves	   something	   more	   than	   the	   happenstance	   of	   one	   being	   together	   with	  others	  in	  a	  particular	  spot.	  Our	  first	  task	  then,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  jurisdiction	  must	  involve	  some	  relation	  to	  a	  thicker	  sense	  of	  community	  than	  the	  territorial	  definition	  infers,	  is	  to	  account	  for	  what	  this	  community	  might	  look	  like.	  Secondly,	  jurisdictional	  practices	  and	  techniques	  –	  by	  asserting	  the	  limits	  and	  scope	  of	  legal	  authority	  –	  appear	  to	  be	  constitutive	  of	   community	   itself.	   So	  we	  also	  need	   to	  account	   for	   this	   function,	   assessing	   the	  particular	  effects	  that	  jurisdiction	  has	  in	  bringing	  community	  to	  presence.	  	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  jurisdiction	  as	  having,	  not	  only	  a	  constitutive	  relation	  with	  what	  community	  brings	  (a	  sense	  of	   identity,	  common	  purpose	  or	  principles)	  but	  also,	  with	  what	  community	   lacks.2	  I	  argue	   that	   jurisdiction	   is	   the	  means	  by	  which	   law	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  trans.,	  Alan	  Bass	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2008),	  192.	  2	  I	  take	  this	  formulation	  of	  community	  both	  “bringing”	  certain	  qualities	  but	  also	  being	  marked	  by	  a	  fundamental	  “lack”	  from	  Richard	  Joyce,	  Competing	  Sovereignties	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2013),	  95-­‐99.	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and	   community	   are	   brought	   into	   relation	   but	   this	   relation	   is	   fragile,	   unworking	   or	  inoperative.	   In	  one	  sense	   jurisdiction	   is	   the	  means	  by	  which	   law	  becomes	  grounded	  in/by	  community.	   However,	   jurisdiction	   also	   works	   to	   unground	   the	   law	   because	   –	  following	  Derrida	  and	  Nancy	  –	   community	   is	  never	   fully	  determinate	  or	   stable	  and	   there	   can	  be	  no	  authoritative	  designation	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  a	  particular	  collective.	  Jurisdiction,	  in	  attempting	  to	  fix	  and	  determine	  the	  limits	  of	  community,	   in	  fact,	   leads	  to	  community’s	  autoimmune	  self-­‐destruction.	  My	  contention	  is	  that	  jurisdiction,	  often	  thought	  to	  be	  solely	  an	  act,	  enunciation	  or	  procedure	  that	  grounds	  the	  law	  and	  declares	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  community,	  is	  also	  the	  very	   practice	   that	   forecloses	   the	   possibility	   of	   there	   ever	   being	   a	   stable	   relationship	  between	   law	   and	   community.	   Following	   a	   non-­‐foundationalist	   account	   of	   community	   I	  suggest	   that	   jurisdiction	   both	   functions	   to	   “ground”	   the	   relation	   between	   law	   and	  community	   but	   also	   exposes	   a	   fragility	   within	   these	   very	   categories,	   “ungrounding”	   both	  law	  and	  community	  at	  the	  very	  moment	  that	  it	  purports	  to	  stabilise	  them.	  	  	  My	  engagement	  with	  community	   focuses	  on	   the	  deconstruction	  of	  community	  pursued	  by	  Derrida	   and	   Nancy.	   The	   question	   of	   community	   is	   central	   to	   Nancy’s	   philosophy.	   In	   The	  
Inoperative	   Community	   he	   develops	   an	   account	   of	   community	   quite	   distinct	   –	   indeed	  contrary	   to	   –	  the	   kind	   of	   communitarian	   notions	   most	   commonly	   associated	   with	   the	  principle.	   Community,	   for	  Nancy,	   is	   defined	   not	   by	  what	   community	   posits	   (that	   is,	   some	  common	  trait	  of	  belonging)	  but	  by	  a	  more	  primary	  connectivity	  that	  ceaselessly	  interrupts	  such	  notions.	  However,	  for	  Nancy	  there	  remains	  a	  promise	  within	  “community”	  and	  though	  his	  work	   significantly	   re-­‐works	  our	  understanding	  of	   community,	   the	   signifier	   remains	   in	  place.	  Nancy	  reanimates	  community	   from	  within,	   rather	   than	  avoid	   the	  notion	  or	  develop	  some	  alternative	  concept	   in	   its	  place.	   In	  contrast	  to	  Nancy,	  Derrida	   is	  deeply	  suspicious	  of	  community.	   For	   him,	   community	   is	   conditioned	   by	   a	   thinking	   that	   effaces	   difference	   and	  attempts	  to	  justify	  exclusions	  of	  otherness	  by	  imposing	  homogeneity	  within	  any	  collective.	  Community,	   for	  Derrida,	   soon	   descends	   into	   the	   very	   bad,	   having	   at	   its	   root	   the	   logics	   of	  totalitarianism.	  	  	  The	   debate	   between	   Nancy	   and	   Derrida	   on	   community	   takes	   up	   the	   second	   part	   of	   this	  chapter.	   In	   tracing	   the	   continuities	   and	   discontinuities	   between	   their	   positions,	   we	   can	  develop	  an	  account	  of	  community	  that	  goes	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  notion	  that	  community	  is	  formed	   around	   some	   common	   trait	   or	   shared	   identity.	   A	   deconstructive	   account	   of	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community,	   then,	   forces	   a	   reappraisal	   of	   jurisdiction’s	   role	   in	   bringing	   community	   into	  relation	  with	   law.	   This	   account	   of	   community	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   always	   an	   excess	   to	  community:	  community	   is	   never	   fully	   present	   and	   this	   excess	   unworks	   the	   “ground”	   that	  jurisdiction	   purports	   to	   provide.	   The	   difficulty	   that	   Nancy	   and	   Derrida	   leave	   us	   with,	  however,	  is	  in	  accounting	  for	  a	  sense	  of	  community	  that	  has	  some	  substantive	  content.	  The	  radical	   critique	   of	   community	   in	   both	   Derrida	   and	   Nancy’s	   account,	   comes	   close	   to	  suggesting	  that	  community	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  little	  more	  than	  a	  vacuity	  of	  content,	  a	  bare	  and	  unqualified,	   if	   inoperative,	   fact	   of	   relation.	   If	  we	   are	   to	   account	   for	   the	  way	   in	  which	  jurisdiction	  mediates	  between	  community	  and	   law,	  we	  need	  something	  more	   than	  this.	   In	  an	   effort	   to	   rescue	   community	   from	   this	   apparent	   “destruction,”	   I	   turn	   to	   Derrida’s	  evocation	   –	   pithily	   captured	   in	   the	   epigraph	   above	   –	  of	   the	   community	   of	   the	   question,	  underpinned	   by	   the	   logic	   of	   autoimmunity,	   a	   principle	   of	   central	   importance	   to	   his	   later	  work.	   Here	   we	   have	   a	   sense	   of	   community	   as	   substantive	   but	   temporary,	   a	   community	  posited	  but	  held	  in	  abeyance.	  	  	  In	  order	   to	  put	   this	  discussion	  of	  community	  and	   law	   into	  some	  context	  and	   flesh	  out	   the	  ways	   in	   which	   the	   deconstructive	   account	   differs	   from	   those	   developed	   in	   the	   existing	  literature,	  I	  first	  turn	  to	  American	  legal	  scholars	  Ronald	  Dworkin	  and	  Robert	  Cover.	  Though	  in	   markedly	   different	   ways,	   Dworkin	   and	   Cover	   both	   argue	   that	   law’s	   legitimacy	   and	  efficacy	   depends	   on	   understanding	   the	   notion	   of	   community	   to	   which	   any	   given	   law	   is	  supposed	   to	   apply. 3 	  Both	   offer	   important	   perspectives	   on	   the	   problems	   at	   play	   in	  accounting	  for	  community’s	  relation	  to	  law	  and	  their	  positions	  serve	  as	  a	  foil	  by	  which	  we	  can	  more	  fully	  appreciate	  the	  radicality	  of	  Derrida	  and	  Nancy’s	  thought.	  	  	  	  Underlying	   this	   argument	   is	   an	  ancillary	   concern	   to	  account	   for	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  Nancy	  and	  Derrida’s	  positions,	   though	  seemingly	  divergent	  on	  the	  question	  of	  community	  are,	   in	  fact,	   deeply	   sympathetic.	   Though	   adopting	   different	   strategies,	   and	   pursued	   in	   different	  registers,	   Derrida	   and	   Nancy	   both	   argue	   for	   a	   radical	   re-­‐imagining	   of	   community	   that	  proffers	   important	   political	   insights.	   These	   consequences,	   only	   touched	   on	   here,	   are	  discussed	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  the	  final	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  a	  sociological	  approach	  to	  law’s	  relation	  to	  community	  see,	  Roger	  Cotterrell,	  Law’s	  Community:	  
Legal	  Ideas	  in	  Sociological	  Perspective	  (Oxford:	  Clarenden	  Press,	  1995).	  Cotterrell’s	  pluralism	  is	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  Cover’s	  approach	  in	  that	  he	  retains	  something	  of	  an	  unproblematicised	  notion	  of	  “community”	  to	  which	  the	  law	  has	  a	  constitutive	  relation.	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4.2	  Community,	  Violence,	  Law	  	  Dworkin	   develops	   a	   fairly	   traditional	   –	  though	   problematic	   –	  notion	   of	   community	   as	  providing	  a	   legitimate	  ground	   for	   the	   law.	  Cover,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  examines	  State	   law’s	  violent	   capacity	   to	   interrupt	   communities	   that	   are	   themselves	   generative	   of	   law.	   Though	  Cover’s	  position	  contra	  Dworkin	  underscores	   the	   law’s	  violence	   in	  relation	   to	  community,	  community	  itself	  remains	  something	  of	  a	  nostalgic	  construction	  in	  his	  account.	  The	  debate	  between	  Nancy	  and	  Derrida	  on	  community	  assessed	  below	  provides	  a	  useful	  supplement	  to	  Cover’s	   account	   of	   community,	   with	   Derrida	   in	   particular	   arguing	   that	   a	   more	   radical	  violence	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  community	  for	  which	  we	  must	  account.	  	  	  
4.2.1	  Communities	  of	  principle	  A	  full	  account	  of	  Dworkin’s	  interprevativist	  contribution	  to	  analytic	  jurisprudence	  falls	  well	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  work.4	  I	  turn	  to	  Dworkin	  because,	  in	  his	  account	  of	  the	  law,	  obligations	   that	   we	   owe	   the	   State	   are	   grounded	   in	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   particular	  understanding	   of	   political	   community.	   The	   jurisdictional	   authority	   of	   State	   power,	   for	  Dworkin,	  ultimately	  rest	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  political	  community	   that	  produces,	  what	  he	  terms,	  “associative	  obligations”.	  As	  Dworkin	  suggest:	  The	  best	  defense	  [sic.]	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  –	  the	  right	  of	  a	  political	  community	  to	  treat	  its	  members	  as	  having	  obligations	   in	  virtue	  of	  collective	  community	  decisions	  –	  is	   to	  be	   found	  not	  in	  the	  hard	  terrain	  of	  contracts	  or	  duties	  of	  justice	  or	  obligations	  of	  fair	  play	  that	  might	  hold	  among	  strangers,	  where	  philosophers	  had	  hope	  to	  find	  it,	  but	  in	  the	  more	  fertile	  ground	  of	  fraternity,	  community	  and	  their	  attended	  obligations.5	  Arguing	   against	   a	   pluralist,	   or	   “checkerboard,”	   legality,	   Dworkin	   turns	   to	   political	  community	  to	  explain	  the	  characteristic	  of	  “integrity”	  within	  the	  legal	  system.	  Integrity	  –	  at	  least	   the	   legislative	   form	   of	   “political	   integrity”	   with	   which	   we	   are	   interested	   here	   –	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Simply	  put,	  Dworkin’s	  “interpretavism”	  argues	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  law	  lies	  in	  understanding	  the	  principles	  that	  offer	  the	  best	  justification	  for	  the	  practices	  of	  a	  particular	  community.	  A	  set	  of	  principles	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  offering	  such	  a	  ground	  through	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  practices,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  desired	  outcomes	  of	  such	  practices,	  within	  the	  community.	  Dworkin	  thus	  suggests	  that	  the	  judge’s	  task	  is	  to	  interpret	  a	  body	  of	  law	  in	  the	  “best	  light”	  she	  can,	  seeking,	  in	  her	  interpretations,	  the	  most	  morally	  coherent	  sense	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  that	  community.	  See	  Ronald	  Dworkin,	  A	  Matter	  of	  
Principle	  (Cambridge	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1985)	  and	  Ronald	  Dworkin,	  Law’s	  Empire	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2012).	  For	  useful	  account	  of	  interpretavism	  see	  David	  Brink,	  “Legal	  Interpretation	  and	  Morality”	  in	  ed.,	  B.	  Leiter	  Objectivity	  in	  Law	  and	  Morals	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001)	  and	  for	  a	  critical	  engagement	  with	  Dworkin’s	  work	  see,	  Reading	  Dworkin	  
Critically,	  ed.,	  Alan	  Hunt	  (Oxford:	  Berg	  Publishers,	  1992).	  	  5	  Dworkin,	  Law’s	  Empire,	  206.	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suggests	  that	  lawmakers	  should	  ‘try	  to	  make	  the	  total	  set	  of	  laws	  morally	  coherent’.6	  In	  this	  sense,	  integrity	  is	  a	  regulatory	  ideal	  to	  which	  lawmakers	  should	  aspire.	  Dworkin	  argues	  that	  integrity	   can	   be	   justified	   neither	   by	   appeals	   to	   justice	   nor	   to	   fairness	   as	   both	   of	   these	  principles	  appear	  to	  support	  the	  “checkerboard”	  pluralism	  that	  he	  wants	  to	  avoid.	  Integrity,	  then,	   must	   be	   grounded	   in	   something	   else.	   Dworkin	   finds	   this	   “something	   else”	   in	   his	  rendering	   of	   political	   community.	   In	   this	   way,	   understanding	   what	   defines	   a	   political	  community	  as	  such	  is	  central	  to	  Dworkin’s	  account	  of	  law.	  	  	  For	   a	   community	   to	   be	   considered	   a	   genuine	   “political	   community”	   Dworkin	   posits	   a	  number	   of	   conditions	   that	  must	   be	  met.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   the	   community	  must	   be	   a	   “bare	  community.”	  By	  this	  Dworkin	  means	  a	  community	  with	  some	  minimal	  criteria	  of	  belonging:	  some	  genetic,	  historical	  or	  geographical	  fact,	  common	  to	  all	  members,	  that	  binds	  individuals	  together.	   In	   addition	   to	   this	   minimal	   requirement,	   four	   further	   factors	   are	   identified:	   (i)	  mutual	  obligations	  within	  the	  community	  must	  be	  distinctive	  for	  that	  community;	  (ii)	  such	  obligations	  must	  be	  of	  a	  personal	  nature,	  connecting	  each	  member	  of	  a	  community	  to	  others	  in	  the	  group;	  (iii)	  each	  member	  must	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility,	  and	  aspiration,	  for	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole;	  and	  (iv)	  the	  obligations	  and	  responsibilities	  owed	  within	  the	   group	   must	   be	   egalitarian,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   each	   member	   of	   the	   community	   must	  engender	  equal	  concern	  and	  respect	  within	  the	  community.7	  	  	  Out	   of	   the	   three	   ‘models	   of	   community’8	  that	   Dworkin	   assesses	   only	   one	   matches	   the	  criteria	  outlined	  above:	  the	  “community	  of	  principle.”	  Communities	  of	  circumstance	  and	  so-­‐called	   “rulebook	   communities”	   are	   both	   rejected.	   The	   former	   refers	   to	   the	   sort	   of	  community	   that	   is	   subject	   to	   a	   territorial	   jurisdiction.	   It	   is	   a	   “community”	   that	   comes	  together	   through	  happenstance	   and	   though	  members,	   through	  mutual	   self-­‐interest,	  might	  show	   some	   signs	   of	   cooperation,	   such	   a	   community	   fails	   to	   satisfy	   the	   need	   for	   the	  particular	   attitudes	   and	   concerns	   that	   Dworkin	   identifies	   as	   crucial	   for	   political	  community.9	  The	  community	  of	  circumstance	  is	  little	  more	  than	  a	  “bare	  community”	  whose	  members	   can	   be	   recognised	   as	   having	   some	   commonality	   but	   little	   more.	   In	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Ibid.,	  176.	  7	  Ibid.,	  195-­‐202.	  	  8	  Ibid.,	  208-­‐215.	  9	  Dworkin	  gives	  the	  example	  here	  of	  two	  strangers	  from	  different	  nations	  washed	  up	  on	  a	  desert	  island	  following	  a	  naval	  battle	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  While	  each	  may	  help	  the	  other	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  their	  own	  survival,	  there	  is	  no	  “community”	  between	  them,	  in	  Dworkin’s	  view.	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contradistinction,	   the	   “rulebook	   community”	   is	   bound	   by	   a	   common	   acceptance	   of	   rules	  established	   through	   particular	   practices	   that	   the	   community	   recognises.	   But	   Dworkin	  suggests	  that	  this	  cannot	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  genuinely	  political	  community	  either	  because	  the	  obligations	  that	  connect	  members	  are	  superficial,	  relying	  only	  on	  a	  formal	  construction	  of	   unity.	   As	   such	   this	   connectivity	   is	   ‘too	   shallow	   and	   attenuated	   to	   count	   as	   pervasive,	  indeed	  to	  count	  as	  genuine	  at	  all’.10	  The	  model	  of	  community	  that	  satisfies	  all	  of	  Dworkin’s	  criteria	   is	   the	   community	   of	   principle	   in	   which	   members	   accept	   that	   they	   are	   bound	  together,	  not	  simply	  because	  of	  shared	  rules	  or	  circumstances	  but,	  by	  common	  principles.	  Such	  an	   ideal	  of	  community	  that	  exhibits	  political	   integrity	  and	  coherence	  offers	  a	  ground	  for	  the	  “law	  as	  integrity”	  argument	  that	  Dworkin	  pursues.	  	  	  As	   a	   list	   of	   criteria	   around	   which	   a	   political	   community	   might	   orientate,	   Dworkin’s	   is	  perfectly	  adequate.	  As	  a	  basis	  for	  justifying	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  particular	  normative	  order,	  it	  is	   also,	   in	   principle,	   equally	   plausible:	   a	   community	   might	   well	   agree	   that	   laws	   are	  legitimated	   not	   only	   by	   the	   shared	   (formal)	   rules	   of	   the	   collective	   but	   also	   common	  principles	   or	   values	   held	   by	   members.	   But	   the	   community	   of	   principle	   that	   Dworkin	  imagines,	  does	  not	  exist.	  This	  is	  a	  fanciful	  utopia,	  particularly	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  account	  of	  the	  nation	  State.	  The	  problem	  with	  Dworkin’s	   account	   lies	   in	   the	  very	   first	   criteria	   that	  he	   so	  quickly	   dismisses.	   The	   conditions	   of	   “bare	   community”	   are,	   Dworkin	   tells	   us,	   easily	  identified:	  People	   disagree	   about	   the	   boundaries	   of	   political	   communities,	   particularly	   in	   colonial	  circumstances	   or	   when	   standing	   divisions	   among	   nations	   ignore	   important	   historical	   or	  ethnic	  or	  religious	  identities.	  But	  these	  can	  be	  dismissed	  as	  problems	  of	  interpretation,	  and	  anyway	  they	  do	  not	  arise	  in	  the	  countries	  of	  our	  present	  main	  concern.	  Practice	  defines	  the	  boundaries	   of	   Great	   Britain	   and	   of	   the	   several	   states	   of	   the	  United	   States	  well	   enough	   for	  these	  to	  be	  eligible	  as	  bare	  political	  communities.11	  In	   a	   telling	   footnote,	   we	   can	   see	   the	   difficulty	   with	   this	   assertion.	   In	   reference	   to	   Great	  Britain,	  Dworkin	  comments,	   ‘I	   ignore	  the	  special	  problem	  of	  Northern	  Island	  here’.12	  Given	  recent	   developments	   in	   British	   politics,	   we	   would	   have	   to	   add	   the	   “special	   problem”	  Scotland	   and	   Wales	   –	  both	   of	   whom	   have	   strong	   nationalist	   movements,	   with	   Scotland	  voting	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2014	  in	  a	  referendum	  for	  independence	  –	  to	  this	  note.	  The	  so-­‐called	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Dworkin,	  Law’	  s	  Empire,	  212.	  	  11	  Ibid.,	  207-­‐208.	  12	  Ibid.,	  208,	  n.	  24.	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West	   Lothian	   question13	  also	   raises	   another	   “special	   problem”	   that	   seems	   to	   threaten	   the	  existence	   of	   a	   bare	   political	   community	   of	   Great	   Britain	   at	   all.	   The	   key	   point	   here	   is	   that	  Dworkin’s	  model	  of	  community	  accepts	  as	  uncontroversial	   the	  preordained	  parameters	  of	  the	   community	   that	   the	   community	   itself	   patently	   holds	   to	   be	   fragile	   and	   uncertain.	   The	  dismissal	   of	   these	   fundamental	   concerns	   as	   ‘matters	   of	   interpretation’	   is	   itself	   revealing:	  there	   is	   always	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   interpretations	   that	   threaten	   the	   supposed	   unity	   of	   a	  collective.	  Dworkin’s	  position	   implies	   that	   there	  could	  be	  a	  sovereign	  position	   from	  which	  adjudication	   over	   such	   differences	   of	   interpretation	   might	   be	   resolved.	   But	   the	   only	  legitimate	  source	  of	  authority	  to	  make	  such	  a	  judgment,	  by	  Dworkin’s	  own	  account,	  must	  be	  the	   political	   community	   itself.	   There	   is,	   then,	   a	   difficult	   circularity	   to	   Dworkin’s	   position.	  The	   very	   possibility	   of	   a	   plurality	   of	   interpretations	   regarding	   the	   limits	   of	   community	  infers	  that	  the	  “political	  community”	   itself	  must	   lack	   integrity.	  As	  the	  recent	  history	  of	   the	  British	   Isles	   clearly	   demonstrates,	   such	   “bare	   political	   communities”	   are	   not	   stable	   or	  certain	   and	   its	   members	   are	   not	   nearly	   as	   willing	   as	   Dworkin	   to	   accept	   their	   (forced)	  membership	  in	  such	  a	  collective.	  	  	  In	  order	   to	  develop	   this	  notion	  of	  a	   “bare	  community”	   –	  which,	   remember,	   is	   the	   sine	  qua	  
non	  of	  any	  political	  community	  –	  these	  difficulties	  have	  to	  be	  ignored.	  Dworkin	  proceeds	  as	  if	  these	  complexities	  did	  not	  exist,	  consigning	  to	  a	  footnote	  the	  example	  that	  threatens	  the	  purity	  of	  his	  account.	  What	  this	  aptly	  illustrates	  is	  that	  in	  any	  positive	  account	  of	  community	  (that	   is,	   one	   defined	   in	   relation	   to	   something	   posited,	   some	   common	   set	   of	   principles	   or	  mores),	   there	   is	   always	   a	   lack,	   a	   failure	   of	   the	   community	   to	   ever	   be	   present	   to	   itself.	  Something	   always	   escapes	   the	   parameters	   that	   are	   erected	   in	   the	   construction	   of	  community	   either	   because	   of	   some	   contention	   of	   the	   community’s	   borders	   or	   in	   the	  challenge	   to	   the	   community’s	   integrity	   made	   by	   a	   multiplicity	   of	   interpretations	   of	   the	  “principles”	  which	  a	  community	  is	  supposedly	  committed.	  To	  be	  clear,	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  Dworkin’s	  model	  could	  be	  refined	   in	  order	  to	  account	   for	  the	  particular	  difficulties	   in	  defining	  the	  “bare	  community”	  of	  Great	  Britain.	  There	   is,	   it	  seems,	  a	  structural	  problem	  in	  community	   itself.	  As	  we	   suggested	   in	   the	  previous	   chapter,	   something	  will	   always	   exceed	  any	   given	   determination.	   In	   this	   sense,	   community	   not	   only	   names	   the	   qualities	   that	   are	  
present,	  or	  even	  aspirational,	  in	  a	  collective	  but	  also	  what	  is	  absent	   from	  the	  collective,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  This	  refers	  to	  the	  contentious	  issue	  of	  whether	  Members	  of	  the	  Westminster	  Parliament	  from	  Scotland,	  Wales	  and	  Northern	  Island	  can	  vote	  on	  matters	  that	  only	  affect	  England.	  This	  rather	  illustrates	  the	  fragility	  of	  the	  political	  settlement	  in	  the	  UK.	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lacuna	   that	   lies	   at	   community’s	   heart.	   Dworkin’s	   account,	   by	   presupposing	   the	   “bare	  community”	   as	   unproblematic	   fails	   to	   adequately	   address	   the	   (perhaps	   necessary)	  exclusions	  and	  absences	  that	  appear	  within	  community.	  	  These	   concerns	   will	   be	   given	   fuller	   elaboration	   in	   our	   discussion	   of	   Derrida	   and	   Nancy	  below;	   both	   of	   whom	   hold	   this	   fundamental	   lack	   within	   community	   as	   central	   to	   their	  accounts	  of	   community.	  Leaving	   these	   concerns	   for	   the	   time	  being,	   I	  want	   to	   turn	  now	   to	  Robert	  Cover	  who	  offers	  a	  useful	  antidote	  to	  Dworkin’s	  approach.	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  State	  authority	   as	   being	   guaranteed	   by	   a	   morally	   and	   politically	   coherent	   community,	   Cover	  argues	  that	  the	  State	  violently	  destroys	  community,	  itself	  generative	  of	  “law.”	  Here,	  some	  of	  the	  difficulties	  that	  haunt	  Dworkin’s	  account	  are,	  rather	  than	  ignored,	  brought	  to	  the	  fore.	  	  	  
4.2.2	  Jurisgenerative	  communities	  and	  the	  jurispathic	  State	  Robert	  Cover,	  legal	  theorist	  and	  historian,	  had	  a	  brief	  but	  influential	  career.14	  Animating	  his	  work	   is	   a	   desire	   to	   account	   for	   the	   central	   role	   of	   violence	   in	   the	   law.	   As	   the	   opening	  sentence	  of	  his	  essay	  “Violence	  and	  the	  Word”	  dramatically	  illustrates	  –	  ‘legal	  interpretation	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  field	  of	  pain	  and	  death’15	  –	  Cover	  sought	  to	  underscore,	  rather	  than	  obscure,	  the	   law’s	  essentially	  violent	   function.16	  This	   involves	  more	   than	  accounting	   for	   the	   judge’s	  power	   to	   enact	   violence	   (or	   have	   other	   carry	   out	   violence)	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	   law	   by	  depriving	   defendants	   of	   property	   or	   liberty.	   The	   law	   is	   also	   violent	   in	   a	   deeper	   sense	  through	   its	   imposition	   of	   homogeneity	   within	   an	   internally	   differentiated	   and	  heterogeneous	   polity.	   However,	   the	   law,	   for	   Cover,	   is	   not	   solely	   violent.	   The	   law	   holds	   a	  promise	   of	   justice	   and	   freedom,	   particularly	   in	   its	   capacity	   to	   be	   a	   conduit	   between	  antagonistic	  communities	  who	  claim	  to	  have	  sovereign	  authority.	   It	   is,	   in	   fact,	   the	   internal	  conflict	  between	  the	  violence	  and	  promise	  of	  law	  that	  is	  central	  to	  Cover’s	  work.	  As	  Austin	  Sarat	   suggests,	   Cover’s	   essays	   are	   primarily	   occupied	   by	   ‘an	   effort	   to	   think	   about	   law	   in	  relation	   to	   institutional	   reality,	   of	   its	   intimate	   engagements	   with	   violence	   while	   also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Cover	  died	  in	  1986	  at	  the	  age	  of	  42.	  Many	  of	  his	  essays	  and	  articles	  are	  collected	  in,	  Narrative,	  
Violence	  and	  the	  Law:	  The	  Essays	  of	  Robert	  Cover,	  M.	  Minow,	  M.	  Ryan	  and	  A.	  Sara	  eds.,	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan	  Press,	  1992).	  	  15	  Robert	  Cover,	  “Violence	  and	  the	  Word,”	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  95	  (1986),	  1601.	  16	  Cover	  explicitly	  distances	  himself	  from	  Dworkin	  who,	  he	  argues,	  ‘blithely	  ignores’	  the	  violent	  implications	  of	  legal	  interpretation.	  See,	  Cover	  “Violence	  and	  the	  Word,”	  1601,	  n.	  2.	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attending	  to	  its	  normativity	  and	  its	  normative	  aspirations’.17	  It	  is	  this	  dual	  function	  of	  law	  as	  being	   something	   both	   aspirational	   and	   creative,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   violent	   and	  destructive,	  on	  the	  other,	  to	  which	  we	  turn	  here	  in	  order	  to	  expand	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  community,	  law	  and	  jurisdiction.	  	  	  In	  “Nomos	  and	  Narrative”18	  Cover	  describes	  the	  encounter	  between	  communities	  and	  law	  as	  necessarily	   violent,	   it	   is	   a	   confrontation	   in	   which	   a	   plurality	   of	   normativity	   is	   destroyed.	  Cover’s	   starting	   point	   is	   to	   decouple	   State,	   or	   positive,	   law	   from	   a	   broader	   category	   of	  normativity.	  As	  he	   remarks	   in	   the	  opening	  passages	  of	   the	   essay:	   ‘we	   inhabit	   a	  nomos	   –	  a	  normative	   universe’ 19 	  that	   entails	   that	   we	   are	   always	   already	   creating	   normative	  distinctions	  between	  the	  permissible	  and	  the	  interdicted,	  the	  lawful	  and	  unlawful,	  the	  bona	  fide	  and	  null	  and	  void.	  Cover	  suggests	   that	   the	  administrative	   functions	  of	  State	   law	  are	  a	  part	   of	   our	   normative	   universe	   but	   only	   ‘a	   small	   part…	   [of	   what]	   ought	   to	   claim	   our	  attention’.20	  By	  opening	  the	  conversation	  up	  to	  a	   larger	  sense	  of	  normativity,	  Cover	  allows	  us	  differentiate	  between	  the	  “law”	  of	  the	  community	  and	  the	  “law”	  of	  the	  State.	  	  	  This	  is	  a	  significant	  move	  in	  relation	  to	  jurisdiction.	  Jurisdiction	  does	  not	  simply	  name	  the	  force	  necessary	  to	  make	  visible	  sovereign	  authority	  but	  also	  infers	  a	  specular	  function	  that	  reflects	  an	  extant	  normativity.	  Cover	  offers	  an	  account	  of	  a	  fundamental	  normativity	  always	  at	   work	   before	   official	   sanction	   or	   fiat.	   Given	   that	   we	   inhabit	   a	   nomos,	   or	   normative	  universe,	  we	  are	  always	  already	  implicated	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  law	  and	  legal	  meaning.	  Such	  legal	  meanings	   are	   articulated	   from	   the	   bottom	   up,	   so	   to	   speak,	   produced	   not	   by	   official	  order	  but	  through	  a	  series	  of	  cultural	  and	  social	  practices.	  This	  process	  of	  generating	  legal	  meaning,	  Cover	  names	  “jurisgenesis.”	  This	  process	  is	  necessarily	  communal	  and	  depends	  on	  a	   community	   coming	   together,	   orientating	   themselves	   around	   particular	   narratives	   of	  order.	   Such	   jurisgenerative	   communities	   have	   an	   educative	   or	   “paedic”	   function	   –	  which	  involves	  training	   in	  a	  common	  normative	  system,	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  particular	  (lawful)	  narrative,	  the	  shared	  belief	  in	  the	  community’s	  identity	  and	  so	  on	  –	  as	  well	  as	  a	  forceful	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Austin	  Sarat,	  “Situating	  Law	  Between	  the	  Realities	  of	  Violence	  and	  the	  Claims	  of	  Justice”	  in	  Law,	  
Violence	  and	  the	  Possibility	  of	  Justice,	  ed.,	  Austin	  Sarat	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  4.	  18	  Robert	  Cover,	  “The	  Supreme	  Court,	  1982	  Term	  –	  Foreword:	  Nomos	  and	  Narrative,”	  Harvard	  Law	  
Review	  97	  (1983),	  4.	  Subsequent	  references	  will	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  “Nomos	  and	  Narrative.”	  19	  Cover,	  “Nomos	  and	  Narrative,”	  4.	  20	  Ibid.	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“imperial”	  function.	  The	  imperial	  function	  is	  “world-­‐maintaining”	  in	  that	  the	  common	  nomos	  of	  a	  community	  is	  enforced	  by	  institutions.	  Cover	  suggests	  that	  in	  one	  State	  there	  could	  be	  a	  plurality	  of	  such	  jurisgenerative	  communities,	  each	  having	  a	  different	  orientating	  narrative	  or	   set	   of	   precepts	   and	   each	   a	   different	   set	   of	   institutions	   and	   conventions	   that	   police	   the	  community,	   determining	   its	   proper	   limits.	   Such	   communities	   give	   sense	   to	   the	   law	   and,	  rather	   like	   Dworkin’s	   communities	   of	   principle,	   by	   creating	   and	   nurturing	   a	   narrative,	  ground	  the	  law,	  providing	  an	  attachment	  between	  the	  community	  and	  the	  norms	  by	  which	  it	   is	   governed.	   But	   there	   is,	   as	   Cover	   suggests,	   a	   ‘radical	   dichotomy	   between	   the	   social	  organization	   of	   law	   as	   power	   and	   the	   organization	   of	   law	   as	   meaning’.21	  The	   law	   is	   not	  simply	  the	  organic	  expression	  of	   jurisgenerative	  practices	  but	  comes	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  institutional	  desire	  to	  maintain	  social	  order.	  	  	  We	  have	   in	  Cover’s	  account	   two	   jurisdictional	  practices	  at	  work.	  The	   first	   is	   the	  notion	  of	  jurisdiction	   (or	   juris-­‐fiction)	   that	   fashions	   a	   narrative	   of	   order	   and	   unity.	   The	   second	   is	  jurisdiction’s	   declarative	   and	   forceful	   mode	   by	   which	   divisions	   and	   differences	   are	  delimited.	  The	  generative	  practices	  of	  a	  community	  come	  into	  most	  stark	  conflict	  with	  the	  authority	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   As	   Cover	   suggests,	   ‘judges	   are	   people	   of	   violence…	   judges	  characteristically	   do	   not	   create	   law,	   but	   kill	   it’22	  by	   imposing	   one	   interpretation	   of	   the	  community’s	  nomos,	  by	  calling	  this	  “law,”	  and	  expelling	  all	  other	  claims	  to	  legality	  as	  heresy.	  The	   violence	   of	   the	   judicial	   decision	   puts	   an	   end	   to	   the	   generative	   efforts	   within	   a	  community,	   it	   stymies	   the	   capacity	   for	   narrative	   creation	   and	   rather	   than	   opening	  normative	  worlds,	   cuts	   across	   the	  nomos,	  delimiting	   a	   sovereign	   legality.	  Unlike,	  Dworkin	  who	   avoids	   the	   question	   of	   the	   judge’s	   violence	   all	   together,	   Cover	   argues	   that	   the	  community	   that	   offers	   a	   ground	   for	   the	   law	   is	   always	   in	   a	   conflict	   with	   this	   jurispathic	  modality.	   But,	   as	   already	   intimated,	   Cover	   is	   not	   so	   simplistic	   to	   suggest	   that	   judges	   are	  purely	  violent.	  Cover	  argues	  that	  the	  jurispathic	  office	  is	  a	  necessity.	  Without	  the	  regulating	  efforts	  of	  the	  institution,	  normative	  communities	  would	  be	  ‘unstable	  and	  sectarian	  in	  their	  social	  organisation,	  dissociative	  and	  incoherent	  in	  their	  discourse,	  wary	  and	  violent	  in	  their	  actions’.23	  In	  this	  sense,	  ‘judges	  are	  also	  people	  of	  peace’24	  because	  they	  are	  able	  to	  mediate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Ibid.,18.	  22	  Ibid.,	  53.	  23	  Ibid.,	  16	  24	  Ibid.,	  53.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Cover	  suggests	  that	  the	  judiciary	  itself	  can	  be	  a	  seen	  to	  be	  a	  jurisgenerative	  community	  when	  it	  opposes	  the	  violence	  and	  coercions	  of	  the	  State’s	  other	  functions	  (the	  police,	  the	  executive	  and	  so	  on).	  See	  Cover,	  “Nomos	  and	  Narrative,”	  58.	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the	  competing	  claims	  of	  warring	  communities.	  Cover,	  then,	  does	  not	  advocate	  a	  non-­‐violent	  law	   that	   allows	   for	   the	   free	   creation	   of	   a	   plurality	   of	   normative	   meanings.	   Rather,	   he	  suggests	   a	   corrective	   might	   be	   found	   if	   the	   judiciary	   and	   legal	   academics	   were	   to	   ‘stop	  circumscribing	   the	   nomos…	   and	   invent	   new	   worlds’.25	  Violence,	   in	   this	   sense,	   cannot	   be	  done	  away	  with	  but	  a	  “lesser	  violence”	  against	  jurisgenesis	  might	  be	  possible.	  	  There	  is	  clearly	  a	  strong	  resonance	  between	  Cover’s	  account	  of	  jurisgenerative	  communities	  and	   the	   jurispathic	   State	   and	   the	   logic	   of	   jurisdiction	   outlined	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   this	   thesis.	  Jurisdiction	  fulfils	  a	  dual	  function	  of	  reflection	  and	  positing.	  The	  jurisgenerative	  community	  produces	  an	  informal	  normativity	  that	  the	  State	  seeks	  to	  reflect	  back	  in	  its	  formal	   legality.	  But	   this	   latter	   function	   of	   jurisdiction	   (in	   delimiting	   and	   dividing)	   is	   necessarily	   violent	  because	   it	   has	   to	   cut	   across	   the	  plurality	  of	   communities	   that	  produce	   the	   law.	  Following	  our	   discussion	   of	  Derrida’s	   analysis	   of	   Kafka	   in	   the	   second	   chapter,	   however,	   can	  we	   not	  posit	   a	   “law”	   prior	   to	   community?	   Cover’s	   account	   suggests	   a	   conflict	   between	   a	   “law”	  produced	  through	  communities	  coming	  together	  around	  particular	  narratives	  and	  attaching	  to	  certain	  identities,	  and	  “State	  law”	  that,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  social	  control,	  destroys	  the	  plurality	  of	   community	   normativity.	   If	   we	   live	   in	   a	   normative	   universe,	   always	   already	   producing	  legality,	   does	   community	   itself,	   rather	   than	   solely	   the	   State,	   not	   circumscribe	   this	  normativity	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	   law?	   Both	   Derrida	   and	   Nancy	   suggest	   that	   a	   more	  fundamental	   law	   –	  the	   “law	   before	   the	   law”	   or	   “law	   of	   abandonment”	   –	  precedes	   the	  violence	  of	  the	  State	  that	  affects	  the	  jurisgenerative	  community.	  	  	  In	  accounting	  for	  the	  violence	  in	  the	  community’s	  encounter	  with	  State	  law,	  Cover	  provides	  a	  supplement	  to	  Dworkin’s	   idealistic	  communities	  of	  principle.	  Cover	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  “bare	  community”	  (in	  Dworkin’s	  terms)	  cannot	  be	  so	  easily	  assumed	  but	  itself	  is	  produced	  through	  a	  dynamic	  and	   inherently	  unstable	  set	  of	   relations	  between	  communities	  and	   the	  State.	  Cover,	  however,	   remains	  wedded	   to	  an	  essentially	  positivist	   account	  of	   community.	  Community	   is	   defined	   by	   the	   common	   narratives	   and	   practices	   that	   inhere	   within	   a	  collective.	  The	  community	  encounters	  violence	  from	  either	  the	  State’s	  jurispathic	  modality	  or	  from	  other	  jurisgenerative	  communities.	  The	  jurisgenerative	  community	  for	  Cover	  is	  not	  inherently	  violent	  but	  has	  violent	  encounters	  with	  its	  various	  others.	  By	  urging	  us	  to	  “invent	  new	  worlds”	  and	  to	  limit	  the	  violence	  of	  State	  law,	  Cover	  suggests	  that	  the	  plurality	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Ibid.,	  68.	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“laws	  of	  the	  communities”	  might	  be	  protected.	  But	  “law”	  in	  this	  understanding	  remains	  tied	  to	  a	   fiction	  of	  unity	  and	  a	  hierarchy	  of	   interpretative	  practices.	  Cover’s	  hope	   for	  a	  greater	  plurality	   of	   communities,	   casts	   community	   in	   somewhat	   nostalgic	   terms,	   as	   if	   community	  itself	   could	   not	   be	   the	   harbinger	   of	   some	   inherently	   violent	   or	   totalitarian	   logic.	   Through	  Derrida	   we	   can	   radicalise	   Cover’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   function	   of	   violence	   in	   the	  community.	  Rather	  than	  seeing	  the	  community	  as	  coming	  into	  conflict	  with	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  State	  or	  other	  communities	  alone,	  Derrida	  makes	  the	  case	  for	  thinking	  of	  community	  as	  always	  already	  violent.	  	  	  Cover’s	   essay	   is	   useful	   in	   the	   present	   context	   because	   it	   illustrates	   how	   the	   two	  jurisdictional	   practices	   assessed	   in	   the	   thesis	   so	   far	   come	   into	   conflict.	   The	   narrative	   of	  order	   fashioned	   by	   jurisgenerative	   communities	   has	   an	   antagonistic	   relation	   with	   the	  jurisdiction	  of	  a	  unitary	  State,	  which	  seeks	  to	  declare	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  one	  law.	  What	  is	  not	  assessed	   by	   Cover,	   and	   why	   we	   now	   turn	   to	   Derrida,	   is	   the	   effect	   that	   jurisdictional	  practices	  have	  within	  community	  itself.	  	  	  
4.3	  Community	  as	  Fraternity	  Derrida	  has	  something	  of	  a	  vexed	  relation	  to	  community.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  he	  had	  no	  time	  at	  all	  for	   communitarian	   politics,	   fraternities	   or	   any	   community	   thought	   of	   as	   essentialised,	  closed	   or	   wholly	   present.	   Following	   much	   of	   the	   work	   of	   Le	   Centre	   de	   Reserches	  
Philosophiques	  sur	  le	  Politique,	  established	  by	  Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  in	  1980,	  Derrida	  associates	  the	  closure	  of	  absolute	  or	  transcendental	  presence	  with	  totalitarianism.26	  In	  this	  sense	  totalitarianism	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  political	  problem	  but	  one	  intimately	  connected	  to	  the	  history	  of	  metaphysics.	  As	  Ian	  James	  points	  out,	   this	  view	  is	  shared	  by	  Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  who	  ‘view	  totalitarianism	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  a	  certain	  relation	  to	  transcendence	  such	  as	  it	  is	  played	  out	  within	  the	  metaphysical	  tradition’.27	  For	  Nancy,	  totalitarianism	  resides	  in	  the	   attempts	   to	   either	   invest	   a	   community’s	   identity	  with	   a	   transcendent	  quality	  or	   claim	  that	   such	   identity	   is	   immanent	   to	  a	   collective.	  Nancy’s	  work	  attempts	   to	   re-­‐think	  what	  he	  claims	   to	   be	   our	   originary	   being-­‐in-­‐common	   in	   a	   way	   that	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   totalitarian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Much	  of	  this	  work	  was	  carried	  out	  at	  Le	  Centre	  de	  Recherches	  Philosophiques	  sur	  le	  Politique,	  established	  by	  Nancy	  and	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  in	  1980.	  Many	  of	  the	  significant	  papers	  published	  at	  this	  time	  are	  collected	  in	  Phillipe	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  and	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  Retreating	  the	  Political,	  ed.	  Simon	  Sparks	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1997).	  27	  James,	  The	  Fragmentary	  Demand,	  163.	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closure.	  Derrida,	   explicitly	  at	   least,	  does	  not	   follow	  Nancy	   in	   this	  endeavour.	  Rather,	  he	   is	  content	  to	  restrict	  himself	  to	  a	  critique	  of	  any	  sense	  of	  closed,	  programmatic	  community	  or	  fraternity.	  This	  rejection	  of	  community	  is,	  perhaps,	  most	  clearly	  elaborated	  in	  A	  Taste	  for	  the	  
Secret:	   I	   do	   not	   define	  myself	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   elementary	   forms	   of	   kinship…	   I	   am	  not	   part	   of	   any	  group…	   I	   do	   not	   identify	   myself	   with	   any	   linguistic	   community,	   a	   national	   community,	   a	  political	   party,	   or	  with	   any	   group	  or	   clique	  whatsoever,	  with	   any	  philosophical	   or	   literary	  school.28	  	  This	   rejection	   of	   “community”	   is	   tied	   to	   Derrida’s	   wariness	   of	   a	   “fraternity”	   residing	   in	  community.	  Community	  is	  bound,	  for	  Derrida,	  to	  a	  logic	  of	  fraternisation	  whereby	  the	  other	  is	  transformed	  into	  the	  brother,	  where	  communal	  relations	  are	  governed	  by	  a	  paternalism	  and	  homogeneity,	  where	  difference	  is	  elided.	  Any	  evocation	  of	  community	  for	  Derrida	  will	  always	  already	  imply	  a	  certain	  spirit	  of	  fraternity	  that	  will	  violently	  exclude	  the	  singularity	  of	  the	  other.	  	  	  In	  conversation	  with	  Elisabeth	  Roudinesco,	  Derrida	  traces	  this	  ‘malaise	  that	  rendered	  [him]	  inapt	  for	  “communitarian”	  experience’29	  to	  his	  troubled	  school	  days	  when	  he	  was	  expelled	  from	   his	   lycée	   because	   of	   the	   anti-­‐Semitic	   policies	   of	   the	   Vichy	   government	   during	   the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Derrida	  later	  enrolled	  in	  an	  temporary	  lycée	  for	  Jewish	  children	  but,	  as	  Benoît	   Peeters	   explains,	   this	   reinforced	   a	   reticence	  with	   community:	   ‘while	   his	   exclusion	  from	   Ben	   Aknoun	   [Derrida’s	   first	   lycée]	   had	   deeply	   wounded	   [him],	   he	   balked	   almost	   as	  much	   at	  what	   he	   perceived	   as	   a	   “group	   identification”.	   He	   hated	   this	   Jewish	   school	   right	  from	  the	  start.’30	  This	  experience	  seems	  to	  have	  marked	  Derrida’s	  approach	  to	  community.	  As	   we	   will	   see	   in	   what	   follows,	   the	   root	   of	   this	   malaise	   is	   directed	   towards	   the	  
predetermined	   criteria	   of	   belonging	   to	   a	   particular	   community.	   Derrida	   suggests	   that	   this	  violent	   predetermination	   –	   that	   excludes	   certain	   individuals	   and	   accepts	   others,	   without	  question	  –	  is	  the	  precondition	  for	  any	  community	  and	  it	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  he	  does	  not	  engage	  with	  the	  notion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Jacques	  Derrida	  with	  Maurizo	  Ferrais,	  A	  Taste	  for	  the	  Secret,	  trans.	  Giacomo	  Donis	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2001)	  27.	  Quoted	  in	  Miller,	  For	  Derrida,	  131.	  	  29	  Derrida	  and	  Roudinesco,	  For	  What	  Tomorrow…:	  A	  Dialogue	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  111	  30	  Benoît	  Peeters,	  Derrida:	  A	  Biography	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2013),	  20-­‐21	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For	   Derrida,	   “community”	   is	   little	   more	   than	   a	   “fraternity”	   that	   not	   only	   subsumes	   the	  individual	   into	   a	   homogeneity	   but	   imposes	   a	   gendered	   (but	   apparently	   neutralised)	  understanding	  of	  community.	  Here	  we	  see	  a	   further	   limitation	  with	  Dworkin’s	  supposedly	  uncontroversial	  assertion	  of	  “bare	  communities.”	  For	  Derrida,	  these	  bare	  communities	  that	  presuppose	  some	  minimal	  common	  trait	  of	  belonging	  are	   themselves	   the	  progenitors	  of	  a	  totalitarian	  logic	  of	  “fraternisation.”	  Such	  fraternisation	  will	  always	  work	  to	  make	  relations	  between	   members	   of	   the	   community	   appear	   “natural”:	   as	   if	   the	   community	   were	   not	  constructed,	  artificial,	  partial	  and	  so	  on,	  but	  simply	  a	  given.	  It	  is	  the	  phantasm	  of	  naturality,	  or	  a	  certain	  “re-­‐naturalisation”	  that	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  fraternisation.	  As	  Derrida	  suggests:	  Let	   us	   not	   forget,	   that	   it	   is	   not	   the	   fraternity	   we	   call	   natural	   (always	   hypothetical	   and	  reconstructed,	  always	  phantasmatic)	  that	  we	  are	  questioning	  and	  analysing	  in	  its	  range	  and	  with	  its	  political	  risks	  (nationalism,	  ethnocentrism,	  androcentrism,	  phallocentrism	  etc.),	  it	  is	  the	  brother	   figure	   in	   its	  re-­‐naturalising	  rhetoric,	   its	  symbolics,	   its	  certified	  conjuration	  –	   in	  other	  words,	  the	  process	  of	  fraternisation.31	  This	   logic	   of	   fraternisation	   conditions	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   community.	   As	   Marie-­‐Eve	  Morin	   suggests:	   ‘The	  woman	   gets	   included	   in	   fraternity	  when	   she	   becomes	   a	   brother	   for	  humanity…	  [because]	  “man”	  is	  the	  archetype	  of	  humanity	  and	  “brother”	  the	  archetype	  of	  the	  relation	   between	   siblings,	   the	   woman	   can	   become	   human	   or	   sibling	   only	   insofar	   as	   she	  resembles	   the	   archetypes	   of	   'man'	   or	   “brother”’.32	  In	   a	   community	   of	   brothers,	   or	   a	  community	  that	  evokes	  fraternity,	  the	  masculine	  authority	  of	  the	  brother	  (and	  by	  extension	  the	  son,	  husband,	  father)	  is	  privileged.33	  	  	  Unlike	   many	   of	   his	   contemporaries,	   Derrida	   offers	   a	   radical	   critique	   of	   community,	  suggesting	  that	  ‘there	  is	  still	  perhaps	  some	  brotherhood	  in	  Bataille,	  Blanchot	  and	  Nancy	  and	  I	   wonder,	   if	   it	   does	   not	   deserve	   a	   little	   loosening	   up,	   and	   if	   it	   should	   still	   be	   a	   guide	   for	  community’. 34 	  In	   The	   Experience	   of	   Freedom,	   for	   example,	   Nancy	   explicitly	   connects	  community	  to	  fraternity,	  aligning	  “fraternity”	  with	  an	  excessive	  and	  immeasurable	  notion	  of	  the	  sharing	  out	  of	  our	  being	  in	  common,	  suggesting	  that	  ‘fraternity	  is	  equality	  in	  the	  sharing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Derrida,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Friendship,	  trans.,	  George	  Collins	  (London:	  Verso,	  2005),	  202.	  	  32	  Marie-­‐Eve	  Morin,	  “Putting	  Community	  Under	  Erasure:	  Derrida	  and	  Nancy	  on	  the	  Plurality	  of	  Singularities”	  Culture	  Machine,	  Vol	  8	  (2006),	  n.	  2.	  Available	  online	  http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewArticle/37/45.	  Accessed,	  19th	  December	  2012.	  33	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Rogues:	  Two	  Essays	  on	  Reason,	  trans.	  Pascale-­‐Anne	  Braukt	  and	  Michael	  Naas	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  58.	  	  34	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Politics	  of	  Friendship,	  48	  n.	  15.	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of	   the	   incommensurable’.35	  Derrida	   questions	   why	   Nancy	   feels	   compelled	   to	   retain	   the	  figure	  of	  the	  brother,	  even	  if	  purely	  symbolic,	  rather	  than	  ‘the	  sister,	  the	  female	  cousin,	  the	  daughter,	  the	  wife	  or	  the	  stranger,	  or	  the	  figure	  of	  anyone	  or	  whoever’.36	  Derrida	  rejects	  the	  use	   of	   “fraternity”	   as	   a	   perpetuation	  of	   a	   Christian	   and	  psychoanalytic37	  privileging	   of	   the	  masculine	   figure	  of	  authority.	  Derrida	  acknowledges	   that	  perhaps	  Nancy’s	  move	   to	  co-­‐opt	  “fraternity”	   for	   his	   own	   ends	   is	   simply	   the	   product	   of	   desire	   to	   recount	   the	   narrative	   of	  these	   concepts	   and	   highlight	   what	   the	   history	   of	   these	   concepts	   implies.38	  But,	   Derrida	  remains	  concerned	  by	  the	  notion	  that,	  	  Nancy	  would	  like	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  fraternity	  of	  this	  received	  narrative…	  There	  is	  someone	  in	  me	  who	  would	   like	   to	  believe	   it;	   but	   another,	   another	  who	  no	   longer	   resembles	  me	   like	   a	  brother,	  simply	  cannot	  bring	  himself	  to	  believe	  it,	  another	  who	  even	  believes,	  on	  reflection,	  and	  with	  experience,	  that	  it	  would	  be	  better	  not	  to	  believe	  it,	  not	  only	  but	  especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  politics’.39	  This	  concern	  colours	  Derrida’s	  rejection	  of	  community.	  Fraternity	  is	  rejected	  because	  of	  the	  gendered,	   Christian	   and	   psychoanalytic	   heritage	   overdetermines	   the	   concept’s	   use.	   But	  community	   evokes	   a	   similarly	   fraternal	   spirit	   where	   each	   singularity	   is	   reduced	   to	  something	  common,	  a	  common	  man	  where	  difference	  is	  obscured.	  	  	  
4.3.1	  The	  violence	  of	  community:	  singularity	  and	  différance	  The	  problem	  that	  faces	  Derrida’s	  position	  –	  and	  one	  that	  has	  been	  underscored	  by	  a	  number	  of	   commentators	   –	   is	   that	   without	   some	   account	   of	   community	   and/or	   fraternity,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	   account	   for	   a	   truly	   political	   dimension	   to	   his	   thought.	   J.	   Hillis	   Miller,	   Wendy	  Brown	   and	   Jacques	   Rancière	   all	   suggest	   that	   a	   kind	   of	   individualism	   underpins	  Derrida’s	  thinking.	  For	  Brown,40	  Derrida	  is	  wedded	  to	  a	  liberal	  conception	  of	  freedom,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  “democracy	  to	  come”	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  a	  radical	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  democracy	  because	  it	  is	  confined	  by	  a	  liberal	  obsession	  with	  individualism.	  In	  particular,	  Brown	  argues	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Ibid.,	  72.	  36	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Rogues,	  58.	  	  37	  Nancy	  refers	  to	  Freud’s	  patricidal	  myth	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  moral	  law	  in	  Totem	  and	  Taboo	  during	  the	  discussion	  of	  fraternity;	  the	  “sharing	  of	  the	  (dismembered)	  body”	  evokes	  a	  Christian	  as	  well	  as	  psychoanalytic	  heritage.	  Nancy	  contends	  that	  fraternity	  is,	  ‘the	  relation	  of	  those	  whose	  Parent,	  or	  common	  substance,	  has	  disappeared,	  delivering	  them	  to	  their	  freedom	  and	  equality.	  Such	  are,	  in	  Freud,	  the	  sons	  of	  the	  inhuman	  Father	  of	  the	  horde:	  becoming	  brothers	  in	  the	  sharing	  of	  his	  
dismembered	  body’.	  Nancy,	  Experience	  of	  Freedom,	  72.	  38	  Derrida,	  Rogues,	  59.	  39	  Ibid.,	  56-­‐60.	  40	  Wendy	  Brown,	  “Sovereign	  Hesitations”	  in	  Derrida	  and	  the	  Time	  of	  the	  Political	  Cheah	  and	  Guerlac	  eds.	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  114-­‐132.	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that	  Derrida’s	  “democracy”	  relies	  both	  on	  the	   force	  of	   ipseity	  and	  a	  conception	  of	   freedom	  defined	   as	   ‘the	   faculty	   of	   power	   to	   do	   as	   one	   pleases’ 41 	  that	   limits	   the	   genuinely	  emancipatory	   potential	   of	   Derrida’s	   thought.	   Along	   similar	   lines,	   Rancière	   argues42	  that	  Derrida’s	   commitment	   to	   the	   absolute	   singularity	   of	   every	   other	   (encapsulated	   in	   the	  idiomatic	   phrase	   tout	   autre	   est	   tout	   autre 43)	   illustrates	   the	   impossibility	   of	   thinking	  politically	   at	   all.	   If	   every	   other	   is	   absolutely	   other,	   and	   thus	   unsubstitutable	   by/for	   any	  other,	   the	  demos	   is	   incapable	   of	   collective,	   unified	   action	   and	   engagement.	   Rancière,	  who	  defines	   the	  demos	  as	   those	   that	  have	  no	  particular	  qualification	   to	   rule	   rather	   than	  being	  ruled,	   sees	   substitutability	   –	   a	   condition	   anathema	   to	   Derrida’s	   deconstruction	   –	   as	  fundamental	   to	   genuine	   political	   engagement.	   Rancière,	   like	   Critichley,	   limits	   Derrida’s	  thought	  to	  an	  ethical	  practice	  of	  hospitality,	  incapable	  of	  translation	  into	  the	  political	  realm.	  For	  Miller,	   Derrida	   develops	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   subject	   that	   is	   radically	   opposed	   to	  collective	  or	   communal	  engagement.	  Miller’s	   claim	   is	  neatly	   summarised	  at	   the	  end	  of	  his	  essay	  “Derrida	  Enisled:”44	  ‘for	  Derrida,	  no	  isthmus,	  no	  bridge,	  no	  road,	  no	  communication	  or	  transfer	  connects	  or	  can	  ever	  connect	  my	  ensiled	  self	  to	  other	  selves’.45	  	  	  This	   understanding	   of	   deconstruction	   suggests	   that	   Derrida’s	   position	   in	   relation	   to	  community	  is	  purely	  negative.	  Derrida	  gives	  us	  the	  means	  by	  which	  we	  might	  expose	  how	  community	  effaces	  the	  singularity	  of	  each	  individual	  but	  from	  here	  it	  remains	  unclear	  how	  we	  can	  retain	  a	  sense	  of	  something	  positive	  within	  community,	  a	  sense	  of	  togetherness	  that	  underpins	   political	   action.	   Furthermore,	   how	   does	   this	   privileging	   of	   singularity	   not	  collapse	  into	  a	  liberal	  obsession	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  unsubstitutable	  	  individual?	  Here	  I	  want	   to	   assess	   these	   issues	   in	   a	   somewhat	   parenthetical	   discussion	   of	   Derrida’s	  understanding	  of	  singularity	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  différance.	  I	  pursue	  this	  because	  it	  is	  through	  this	  material	  that	  we	  can	  sense	  a	  close	  alliance	  between	  Nancy	  and	  Derrida	  on	  the	  question	  of	  “originary	  sociability”.	  And	  it	  is	  here	  that	  we	  can	  most	  clearly	  see	  the	  purchase	  in	  reading	  Nancy	  together	  with	  Derrida,	  giving	  some	  substance	  to	  the	  political	  inference	  of	  différance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Derrida,	  Rogues,	  22	  42	  Jacques	  Rancìere,	  “Should	  Democracy	  Come?	  Ethics	  and	  Politics	  in	  Derrida”	  in	  Derrida	  and	  the	  Time	  
of	  the	  Political	  ed.	  Cheah	  and	  Guerlac	  (London:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  274-­‐288.	  	  43	  In	  The	  Gift	  of	  Death	  David	  Wills	  translates	  this	  as	  ‘every	  (one)	  other	  is	  every	  (bit)	  other’	  (see	  The	  
Gift	  of	  Death,	  trans.	  David	  Wills	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  68.	  This	  indicates	  the	  simultaneous	  inference	  of	  individual	  absolute	  singularity	  and	  that	  this	  is	  a	  common	  condition	  –	  every	  other	  is	  other,	  just	  like	  everyone	  else.	  	  44	  J.	  Hillis	  Miller,	  “Derrida	  Enisled”	  in	  For	  Derrida	  (New	  York:	  New	  York	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  101-­‐132.	  45	  Miller,	  For	  Derrida,	  132.	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Derrida’s	   reticence	   with	   community	   stems	   not	   only	   from	   a	   concern	   for	   being	   just	   with	  singularity	   but	   also	   a	   concern	   for	   fundamental	   sociability.	   So	   rather	   than	   foreclosing	   the	  possibility	  of	  political	  community,	  Derrida,	  like	  Nancy,	  radically	  re-­‐thinks	  the	  notion.	  	  
	  In	  his	   reading,	  Miller	   suggests	   that	   there	  are	  good	  –	  ethical	   –	   reasons	   for	  maintaining	   the	  absolute	  solitude	  of	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  notion	  that	  every	  other	  is	  absolutely	  other	  (and	   thus	   unknowably	   other)	   informs	   the	   scope	   of	   our	   ethical	   responsibilities.	   Miller	  returns	  to	  Derrida’s	  phrase,	  tout	  autre	  est	  tout	  autre	  to	  describe	  this	  ethical	  responsibility	  to	  be	   just	  with	   the	  absolute	  otherness	  of	   the	  other.	   I	  want	   to	   suggest	   that	  Miller’s	   confusion	  turns	   on	   his	   (mis)translation	   of	   tout	   autre	   est	   tout	   autre.	   Miller	   translates	   the	   phrase	   as	  “every	   other	   is	   wholly	   other”.46	  This	   differs	   from	   David	   Wills’s	   translation	   in	   The	   Gift	   of	  
Death	  (the	  book	  in	  which	  this	  expression	  is	  given	  its	  fullest	  elaboration)	  which	  offers,	  “every	  (one)	   other	   is	   every	   (bit)	   other”	   as	   an	   apt	   translation.47	  This	   difference	   is	   significant.	   In	  Miller’s	   hands,	   tout	  autre	  est	   tout	  autre	   solely	   becomes	   an	   affirmation	  of	   the	   otherness	   of	  every	   other	   and	   appears	   to	   impute	   onto	   Derrida’s	   term	   a	   Levinasian	   sense	   of	   a	  transcendentally	   other	  Other.	   In	   contrast,	  Wills’s	   translation	  maintains	   the	   undecidability	  between	   two	   possible	   readings	   of	   the	   phrase;	   we	   read	   it	   with	   or	   without	   the	   bracketed	  words:	   “every	   other	   is	   every	   other”	   or	   “every	   one	   other	   is	   every	   bit	   other”.	   The	   latter	  rendering	  echoes	  Miller’s	   translation,	   suggesting	   that	   every	  particular	  other	   is	   completely	  other.	  The	  former,	  however,	  suggests	  something	  radically	  different:	  the	  other	  is	  the	  same	  in	  their	   otherness	   as	   each	   other;	   or,	   we	   might	   say,	   each	   other	   is	   singularly	   other,	   just	   like	  everyone	  else.	  The	  significant	  thing	  is	  that	  Wills’s	  translation	  stresses	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  same	  in	  Derrida’s	  expression:	  we	  are	  all	  alike	  in	  our	  otherness.	  	  	  Miller’s	  rendering	  of	  the	  term	  fails	  to	  be	  just	  with	  the	  intricacies	  of	  Derrida’s	  thought	  here.	  By	   disavowing	   the	   alternative	   reading	   of	   the	   term,	  Miller	   stifles	   the	  différantial	   logic	   that	  structures	   the	  phrase.	  The	  key	   thing	   in	   the	  notion	   that	   tout	  autre	  est	  tout	  autre	   is	   that	   the	  difference	   between	   each	   other	   is	   a	   différance:	   the	   unique	   way	   in	   which	   every	   other	   is	  distinguished	   from	   every	   one	   else,	   relies	   on	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   differences	   that	   is	   not	   fully	  present.	  I	  am	  singularly	  other	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  I	  am	  contaminated,	   in	  a	  unique	  way,	  by	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  othernesses	  –	  my	  personal	  history,	  ethnicity,	  sexuality,	  my	  relations	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Miller,	  For	  Derrida,	  xviii.	  47	  Derrida	  gives	  a	  detailed	  reading	  of	  the	  various	  implications	  of	  the	  phrase	  in	  Gift	  of	  Death,	  82-­‐85.	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family,	  friends	  etcetera.	  So	  the	  other	  can	  only	  be	  defined	  as	  an	  other	  through	  reference	  to	  an	  always	   already	   differentiation	   between	   others.	   In	   the	   same	   way	   that	   “cat”	   can	   be	  distinguished	   through	   its	   implicit	   reference	   to	   “bat,”	   “sat,”	   “fat”	   etcetera,	   the	   other	   is	  different	   to	   another	  other	   through	  an	   implicit	  differentiation.	  These	  differences,	   however,	  can	  never	  be	  wholly	  present	  and	  as	  such	  are	  always	  deferred.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  otherness	  of	  every	  other	  is	  never	  present;	  access	  to	  the	  unique	  way	  in	  which	  every	  other	  is	  other	  being	  foreclosed	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  différance.48	  	  In	   this	  sense,	   then,	   I	  would	  argue	  that	  Derrida’s	  reticence	  with	  community	   is	  not	  simply	  a	  concern	  with	  community’s	  propensity	   to	  efface	   the	  singularity	  of	  each	   the	  other	  or	   is,	  put	  crudely,	   an	   attack	   on	   individualism.	   For	   Derrida,	   singularity	   is	   born	   out	   of	   a	   prior	   but	  
différantial	   relation	   to	   others.	   The	   violence	   that	   community	   effects,	   then,	   is	   a	   violence	  against	   a	   prior	   sociability	   that	   is	   a	   logical	   prior	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   singularity.	  Community	  then	  affronts	  a	  prior	  “law	  of	  sociability”	  by	  circumscribing	  a	  more	  fundamental	  sense	   of	   interrelation	   or	   différance.	   In	   this	   sense,	   Derrida	   re-­‐imagines	   the	   “political”	  implications	  of	  community	  as	  such.	  Rather	  than	  see	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  community	  as	  the	  sine	  
qua	  non	  of	  politics,	  as	  Rancière	  does,	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  an	  inchoate	  sense	  of	  the	  political	  that	  precedes	  the	  community,	  an	  originary	  différantial	  relational.	  	  	  	  Nonetheless,	  Derrida’s	  critique	  of	  community	  troubles	  the	  notion	  that	  community	  can	  offer	  a	   ground	   for	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   law.	   To	   say	   that	   law	   has	   a	   constitutive	   relation	   with	  “community”	  (as	  suggested	  by	  Cover	  and	  Dworkin),	  is	  tantamount	  to	  saying	  that	  law	  has	  a	  constitutive	  relation	  with	   fraternity:	   to	  a	   logic	   that	  reduces	  members	  of	  a	  collective	   to	   the	  
Same.	   Unlike	   Cover	   who	   suggests	   that	   jurisgenerative	   communities	   are	   prone	   to	   violent	  encounters	  with	  the	  State,	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  violence	  already	  at	  work	  within	  such	   communities,	   a	   violence	   of	   exclusion	   and	   homogeneity.	   Such	   jurisgenerative	  communities	  are	  not	  immune	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  fraternalism.	  The	  position	  Derrida	  pursues	  in	   relation	   to	   community	   leaves	   us	   without	   a	   legitimate	   ground	   for	   law.	  “Community/fraternity”	  can	  never	  offer	  a	   legitimate	  ground	  because	   it	   is	   constituted	  by	  a	  violence	   that	   effaces	   singularity	   and	   a	   prior	   sociability.	   The	   line	   drawing	   obsessions	   of	  jurisdictional	  techniques	  are	  anathema	  to	  deconstruction	  which	  suggests	  that	  any	  attempt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  For	  the	  clearest	  explication	  of	  différance	  see	  Derrida,	  “Différance”	  in	  Margins	  of	  Philosophy,	  trans.	  Alan	  Bass	  (Brighton:	  Harvester	  Press,	  1982),	  3-­‐27.	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to	   ground	   law	   with	   the	   evocation	   of	   community	   is	   bound	   to	   a	   certain	   spirit	   of	  totalitarianism.	  	  	  There	   are	   two	   limitations	   with	   this	   line	   of	   thinking.	   Firstly,	   though	   we	   can	   read	   within	  Derrida	  a	  sensitivity	  for	  a	  différantial	  notion	  of	  relation	  or	  “originary	  sociability”	  it	  is	  neither	  prominent	  nor	  viscous	  enough	  in	  his	  thought	  to	  provide	  a	  theoretically	  grounded	  account	  of	  jurisdiction’s	   function	   in	  bringing	   law	   into	  relation	  with	   “community.”	   It	   is	   for	   this	   reason	  that	   I	   turn	   to	   Nancy.	   Nancy’s	   thinking	   of	   community	   and	   being	   in	   common	   provides	   a	  supplement	  to	  Derrida,	  offering	  an	  account	  of	  community	  that	  seeks	  to	  accommodate	  some	  of	   Derrida’s	   concerns	   with	   fraternity	   and	   the	   effacement	   of	   singularity.	   Secondly,	   if	   we	  follow	  my	  reading	  of	  Derrida	  above,	  there	  seems	  little	  room	  to	  account	  for	  anything	  positive	  in	  relation	  to	  jurisdiction.	  Jurisdiction,	  in	  this	  reading,	  would	  be	  solely	  related	  to	  the	  means	  by	   which	   a	   (soft)	   totalitarian	   spirit	   or	   sensibility	   is	   established	   and	   policed,	   jurisdiction	  would	  be	  the	  means	  by	  which	  this	  originary	  relation	  of	  différance	  is	  circumscribed.	  This	  is	  a	  pretty	  reductive	  account	  of	  jurisdiction	  and	  –	  though,	  perhaps,	  accurate	  in	  part	  –	  it	  obscures	  the	  specular	  function	  of	   jurisdiction	  that	  we	  assessed	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Given	  the	  centrality	  of	   community	   for	  Nancy’s	  philosophy,	   I	  want	   to	  explore	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  we	  can	  find	  a	  thinking	  of	  community	  and	  jurisdiction	  somewhat	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  role	  that	  jurisdiction	   plays	   in	   capturing	   a	   sense	   of	   the	   extant	   but	   informal	   practices,	   interests	   and	  relations	  that	  precede	  formal	  designation.	  	  	  	  
4.4	  Community	  as	  inoperative	  Nancy’s	  The	  Inoperative	  Community	   should	  be	   read	   in	   the	   context	  of	   two	  other	   significant	  texts	  of	  the	  same	  period:	  Blanchot’s	  The	  Unavowable	  Community	  and	  Agamben’s	  The	  Coming	  
Community.	  These	  three	  texts	  all	  present	  community	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  not	  orientated	  around	  some	   common	   property	   or	   identity.49	  Following	   Georges	   Bataille’s	   attempts	   to	   associate	  community	   with	   a	   non-­‐foundationalist	   ontology,50	  community	   is	   conceived	   as	   a	   vehicle	  through	  which	  an	  originary	  sociability	  can	  be	  identified	  and	  recast	  in	  a	  world	  where	  such	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  The	  Unavowable	  Community,	  trans.,	  Pierre	  Jorris	  (New	  York:	  Station	  Hill	  Press,	  1988);	  and	  Giorgio	  Agamben,	  The	  Coming	  Community,	  trans.	  Micheal	  Hardt	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2007).	  As	  discussed	  briefly	  below,	  Blanchot’s	  text	  was	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  Nancy’s	  work	  on	  community.	  Whilst	  Agamben’s	  text	  does	  not	  directly	  engage	  with	  Nancy’s	  thinking,	  there	  are	  clear	  affinities	  between	  the	  projects.	  	  50	  See	  in	  particular	  Georges	  Bataille,	  “The	  Psychological	  Structures	  of	  Fascism”	  in	  Visions	  of	  Excess,	  ed.	  Allan	  Stoekl	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1985).	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sociability	   has	   been	  obscured.	   These	   three	   texts	  were	  published	  between	  1986	   and	  1990	  when	  the	  worst	  aberrations	  of	  Communist	  rule	  in	  the	  USSR	  were	  well	  known	  and	  at	  a	  time	  when	   the	   Soviet	   project	   was	   in	   terminal	   decline.	   The	   texts	   share	   the	   common	   political	  concern	   of	   re-­‐imagining	   the	   fundamentals	   of	   community	   and	   communal	   politics	   in	   a	  way	  that	   does	   not	   lead	   to	   the	   totalitarian	   horrors	   of	   the	   period.	   If,	   as	   Sartre	   commented,	  ‘communism	  is	  the	  unsurpassable	  horizon	  of	  our	  time’51	  these	  thinkers	  desire	  a	  reclamation	  of	   the	   fundamentals	   of	   this	   project	   by	   recasting	   and	   reshaping	   the	   modes	   of	   our	   being	  together.	   All	   endeavour	   to	   theorize	   a	   community	   that	   is	   not	   united	   around	   a	   closed	   or	  unitary	   sense	  of	   identity,	   rather	   community	   is	   thought	  of	   as	   cohering	  around	   (howsoever	  conceived)	  singularity	  and	  difference.	  	  In	   its	   traditional	   rendering	   (typified	   by	   Dworkin’s	   communities	   of	   principle	   discussed	  above)	  community	  is	  aligned	  with	  a	  certain	  essence	  and	  identity:	  we	  are	  in	  such	  and	  such	  a	  community	   because	   of	   some	   identifiable	   trait	   of	   belonging.	   Nancy’s	   The	   Inoperative	  
Community52	  is	  a	  sustained	  critical	  engagement	  with	  such	  a	  conception	  but	  unlike	  Derrida	  sees	  some	  promise	  in	  retaining	  and	  re-­‐working	  the	  notion	  of	  “community.”	  For	  Nancy,	  this	  “traditional”	  notion	  of	   community	  has	   its	   roots	   in	  Rousseau’s	  nostalgia	   for	   a	   lost	   sense	  of	  communitarianism.	   Rousseau	   casts	   society	   (state	   institutions	   and	   political	   regulation)	   as	  rupturing	  an	  originary	  community	  life	  of	  self-­‐presence	  and	  stable	  identity:	  Rousseau…	   was	   perhaps	   the	   first	   thinker	   of	   community,	   or	   more	   exactly,	   the	   first	   to	  experience	  the	  question	  of	  society	  as	  an	  uneasiness	  directed	  towards	  the	  community,	  and	  as	  the	  consciousness	  of	  a	  (perhaps)	  irreparable	  rupture	  in	  this	  community.53	  Here	   community	   is	   conceived	   in	   nostalgic	   terms	   whereby	   a	   harmonious	   and	   intimate	  communalism	   has	   been	   lost	   and	   needs,	   somehow,	   to	   be	   recaptured;	   a	   nostalgia,	   perhaps	  redolent	   of	   Cover’s	   account.	   Nancy	   suggests	   that	   this	   nostalgia	   lays	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  perennial	   evocation	   of	   some	   golden	   by-­‐gone	   age	   where	   a	   strong	   sense	   of	   political	  community	  united	  members	  in	  a	  common	  cause.	  	  	  The	  task,	  for	  Nancy,	  is	  to	  interrupt	  these	  myths	  of	  essence,	  foundation	  and	  immanence	  and	  in	   so	   doing	   to	   think	   beyond	   communitarian	  models	   of	   community.54	  In	   this	   very	   effort	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Quoted	  in	  Nancy,	  Inoperative	  Community,	  1.	  52	  First	  published	  as	  La	  Communauté	  Désoeuvrement	  in	  Aléa	  4	  (1983).	  See	  Nancy,	  Inoperative	  
Community,	  41.	  The	  text	  to	  which	  I	  refer	  here	  is	  the	  expanded	  book	  version	  which	  includes	  the	  original	  essay	  along	  with	  four	  further	  essays	  developing	  the	  material.	  	  53	  Nancy,	  Inoperative	  Community,	  9.	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think	  beyond	  the	  traditional	  parameters	  of	  community,	  Nancy	  re-­‐appropriates	  the	  term	  for	  his	  own	  ends.	  Distinguishing	  between	  “communion”	  –	  a	  being-­‐together	  conceived	  as	  a	  unity	  –	   and	   “inoperative	   community”	   –	   a	  being-­‐together	  orientated	  around	  difference	   that	  does	  not	   posit	   a	   unitary	   sense	   of	   togetherness.55	  For	   Nancy,	   what	   is	   often	   referred	   to	   as	  “community”	  reveals	  the	  totalising	  and	  unifying	  work	  of	  “communion”	  and	  what	  is	  needed	  is	  an	  unearthing	  of	   the	  “inoperative	  community”	  that	  exposes	  a	  certain	  sense	  of	  our	  being	  together.	  Nancy	  works	   to	   reveal	   the	   constitutive	   sense	  of	   inoperative	   community	   covered	  over	  by	  communion’s	  unifying	   logic.	  Nancy	  contends	   that	   it	   is	  precisely	   the	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  essentialism	  of	  communion	  that	  is	  ‘constitutive	  of	  “community”	  itself’.56	  	  	  It	   is	  perhaps	  here	  that	  the	  “inoperativity”	  of	  the	  book’s	  title	  comes	  into	  focus.	  Communion	  would	  be	  akin	   to	  an	  operative	  community	  where	  an	  essence	   is	  produced	  and	  put	   to	  work,	  where	  a	  myth	  of	  union	  is	  propagated	  and	  maintained.	  The	  “inoperativity”	  (désoueuvrement)	  of	  community	  signals	  something	  radically	  different.	  This	   idiomatic	  term	  implies	  a	  range	  of	  meanings:	  idleness,	  unoccupancy,	  worklessness	  or	  uneventfulness,	  as	  well	  as	  un-­‐working	  or	  rendering	   inoperative/non-­‐functioning. 57 	  Nancy	   characterises	   désoeuvrement	   (here	  translated	  as	  “unworking”)	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  Community	  cannot	  arise	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  work.	  One	  does	  not	  produce	  it,	  one	  experiences	  or	  one	  is	  constituted	  by	  it	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  finitude.	  Community	  understood	  as	  a	  work	  or	  through	   works	   would	   presuppose	   that	   the	   common	   being	   as	   such	   be	   objectifiable	   and	  producible	   (in	   sites,	   persons,	   buildings,	   discourses,	   institutions,	   symbols:	   in	   short,	   in	  subjects)…	   Community	   necessarily	   takes	   place	   in	   what	   Blanchot	   has	   called	   “unworking”	  [désoeuvrement]	   referring	   to	   that	   which,	   before	   or	   beyond	   the	  work,	   withdraws	   from	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Ibid.,	  22.	  	  55	  Ibid.,	  12.	  56	  Ibid.	  	  57	  The	  English	  translation	  of	  désoeurvrement	  has,	  perhaps	  unsurprisingly,	  given	  rise	  to	  much	  head-­‐scratching.	  The	  term	  is	  most	  prominently	  associated	  with	  Blanchot.	  Here	  the	  term	  is	  translated	  (by	  Pierre	  Joris	  in	  The	  Unavowable	  Community	  for	  example)	  as	  “the	  unworking”.	  Joris	  gives	  a	  helpful	  exploration	  of	  the	  term	  in	  his	  “Translator’s	  Preface”	  to	  Blanchot’s	  book	  (see	  Blanchot,	  Unavowable	  
Community,	  xxi-­‐xxv).	  In	  commenting	  on	  the	  difficulties	  of	  rendering	  the	  term	  in	  English,	  Joris	  suggests	  (rather	  tongue	  in	  cheek)	  that	  the	  obstacles	  of	  translation	  perhaps	  lie	  in	  ‘the	  puritan	  impulses	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  culture	  blocking	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  a	  positive,	  active	  connotation	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  work’	  (xxiv).	  Stefano	  Franchi	  traces	  the	  terms	  origins	  to	  Alexandre	  Kojève	  who	  uses	  the	  term	  to	  describe	  three	  novels	  by	  Raymond	  Queneau.	  This	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  debate	  over	  the	  meaning	  of	  désoeuvrement	  between	  Kojève	  and	  Bataille.	  Franchi’s	  focus	  is	  Agamben’s	  use	  the	  term	  inoperosità	  (often	  used	  in	  conjunction	  with	  French	  désoeurvrement)	  and	  Franchi	  finds	  certain	  affinities	  (though	  not	  necessarily	  a	  synonymity)	  with	  Blanchot’s	  use	  of	  the	  term.	  See	  Stefano	  Franchi,	  “Passive	  Politics”	  Contretemps	  5	  (2004),	  33-­‐34.	  Perhaps	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  the	  term	  that	  these	  authors	  note	  performs	  something	  of	  its	  sense.	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work,	   and	   which	   no	   longer	   having	   to	   do…with	   production…	   encounters	   interruption,	  fragmentation	  and	  suspension.58	  	  The	   inoperative	   community	   is	   not	   some	   project	   with	   a	   definable	   end,	   a	   project	   that	  
presupposes	   the	   common	   being	   of	   community.	   However,	   the	   “inoperativity”	   of	   the	  community	   should	   not	   be	   characterised	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   inertia	   or	   stasis.	   The	   inoperative	  community	   is	   a	   ‘gift	   to	   be	   renewed	   and	   communicated’	   and	   whilst	   not	   a	   work	   is	  nevertheless	   a	   ‘task’.59	  The	   inoperativity	   of	   community,	   then,	   appears	   as	   at	   once	   the	  condition	  of	  possibility	   for	   the	  operative	  variant	  of	   community	   (communion)	  but	   also	   the	  very	   movement	   by	   which	   this	   communion	   is	   un-­‐done	   or	   unravelled. 60 	  Inoperative	  community	  would	  name	  a	  certain	  originary	  sense	  of	  being-­‐with	  others	  that	  underpins	  those	  operative	  communities	  orientated	  around	  identity	  and	  essence.	  	  	  Nancy	   develops	   this	   sense	   of	   the	   inoperative	   community	   through	   a	   reappraisal	   of	   an	  ontology	  of	  the	  “with.”	  Heidegger’s	  Mitsein	  is	  re-­‐worked	  and	  presented	  as	  an	  ontology	  of	  the	  “singular	   plural.”61	  Nancy	   asserts	   an	   ontology	   that	   undoes	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   ego	   or	  
autos	  whilst	   retaining	   a	   radical	   sense	   of	   singularity.	   Our	   singularity	   can	   only	   be	   revealed	  through	  our	  interpenetration	  and	  co-­‐contamination	  with/by	  others.	  The	  “with”	  is	  the	  bare	  fact	  of	  being:	  we	  are	  beings,	  Nancy	  insists,	  who	  are	  intractably	  with	  others,	  always	  ‘exposed	  to	   others,	   always	   turned	   toward	   an	   other…	   never	   facing	  myself’.62	  This	   “with”	   cannot	   be	  essentialised,	  named	  or	  identified,	  for	  in	  naming	  or	  essentialising	  we	  are	  caught	  in	  a	  model	  of	   communion	   that	   the	   inoperative	   community	   exceeds.	  Appealing	   to	   a	  Derridian	   lexicon,	  Stella	  Gaon	  describes	  the	   inoperative	  community	  as	   ‘arche-­‐community…	  [and]	   is	   thus	  that	  spacing	  (arche-­‐writing)	  that	  will	  have	  “produced”	  community,	  as	  such,	  but	  which	  itself	  can	  never	  appear’.63	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Nancy,	  Inoperative	  Community,	  31.	  59	  Ibid.,	  35.	  60	  The	  emphasis	  on	  the	  movement	  of	  inoperativity	  is	  helpfully	  pursued	  by	  Tataryn	  and	  Mulqueen	  by	  connecting	  social	  movements	  (specifically	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street)	  to	  Nancy’s	  inoperativity:	  ‘within	  the	  very	  action	  and	  process	  of	  coming	  together,	  community	  and	  its	  law	  are	  constantly	  being	  un-­‐ravelled…	  [this	  is]	  the	  ongoing	  movement	  of	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  negotiated	  and	  constantly	  worked	  through	  when	  people	  come	  together’.	  See	  Anastastia	  Tataryn	  and	  Tara	  Mulqueen,	  “Don’t	  Occupy	  This	  Movement:	  Thinking	  Law	  in	  Social	  Movements”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  (2012)	  23,	  286.	  61	  Nancy’s	  ontology	  of	  being	  singular	  plural	  is	  most	  thoroughly	  elaborated	  in	  Being	  Singular	  Plural,	  trans.,	  Robert	  D	  Richardson	  and	  Anne	  E	  O’Byrne	  (Stanford	  :	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2000)	  1-­‐99.	  62	  Nancy,	  The	  Inoperative	  Community,	  xxxvii-­‐xxxviii.	  63	  Stella	  Gaon,	  “Communities	  in	  Question:	  Sociality	  and	  Solidarity	  in	  Nancy	  and	  Blanchot”	  Journal	  for	  
Cultural	  Research,	  9(4)	  (2005),	  395.	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4.4.1	  In	  common	  without	  community	  With	  the	  notion	  of	  “arche-­‐community”	  we	  have	  perhaps	  begun	  to	  sense	  an	  affinity	  between	  Derrida	  and	  Nancy.	  Differences,	  however,	  clearly	  remain.	  Discussing	  Nancy’s	  work,	  Derrida	  expresses	  general	  sympathy	   for	  Nancy’s	   “inoperative	  communities”	  but	  ponders,	   ‘why	  call	  them	   communities?’64	  As	   discussed	   above,	   Derrida’s	   reticence	   stems	   from	   the	   idea	   that	  community	   can	   never	   be	   conceived	   in	   a	   way	   that	   exceeds	   the	   logic	   of	   communion.	  “Communion”	  for	  Derrida	  would	  be	  akin	  to	  “fraternisation”	  where	  the	  trait	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  certain	  community	  is	  determined	  in	  advance	  by	  a	  pre-­‐existing,	  quasi-­‐familial	  relationship.	  	  Any	   community	   will	   always	   work	   to	   determine	   its	   parameters,	   it	   will	   always	   involve	   a	  jurisdictional	   logic,	   where	   the	   law	   of	   the	   community	   is	   known	   to	   end.	   This	   is	   seen	  most	  vividly	  in	  the	  evocation	  of	  a	  fraternity	  where	  membership	  turns	  on	  gender,	  class,	  initiation	  etcetera.	   But,	   following	   Derrida,	   we	   might	   assert	   that	   even	   the	   most	   open,	   seemingly	  hospitable,	   community	   perpetuates	   a	   similar	   logic	   of	   exclusion,	   however	   subtly	   or	  unthinkingly. 65 	  There	   is	   an	   insidious	   logic	   at	   work	   in	   community	   that	   even	   Nancy’s	  inoperative	  community	  fails	  to	  avoid.	  That	  said	  there	  are	  clear	  resonances	  between	  Derrida	  and	   Nancy’s	   thought	   here.	   Both,	   for	   example,	   see	   community	   as	   being	   in	   need	   of	  deconstruction	  and,	  perhaps,	  more	   importantly,	  both	  undertake	  this	  deconstruction	   in	  the	  name	   of	   an	   originary	   sociability,	   before	   or	   beyond	   the	   very	   possibility	   of	   constructed	  communities.	   As	   Derrida	   asserts:	   we	   are	   caught	   up,	   one	   and	   another,	   in	   a	   sort	   of	  heteronomic	   and	  dissymmetrical	   curving	  of	   social	   space…	  a	   curving	  of	   the	   relation	   to	   the	  other	  prior	  to	  all	  organised	  socius,	  all	  políteia,	  all	  determined	  ‘government’,	  before	  all	  ‘law’.66	  And	  as	  outlined	  above	  Derrida	  shares	  Nancy’s	  contention	  that	  singularity	  is	  conditioned	  by	  a	  more	  fundamental	  communality.	  Community,	  and	  singularity,	  are	  both	  made	  possible	  by	  this	   ‘curving	   of	   the	   relation	   to	   the	   other’	   but	   it	   is	   also	   the	   very	   thing	   that	   undercuts	   and	  exceeds	   community.	   There	   is	   a	   “with”	   that	   always	   exceeds	   the	   particularity	   of	   the	  community	  that	  is	  both	  the	  condition	  of	  its	  possibility	  and	  impossibility.	  This	  speaks	  directly	  to	   the	   inoperativity	   that	   underpins	   community	   in	   Nancy.	   As	   we	   discussed	   above	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  Jacques	  Derrida	  with	  Maurizo	  Ferrais,	  A	  Taste	  for	  the	  Secret,	  trans.	  Giacomo	  Donis	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2001),	  25.	  	  65	  For	  an	  assessment	  of	  Derrida’s	  deconstruction	  of	  Rousseau’s	  nostalgia	  for	  a	  purely	  peaceful,	  joyous,	  originary	  community	  in	  Of	  Grammatology	  see	  Drucilla	  Cornell,	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Limit,	  42-­‐57.	  Cornell	  emphasises	  that	  for	  Derrida	  community	  will	  always	  imply	  an	  originary	  and	  inescapable	  violence	  born	  out	  of	  the	  exclusionary	  logic	  discussed	  above.	  	  	  66	  Derrida,	  Politics	  of	  Friendship,	  231.	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inoperativity	   of	   the	   community	  withdraws,	   can	   never	   be	   present	   itself	   but	   is	   that	   which	  conditions	  the	  possibility	  of	  community.	  	  	  Emphasising	  this	  common	  account	  of	  a	  sociability	  that	  exceeds	  community,	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  re-­‐iterate	  Derrida’s	  question	  to	  Nancy,	  “why	  call	  this	  community?”	  If	  the	  concern	  is	  with	  the	  originary	  “with”	  that	  makes	  community	  possible,	  why	  evoke	  the	  notion	  of	  “community”	  at	  all?	  As	  noted	  above,	  Nancy’s	  intervention	  comes	  at	  a	  particular	  historical	  juncture	  where	  the	  desire	  to	  recapture	  the	  language	  of	  communism,	  community	  and	  communality	  and	  re-­‐cast	  it	  anew	   was	   palpable.	   Moreover,	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   ontological	   is	   not	   without	   political	  purchase.	  In	  assessing	  Blanchot’s	  criticisms	  of	  Nancy’s	  inoperative	  community,67	  Ian	  James	  points	  out	  that	  in	  ‘maintaining	  an	  ontological	  perspective…	  [Nancy	  presents	  community]	  as	  something	   that	   always	   necessarily	   is	   by	   virtue	   of	   our	   shared	   finitude’ 68 	  not	   simply	  something	  that	  is	  forever	  deferred	  for	  the	  future	  or	  irrecoverably	  lost	  to	  a	  past	  golden-­‐age.	  Echoing	   this	   defence	   of	   Nancy,	   Stella	   Gaon,	   rightly	   identifies	   ‘a	   certain	   solidarity’69	  that	  emerges	   from	   Nancy’s	   deconstruction	   of	   community	   that	   is	   perhaps	   less	   identifiable	   in	  Blanchot	  and	  Derrida.	  But	  Derrida’s	  critique	  serves	  as	  a	  stark	  warning	  about	  the	  logic	  that	  underpins	  community.	  Appealing	  to	  community	  –	  even	  in	  its	  re-­‐worked,	  deconstructed	  and	  displaced	  guise	  –	  will	  always	  evoke	  a	  violent	  exclusionary	  logic.	  Perhaps,	  as	  Gaon	  suggests,	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  evoke	  the	  certain	  spirit	  of	  sociability	  and	  solidarity	  that	  emerges	  from	  Nancy	   (as	   Derrida	   evokes	   a	   certain	   spirit	   of	   Marxism	   in	   Spectres	   of	   Marx70)	   rather	   than	  reengage	   a	   tired	   and	   compromised	   language	   of	   “community”	   as	   being	   able	   to	   offer	   any	  ground	  for	  law.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  Blanchot’s	  Unavowable	  Community	  was	  published	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Nancy’s	  initial	  essay-­‐length	  version	  of	  “Inoperative	  Community”.	  Throughout,	  Blanchot	  criticises	  Nancy’s	  reliance	  on	  the	  ontological	  register	  to	  describe	  community.	  Particularly,	  Blanchot	  seeks	  to	  highlight	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Bataille’s	  conception	  of	  “the	  community	  of	  those	  without	  community”	  is	  in	  excesses	  of	  ontology.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Blanchot	  evokes	  an	  ethical	  register	  (in	  the	  Levinasian	  sense)	  to	  describe	  community.	  	  	  68	  Ian	  James,	  The	  Fragmentary	  Demand:	  An	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  192.	  	  69	  Stella	  Gaon,	  “Communities	  in	  Question,”	  401	  et	  passim.	  	  70	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Spectres	  of	  Marx	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2003),	  62.	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Notably,	   Nancy	   himself	   is	   not	   averse	   to	   such	   a	   re-­‐articulation	   of	   his	   project.	   In	   “The	  Confronted	   Community”71	  Nancy	   reveals	   that	   since	   the	   publication	   of	   The	   Inoperative	  
Community,	   he	   has	   more	   acutely	   noted	   the	   ‘dangers	   inspired	   by	   the	   usage	   of	   the	   word	  “community”’	  among	  these	  dangers,	  he	  notes	  the	   ‘inevitable	  Christian	  reference…	  spiritual	  and	   brotherly	   community,	   communal	   community’. 72 	  Nancy	   suggests	   that	   given	   these	  difficulties	   he	   has	   favoured	   to	   focus	   simply	   on	   the	   “with,”	  without	   the	   need	   to	   place	   this	  “with”	  in	  reference	  to	  community	  or	  communion.	  This	  “with,”	  he	  writes,	  is	  almost	   indistinguishable	   from	   the	   “co-­‐”	   of	   community,	   it	   brings	  with	   it	   however	   a	   clearer	  indicator	   of	   the	   removal	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   proximity	   and	   intimacy.	   The	   “with”	   is	   dry	   and	  neutral:	  neither	  communion	  nor	  atomisation,	  jut	  sharing	  and	  the	  sharing	  out	  of	  space.73	  Perhaps,	  here	  Derrida	  and	  Nancy	  appear	  closest.	  With	  “community”	  effaced,	  all	  that	  remains	  is	  a	  common	  assertion	  of	  our	  bare	  (or	  unqualified)	  sociability,	  the	  evocation	  of	  the	  originary	  “with”	   before	   and	   beyond	   the	   inevitable	   constructions	   and	   determinations	   of	   community	  proper.	  	  	  If	   it	   is	   here	   that	   Derrida	   and	   Nancy	   are	   closest,	   we	   have	   come	   full	   circle.	   Community	   –	  brought	   to	  presence	  by	   certain	   jurisdictional	  practices	  –	  seems	   to	  be	   conceived	   in	  purely	  negative	  terms.	  If	  we	  remove	  community	  from	  the	  scene	  entirely,	  as	  Nancy	  seems	  to	  suggest	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  dry	  and	  neutral	  “with,”	  we	  are	  incapable	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  reality	  of	  communities	  that	  we	  encounter,	  are	  members	  of,	  are	  terrified	  by,	  reject,	  admire	  and	  desire	  in	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  To	  efface	  community	  tout	  court	  and	  retain	  only	  a	  sense	  of	  our	  “with-­‐ness,”	   beyond	   any	   constructed	   community,	   would	   seem	   to	   undermine	   the	   political	   and	  social	   efficacy	   of	   such	   “communities,”	   particularly	   in	   relation	   to	   jurisdiction,	  which	   is	   the	  primary	   means	   by	   which	   community	   is	   brought	   to	   presence.	   Through	   jurisdictional	  determinations	  concerning	   the	   limits	  of	  a	  community,	   reparations	  of	  past	  aberrations	  and	  exclusions	  might	  be	  possible,	   jurisdictional	   limits	  might	  protect	  against	  certain	  hegemonic	  powers,	   provide	   a	   protection	   against	   imperial	   aggression	   or	   provide	   succour	   for	   the	  excluded	  or	   ignored.	  Such	  concerns	  are	  particularly	   important	  –	  as	  we	  will	   see	  below	  –	  in	  relation	  to	  account	  seeking	  to	  address	  the	  exclusions	  that	  are	  produced	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  political	  community.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  “The	  Confronted	  Community,”	  trans.	  Amanda	  Macdonald,	  Postcolonial	  Studies,	  (2003)	  Vol	  6,	  No	  1,	  23-­‐36.	  The	  text	  was	  initially	  commissioned	  to	  be	  published	  as	  the	  preface	  for	  an	  Italian	  edition	  of	  Blanchot’s	  The	  Unavowable	  Community.	  	  	  72	  Nancy,	  “Confronted	  Community,”	  31.	  	  73	  Ibid.,	  32.	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  How,	  then,	  do	  we	  understand	  community	  in	  a	  way	  that	  retains	  a	  sense	  of	  juridico-­‐political	  efficacy	  and	  potential	  but	  a	  community	  that	  foregrounds	  rather	  than	  effaces	  the	  exclusions	  necessary	  in	  community’s	  very	  constitution?	  In	  the	  following	  section	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  can	  develop,	   through	   Derrida’s	   logic	   of	   autoimmunity,	   a	   characterisation	   of	   jurisdiction’s	  relation	   to	   community	   as	   partaking	   in	   both	   the	   indeterminate	   and	   determinate	  modes	   of	  communality	  discussed	  so	  far.	  On	  this	  reading	  jurisdiction	  is	  grounded	  on	  a	  self-­‐referential	  assertion	   of	   community	   but	   such	   a	   claim	   is	   temporary	   and	   unstable,	   always	   already	  interrupting	  the	  community’s	  claim	  to	  presence	  from	  within.	  Through	  autoimmunity	  we	  can	  account	  for	  community’s	  function	  as	  (un)grounding	  law.	  	  
4.5	  Community	  and	  Autoimmunity:	  Jurisdiction	  (Un)grounding	  Law	  In	   this	   section	   I	   want	   to	   argue	   that	   in	   Derrida’s	   logic	   of	   autoimmunity	   we	   find	   a	  characterisation	  of	  community	  that	  works	  to	  offer	  a	  “ground”	  for	  law.	  Following	  Nancy	  and	  Derrida,	   however,	   this	   “ground”	   cannot	   be	   stable	   or	   present.	   The	   logic	   of	   autoimmunity	  suggests	   that	   community	   is	   always	   already	   in	   negotiation	   with	   the	   bare	   sociability	   that	  exceeds	  it	  and	  thus	  always	  already	  compromised,	  partial	  and	  bound	  to	  failure	  and	  yet	  it	   is	  the	   very	   site	   by	  which	   an	   opening	   to	   the	   future	   is	  made	   possible.	   Community	   by	   holding	  itself	   in	  suspense,	  as	  a	  question,	  becomes	  an	  essential	  site	  of	  political	  struggle.	  This	  site	  of	  struggle	   and	   the	   jurisdictional	   practices	   to	   which	   it	   gives	   rise	   are	   what	   (un)grounds	  community	   and	   law.	   In	   order	   to	   develop	   this	   notion	   of	   autoimmunity	   in	   relation	   to	  community,	   law	   and	   jurisdiction,	   I	   turn	   to	   Derrida’s	   engagement	  with	   democracy,	   where	  Derrida	  gives	  the	  fullest	  elaboration	  of	  autoimmunity.	  	  
4.5.1	  Democracy	  as	  autoimmune	  The	   idea	   of	   autoimmunity	   is	   of	   central	   importance	   to	   Derrida’s	   later	   work.	   Biologically,	  autoimmunity	   describes	   a	   kind	   of	   bodily	   self-­‐destruction	   whereby	   the	   body’s	   immune	  system	  produces	  antibodies	  or	  lymphocytes	  that	  work	  against	  substances	  naturally	  present	  in	   the	   body.	  Whilst	   clearly	   inspired	   by	   the	   biological	   inference,	   Derrida	   uses	   the	   term	   to	  describe	  a	  gesture	  of	  self-­‐defence	  or	  self-­‐preservation	  of	  some	  thing	  that	  in	  fact	  leads	  to	  that	  thing’s	   destruction.	   So,	   to	   suggest	   that	   democracy	   is	   autoimmune	   is	   to	   claim	   that	   it	   is	  threatened	  internally	  by	  its	  very	  own	  logic.	  Such	  a	  characterisation	  of	  democracy	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  democratic	  process,	   in	  order	  to	  protect	  the	  process	   itself,	  must	  retain	  the	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capacity	   to	   suspend	   democracy.	   In	   Rogues	   Derrida	   cites	   the	   example	   of	   the	   elections	   in	  Algeria	   in	   1992	  where	   it	   was	   predicted	   that	   a	  majority	   that	  wanted	   to	   reject,	   or	   at	   least	  restrict,	  democratic	  freedoms	  was	  forecasted	  victory	  in	  parliamentary	  elections.74	  In	  order	  to	   avoid	   this	   result	   the	   government	   suspended	   the	   elections.	   So	   in	   order	   to	   protect	  democracy,	  democracy	  itself	  was	  destroyed.	  This,	  rather	  than	  an	  aberration	  or	  anomaly,	  for	  Derrida	  goes	  to	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  democracy’s	  	  logic.75	  	  This	   logic	  of	   autoimmunity	   is	  key	   to	  understanding	  Derrida	   concept	  of	   the	   “democracy	   to	  come”	   (démocratie	   à	   venir).	   Firstly,	   an	   autoimmunity	   is	   revealed	   through	   the	   relation	  between	  democracy	  and	  sovereignty.	  In	  order	  for	  democracy,	  understood	  quite	  literally	  as	  the	  rule	  (cratos)	  of	  the	  people	  (demos),	  to	  have	  any	  discernable	  effect	  in	  ruling	  it	  must	  rely	  on	  some	  form	  of	  sovereignty.	  As	  Derrida	  puts	  it:	  As	  always,	   these	  two	  principles,	  democracy	  and	  sovereignty,	  are	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  but	  also	  by	  turns,	  inseparable	  and	  in	  contradiction	  with	  one	  another.	  For	  democracy	  to	  be	  effective,	  for	  it	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  system	  of	  law	  that	  can	  carry	  the	  day…	  for	  it	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  an	  effective	  power,	   the	   cracy	   of	   the	   demos	   –	   of	   the	   world	   demos	   in	   this	   case	   –	   is	   required.	   What	   is	  required	  thus	  is	  a	  sovereignty,	  a	  force	  that	  is	  stronger	  than	  all	  the	  other	  forces	  in	  the	  world.76	  The	   multiplicity	   of	   the	   people	   who	   express	   a	   desire	   and	   capacity	   to	   rule	   themselves,	  transform	  themselves	  into	  a	  sovereign	  “people”	  or	  “nation”	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  themselves	  from	  destruction	  and	  provide	  justification	  for	  their	  rule.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  some	  efficacy,	  therefore,	   democracy	   co-­‐opts	   sovereignty.	   But	   in	   striving	   to	   protect	   itself	   through	  sovereignty,	   democracy	   suffers	   from	   an	   autoimmune	   self-­‐destruction.	   In	   an	   attempt	   to	  immunise	   and	   protect	   itself	   from	   destruction,	   democracy	   destroys	   itself	   by	   closing	   off,	  unifying	  and	  essentialising	  the	  multiplicity	  that	  enables	  the	  formation	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  first	   place.	   As	   Wendy	   Brown	   puts	   it,	   the	   originary	   expression	   of	   ipseity	   ‘would	   be	   the	  sovereignty	  of	  every	  “I”	  or	  “we”	  that	  aspires	  to	  rule	  or	  govern	  itself,	  every	  entity	  that	  acts	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Derrida,	  Rogues,	  33	  75	  The	  parallels	  with	  Giorgio	  Agamben’s	  work	  on	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  sovereign	  decision	  here	  are	  clear.	  Agamben	  argues	  that	  the	  state	  of	  exception	  –	  whereby	  the	  “normal”	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  suspended	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  sovereign’s	  executive	  power	  –	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  norm	  and	  constitutes	  the	  paradigm	  of	  government.	  Agamben	  identifies	  a	  zone	  of	  indistinction	  between	  the	  norm	  and	  the	  exception,	  in	  his	  own	  way	  identifying	  an	  internal	  distortion	  within	  the	  logic	  of	  sovereignty	  and	  democracy.	  See	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  Homo	  Sacer:	  Sovereign	  Power	  and	  Bare	  Life,	  trans.	  Daniel	  Heller-­‐Roazen	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  30-­‐38	  and	  Giorgio	  Agamben	  The	  State	  of	  Exception,	  trans.	  Kevin	  Attell	  (Chicago:	  Chicago	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  1-­‐31.	  	  76	  Derrida,	  Rogues,	  100.	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its	  own	  behalf’.77	  But	  this	  orignary	  expression	  of	  self-­‐initiated	  power	  is	  at	  the	  very	  heart	  of	  democracy,	   animating	   its	   very	   raison	  d’etre.	   This	   self-­‐affirmation	   of	   ipseity	   that	   animates	  democracy	   also	   forces	   sovereignty	   on	   to	   the	   scene,	   and	   from	   here	   on	   in	   democracy	   and	  sovereignty	  are	  caught	  in	  an	  aporetic	  double	  bind	  that	  results	  in	  democracy’s	  autoimmune	  self-­‐destruction.	   Democracy	   and	   sovereignty,	   then,	   are	   bound	   in	   a	   destructive	   clasp	   that	  means	   democracy	   as	   such	   (that	   is,	   a	   democracy	   without	   sovereignty)	   remains	   an	  impossibility.	  	  	  Secondly,	  Derrida	  highlights	  the	  canonical	  problem	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  equality	  and	  liberty.	   In	   Rogues	   Derrida	   equates	   equality	   with	   the	   calculable	   and	   freedom	   with	   the	  incalculable.78	  These	   two	   necessary	   but	   contradictory	   claims	   that	   unite	   in	   democracy	  represent	   a	   constitutive	   fissure	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   democratic.	   Derrida	   suggests	   that	  freedom	   is	   impossible	  without	   a	   concept	   of	   equality	   –	   the	   suggestion	   being	   that	   freedom	  must	   always	   take	  place	   in	   relation	   to	   limits	   imposed	  by	  others	   and	  we	  must,	   in	   theory	  at	  least,	  all	  be	  equally	  free.	  Democratic	  freedom	  only	  makes	  sense,	  then,	  if	  everyone	  within	  the	  demos	   is	  equally	   free.	   So,	   equality	  becomes	  an	   integral	  part	  of	   freedom	  and	  because	   such	  equality	  is	  inscribed	  within	  freedom,	  equality	  itself	  becomes	  incalculable.	  The	  two	  concepts	  are	  intrinsically	  bound	  but	  in	  an	  autoimmune	  relation.	  Equality	  confines	  every	  singularity	  to	  a	  measurable	  unit	  that	  is	  infinitely	  substitutable.	  Freedom,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  exceeds	  this	  calculation	  and	  enables	  each	  singularity	  to	  be	  heterogeneous	  to	  others.	  But,	  for	  democracy,	  these	   two	  competing	   factors	  are	  mutually	  dependent	  –	  as	  we	  suggested	   liberty	  must	   take	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	   liberty	  for	  all	  –	  so	  this	  represents	  an	  internal	  corruption	  within	  the	  very	  structure	  of	  democracy.	  To	  be	  clear,	  Derrida	  is	  not	  describing	  external	  factors	  like	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  or	  the	  inequity	  of	  opportunities	  within	  a	  polity	  that	  prevent	  equality	  or	  liberty	  from	  being	  realized,	  rather	  the	  focus	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  concepts,	  because	  of	  their	  co-­‐implication	  in	  democracy,	  corrupt	  democracy	  from	  within.	  	  	  The	   autoimmunity	   of	   democracy	   is	   structured	   by	   a	   différantial	   logic.	   The	   difference	   that	  constitutes	  democracy	  is	  coupled	  with	  a	  logic	  of	  deferral	  whereby	  democracy’s	  full	  presence	  is	   foreclosed.	   Returning	   to	   the	   question	   of	   sovereignty,	   in	   its	   claim	   to	   presence	   (“this	   is	  democracy	   here-­‐and-­‐now”)	   democracy	   evokes	   the	   sovereignty	   that	   calls	   forth	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Brown,	  “Sovereign	  Hesitations,”	  119.	  78	  Derrida,	  Rogues,	  48.	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destruction.	  Democracy	  is,	  then,	  never	  fully	  present	  in	  the	  (sovereign)	  claim	  that	  democracy	  has	   arrived	   or	   been	   achieved	   and	   is	   thus	   always	   “to	   come”.	   It	   is	   clear,	   then,	   that	   the	   “to	  come”	   in	   the	   democracy	   to	   come	   is	   not	   the	   positing	   of	   some	   horizon	   of	   possibility	   for	  democracy	   (as	   if	   it	  were	   just	  an	   Idea	  that	  we	  must	  move	   towards79),	   rather	   the	   “to	  come”	  expresses	  the	  dislocation	  that	  structures	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  democracy	  from	  within.	  As	  Alex	   Thomson	   has	   pointed	   out,	   for	   Derrida	   ‘the	   problem	   is	   an	   internal	   dehiscence	   in	   the	  concept	   of	   democracy	   itself,	   not	   just	   the	   distance	   of	   modern	   democracies	   to	   democratic	  ideals’.80	  In	   this	   sense,	   Thomson	   suggests,	   Derrida’s	   “democracy	   to	   come”	   is	   in	   fact	  more	  radical	  than	  the	  “radical	  democracy”	  of	  Ernesto	  Laclau	  and	  Chantal	  Mouffe.81	  	  Unlike	  in	  the	  biological	  setting,	  the	  metaphor	  of	  autoimmunity	  in	  this	  context	  is	  not	  an	  ill	  or	  evil	  because	  it:	  Enables	   an	   exposure	   to	   the	   other,	   to	  what	  and	   to	  who	   comes	   –	  which	  means	   that	   it	  must	  remain	   incalculable.	   Without	   autoimmunity,	   with	   absolute	   immunity,	   nothing	   would	   ever	  happen	  or	  arrive…	  We	  would	  no	  longer	  expect…	  any	  event.82	  	  This	   is	   why	   the	   democracy	   to	   come,	   in	   its	   articulation	   of	   the	   originary	   flaw	   within	  democracy,	  allows	  us	  to	  think	  of	  another	  space	  for	  democracy	  and	  new	  possibilities	  for	  the	  democratic.	   This	   contamination	   of	   democracy	   with	   sovereignty	   is	   what	   gives	   democracy	  “play”	   and	   opens	   it	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   infinite	   recasting,	   reworking	   and	   reiteration.	  Absolute	   immunity	   is	   equivalent	   to	   absolute	   sovereignty:	   if	   democracy	   were	   absolutely	  immune	  from	  the	  parasite	  of	  sovereignty	  it	  would	  itself	  become	  sovereign.	  The	  openness	  to	  a	  new	  space	  for	  politics	  and	  democracy	  is	  engendered	  by	  the	  emancipatory	  promise	  of	  the	  à	  
venir.	   Even	   if	   deconstruction	   rejects	   traditional	   messiansim,	   teleology	   or	   metaphysics,	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  Derrida	  is	  keen	  to	  distinguish	  the	  democracy	  to	  come	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Kantian	  Idea	  (see,	  
Rogues,	  84-­‐94).	  However,	  this	  clearly	  does	  not	  foreclose	  the	  quest	  for	  better	  democracy	  or	  more	  democracy,	  rather	  it	  indicates	  that	  that	  task	  is	  endless.	  	  80	  Alex	  Thomson,	  Deconstruction	  and	  Democracy:	  Derrida’s	  Politics	  of	  Friendship	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2005),	  49.	  81	  Thomson	  has	  in	  mind,	  particularly,	  Hegemony	  and	  Socialist	  Strategy:	  Towards	  a	  Radical	  Democratic	  
Politics	  (London:	  Verso,	  2001).	  Thomson’s	  suggestion	  is	  that	  Derrida’s	  thinking	  of	  democracy	  offers	  a	  re-­‐thinking	  of	  politics,	  critiquing	  the	  limits	  of	  democracy	  itself,	  whereas	  Laclau	  and	  Mouffe	  offer	  an	  historically	  situated	  political	  theory	  which	  avoids	  this	  more	  radical	  critique.	  See,	  Thomson,	  
Deconstruction	  and	  Democracy,	  41-­‐54.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Martin	  Hägglund	  has	  recently	  argued	  that	  Mouffe	  and	  Laclau	  resist	  the	  more	  radical	  gesture	  –	  present	  in	  Derrida’s	  thought	  –	  of	  rejecting	  the	  
desire	  for	  a	  totalized,	  sovereign	  political	  order.	  Rather	  their	  critique	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  assertion	  that	  such	  a	  totalized,	  sovereign	  order	  is	  impossible.	  For	  Hägglund	  Derrida’s	  critique	  of	  democracy	  illustrates	  that	  such	  a	  political	  order	  is	  not	  only	  impossible	  but	  also	  undesirable.	  And	  this	  represents	  a	  more	  radical	  position.	  See	  Martin	  Hägglund,	  Radical	  Atheism:	  Derrida	  and	  the	  Time	  of	  Life	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  191;	  191-­‐205.	  	  82	  Derrida,	  Rogues,	  152.	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remains	  committed	  to	  emancipatory	  politics:	  ‘there	  is	  no	  ethico-­‐political	  decision	  or	  gesture	  without	  what	  I	  would	  call	  a	  “Yes”	  to	  emancipation’.83	  This	  is	  the	  double	  bind	  Derrida	  leaves	  us	  with:	   the	  very	  possibility	  of	  a	  democracy	  to	  come,	   lies	   in	  democracy’s	  exposure	  to,	  and	  corruption	  by,	  that	  which	  causes	  its	  own	  destruction.	  	  
	  
4.5.2	  Community	  as	  autoimmune	  Derrida	  asserts	  that	  community	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  same	  autoimmune	  logic	  as	  democracy.84	  This	   notion	   is	   briefly	   mentioned	   in	   the	   essay	   “Faith	   and	   Knowledge”	   but	   not	   given	  substantive	   elaboration.	   There	   is,	   he	   suggests,	   an	   automatic	   –	   mechanical	   even	   –	   self-­‐destructive	  logic	  to	  the	  positing	  of	  community:	  Community	  as	  com-­‐mon	  auto-­‐immunity:	  no	  community	  <is	  possible>	  that	  would	  not	  cultivate	  its	  own	  autoimmunity,	  a	  principle	  of	  sacrificial	  self-­‐destruction	  ruining	  the	  principle	  of	  self-­‐protection	   (that	   of	   maintaining	   its	   self-­‐integrity	   intact)	   and	   this	   in	   view	   of	   some	   sort	   of	  invisible	   and	   spectral	   survival.	   This	   self-­‐contesting	   attestation	   keeps	   the	   autoimmune	  community	  alive,	  which	   is	   to	  say,	  open	  to	  something	  other	  and	  more	   than	   itself:	   the	  other,	  the	  future,	  death,	   freedom,	  the	  coming	  or	  the	   love	  of	  the	  other,	   the	  space	  and	  the	  time	  of	  a	  spectralizing	  messianicity	  beyond	  all	  messianism.85	  	  There	  are	  two	  affects	  of	  autoimmunity	  noted	  here.	  Firstly,	  autoimmunity	  works	  to	  destroy	  community	  from	  within.	  Community	   is	  self-­‐destructive,	   inherently	  exclusionary	  and	  prone	  to	  a	  certain	  evocation	  of	  sovereign	  autonomy.	  It	  is	  this	  very	  exclusionary	  logic	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  positing	  of	  a	  purely	  immune	  community	  that	  in	  turn	  prompts	  the	  community’s	  autoimmune	  self-­‐annihilation.	   Community	   can	   never	  maintain	   the	   immunity	   that	   it	   craves,	   rather	   it	   is	  bound	  to	  autoimmune	  self-­‐destruction.	  Autoimmunity	  in	  this	  sense	  would	  simply	  name	  the	  logic	  by	  which	  the	  constitutive	  outside	  of	  community	  returns	  to	  haunt	  the	  community	  and	  cause	  its	  destruction.	  Importantly,	  however,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  external	  infection	  or	  affliction,	  the	  very	   logic	   of	   community	   itself,	   governed	   by	   jurisdictional	   techniques	   that	   determine	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “Remarks	  on	  Deconstruction	  and	  Pragmatism”	  in	  Deconstruction	  and	  Pragmatism,	  ed.,	  Chantal	  Mouffe	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1996),	  82.	  84	  As	  Derrida	  reminds	  us	  (see	  Derrida,	  Acts	  	  of	  Religion,	  80,	  n.	  27)	  the	  notion	  of	  immunity	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  of	  the	  political	  and	  social	  vocabulary	  rather	  than	  the	  biological.	  The	  common	  Latin	  root	  of	  
munus	  –	  in	  both	  immunity	  and	  community	  –	  refers	  to	  the	  obligation	  owed	  within	  a	  group	  or	  a	  public	  duty.	  Immunity	  (in-­‐	  meaning	  ‘not’	  and	  munis	  meaning	  ‘ready	  to	  serve’)	  therefore	  refers	  to	  the	  exemption	  from	  such	  an	  obligation.	  The	  biological	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  was	  used	  metaphorically,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  social	  or	  political	  meaning:	  The	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  notes	  that	  the	  biological	  inference	  is	  not	  recorded	  until	  the	  19th	  century,	  the	  social	  inference	  has	  been	  in	  use	  since	  the	  early	  17th	  century.	  So	  Derrida’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  simply	  repeats	  the	  metaphorical	  gesture	  first	  coined	  in	  biology.	  See	  The	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  and	  Miller,	  For	  Derrida,	  124.	  	  85	  Derrida,	  Acts	  of	  Religion,	  87.	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limit	  and	  scope	  of	  community,	  produces	   the	  exclusion	   that	  compromises	  community	   from	  within.	  	  	  The	  expansive	  conception	  of	  sociability	  discussed	  in	  relation	  to	  both	  Nancy	  and	  Derrida	  is	  what	  comes	  to	  undo	  the	  community.	  Jurisdiction’s	  attempt	  to	  limit	  and	  close	  community	  is	  always	   partial	   and	   compromised.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   however,	   autoimmunity	   is	   not	  absolutely	  destructive.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  very	  contamination	  of	  community	  by	  the	  bare	  sociability	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  limit	  and	  predetermine	  that	  community	  becomes	  open	  to	  an	  unforeseeable	  coming	   of	   the	   other.	   So	  whilst	   at	   once	   bound	   to	   self-­‐destruction,	   community	   –	   in	   its	   very	  
destruction	  –	  becomes	  the	  site	  of	  an	  opening	  to	  the	  unconditional	  “to	  come”	  of	  the	  event.86	  We	  must	  note,	  too,	  that	  autoimmunity	  opens	  the	  community	  to	  the	  very	  best	  and	   the	  very	  worst,	   exposing	   an	   unbridgeable	   fissure	   in	   community	   that	   at	   once	   causes	   community’s	  destruction	   and	   opens	   the	   possibility	   of	   what	   is	   to	   come	   (à	   venir).	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  autoimmunity	   at	  work	  within	   community	   identifies	   community	   itself	   as	   a	   site	   of	   political	  contestation	  and	  negotiation	  rather	   than	  a	  political	  end,	   in	  and	  of	   itself.	  Community,	   then,	  cannot	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   “ideal”	   that	   we	   try	   to	   achieve	   rather	   it	   names	   the	   site	   of	  negotiation	  not	  only	  within	   the	  community	   itself	  but	  with	   the	  community’s	  other,	  with	   its	  constitutive	  outside	  that	  it	  desperately	  tries	  to	  be	  without.	  To	  name	  community	  as	  a	  telos	  or	  as	  an	  answer	   to	  a	  particular	  political	  or	   legal	  problematic,	  would	  be	   to	  predetermine	  and	  delimit	  in	  advance	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  community.	  “Community,”	  then,	  must	  always	  hold	  itself	  in	  abeyance	  and	  must	  always	  already	  be	  in	  negotiation	  with	  the	  bare	  sociability	  that	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  its	  (im)possibility.	  	  This	   logic	   at	   work	   within	   community	   would	   suggest	   that	   we	   cannot	   do	   away	   with	  community	   tout	   court	   and	   simply	   appeal	   to	   an	   originary	   “with”	   or	   a	   bare	   sociability	   that	  exceeds	  our	  constructed	  and	  partial	  communities.	  Such	  a	  move	  –	  even	  if	  desirable	  –	  would	  be	   impossible.	   The	   construction	   of	   communities	  whether	   in	   the	   pursuit	   of	   the	   noblest	   or	  most	   dangerous	   ends	   is	   inevitable.	   However,	   by	   identifying	   the	   autoimmunity	   at	   work	  within	  community	  Derrida	  points	  to	  the	  political	  work	  necessary	  in	  the	  negotiations	  of/with	  community.	   If	   the	   autoimmunity	   of	   community	   opens	   a	   space	   of	   the	  à	  venir,	   a	   coming	   of	  infinite	   and	   incalculable	   possibility,	   then	   it	   must	   be	   accompanied	   by	   the	   injunction	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  Ibid.,	  xiv.	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calculate	  and	  render	  possible;	   to	  work	  away	   in	   the	  aporia	  of	  community	   to	   fashion	  better	  communities	  to	  come.	  	  	  Such	   an	   account	   of	   community	   suggests	   that	   it	   is	   an	   opening	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	  deconstructive	  politics:	  a	  politics	  that	  will	  always	  already	  hold	  the	  community	  in	  suspense,	  as	   a	   question,	   never	   determining	   in	   advance	   the	   co-­‐	   that	   makes	   community	   possible.	  Derrida	   notes,	   this	  may	   be	   ‘very	   little	   –	   almost	   nothing’	   but	   is	   nonetheless,	   a	   community	  worthy	   of	   the	   name:	   ‘a	   community	   of	   the	   question,	   therefore,	  within	   that	   fragile	  moment	  when	   the	   question	   is	   not	   yet	   determined	   enough	   for	   the	   hypocrisy	   of	   an	   answer	   to	   have	  initiated	  itself	  beneath	  the	  mask	  of	  the	  question’.87	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  in	  this	  spirit	  that	  we	  should	  evoke	   community	   in	   assessing	   its	   relation	   to	   law:	   as	   a	   juridico-­‐political	   question	   itself,	  rather	  than	  an	  answer.	  	  
4.5.3	  Jurisdiction	  (un)grounding	  law	  This	  discussion	  of	  community	  as	  autoimmune	  does	  not	  try	  to	  do	  without	  community,	  rather	  it	  accepts	  that	  operative	  communities	  are	  bound	  to	  be	  formed.	  Jurisdictional	  practices	  will	  always	   affirm	   the	   fact	   of	   our	   being	   together	   in	   constructed	   and	   operative	   collectives,	  inscribing	   and	   sustaining	   the	   law	   of	   the	   community.	   But	   jurisdiction	   takes	   on	   a	   doubled	  logic.	   On	   the	   one	   hand	   jurisdiction	   allows	   community	   to	   come	   to	   presence.	   By	   drawing	   a	  collective	   into	   relation	  with	   the	   law,	   jurisdiction	  makes	   the	   limits	   of	   a	   legally	   sanctioned	  collective	  known	  and	  visible.	   In	   this	   sense,	   jurisdiction	  grounds	   law	   in	   community.	  But	   in	  this	   very	   inscription,	   the	   community’s	   impossibility	   is	   also	   revealed.	   The	   community’s	  presence	   can	   only	   come	   to	   be	   through	   the	   circumscription	   of	   a	   more	   primary	   sense	   of	  relation;	   what	   Nancy	   describes	   as	   a	   primordial	   sharing	   or	   “withness”	   to	   being	   and	  what	  Derrida	  might	  simply	  refer	  to	  as	  différance.	  In	  this	  latter	  sense,	  jurisdiction	  ungrounds	  law	  by	   revealing	   the	   partial	   and	   always	   compromised	   nature	   of	   the	   community	   which	   it	  produces.	  There	   is	  an	  added	  difficulty	  that	  takes	  us	  back	  to	  the	  circularity	  associated	  with	  Dworkin’s	  communities	  of	  principle.	   If	  community	   is	  never	  present	  but	  only	  temporary	  or	  held	   in	   suspense,	   ungrounded	   by	   the	   very	   gesture	   by	   which	   it	   becomes	   grounded,	  community	  itself	  can	  offer	  no	  “legal”	  justification	  for	  the	  limit	  that	  jurisdiction	  marks.	  That	  which	   jurisdictional	   practices	   efface,	   expel	   or	   silence	   in	   the	   supposedly	   “natural”	   relation	  between	   law	  and	  community	  will	   return	   to	  haunt	   this	   relation,	  displacing	  any	   such	  claim.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  trans.,	  Alan	  Bass	  (London;	  Routledge,	  2008),	  98.	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Jurisdiction,	  then,	  can	  only	  bring	  about	  a	  relation	  between	  community	  and	  law	  “for	  the	  time	  being,”	  a	  relation	  that	  is	  always	  already	  open	  to	  being	  rewritten	  otherwise.	  	  	  	  I	  want	  to	  end	  this	  discussion	  of	  autoimmunity,	  community	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  jurisdiction	  by	  brief	  reference	  to	  a	  case	  which	  acutely	  demonstrates	  the	  function	  of	  jurisdiction	  alluded	  to	  here.	  The,	  now	  famous,	  decision	  in	  Mabo	  v	  Queensland	  (No.	  2),88	  in	  which	  the	  common	  law	  category	  of	  native	  title	  came	  to	  be	  recognised,	  the	  Australian	  High	  Court	  illustrates	  the	  dual	  function	   of	   jurisdiction	   as	   both	   grounding	   and	   ungrounding	   the	   law	   by	   bring	   law	   into	  relation	  with	  community.	  	  	  The	  case	  concerns	  the	  legal	  status	  of	  the	  acquisition	  of	  territory	  by	  the	  British	  Crown	  in	  the	  Murray	  Islands.	  Such	  acquisition	  was	  supposedly	  guaranteed	  by	  either	  the	  Legislature	  of	  the	  Colony	  of	  Queensland	  in	  1879	  or	  by	  an	  Act	  of	  Imperial	  Parliament	  in	  1895.	  The	  central	  legal	  issue	   turns	   on	   the	   status	   of	   this	   acquisition,	   in	   particular	   whether	   either	   of	   these	  mechanisms	   invested	  absolute	  beneficial	  ownership	  of	   land	   in	   the	  Crown.89	  The	  claimants	  argued	  that	  the	  Crown	  had	  obtained	  “radical”	  or	  “ultimate”	  title	  (which	  included	  the	  right	  to	  confer	  title)	  but	  not	  absolute	  beneficial	  title.	  It	  was	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  the	  claimants	  argued	  that	  indigenous	  land	  rights	  and	  interests	  were	  a	  burden	  on	  this	  radical	  title.	  It	  follows	  that	  in	   cases	   where	   such	   indigenous	   claims	   had	   not	   been	   properly	   extinguished,	   these	  indigenous	   beneficial	   interests	   subsisted.	   In	   accepting	   this	   argument,	   the	   High	   Court	  describe	  the	  contrary	  position	  pursued	  by	  the	  State	  of	  Queensland	  –	  that	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  Crown	  over	  territory,	  automatically	  inferred	  beneficial	  ownership	  that	  extinguished	  any	  indigenous	   claim	   –	  as	   a	   fallacy.90	  The	   decision	   provides	   a	   basis	   for	   the	   common	   law	  recognition	   of	   indigenous	   land	   claims	   in	   circumstances	   where	   grants	   of	   tenure	   had	   not	  effectively	   extinguished	   indigenous	   interests.	   Subsequent	   decisions	  make	   clear	   that	  Mabo	  establishes	  a	  regulatory	  system	  which	  administers	  which	  indigenous	  land	  claims	  can	  come	  to	  be	  recognised	  by	  the	  common	  law.	  The	  case	  traces	  the	  jurisdictional	  reach	  of	  the	  common	  law	  by	  determining	  the	  proper	  boundaries	  of	  the	  Australian	  political	  community.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  (1992)	  175	  CLR.	  	  89	  Mabo	  (No.	  2)	  (1992)	  175	  CLR,	  [20]-­‐[25].	  	  90	  Ibid.,	  [50]-­‐[51].	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Mabo	  opens	  a	  number	  of	  contentious	  questions	  for	  law	  and	  legal	  theory.91	  One	  aspect	  of	  the	  decision,	  to	  which	  I	  want	  to	  turn	  here,	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  court	  articulates	  the	  relation	  between	   law	   and	   political	   community.	   The	   decision,	   in	   acknowledging	   the	   efficacy	   of	  indigenous	   claims,	   sought	   to	   ground	  a	   relation	  between	   law	  and	   community	   in	  which	   the	  rights	   and	   interests	   of	   the	   community	   were	   reflected	   in	   the	   legal	   order	   to	   which	   the	  community	  is	  subject.	  However,	  this	  jurisdictional	  delimitation,	  at	  once	  opening	  the	  law	  to	  difference,	   embracing	   (however	   limitedly)	   indigenous	   claims	   to	   land	   within	   a	   previously	  colonial	  legal	  frame,92	  also	  violently	  demarcates	  the	  limits	  of	  such	  claims.	  The	  decision,	  then,	  seeks	  to	  establish	  the	  proper	  (jurisdictional)	  limits	  of	  the	  common	  law	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  community	   to	   which	   such	   law	   applies.	   As	   Stewart	   Motha	   rightly	   identifies,	   the	   central	  question	  that	  the	  court	  sought	  to	  resolve	  was	  whether	  ‘indigenous	  law	  and	  custom,	  and	  thus	  
community,	   is	   consistent	  with	   “Australian	   law”’.93	  Implicit	   in	   the	   decision,	   however,	   is	   the	  need	  for	  both	  community	  and	  law	  to	  be	  constitutively	  open,	  possible	  (in	  principle	  at	  least)	  to	  being	  recast	  beyond	  its	  current	  form.	  The	  “grounding”	  of	  Australian	  common	  law	  that	  the	  case	  supposedly	  marks	  also	  bears	  witness	  to	  the	  “ungrounding”	  of	  both	  law	  and	  community;	  the	   decision	   is	   the	   means	   by	   which	   the	   autoimmunity	   of	   the	   community	   and	   the	  (un)grounding	  of	  law	  are	  effected.	  	  	  In	  many	  quarters	   the	  decision	   in	  Mabo	  has	  been	   lauded	   for	  at	  once	  recognising	  difference	  within	  the	  common	  law94	  and	  reaffirming	  the	  common	  law	  as	  the	  ultimate	  foundation	  of	  the	  Australian	   State. 95 	  As	   Dorsett	   and	   McVeigh	   suggest,	   the	   court	   in	   Mabo	   grounded	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  The	  key	  debate	  turns	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  case	  succeeds	  in	  addressing	  Australia’s	  colonial	  past.	  A	  number	  of	  critical	  approaches	  have	  proved	  helpful:	  see	  in	  particular,	  Stewart	  Motha,	  “The	  Sovereign	  Event	  in	  a	  Nation’s	  Law”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  13	  (2002),	  311-­‐338	  and	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick,	  “No	  Higher	  Duty:	  Mabo	  and	  the	  Failure	  of	  Legal	  Foundation”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  13	  (2002),	  232-­‐252.	  In	  stressing	  the	  jurisdictional	  nature	  of	  the	  decision,	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh’s	  analysis	  perhaps	  comes	  closest	  to	  my	  own	  concerns	  here;	  see	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  and	  Shaun	  McVeigh,	  “Just	  So:	  ‘The	  Law	  That	  Governs	  Australia	  is	  Australian	  Law’”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  13	  (2002),	  	  289-­‐309.	  However,	  rather	  than	  view	  jurisdiction	  as	  mediating	  between	  sovereignty	  and	  law	  (as	  well	  as	  sovereignty	  and	  territory,	  as	  they	  do),	  I	  read	  the	  jurisdictional	  significance	  of	  the	  case	  in	  relation	  to	  community.	  	  	  92	  On	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Mabo	  remains	  wedded	  to	  a	  colonial	  framework	  see	  	  Elizabeth	  Povinelli,	  The	  
Cunning	  of	  Recognition:	  Indigenous	  Alterities	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Australian	  Multiculturalism	  (Durham:	  Duke	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  153-­‐186.	  	  93	  Stewart	  Motha,	  “The	  Sovereign	  Event	  in	  a	  Nation’s	  Law”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  13	  (2002),	  333,	  my	  emphasis.	  94	  See	  Paul	  Patton,	  “Poststructularism	  and	  the	  Mabo	  Debate:	  Difference,	  Society	  and	  Justice”	  in	  eds.,	  Wilson	  and	  Yeatman,	  Justice	  and	  Identity:	  Antipodean	  Practices	  (Wellington:	  Bridget	  Williams	  Books,	  1995)	  and	  Michael	  Detmold,	  “Law	  and	  Difference:	  Reflections	  on	  Mabo’s	  Case”	  Sydney	  Law	  Review	  15(2)	  (199)	  159-­‐167.	  95	  Richard	  Bartlett,	  “Another	  Triumph	  for	  the	  Common	  Law,”	  Sydney	  Law	  Review	  15	  (1993),	  178-­‐186.	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authority	   between	   the	   common	   law	   of	   Australia	   and	   the	   political	   community	   that	  legitimated	  the	  State:	  The	  court	  did	  not	  ground	  its	  jurisdiction	  in	  natural	  law:	  it	  positioned	  itself	  as	  the	  guardian	  of	  the	   common	   law	  of	  Australia	   (Rechtstand)	   and	  enunciated	  various	  ethical	  positions	  whose	  statuses	  were	  left	  open.	  One	  interpretation	  of	  the	  judgment	  in	  Mabo	  (No.	  2)	  has	  been	  that	  the	  High	  Court	  was	  taking	  up	  the	  opportunity	  created	  by	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Australia	  Act	  1986	  (Cth)	  to	  re-­‐legitimate	  the	  Australian	  State.96	  I	  want	  to	  discuss	  how	  the	  decision	  produces	  both	  a	  ground	  and	  a	  usurpation	  of	  that	  ground	  in	   two	   registers,	   first	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   legal	   foundation	   and	   secondly	   in	   relation	   to	  community.	  The	  court	  justifies	  its	  authority	  to	  make	  the	  jurisdictional	  determination	  that	  it	  does	  in	  a	  quintessentially	  common	  law	  effort	  to	  mediate	  between	  determinate	  or	  sovereign	  law,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  extant	  customs	  and	  practices,	  on	  the	  other.	  As	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	   chapter	   two,	   the	   common	   law	   asserts	   its	   authority	   from	   its	   continual	   usage	   and	   its	  organic	  relation	  to	  the	  informal	  normativity	  and	  lore	  of	  a	  community.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Mabo	  
(No.	   2)	   the	   court	   sought	   to	   bring	   the	   common	   law	   into	   a	   harmonious	   relation	   with	   the	  political	  community,	  to	  make	  transparent	  –	  as	  the	  early	  common	  lawyers	  purported	  to	  do	  –	  	  this	   relation.	   This	   was	   no	   easy	   task	   and	   required	   the	   court	   to	   bring	   into	   relation	   a	  reinvented	  Australian	  political	  community	  that	  included	  indigenous	  practices	  and	  interests	  and	  the	  common	  law	  principles	  of	  tenure	  and	  land	  acquisition	  that,	  as	  Fitzpatrick	  points	  out,	  had	  denied	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  such	  indigenous	  claims	  in	  the	  first	  place.97	  	  	  The	  difficulty	  with	  such	  a	  grounding	  is	  most	  pointedly	  revealed	  in	  Brennan	  J’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  terra	  nullius.	  Brennan	  J	  rejects	  both	  conquest	  and	  cession	  as	  grounds	  for	  the	  colonial	   appropriation	   of	  Australian	   land,	   favouring	   instead	   the	   notion	   that	  Australia	  was	  colonised	  through	  ‘acquisition	  by	  settlement’.98	  It	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  terra	  nullius	  –	  notably,	  an	  enlarged	  conception	  of	  terra	  nullius	  that	  conceives	  land	  inhabited	  by	  indigenous	  groups	  as	  if	  it	   were	   deserted99	  –	  that	   allows	   for	   Brennan	   J’s	   assertion	   that	   the	   ‘the	   common	   law	   thus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  and	  Shaun	  McVeigh,	  “Just	  So:	  The	  Law	  That	  Governs	  Australia	  is	  Australian	  Law’”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  13	  (2002),	  	  307.	  	  97	  Peter	  Fitzpatrick,	  “No	  Higher	  Duty:	  Mabo	  and	  the	  Failure	  of	  Legal	  Foundation”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  13	  (2002),	  244.	  	  98	  Mabo	  (No.	  2)	  (1992)	  175	  CLR,	  [24]	  (Brennan	  J).	  99	  As	  Brennan	  J	  makes	  clear	  the	  common	  law	  definition	  of	  terra	  nullius	  was	  not	  concerned	  with	  land	  being	  uninhabited.	  Referring	  to	  a	  Privy	  Council	  decision	  of	  1919,	  Brennan	  explains	  that	  the	  common	  law	  held	  that	  if	  indigenous	  groups	  were	  viewed	  to	  be	  ‘so	  low	  in	  the	  scale	  of	  social	  organisation’	  their	  presence	  on	  newly	  colonised	  land	  was	  considered	  inexistent	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  law.	  See	  Mabo	  
(No.	  2)	  (1992)	  175	  CLR,	  [38]-­‐[39]	  (Brennan	  J).	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became	  the	  common	  law	  of	  all	  subjects	  within	  the	  colony’.100	  Strikingly,	  however,	  Brennan	  J	  relies	   on	   terra	  nullius	  to	   ground	   the	   court’s	   authority	   at	   the	   very	  moment	  he	  disavows	   it,	  rejecting	   the	  doctrine	   as	   factually	   erroneous	   and	   contrary	   to	   justice.	  He	   suggest	   that,	   ‘the	  facts	   as	   we	   know	   them	   today	   do	   not	   fit	   the	   “absence	   of	   law”	   or	   “barbarian”	   theory	  underpinning	   the	   colonial	   reception	   of	   the	   common	   law	   of	   England’101	  and	   describes	   the	  doctrine	  of	  terra	  nullius	  (the	  very	  principle,	  remember,	  that	  underpins	  the	  court’s	  authority	  to	  assert	  the	  Australian	  common	  law’s	  ultimate	  authority)	  as	  ‘false	  in	  fact	  and	  unacceptable	  in	   our	   society’.102	  	   The	   court,	   then,	   attempts	   to	   occupy	   an	  Archimedean	  point	   from	  which	  law	  and	  community	  can	  be	  brought	  into	  relation.	  But,	  as	  the	  court	  readily	  admits,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  legal	  justification	  for	  this	  authority.	  Brennan	  J	  refers	  approvingly	  to	  the	  position	  taken	  by	   Gibbs	   J	   in	   New	   South	   Wales	   v	   The	   Commonwealth:	   ‘The	   acquisition	   of	   territory	   by	   a	  sovereign	  state	  for	  the	  first	  time	  is	  an	  act	  of	  state	  which	  cannot	  be	  challenged,	  controlled	  or	  interfered	  with	  by	  the	  courts	  of	  that	  state’.103	  Because	  the	  court’s	  authority	  ultimately	  rests	  on	   the	   sovereign	   acquisition	   of	   territory	   and	   the	   –	   paradoxically	   (dis)avowed	   –	   notion	   of	  
terra	  nullius,	  the	  construction	  of	  political	  community	  by	  the	  court	  appears	  to	  ultimately	  rely	  on	   nothing	   but	   fiat	   or	   sovereign	   force.	  Whilst	   seeking	   to	   justify	   a	   ground	   for	   the	   court’s	  decision	  and	  thus	  hoping	  to	  clarify,	  through	  a	  revealing	  tautology,	  that	  ‘the	  law	  that	  governs	  Australia	   is	   Australian	   law’,104	  Brennan	   J	   exposes	   this	   ground’s	   undoing.	   Nonetheless,	   the	  decision	  has	  the	  effect	  of	  bringing	  a	  reimagined	  Australian	  national	  community	  to	  presence	  and	   though	   based	   on	   a	   fiction,	   this	   is	   an	   ‘operative	   and	   potent	   fiction’105	  that	   serves	   to	  ground	   the	   community	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   law.	   By	   acknowledging	   (though	   in	   markedly	  limited	  ways)	  the	  validity	  of	  indigenous	  land	  claims,	  an	  enlarged	  community	  is	  inscribed	  by	  law	  that,	  as	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh	  argue,	  offers	  a	  ‘belated	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  negotiation	  of	  the	  settlement	  of	  Australia’.106	  	  Though	  opening	   the	  possibility	  of	   reckoning	  with	  Australia’s	   colonial	  past,	   the	  decision	   in	  
Mabo	  also	  violently	  limits	  the	  scope	  of	  such	  recognition,	  prescribing	  strict	  criteria	  by	  which	  indigenous	  claims	  must	  conform	  in	  order	  to	  be	  recognised	  at	  law.	  In	  this	  way,	  Mabo	  creates	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Mabo	  (No.	  2)	  (1992)	  175	  CLR,	  [36]	  (Brennan	  J).	  	  101	  Ibid.,	  [38]	  (Brennan	  J).	  102	  Ibid.,	  [39]	  (Brennan	  J).	  103	  (1975)	  135	  CLR,	  at	  388,	  quoted	  in	  Mabo	  (No.	  2)	  (1992)	  175	  CLR,	  [31].	  104	  Mabo	  (No.	  2)	  (1992)	  175	  CLR,	  [29]	  (Brennan	  J).	  105	  Fitzpatrick,	  “No	  Higher	  Duty,”	  245.	  106	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh,	  “Just	  So,”	  308.	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the	  community’s	  limit,	  inscribing	  the	  strict	  demarcation	  between	  those	  rights	  and	  interests	  that	   fall	   within	   and	   without	   the	   political	   community	   of	   Australia.	   As	   set	   out	   in	   Mabo,	  indigenous	  claims	  depend	  on	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  particular	  criteria:	  Native	  title	  to	  particular	  land…	  its	  incidents	  and	  the	  persons	  entitled	  thereto	  are	  ascertained	  according	   to	   the	   laws	   and	   customs	   of	   the	   indigenous	   people,	   who	   by	   the	   those	   laws	   and	  customs,	  have	  a	  connection	  with	  the	  land…	  Membership	  of	  the	  indigenous	  group	  depends	  on	  biological	   descent	   from	   the	   indigenous	   people	   and	   on	   mutual	   recognition	   of	   a	   particular	  person’s	  membership	  by	  that	  person	  and	  by	  the	  elders	  or	  other	  persons	  enjoying	  traditional	  authority	  among	  these	  people.107	  	  As	  Motha	  has	  persuasively	  argued,	  in	  this	  move	  the	  court	  constructs	  an	  essentialised	  notion	  of	   indigeneity,	   acting	  as	   the	   final	   arbiter	  of	  what	   counts	  as	   “tradition	  and	  custom”	   for	   the	  purposes	   of	   a	   native	   title	   claim.108	  	   In	   policing	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   political	   community	   and	  vetting	   the	   “traditional	   practices”	   that	   underpin	   indigenous	   land	   claims,	   the	   court	  dramatically	  illustrates	  the	  jurispathic	  function	  of	  State	  law	  discussed	  above.	  As	  Cover	  tells	  us,	   State	   law	   kills	   the	   plurality	   of	   laws	   associated	   with	   jurisgenerative	   communities,	  asserting	  the	  singularity	  of	  one	  normative	  system	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  all	  others.	  As	  we	  have	  discusses	   in	   relation	   to	   Derrida,	   however,	   such	   delimitation	   is	   never	   fully	   effective:	   the	  ‘continuing	   insistence	   of	   the	   indigenous	   presence’ 109 	  marks	   the	   failure	   of	   any	   full	  determination	   of	   the	   political	   community.	   As	   with	   all	   jurisdictional	   delimitations,	   the	  borders	   that	   the	  Mabo	  principles	  erect	  and	  seek	   to	  police	  are	   fragile	  and	   temporary.	   	   It	   is	  worth	  remembering	  that	  it	  is	  the	  very	  fragility	  of	  the	  jurisdictional	  limit	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  re-­‐inscription	  of	   these	   limits	   in	   the	   first	  place;	   their	   temporariness	  allows	   for	   the	  court	   to	  move	  beyond	  (however	  minimally)	  the	  preceding	  colonial	  determinations.	  	  	  The	   “continuing	   insistence”	   of	   indigenous	   claims	   underscores	   the	   more	   primary	  relationality	   that	  underpins	  and	  exceeds	  any	  assertion	  of	   limits	  of	   community.	  Fitzpatrick	  connects	  the	  High	  Court’s	  futile	  search	  for	  the	  grounds	  to	  law	  with	  the	  revelation	  of	  a	  bare	  fact	   of	   our	   being	   before	   the	   law,	   suggesting	   that	   ‘we	   are	   all	   native	   now’.110	  Whilst	   not	  effacing	   the	   particularity	   and	   importance	   of	   the	   indigenous	   claims	   in	   question	   in	  Mabo,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Mabo	  (No.	  2)	  (1992)	  175	  CLR	  [83]	  (Brennan	  J).	  108	  Stewart	  Motha,	  “The	  Failure	  of	  ‘Postcolonial’	  Sovereignty	  in	  Australia”	  Australian	  Feminist	  Law	  
Journal	  22	  (2005),	  119-­‐124.	  Motha	  is	  particularly	  concerned	  with	  (and	  strongly	  critical	  of)	  the	  reception	  of	  the	  Mabo	  framework	  for	  establishing	  native	  title	  in	  Yorta	  Yorta	  Aboriginal	  Community	  v	  
State	  of	  Victoria	  (2002)	  HCA	  58.	  	  109	  Fitzpatrick,	  “No	  Higher	  Duty,”	  235.	  110	  Ibid.,	  252.	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Fitzpatrick	   points	   to	   a	   broader	   logic	   at	   work	   within	   modern	   law:	   we	   all	   find	   ourselves	  subject	   to	   formal	   law	   that	   is,	   itself,	   without	   (just)	   foundation.	   We	   are,	   in	   our	   bare	  relationality	  before	  the	  law,	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  law’s	  (un)grounding	  violence.	  Mabo,	  then,	  speaks	   to	   a	   broader	   logic	   at	   work	   in	   any	   jurisdictional	   affirmation.	   The	   assertion	   of	   the	  proper	   limits	   of	   the	   community	   not	   only	   acts	   jurispathically	   against	   a	   plurality	   of	  jurisgenerative	  communities,	  but	  circumscribes	  a	  more	  fundamental	  relationality:	  our	  being	  in	  common	  before	  the	  law.	  Jurisdiction,	  by	  announcing	  community’s	  relation	  with	  law,	  must	  stand	  outside	  both	  law	  and	  the	  community	  and	  seek	  to	  stabilise	  or	  ground	  this	  relation.	  But	  this	   “grounding”	   refers	   to	   an	   always	   already	   compromised	   community	   that	   is	   brought	   to	  presence	   through	   a	   circumscription	   of	   a	  more	   expansive	   and	   inoperative	   sense	   of	   being-­‐with.	  It	  is	  this	  desire	  to	  delimit	  and	  determine	  that	  inscribes	  the	  exclusions	  and	  paradoxes	  that	  return	  to	  the	  law,	  ungrounding	  its	  apparent	  authority.	  	  The	   decision	   in	  Mabo	   illustrates	   the	   dual	   function	   of	   jurisdiction	   as	   (un)grounding	   law.	  Jurisdiction	   –	  naming	   those	   techniques	   that	   seek	   to	   stabilise	   and	   cohere	   a	   particular	  community	  –	  instigates	  the	  autoimmune	  threat	  to	  community.	  “Community,”	  by	  announcing	  its	   self-­‐presence	   and	   its	   “natural”	   relation	   to	   law,	   will	   always	   exclude	   and	   silence	   the	  plurality	  on	  which	  it	  is	  based.	  The	  excluded	  other,	  in	  the	  very	  act	  of	  inscribing	  the	  limits	  of	  community,	   threatens	   the	   community’s	   newly	   crafted	   limits,	   haunting	   the	   community	   by	  virtue	  of	  the	  community’s	  very	  existence.	  It	  is	  jurisdiction	  that	  allows	  the	  community	  to	  take	  shape	   by	   entering	   an	   inchoate	   (and	   informal)	   collective	   into	   relation	   with	   formal	   and	  determinative	  law.	  But	  this	  very	  relation,	  because	  it	  cannot	  offer	  any	  ultimate	  ground	  for	  its	  own	  authority	  to	  bring	  about	  such	  a	  relation,	  also	  ungrounds	  law.	  	  	  As	  evidenced	  by	   the	  rhetoric	  of	   the	  High	  Court	  and	  much	  of	   the	  commentary	  on	   the	  case,	  
Mabo	   is	   often	   conceived	   as	   providing	   a	   sound	   foundation	   for	  Australian	   law	   and	  political	  community.	   Clearly,	   the	   analysis	   above	   challenges	   such	   a	   view	  but	   it	  would	   also	  miss	   the	  significance	   of	   the	   juridico-­‐political	   moment	   at	   stake	   in	  Mabo	   if	   we	   read	   the	   decision	   as	  revealing	   an	   absolute	   failure	   of	   grounds.	   Following	   Derrida’s	   tentative	   and	   wary	  engagement	  with	  community,	  perhaps	  we	  should	  read	  Mabo,	  and	  jurisdiction’s	   function	  in	  bringing	   community	   to	   presence	  more	   generally,	   as	   posing	   the	   limits	   of	   community	   as	   a	  question,	   tracing	   the	   edges	   of	   the	   community,	   for	   the	   time	   being.	   The	   autoimmune	  community	   that	   is	   inscribed	   through	   the	   jurisdictional	   logic	   assessed	   here	   is	  wholly	   self-­‐
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destructive	   only	   if	   it	   convinces	   itself	   that	   it	   can	   be	  without	   an	   openness	   to	   that	  which	   it	  necessarily	  circumscribes:	  the	  singular	  plurality	  of	  being	  in	  common.	  Autoimmunity	  whilst	  instigating	  a	  threat	  to	  community	  also	  marks	  an	  opening	  to	  the	  future,	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  new	  worlds	  and	  new	  communities,	  ungrounded	  by	  the	  very	  questioning	  that	  provides	  their	  fragile	  ground.	  	  	  Let	  me	   end	   this	   discussion	   by	   suggesting	   how	  understanding	   community	   as	   autoimmune	  might	  shift	  the	  form	  of	  jurisdictional	  practices.	  As	  Dorsett	  and	  McVeigh	  argue,	  Mabo	  charts	  the	  way	   in	  which	   two	   legal	   orders	   come	   into	   relation.	   This	   forces	   a	   responsibility	   on	   the	  jurist	   and	   jurisprudent	   to	   account	   for	   the	   quality,	   form	   and	   conduct	   of	   this	   meeting	   of	  laws.111	  Indigenous	  law	  and	  community	   is	  brought	   into	  relation	  with	  the	  common	  law	  and	  inherited	  colonial	  norms	  and	  practices.	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  starting	  from	  the	  acceptance	  of	  community’s	   autoimmunity	   opens	   a	   greater	   possibility	   of	   ethically	   responsible	   and	  hospitable	  conduct	  in	  the	  meeting	  of	  laws.	  This	  is	  for	  two	  reasons.	  Firstly,	  the	  autoimmunity	  of	   community	   reminds	   us	   that	   community	   is	   never	   hermetically	   sealed	   and	  must	   remain	  open	   to	   otherness	   for	   its	   very	   survival,	   necessitating	   an	   openness	   to	   community’s	   others.	  Secondly,	   the	   autoimmunity	   of	   community,	   whilst	   accepting	   that	   communities	   will	   be	  posited,	  policed	  and	  brought	  to	  presence,	  in	  no	  way	  seeks	  to	  assert	  their	  ultimate	  or	  natural	  foundation.	   The	   autoimmune	   community	   is	   a	   community	   that	   holds	   itself	   as	   a	   question,	  willing	  and	  ready	  to	  take	  a	  new	  form	  as	  it	  encounters	  its	  various	  others.	  In	  seeking	  to	  offer	  a	  secure	   ground	   for	   the	   Australian	   law	   and	   community,	   these	   attitudes	   did	   not	   prevail	   in	  
Mabo,	   rather,	   the	   court	   asserted	   the	   common	   law	   as	   the	   only	   place	   for	   such	   a	   meeting	  between	  common	  law	  and	  indigenous	  practices	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  denigrated	  both	  the	  law	  and	  the	  community	  of	  the	  indigenous	  groups.	  The	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  and	  the	  ethical	  conduct	  inferred	  by	  both	  Derrida	  and	  Nancy’s	  understanding	  of	  that	  which	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  community,	  perhaps,	  offers	  a	  corrective	  in	  this	  regard.	  In	  displacing	  the	  stability	  of	  community	  a	  more	  hospitable	  encounter	  between	  different	  practices,	  communities	  and	  laws	  might	  be	  possible.	  	  	  
	  
4.6	  Conclusion	  This	   chapter	   has	   argued	   that	   jurisdiction	   has	   a	   constitutive	   relation	   with	   community,	  bringing	   community	   into	   relation	   with	   law.	   Jurisdiction	   seeks	   to	   bring	   these	   two	   into	  “proper”	   relation.	   The	   notion	   of	   community	   as	   a	   stable	   and	   unified	   collective	   that	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	  Shaunnagh	  Dorsett	  and	  Shaun	  McVeigh,	  Jurisdiction	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  98-­‐114.	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established	   through	   jurisdiction,	  however,	   is	  deeply	  problematic.	   Such	  a	   community,	   even	  as	   an	   ideal	   or	   aspiration,	   rests	   on	   exclusion	   and	   essentialism	   and	   is	   tied	   to	   a	   logic	   of	  totalitarianism.	  Community,	  in	  a	  traditional	  or	  nostalgic	  form,	  is	  governed	  by	  fraternisation,	  effaces	   difference	   and	   circumscribes	   a	  more	   primary	   law	   of	   sociability.	   The	   jurisdictional	  practices	  that	  enable	  the	  formation	  of	  such	  communities	  –	  by	  either	  declaring	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  community	  or	  policing	   the	   limits	  of	  a	  collective	  –	  will	  always	  cut	  across	  an	  expansive	  “with”	  that	  overflows	  and	  exceeds	  such	  determinations.	  This	  “with,”	  however,	  is	  something	  of	  a	  vacuity	  and	  offers	  no	  secure	  ground	  for	  law.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  articulate	  a	  sense	  of	  political	  community	   that	   neither	   collapses	   into	   such	   a	   vacuity	   nor	   inevitably	   leads	   to	   fraternity,	   I	  followed	   Derrida	   in	   evoking	   the	   “community	   of	   the	   question,”	   governed	   by	   the	   logic	   of	  autoimmunity.	   Jurisdiction,	  by	   cutting	  across	   a	  différantial	  plane	  of	  our	  being	   in	   common,	  creates	   the	   autoimmune	   community.	   In	   this	   sense,	   rather	   than	   conceive	   of	   jurisdiction	   as	  simply	   stabilising	   community	   by	   bring	   community	   into	   relation	   with	   determinative	   law,	  jurisdiction	   reveals	   an	   inherent	   instability	   in	   this	   relation.	   As	   noted	   above,	   the	  autoimmunity	   that	   is	   inscribed	  within	  community	  represents	  an	  opening	   to	   the	   “to	  come”	  and	  infers	  an	  ethical	  responsibility	  in	  encountering	  a	  community’s	  others.	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Chapter	  5	  	  
FROM	  JURISDICTION	  TO	  JURISWRITING	  	  	  One	  never	  writes	  alone	  (Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy)1	  	  	  “Write	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  truth.”	  “Then	  be	  a	  lie,	  because	  to	  write	  with	  the	  truth	  in	  mind	  is	  to	  write	  what	  is	  not	  yet	  true	  and	  perhaps	  never	  will	  be	  true.”	  (Maurice	  Blanchot)2	  	  	  
5.1	  Introduction	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  suggested	  that	  jurisdiction	  both	  grounds	  and	  ungrounds	  law.	  By	  drawing	  a	  line	  between	  those	  within	  and	  without	  the	  community,	  and	  in	  so	  doing	  seeking	  to	  stabilise	   the	  relation	  between	  community	  and	   law,	   jurisdiction	  not	  only	   limits	  community	  but	   also	   opens	   community	   to	   a	   limitlessness.	   This	   limitless	   opening	   to	   otherness	   is	  engendered	  by	   the	   logic	  of	   autoimmunity	   that	   jurisdiction	   sets	   in	  motion.	  By	  marking	   the	  limits	   of	   community,	   community	   comes	   to	   presence	   but,	   in	   its	   very	   appearance,	   is	  inherently	  compromised	  and	  this	  internal	  flaw	  to	  community	  opens	  it	  to	  the	  “to	  come”	  of	  an	  unforeseeable	  future.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  want	  to	  assess	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  opening	  might	  be	  sustained	  rather	  than	  effaced	  by	  suggesting	  that	  jurisdiction’s	  function,	  in	  expressing	  the	  limits	  and	  possibilities	  of	  legality,	  can	  be	  occupied	  otherwise.	  Rather	  than	  see	  this	  function	  as	   being	   exclusively	   tied	   to	   demarcation	   and	   delimitation,	   such	   a	   re-­‐imagining	   of	  jurisdiction	  would	   involve	   the	   expression	  of	   legality	  without	   reference	   to	   the	   closure	   and	  determination	   commonly	   associated	   with	   the	   term.	   Such	   practices	   that	   speak	   the	   law	  otherwise,	  I	  name	  “juriswriting”.	  	  	  Juriswriting	   is	  developed	  through	  an	  engagement	  with	   three	  sources:	   firstly,	   the	  notion	  of	  “right-­‐ing”	   developed	   by	   Costas	   Douzinas	   and,	   later,	   Illan	   rua	  Wall,	   in	   relation	   to	   human	  rights;	  secondly,	  Derrida	  –	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  –	  Blanchot	  and	  Nancy’s	  meditations	  on	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Nancy,	  The	  Inoperative	  Community,	  73.	  	  2	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  “Literature	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Death”	  in	  The	  Work	  of	  Fire,	  trans.,	  Charlotte	  Mandell	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  300-­‐344,	  312.	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philosophical	   and	   political	   significance	   of	   writing;	   and,	   lastly,	   the	   events	   that	   dominated,	  and	   in	   many	   respects	   reshaped,	   the	   political	   landscape	   in	   early	   2011,	   in	   particular	   the	  strategy	  of	  occupying	  public	  space	  to	  affirm	  the	  need	  for	  political	  change.	  	  	  The	  notion	  of	  writing	  developed	  by	  Derrida	  et	  al	  and	  that	  of	  right-­‐ing	  by	  Douzinas	  and	  Wall	  both	  offer	  insights	  that	  are	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  theoretical	  orientation	  of	  the	  thesis.	  Let	  me	  say	   something	  briefly,	   then,	   about	  my	  reliance	  on	   recent	  political	   events	  and	  practices,	   as	  this	   might	   seem	   to	   some	   a	   little	   incongruous	   with	   the	   approach	   pursued	   so	   far.3	  My	  contention	   is	   that	   the	   occupations	   of	   2011	   (and	   later	   events	   still)	   not	   only	   represent	   a	  challenge	   to	   existing	  models	  developed	   in	   radical	  philosophy	  or	   social	   theory	  –	  neither	  of	  which,	  arguably,	  has	  done	  an	  adequate	   job	  of	  accounting	   for	   these	  events4	  –	  but	  also	  pose	  important	   questions	   to	   legal	   theory.	   In	   reading	   these	   events	   in	   relation	   to	   jurisdiction,	   I	  suggest	   that	   these	   events	   were	   legal	   as	   much	   as	   they	   were	   political.	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  occupations	   were	   expressions	   of	   law	   (of	   a	   certain	   sort)	   but	   the	   extant	   category	   of	  jurisdiction	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  wherewithal	  to	  account	  for	  their	   form	  and	  tenor.	   I	  argue	  that	   juriswriting	   comes	  much	   closer	   to	   capturing	   the	  multiplicity,	   ambiguity	   and	   force	   of	  these	  events.	  	  	  The	   relationship	   between	   theory	   and	   praxis	   is	   a	   contentious	   issue.	   Too	   often,	   perhaps,	  theorists	   instrumentalise	   events	   to	   provide	   support	   for	   their	   theoretical	   framework	   or	  otherwise	  use	  their	  theoretical	  material	  to	  chastise	  actors	  when	  practices	  or	  decisions	  fail	  to	  match	   up	   to	   their	   (the	   theorists’),	   preordained,	   criteria.	   Rather	   than	   seeing	   the	   events	   of	  2011	  as	  ex	  post	  facto	  “proof”	  of	   juriswriting,	   I	  want	  to	  speculate	  on	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  our	  understanding	  of	  jurisdiction	  might	  be	  re-­‐formed	  in	  light	  of	  these	  events.	  In	  this	  sense,	  I	  see	  the	  occupation	  of	  the	  squares	  and	  other	  public	  spaces5	  in	  2011	  as	  posing	  certain	  questions	  to	  law	  and	  legal	  theory	  and	  juriswriting	  as	  one,	  tentative,	  response	  to	  this	  provocation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Of	  course,	  we	  did	  assess	  the	  declaration	  made	  by	  the	  NTC	  in	  Libya	  in	  chapter	  three	  but	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  events	  of	  2011	  need	  more	  careful	  introduction.	  In	  our	  previous	  discussion	  we	  focused	  on	  the	  NTC’s	  declaration,	  referring	  primarily	  to	  the	  texts	  that	  they	  published.	  Here,	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  practices	  and	  concerns	  are	  drawn	  upon	  and	  so	  some	  explanation	  of	  this	  turn	  seems	  appropriate.	  	  4	  This	  is	  the	  contention	  that	  animates	  Douzinas’s	  intervention	  regarding	  the	  events	  surrounding	  the	  2011	  “return	  of	  history.”	  For	  an	  assessment	  and	  critique	  of	  contemporary	  theory’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  2011	  uprisings	  see	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  Philosophy	  and	  Resistance	  in	  the	  Crisis	  (London:	  Polity,	  2013),	  176-­‐197.	  	  	  5	  Unlike	  other	  sites	  of	  occupation	  (Tahrir	  Square,	  Syntagma	  and	  so	  on)	  the	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street	  movement	  occupied	  a	  privately	  owned	  space,	  Zuccotti	  Park.	  As	  Astra	  Taylor	  notes,	  the	  occupation	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  One	   other	   issue	   pursued	   in	   the	   following	   discussion	   returns	   us	   to	   the	   second	   strand	   of	  argument	   developed	   in	   the	   thesis.	   By	   bringing	   Derrida’s	   notion	   of	   (arche-­‐)writing	   into	  conversation	  with	  concrete	  political	  events,	   I	   seek	   to	  elucidate	   the	  political	   significance	  of	  his	   thought	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   law.	   By	   engaging	   Blanchot	   and	  Nancy,	  who	   both	   foreground	   the	  political	  in	  their	  assessment	  of	  writing,	  I	  seek	  to	  suggest	  ways	  in	  which,	  what	  at	  first	  blush	  might	  appear	  the	  most	  abstract	  or	  philosophically	  demanding	  aspect	  to	  Derrida’s	   thought,	  in	   fact	  speaks	  directly	   to	  political	  events,	  practices	  and	  concerns.	   If	  critical	   legal	  studies	   is	  entering	  a	  period	  that	  that	  (re)engages	  questions	  of	  the	  political,6	  the	  following	  discussion	  seeks	  to	  address	  how	  Derrida	  and	  deconstruction	  have	  continuing	  relevance.	  	  	  
5.2	  Right-­‐ing	  Let	   us	   begin	   to	   formulate	   juriswriting	   by	   referring	   to	   “right-­‐ing”	   a	   term	   first	   coined	   by	  Douzinas	   in	   The	   End	   of	   Human	   Rights. 7 	  Not	   only	   homophonic	   with	   the	   writing	   that	  underpins	   juriswriting,	   right-­‐ing	   is	   substantially	   imbricated	   with	   the	   logics	   of	   “writing,”	  broadly	  understood.	  For	  both	  Douzinas	  and	  Wall	  right-­‐ing	  is	  an	  engagement	  or	  action	  in	  the	  world	   but	   one	   that	   thinks	   beyond	   the	   existing	   essentialism	   and	   legalism	   associated	  with	  human	  rights.	   In	   this	  sense	  right-­‐ing	  helps	  mediate	  between	  the	  more	  abstracted	  sense	  of	  writing	   that	  we	  will	  discuss	  at	   length	   through	  Derrida	  et	  al	  below	  and	   the	   immediate	  and	  material	   events	  of	  2011.	  Right-­‐ing	  not	  only	  describes	   a	   creative	   engagement	   in	   the	  world	  but	  also	  offers	  a	  non-­‐	  or	  post-­‐metaphysical	  “grounding”	  for	  human	  rights.	  In	  this	  sense	  then,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  was	  in	  fact	  only	  possible	  only	  because	  of	  this	  fact:	  as	  the	  park	  was	  privately	  owned	  it	  could	  –	  unlike	  public	  parks	  –	  be	  open	  24	  hours	  a	  day.	  See	  Occupy!	  Scenes	  from	  Occupied	  America,	  Astra	  Taylor,	  Keith	  Gessen	  and	  editors	  from	  n+1,	  Dissent,	  Triple	  Canopy	  and	  The	  New	  Inquiry,	  eds.,	  (London:	  Verso,	  2011),	  64.	  	  6	  Stone,	  Wall	  and	  Douzinas	  suggest	  that	  the	  chronology	  of	  British	  Critical	  Legal	  Studies	  has	  been	  marked	  by	  first,	  aesthetic	  and	  textual	  concerns;	  secondly,	  an	  ethical	  orientation	  towards	  otherness;	  and	  is	  now	  entering	  a	  new	  period	  of	  political	  reflection.	  In	  some	  respects	  this	  represents	  a	  return	  to	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  (American)	  CLS	  which	  sought	  to	  explain	  how	  law	  is	  a	  form	  of	  politics.	  However,	  as	  Stone	  et	  al	  make	  clear,	  the	  recent	  shift	  towards	  the	  political	  in	  (British)	  critical	  legal	  thought	  seeks	  precisely	  to	  engage	  the	  question	  of	  “the	  political”	  (le	  politique)	  as	  such	  rather	  than	  assess	  how	  law	  is	  caught	  up	  with	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  matters	  of	  politics	  (la	  politique).	  See	  Stone,	  Wall	  and	  Douzinas	  eds.,	  New	  Critical	  Legal	  Thinking:	  Law	  and	  the	  Political	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  1-­‐7.	  7	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  The	  End	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  Critical	  Legal	  Thought	  at	  the	  Turn	  of	  the	  Century	  (Oxford:	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2000).	  Through	  a	  genealogy	  of	  rights	  –	  and	  drawing	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  philosophical	  and	  theoretical	  approaches	  including	  Lacan,	  Bloch,	  Levinas	  and	  Derrida	  –	  Douzinas’s	  The	  End	  of	  
Human	  Rights	  develops	  an	  alterative	  orientation	  for	  human	  rights.	  Following,	  in	  the	  main,	  a	  Levinasian	  inspired	  ethics	  of	  alterity,	  Douzinas	  develops	  a	  philosophically	  	  “grounded”	  account	  of	  rights	  based,	  not	  on	  the	  essentialism	  that	  dominates	  legal	  humanism	  but	  on	  ethical	  opening	  to	  otherness,	  heralding	  an	  interruption	  of	  extant	  categories	  and	  determinations.	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right-­‐ing	  is	  both	  imminent	  to	  the	  world,	  describing	  certain	  creative	  practices	  or	  techniques	  
and	  transcending	  the	  world,	  offering	  some	  foundational	  axioms	  for	  human	  rights	  discourse.	  As	  Motha	  and	  Zartaloudis	  point	  out,	  Douzinas	  grounds	  his	  conception	  of	  human	  rights	  on	  an	  “immanent-­‐transcendent”	   radical	   humanism. 8 	  The	   “immanent-­‐transcendent”	   or	   “trans-­‐imminence”	   of	   right-­‐ing	   is	   crucial	   to	   connecting	   right-­‐ing	   to	   writing	   as	   such	   a	   logic	   is	  common	  to	  both	  terms:	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  Derrida’s	  discussion	  of	  writing,	  writing	  engages	  a	  transcendence	  (that	  is,	  arche-­‐writing)	  but	  this	  transcendence	  is	  immanent	  to	  the	  materiality	  of	  writing	  itself.	  	  	  Douzinas’s	   introduces	   right-­‐ing	   in	   a	   discussion	   of	   non-­‐metaphysical	   humanism.	   Read	  through	   Heidegger’s	   critique	   of	   Sartre’s	   “existential	   humanism,”9	  Douzinas	   argues	   that	   a	  reimagined	   “human	   rights,”	   devoid	   of	   the	   individualism	   and	   essentialism	   that	   pervades	  their	  current	  rendering,	  might	  be	  found	  in	  a	  process	  of	  “right-­‐ing”.	  As	  he	  suggests:	  Some	   human	   rights	   may	   be	   consistent	   with	   non-­‐metaphysical	   humanism.	   But	   the	   overall	  form	  of	  the	  social	  bond	  would	  change	  from	  rights	  and	  principles	  to	  being-­‐in-­‐common,	  to	  the	  public	   recognition	   and	   protection	   of	   the	   becoming-­‐human	  with	   others,	   a	   dynamic	   process	  which	  resists	  all	  attempts	  to	  hold	  humanity	  to	  an	  essence	  decided	  by	  the	  representatives	  of	  power.	  To	  coin	  a	  term,	  this	  would	  be	  a	  process	  of	  “right-­‐ing”	  and	  not	  a	  series	  of	  rights	  and,	  like	  writing,	  it	  would	  open	  Being	  to	  the	  new	  and	  unknown	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  its	  humanity.10	  Right-­‐ing	   is	   thus	  an	   imminent	  potential	  within	  rights	  but	  nonetheless	  a	   task	   that	   requires	  creative	  praxis	  and	  intervention.	  Such	  interventions	  that	  seek	  to	  “right”	  rights,	  however,	  do	  not	   assert	   some	   essential	   or	   transcendental	   “truth”	   or	   create	   new	   or	   higher	   order	   rights,	  rather	   they	  would	   involve	   practices	   that	   trouble	   such	   closures,	   allowing,	   instead,	   for	   the	  coming	  of	  a	  non-­‐metaphysical	  and	  anti-­‐foundationalist	  sense	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐common.	  	  	  Douzinas’s	   turn	   to	   “right-­‐ing”	   is	  provoked	  by	   two	  concerns:	   firstly,	   the	  reanimation	  of	   the	  notion	  of	  “radical	  natural	  right”	  and	  secondly,	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  temporality	  of	  ontology.	  Douzinas	  traces	  “natural	  right”	  through	  first	  Greek	  and	  then	  Roman	  understandings	  of	  law,	  justice	  and	  nature	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  terms	  change	  form	  in	  early	  modernity.	  A	  line	  of	  thinking	  from	  the	  Sophists	  to	  the	  Stoics,	  which	  saw	  in	  physis	  (nature)	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Stewart	  Motha	  and	  Thanos	  Zartaloudis,	  “Law,	  Ethics	  and	  the	  Utopian	  End	  of	  Human	  Rights”	  Social	  
and	  Legal	  Studies	  12(2)	  (2003),	  243-­‐268,	  256.	  9	  See	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  “Letter	  on	  Humanism,”	  in	  Basic	  Writings	  ed.	  David	  Farrell	  Krell	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2011).	  10	  Douzinas,	  The	  End	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  215-­‐216.	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means	   to	   resist	   and	   even	   overcome	  nomos	  (law),	   is	   privileged	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   counter	   the	  modern	  assertion	  that	  law,	  nature	  and	  justice	  are	  radically	  distinct.11	  Douzinas	  reminds	  us	  that	  the	  physis	  of	  the	  classical	  world	  was	  not	  a	  static	  or	  God-­‐given	  order	  but	  was	  dynamic	  and	   shifting,	   ‘never	   finished	   or	   perfected	   but	   always	   on	   the	  move’.12	  Set	   against	   the	   law’s	  insistence	   on	   stability	   and	   fixity,	   the	   discovery	   of	   the	   right	   course	   or	   just	   result,	  within	   a	  shifting	   natural	   order,	   was	   the	   business	   of	   natural	   right.	   In	   this	   sense,	   natural	   right	   is	  methodological,	  concerned	  with	  discovering	  the	  just	  path	  or	  decision.	  As	  Douzinas	  claims:	  [Natural	   right]	   allowed	   the	   philosopher	   to	   criticise	   sedimented	   tradition	   and	   the	   jurist	   to	  discover	   the	   just	   solution	   in	   the	   case	   at	   hand…	  Natural	   right	   enters	   the	   historical	   agenda,	  directly	  or	  in	  disguise,	  every	  time	  people	  struggle	  to	  “overthrow	  all	  relations	  in	  which	  man	  is	  a	   degraded,	   enslaved,	   abandoned	   or	   despised	   being”…	   For	   those	   fighting	   against	   injustice	  and	  for	  a	  society	  that	  transcends	  the	  present,	  natural	  right	  has	  been	  the	  method	  and	  natural	  law	  has	  defined	  the	  content	  of	  the	  new.13	  	  Douzinas	   reads	   this	   dynamic	   notion	   of	   nature	   in	   classical	   Greek	   thought	   together	  with	   a	  post-­‐modern	  concern	  with	  temporality,	  ontology	  and	  the	  question	  of	  humanity.	  Explaining	  how	  right-­‐ing	  challenges	   the	   legal	  humanism	  of	  modernity,	  Douzinas	   turns	   to	  Heidegger’s	  claim	   that	   humanism,	   by	  posting	   an	   essence	   for	   humanity	   that	   has	   some	  absolute	   –	   or	   at	  least	  privileged	  –	  value,	  effaces	  the	  open	  possibility	  of	  Being.	  Metaphysical	  humanism	  closes	  the	  humanity	  of	  the	  human,	  restricting	  it	  to	  some	  present	  and	  unchanging	  value,	  removing	  the	  human	   from	  both	   its	   historical	   situation	   and	  possibility	   for	   radical	   change.	  Heidegger	  provides	   the	   seed	   for	   a	   non-­‐metaphysical	   orientation	   for	   human	   rights.	   In	   particular,	   the	  fundamental	   connection	   between	   ontology	   and	   temporality	   developed	   in	  Being	  and	  Time,	  works	  against	  the	  impulse	  to	  solidify	  and	  determine	  the	  value	  of	  the	  human;	  the	  key	  insight	  being	  that	  Being	  is	  always	  in	  a	  process	  of	  presenting	  or	  (echoing	  Douzinas’s	  formulation	  of	  right-­‐ing)	   “present-­‐ing”	   itself.	   Being	   is	   in	   movement,	   a	   “coming	   to	   be,”	   rather	   than	   an	  already	   “is.”	   Bringing	   this	   thinking	   into	   conversation	   with	   the	   legal	   humanism	   that	  underpins	  contemporary	  human	  rights	  discourse,	  Douzinas	  sees	  a	  non-­‐metaphysical	  notion	  of	   rights	   as	   being	   connected	   to	   a	   process	   of	   right-­‐ing,	   a	   conception	   of	   rights,	   then,	   that	  rejects	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   objectified	   and	   static	   set	   of	   indubitable	   “rights”	   with	   their	  concomitant	  commitment	  to	  both	  legalism	  and	  metaphysics,	   in	  favour	  of	  a	  notion	  of	  rights	  connected	  to	  the	  shifting	  physis	  of	  the	  classical	  world.	  Rights	  are	  reimagined	  as	  always	  being	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Ibid.,	  24-­‐68.	  	  12	  Ibid.,	  44.	  	  13	  Ibid.,	  68.	  Note	  that	  the	  quotation	  here	  is	  from	  Ernst	  Bloch,	  Natural	  Law	  and	  Human	  Dignity	  trans.,	  D.	  J.	  Schmidt	  (Cambridge,	  Mass,	  MIT	  Press,	  1988),	  xxviii-­‐xxix.	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in	  a	  state	  of	  becoming.	  	  	  Such	  a	  notion	  of	  right-­‐ing,	  grounded	  in	  a	  resistance	  to	  nomos	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  primary	  but	  unstable	   physis	   is	   picked	   up	   and	   developed	   by	   Illan	   rua	   Wall	   in	   Human	   Rights	   and	  
Constituent	   Power.14	  Broadly	   accepting	   the	   Heideggerian	   insights	   that	   Douzinas	   utilises,	  Wall	  supplements	  the	  concept	  by	  tying	  it	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  “open	  constituent	  power.”15	  	  	  In	  classical	  constitutionalism,	  the	  authority	  to	  speak	  the	  law	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  community	  rests	   with	   “constituent	   power”.	   This	   power	   is	   ultimately	   orientated	   towards	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  constitutional	  order	  and	  thus	  has	  as	  its	  telos	  constituted	  power;	  that	  is,	   the	   power	   over	   a	   particular	   polity,	   invested	   in	   a	   constitutional	   document	   or	   the	  institutions	  and	  practices	  of	  the	  State.	  Constituent	  power,	  in	  the	  classical	  mould,	  is	  wedded	  to	  identity	  and	  essentialism,	  taking	  shape	  in	  “the	  people”	  or	  “nation”	  that,	  when	  evoked,	  has	  the	  power	  to	  topple	  constituted	  power	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  higher	  authority	  that	  it	  purports	  to	   represent.	   Drawing	   on	  Nancy,	   Rancière,	   Agamben	   et	  al,	  Wall	   argues	   that	   the	   power	   of	  constituent	  power	  lies	  precisely	   in	  the	  fact	  that	   it	  exceeds	  the	  identitarian	  and	  essentialist	  logic	  commonly	  associated	  with	  the	  principle.	  Open	  constituent	  power	  does	  not	  claim	  some	  transcendent	  ground	  for	  its	  praxis,	  nor	  does	  it	  have	  constituted	  power	  as	  its	  ultimate	  goal.	  Rather,	   constituent	   power	   rests	   on	   an	   inoperative	   “being-­‐with”	   that	   cannot	   be	   fully	  determined	   or	   captured.	   And	   rather	   than	   seeking	   potestas	   (the	   power	   over	   something),	  constituent	   power	   should	   be	   conceived	   as	   an	   expression	   of	   open	  potentia	  (the	   power,	   or	  potential,	   to	   do	   something).	   Constituent	   power,	   in	   Wall’s	   formulation,	   is	   a	   strategic	   and	  temporary	  opening	  of	  possibility	  within	  the	  polity.	  	  Right-­‐ing,	   for	  Wall,	   is	   ‘the	  opening	  of	  human	  rights	  by	  constituent	  power’16	  and	  names	  the	  assertion	   of	   a	   collective	   resistance	   to	   the	   biopolitics	   and	   logics	   of	   security	   that	   dominate	  State	   authority.	   Such	   right-­‐ing	   is	   involved	  with	   the	   creation	   of	   the	  world	   but	   not	   a	   “new	  world”	  governed	  by	  “new	  rights”	  but	  the	  insistent	  on	  the	  ineluctable	  ‘invention	  of	  the	  world	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Illan	  rua	  Wall,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Constituent	  Power:	  Without	  Model	  or	  Warranty	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012).	  15	  Illan	  rua	  Wall,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Constituent	  Power;	  Wall,	  “Notes	  on	  an	  “Open”	  Constituent	  Power”	  
Law	  Culture	  and	  the	  Humanities	  (forthcoming),	  available	  online	  (1743872113501840,	  first	  published	  on	  October	  3,	  2013),	  accessed	  8	  March	  2014;	  Wall,	  “Tunisia	  and	  the	  Critical	  Legal	  Theory	  of	  Dissensus”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  23(3)	  (2012),	  219-­‐236.	  	  16	  Wall,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Constituent	  Power,	  145.	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without	  model	  or	  warranty’.17	  This	  is	  an	  effort	  (underlining	  the	  temporality	  at	  stake	  here)	  in	  what	  we	  might	  call,	  “world-­‐ing”	  that,	  rather	  than	  aiming	  to	  close	  and	  determine	  the	  world,	  emphasises	   the	   temporality	   that	   undercuts	   such	   endeavours	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   opens	  “human,”	  “rights”	  and	  “world”	  to	  possibilities	  to	  come	  (à	  venir).	  	  	  Wall	   offers	   a	   useful	   supplement	   to	   Douzinas’s	   concept	   of	   right-­‐ing.	   In	  The	  End	  of	  Human	  
Rights	  –	  which,	  it	  is	  worth	  remembering,	  is	  written	  as	  ‘an	  advanced	  textbook	  of	  legal	  theory	  and	  human	  rights’18	  and	  therefore	  foregrounds	  exegesis	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  detailed	  articulation	  the	   author’s	   own	  position	   –	  Douzinas	   passes	   over	   his	   neologism	  pretty	   quickly,	   opting	   to	  hint	   at	   the	   radical	   potential	   in	   the	   term	   rather	   than	   explicate	   it	   fully.	  Wall’s	   intervention	  accepts	  the	  thrust	  of	  Douzinas’s	  work	  but,	  by	  connecting	  right-­‐ing	  to	  a	  reimagined	  notion	  of	  constituent	  power,	   gives	   the	   term	  a	  material	   grounding.	  Douzinas’s	   tantalising	   suggestion	  that	   right-­‐ing	   is	   akin	   to	  writing	  prompts	  my	  own	   intervention.	   Furthering	  Wall’s	   effort	   to	  bring	  right-­‐ing	  into	  conversation	  with	  extant	  legal	  categories,	  beyond	  human	  rights,	  I	  want	  to	  read	  right-­‐ing	  together	  with	  writing	  and	  bring	  this	  conversation	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  critique	  of	  jurisdiction	  that	  this	  thesis	  has	  pursued.	  	  
	  
5.3	  Writing	  As	  intimated	  above,	  juriswriting	  is	  involved	  with	  an	  engagement	  in	  the	  world.	  By	  turning	  to	  writing	  in	  order	  to	  further	  examine	  this	  mode	  engagement	  we	  need	  to	  proceed	  carefully	  to	  avoid	   confusion.	   Writing	   in	   1947,	   Jean-­‐Paul	   Sartre	   advocates	   a	   project	   of	   “engaged	  literature”	  whereby	  the	  writer	  of	  prose	  fiction	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  directly	  acting	  in	  the	  world	  and	  engaged	  in	  a	  project	  of	  human	  emancipation.19	  Positioning	  himself	  against	  the	  “art	  for	  art’s	  sake”	   aesethicism	   that	   wilfully	   disengaged	   from	   political	   struggle,	   Sartre	   argues	   that	   the	  writer,	  as	  an	  actor	  in	  worldly	  affairs,	  has	  to	  face	  up	  to	  the	  responsibility	  that	  this	  entails.	  The	  notion	  of	  “writing”	  that	  Sartre	  mobilises	  to	  make	  this	  argument	  is	  precisely	  not	  the	  one	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid.,	  143,	  emphasis	  in	  the	  original.	  Wall	  takes	  this	  formulation	  from	  Philippe	  Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	  and	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy	  Retreating	  the	  Political,	  ed.	  Simon	  Sparks	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1997),	  158.	  18	  Douzinas,	  The	  End	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  vii.	  	  19	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre,	  What	  is	  Literature?	  trans.,	  Bernard	  Frechtman	  (New	  York:	  Philosophical	  Library,	  1949).	  As	  Leslie	  Hill	  makes	  clear,	  Sartre’s	  intervention	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  highly	  influential	  reading	  of	  Hegel	  pursued	  by	  Alexandre	  Kojève	  in	  the	  1940s.	  In	  particular,	  Sartre	  is	  concerned	  to	  address	  Kojève’s	  claim	  that	  the	  literary	  intellectual	  lives	  a	  life	  devoid	  of	  action	  or	  authentic	  creativity.	  The	  artist	  or	  (literary)	  writer,	  in	  Kojève’s	  scheme	  lives	  a	  life	  of	  solitary	  abstraction	  from	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  reality	  of	  the	  world,	  unable	  to	  negate	  and	  therefore	  transcend	  herself.	  The	  artist	  or	  author	  is,	  therefore,	  something	  of	  a	  fraud.	  See	  Leslie	  Hill,	  Blanchot:	  Extreme	  Contemporary	  (London:	  Routledge	  1997),	  103-­‐106.	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informs	   the	   notion	   of	   juriswriting	   developed	   in	   this	   chapter.	   A	  moment	   spent	   comparing	  Sartre’s	  “engaged	  literature,”	  and	  his	  particular	  understanding	  of	  writing	  that	  underpins	  it,	  with	  Maurice	   Blanchot’s	   theory	   of	   literature	   should	   help	   to	   begin	   to	   clarify	   the	   notion	   of	  writing	  that	  supports	  my	  position.	  Blanchot’s	  “Literature	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Death”	  published	  in	  1948,	  and	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  Sartre’s	  position	  in	  What	  is	  Literature?,	  	  is	  something	  of	  a	  proto-­‐deconstructive	  text	  that	  will	  also	  help	  introduce	  Derrida’s	  notion	  of	  writing	  to	  which	  we	  turn	  below.	  	  	  Prose	  writing,	  in	  Sartre’s	  model,	  is	  a	  process	  of	  signification,	  nothing	  more:	  ‘the	  art	  of	  prose	  is	  employed	  in	  discourse;	  its	  substance	  is	  by	  nature	  significative…	  words	  are	  first	  of	  all	  not	  objects	   but	   designations	   for	   objects’.20	  In	   this	   sense,	   writing	   should	   be	   transparent	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  world	  and	  is	  little	  more	  than	  a	  vehicle	  for	  expressing	  particular	  thoughts	  and	  positions,	   a	   means	   by	   which	   the	   “real	   world”	   might	   be	   articulated	   and	   engaged.	  Writing	  itself,	   then,	   is	   given	   no	   special	   treatment	   but	   is	   characterised	   by	   its	   ability	   to	   convey	  meaning	  in	  precisely	  the	  same	  way	  as	  everyday	  speech.	  Blanchot’s	  “Literature	  and	  the	  Right	  to	   Death”	   posits	   a	   more	   radical	   and	   philosophically	   sophisticated	   understanding	   of	   the	  connection	   between	   writing	   and	   political	   “engagement.”	   This	   serves	   as	   a	   marker	   for	   the	  development	  of	  juriswriting.	  	  Blanchot	   follows	  Hegel’s	   insistence	   on	   the	   centrality	   of	   negation	   for	   language	   but	   sees	   in	  literature	   a	   redoubling	   of	   negation	   that	   forecloses	   the	   naïve	   characterisation	   of	   writing	  pursued	   by	   Sartre.	   As	   Blanchot	   comments,	   language	   depends	   fundamentally	   on	   a	  suppression	   or	   negation	   of	   the	   world:	   ‘for	   me	   to	   be	   able	   to	   say	   “This	   woman,”	   I	   must	  somehow	  take	  her	  flesh-­‐and-­‐blood	  reality	  away	  from	  her,	  cause	  her	  to	  be	  absent,	  annihilate	  her’.21	  This	   is	   a	   fundamental	   condition	   for	   all	   language	   but,	   for	   Blanchot,	   literature	   is	  governed	  by	  a	  law	  of	  double	  negation.	  There	  is	  no	  “real	  world”	  which	  is	  negated	  in	  literature	  as	   this	   world	   is	   already	   annihilated	   through	   the	   author’s	   use	   of	   the	   fictional	   register.	   As	  Blanchot	  suggests,	  in	  literature,	  	  The	  whole	  [world]	  does	  not	  present	  itself	  as	  real	  but	  as	  fictional,	  that	  is,	  precisely	  as	  a	  whole,	  as	  everything:	  perspective	  of	  the	  world,	  grasp	  of	  that	   imaginary	  point	  where	  the	  world	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Sartre,	  What	  is	  Literature?,	  20.	  Sartre	  suggests	  a	  radical	  difference	  between	  poetry	  and	  prose:	  poetry	  treats	  words	  as	  objects	  themselves	  whereas	  prose	  is	  purely	  representational.	  Sartre	  effectively	  dismisses	  poetry	  as	  having	  no	  direct	  engagement	  with	  the	  world.	  	  21	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  “Literature	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Death,”	  322.	  This	  essay	  was	  originally	  published	  in	  1948	  and	  then	  reproduced	  for	  the	  book-­‐length	  The	  Work	  of	  Fire,	  published	  a	  year	  later.	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be	  seen	  in	  its	  entirety.	  What	  we	  are	  talking	  about,	  then,	  is	  a	  view	  of	  the	  world	  which	  realises	  itself	  as	  unreal	  using	  language’s	  own	  peculiar	  reality.22	  	  	  The	  fictional	  world,	  then,	   is	  markedly	  different	  from	  the	  real	  one.	  In	  fact	   it	   is	  precisely	  the	  indeterminacy	  between	   the	   real	   and	   the	   fictional	   that	   gives	   literary	  writing	   its	   effect.	  The	  double	  negation	  within	  literary	  language	  suggests	  that	  fiction	  has	  no	  necessary	  relation	  to	  reality.	  Blanchot	   interrupts	   the	   simple	   relation	   that	   Sartre	  posits	  between	  author	   and	   the	  world:	  rather	  than	  obliging	  a	  responsibility	  for	  the	  author’s	  representation	  of	  the	  world	  and	  engagement	  with	  it,	  writing	  also	  names	  a	  fundamental	  disengagement	  or	  suspension	  of	  the	  world.	  Writing	  is	  not	  cast	  as	  a	  purely	  representational	  medium	  that	  works	  as	  a	  transparent	  film	   through	  which	  we	  might	   act	   in	   the	   world,	   rather,	   by	   attending	   to	   the	  materiality	   of	  writing	   itself,	   Blanchot	   complicates	   this	   relation.	   The	   author	   cannot	   approach	   the	   world	  
directly,	  because	  of	  the	  double	  negation	  of	  literary	  language	  writing	  can	  only	  ever	  indirectly	  give	  an	  impression	  or	  sense	  of	  the	  world.23	  The	  obliqueness	  of	  the	  literary	  text	  in	  relation	  to	  the	   world	   privileges	   the	   materiality	   of	   writing,	   underscoring	   how	   language	   not	   only	  represents	   the	   world	   but	   in	   itself	   (that	   is,	   by	   its	   rhythm,	   tone	   and	   inference)	   expresses	  something.	  There	  is,	  then,	   in	  writing,	  an	  undecidability	  between	  language’s	  expressive	  and	  representational	  modes,	  we	  cannot	  know	  whether	  a	  word,	  ‘is	  a	  thing	  or	  means	  that	  thing’.24	  In	  short,	  there	  is	  no	  simply	  “engaged	  literature,”	  the	  literary	  form	  expresses	  a	  fundamental	  ambiguity	   in	  relation	   to	  both	   the	  world	  and	  the	  author’s	  relation	   to	   the	   text;	   literature,	  as	  Blanchot	  comments,	  ‘denies	  the	  substance	  of	  what	  it	  represents’.25	  	  	  If	   literature	  represents	  a	  doubly	  detached	  relation	  to	  the	  world,	   literary	   language	  must	  be	  self-­‐referential.	  Instead	  of	  referring	  to	  objects	  in	  the	  world,	  literary	  language	  can	  only	  refer	  to	  itself,	  that	  is	  to	  other	  words	  that	  themselves	  have	  been	  doubly	  negated	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  world.	   In	   this	   sense,	   writing	   disrupts	   the	   stability	   between	   subject	   (author)	   and	   world,	  relying	   on	   a	   play	   of	   differences	   to	   convey	   meaning	   or	   sense.	   Furthermore,	   Blanchot’s	  position	  underlines	  the	  fact	  that	  literature	  persists	  in	  the	  radical	  absence	  of	  an	  author.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Blanchot,	  “Literature	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Death,”	  339.	  23	  On	  the	  distinction	  between	  sense	  and	  signification,	  Nancy	  helps.	  For	  Nancy,	  signification	  names	  a	  closure	  of	  representation:	  a	  word	  (signifier)	  refers	  to	  a	  concept	  or	  thing	  (signified)	  and	  names	  a	  representational	  loop,	  a	  closure	  of	  meaning	  and	  the	  world.	  Sense,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  in	  excess	  of	  signification	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  world	  presents	  itself,	  prior	  to	  the	  closure	  of	  signification.	  Sense,	  what	  has	  become,	  Nancy’s	  key	  term,	  is	  closely	  related	  to	  Derrida’s	  différance.	  See	  Jean-­‐Luc	  Nancy,	  The	  Sense	  of	  the	  World,	  trans.,	  Jeffery	  S.	  Librett	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  1997),	  1-­‐29,	  et	  passim.	  	  24	  Blanchot,	  “Literature	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Death,”	  341-­‐342.	  25	  Ibid.,	  310.	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logic	  that	  doubly	  removes	  the	  literary	  text	  from	  the	  world,	  must	  itself	  remove	  or	  negate	  the	  author	  herself	  from	  the	  text.	  	  	  Underlying	   Blanchot’s	   position	   is	   a	   rethinking	   of	   the	   function	   of	   death,	   signaled	   by	   the	  essay’s	  title.	  For	  Blanchot	  death	  not	  only	  names	  the	  ultimate	  possibility	  of	  our	  existence,	  a	  mark	   of	   our	   absolute	   finitude	  which	   structures	   our	   lives,	   but	   so	   too	   is	   death	   related	   to	   a	  fundamental	   impossibility;	   an	   impossibility	   of	   a	   “self”	   ever	   dying.	  As	  Blanchot	   comments:	  ‘when	   I	   die,	   by	   ceasing	   to	   be	   a	  man	   I	   also	   cease	   to	   be	  mortal,	   I	   am	   no	   longer	   capable	   of	  dying…	   no	   longer	   death	   but	   the	   impossibility	   of	   dying’. 26 	  Death,	   then,	   can	   only	   be	  experienced	   as	   other	   and	   by	   the	   other,	   never	   by	   a	   (sovereign)	   self.	   In	   this	   sense,	   death	  becomes	   an	   impossibility;	   as	   Blanchot	   puts	   in	  The	  Writing	  of	   the	  Disaster,	   ‘“I”	   dies	   before	  being	  born’.27	  Writing,	  by	  troubling	  the	  author/world	  binary,	  participates	  in	  this	  “death”	  by	  divorcing	   the	   author	   from	   the	   world.	   As	   Blanchot	   comments,	   ‘language	   is	   the	   life	   that	  endures	   death	   and	   maintains	   itself	   within	   it’.28 	  The	   sovereign	   “self”	   of	   the	   author	   –	  presupposed	   in	   the	   “engaged	   literature”	   model	   –	   is	   displaced	   in	   Blanchot’s	   account.	  Literature,	   then,	  names	  an	  opening	   to	  otherness	  and	  a	  challenge	   to	   the	  sovereignty	  of	   the	  self.	  	  	  Blanchot’s	  concern,	   	  in	  “Literature	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Death”	  at	  least,	   is	  with	  literary	  writing.	  Unlike	  Sartre,	  he	  sees	   literature	  as	  encompassing	  both	  poetry	  and	  prose;	   in	  fact,	  we	  might	  read	  Blanchot’s	  position	  as	  seeking	  to	  illustrate	  how	  a	  certain	  poetry	  (with	  its	  reliance	  on	  an	  expressive	   linguistic	   mode)	   persists	   within	   prose,	   which,	   by	   contrast	   is	   largely	  representational.	   In	   this	   examination	   of	   literature,	   however,	   Blanchot	   reveals	   a	   logic	   that	  itself	   seems	   fundamental	   to	  all	  writing.	   It	   is	  a	   fuller	  account	  of	   this	   logic	  of	  writing,	   in	   the	  most	  general	  terms,	  that	  Derrida	  pursues	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  to	  which	  we	  turn	  in	  a	  moment.	  What,	   though,	   of	   the	   politics	   of	   writing?	   Is	   Blanchot’s	   insistence	   on	   a	   surface	   play	   and	  ambiguity	   at	   work	   within	   literature	   suggesting	   that	   literature	   can	   never	   be	   engaged	   or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ibid.,	  337.	  27	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  The	  Writing	  of	  the	  Disaster,	  trans.,	  Ann	  Smock	  (Lincoln:	  University	  of	  Nebraska	  Press,	  1995),	  101.	  28	  Ibid.,	  336.	  Blanchot’s	  reading	  of	  death	  is	  offered	  as	  a	  supplement	  to	  Heidegger’s	  characterisation	  of	  
Dasein	  as	  being	  orientated	  toward	  death.	  For	  Heidegger,	  death	  is	  Dasein’s	  ultimate	  horizon,	  the	  outermost	  possibility	  that	  should	  –	  in	  an	  authentically	  lived	  existence	  –condition	  our	  being	  in	  the	  world.	  As	  Hill	  observes,	  however,	  in	  Blanchot	  death	  becomes	  ‘abruptly	  inverted’,	  death	  signifies	  an	  ultimate	  impossibility	  rather	  than	  possibility.	  As	  Hill	  comments,	  Blanchot	  sees	  death	  as	  ‘a	  limitless	  non-­‐experience	  of	  the	  impossibility	  of	  dying’.	  Hill,	  Blanchot:	  Extreme	  Contemporary,	  113.	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political?	  Quite	  the	  opposite.	  Instead	  of	  insisting	  on	  the	  political	  responsibility	  of	  the	  author,	  Blanchot	   suggests	   that	   the	  very	  medium	  of	  writing	   itself	   imposes	   a	  more	   radical	   sense	  of	  politicisation.	  By	  effacing	  the	  sovereign	  author/actor	  that	  must	  be	  held	  “responsible”	  for	  her	  actions	  in	  the	  world,	  Blanchot’s	  account	  of	  literature	  underscores	  the	  sociability	  of	  writing	  and	  reading.	  Writing	  is	  an	  exposure	  to	  otherness	  that	  cannot	  be	  captured	  by	  a	  monadic	  self.	  In	  this	  sense,	  literature	  is	  radically	  political.	  Like	  the	  “death”	  to	  which	  it	  is	  a	  witness,	  writing	  opens	  a	   sense	  of	  our	  being-­‐with-­‐others	   in	   the	  world	  and	  by	   creating	  worlds	   that	  have	  no	  necessary	   relation	   to	   the	   real	   one,	   point	   to	   possibilities	   beyond	  our	   current	   predicament.	  We	   might	   characterise	   the	   difference	   between	   Blanchot	   and	   Sartre	   by	   reference	   to	   the	  distinction	  between	  politics	  and	  the	  political.	  Sartre’s	  engaged	  literature	  calls	  for	  a	  politics	  (la	  politque)	  of	  writing,	  seeking	  to	  hold	  the	  writer	  to	  account	  for	  their	  actions,	  decisions	  and	  worldly	   responsibility.	   Blanchot,	   in	   contrast,	   suggests	   that	   in	   literature	   we	   might	   find	   a	  retreatment	   of	   the	   political	   (le	   politique).	   Seen	   more	   clearly	   in	   his	   fictional	   writings,	  Blanchot	   demonstrates	   how	  writing	   is	   capable	   of	   the	   continual	   interruption	   of	   seemingly	  closed	  or	   “natural”	   categories	   such	  as	  narrative,	   character,	   authorial	  voice	  and	  so	  on.	  And	  this	  itself	  is	  not	  without	  political	  import:	  Blanchot’s	  account	  of	  writing	  provokes	  a	  thinking	  of	   politics	   without	   –	  or	   at	   least	   beyond	   current	   understandings	   of	   –	  author,	   reader	   and	  narrative.	   By	   focusing	   on	   the	   peculiarities	   of	   writing	   itself,	   rather	   than	   assuming	   that	  writing	  takes	  the	  same	  form	  as	  any	  other	  communication,	  Blanchot	  is	  able	  to	  sketch,	  avant	  
la	  lettre,	  a	  deconstructive	  politics.	  	  	  
5.3.1	  Writing,	  text,	  interpretation	  In	  Of	  Grammatology	  Derrida	  develops	  a	  way	  of	  reading	  the	  entirety	  of	  Western	  thought	  by	  rethinking	  “writing”	  in	  terms	  not	  unfamiliar	  to	  Blanchot.	  Reflecting	  both	  an	  early	  twentieth	  century	   turn	   in	   philosophy	   to	   language29	  and	   a	   more	   contemporary	   scriptural	   turn	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	  “linguistic	  turn”	  was	  felt	  in	  both	  analytic	  and	  continental	  schools	  of	  philosophy.	  The	  key	  contention	  –	  discernable	  in	  as	  diverse	  a	  set	  of	  figures	  as	  Wittgenstein,	  Heidegger,	  Russell,	  Lacan,	  Carnap	  et	  al	  –	  is	  that	  language	  itself	  is	  centrally	  Important	  to	  philosophy.	  Putting	  things	  rather	  brutally,	  before	  the	  turn	  to	  language	  Western	  philosophy	  had	  been	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  accounting	  for	  a	  relation	  between	  subject	  and	  object	  and	  understanding	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  knowledge,	  experience,	  ontology	  etc.	  In	  this	  scheme	  language	  is	  purely	  incidental	  to	  philosophy.	  The	  linguistic	  turn,	  in	  its	  various	  guises,	  took	  language	  to	  be	  absolutely	  essential	  to	  the	  very	  possibility	  of	  making	  claims	  about	  the	  world	  or	  our	  experience	  of	  it.	  Language,	  then,	  rather	  simply	  being	  shaped	  by	  the	  subject	  (and	  incidental	  to	  claims	  made	  about	  the	  world	  or	  experience)	  is	  crucial	  to	  shaping	  the	  very	  parameters	  of	  thought.	  Language,	  then,	  becomes	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  for	  philosophy	  at	  all,	  constructing	  the	  limits	  of	  that	  which	  can	  be	  known.	  For	  example,	  for	  Wittgenstein,	  the	  form	  of	  language	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  form	  of	  the	  world	  and	  for	  Heidegger,	  it	  is	  “language	  that	  speaks	  man”	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science,	   media	   and	   culture,30	  Derrida	   articulates	   a	   notion	   of	   “writing”	   as	   a	   fundamental	  condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   all	   communication,	   thought	   and,	   indeed,	   life	   itself.	  Writing,	   or	  
arche-­‐writing,	   comes	   to	   signify	  a	  general	  movement	  of	  difference	  and	  deferral	   that	  allows	  for	  speech,	  scriptural	  writing,	  and	  political	  engagement	  to	  take	  place.	  By	  reading	  a	  number	  of	  thinkers	  central	  to	  the	  Western	  tradition,	  Derrida	  demonstrates	  how	  this	  notion	  of	  arche-­‐writing	   has	   subsisted	   within	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy	   but	   has	   been	   covered	   over	   and	  ignored	  by	  a	  series	  of	  metaphysical	  presuppositions,	  particularly	  with	  regards	  to	  temporal	  presence.	  Writing	  has	  been	  historically	  mistrusted	  by	  philosophy	  because	  of	  its	  “gap”	  (both	  spatial	  and	  temporal)	  from	  the	  supposedly	  “present”	  thoughts	  of	  the	  subject.	  The	  everyday	  notion	   of	   writing	   –	   or	   what	   Derrida,	   calls	   the	   ‘vulgar	   conception	   of	   writing’31	  –	   has	   been	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  signifier	  of	  a	  signifier:	  a	  representation	  of	  a	  more	  primary	  representation	  (i.e.	   speech),	  which	   in	   turn	   represents	   thought.	  Writing	   is	   thus	   doubly	   removed	   from	   the	  primacy	  of	  the	  subject’s	  present	  thoughts	  and	  intentions.	  This	  downgrading	  of	  writing	  rests	  on	  a	  metaphysical	  assumption	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  purely	  “present”	  moment	  which	  has	  sovereign	  authority.	  Following	  our	  discussions	  of	   iterability	  and	  performativity	   in	  chapter	  three,	  we	   have	   already	   seen	   that	   Derrida	   carefully	   examines	   how	   this	   notion	   of	   a	   purely	  present	  moment	   is	   a	   fallacy.	  What	   appears	   as	   if	   “present”	   rests	   on	   a	   prior	  movement	   of	  difference	  and	  deferral	  that	  ceaselessly	  interrupts	  any	  such	  claim.	  Writing	  is	  never	  present	  to	   itself	   but	   is	   always	   already	   dislocated.	   More	   precisely,	   writing	   relies	   on	   a	   logic	   of	  “spacing”	   (espacement).	   Spacing	   is	   the	  becoming-­‐time	  of	   space	  and	   the	  becoming-­‐space	  of	  time32	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  possibility	   for	  writing.	  Writing	  can	  only	  function	  through	  a	  spacing	  out	  or	  spatial	  organisation	  of	  signs	  or	  marks	  and	  this	  engages	  temporality	  because	   every	  mark	   can	  neither	   be	   inscribed	  nor	   perceived	   in	   a	   single	   instant;	  writing	   is	  constituted	  by	  a	  fundamental	  deferral.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  rather	  than	  vice	  versa.	  See	  Wittgenstein,	  The	  Tractatus,	  passim,	  and	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  Poetry,	  
Language,	  Thought,	  trans.,	  Albert	  Hofstader	  (New	  York:	  HarperCollins,	  197),	  185-­‐208.	  30	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Grammatology	  Derrida	  highlights	  the	  way	  in	  which	  “writing”	  has	  come	  to	  signify	  much	  more	  than	  the	  everyday	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  DNA	  is	  described	  as	  a	  “code”	  or	  a	  genetic	  “script”	  and	  cybernetic	  theory	  accounts	  for	  the	  operations	  within	  systems	  as	  a	  generalized	  “pro-­‐gram”	  of	  writing	  or	  inscription.	  What	  interests	  Derrida	  here	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  writing	  has	  become	  generalized	  to	  mean	  much	  more	  than	  its	  everyday	  designation.	  It	  is	  the	  prevalence,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  expanded	  meaning,	  of	  writing	  as	  “inscription	  in	  general”	  that	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  Derrida’s	  assessment	  of	  a	  science	  of	  writing,	  or	  “grammatology.”	  See	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Of	  Grammatology,	  trans.	  G.	  Spivak	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  8-­‐9.	  31	  Derrida,	  Of	  Grammatology,	  56.	  	  32	  Ibid.,	  68	  and	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Speech	  and	  Phenomena,	  trans.,	  David	  B.	  Allison	  (Evaston:	  Northwestern	  University	  Press,	  1973),	  85-­‐86.	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While	  Derrida’s	  understanding	  of	  writing	  responds	  to	  a	  twentieth	  century	  turn	  to	  language	  and	   the	  pervasiveness	  of	   script	   and	   text	   in	   contemporary	   culture,	   the	   common	   law’s	  own	  turn	  to	  the	  written	  form	  occurs	  much	  earlier.	  As	  Peter	  Goodrich	  has	  carefully	  charted,	   the	  early	  modern	  transformation	  of	  the	  common	  law	  from	  a	  largely	  oral	  culture	  to	  an	   ‘equally	  codified	   but	   materially	   distinct’33	  written	   form,	   prompts	   a	   shift	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   legal	  knowledge,	  interpretation	  and	  understanding.	  The	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  the	  oral	  to	  the	  written	  proceeded	  hand	  in	  glove	  with	  an	  increasingly	  static	  and	  determinate	  conception	  of	  legality.	  As	   Goodrich	   suggests,	   ‘the	   peripatetic	   tradition	   of	   the	   common	   law	   that	   came	   to	   specific	  places	  and	  applied	  its	  particular	  knowledges	  as	  a	  travelling	  law	  is	  replaced	  by	  a	  system	  of	  sedentary	   courts	   and	   available	   written	   texts’. 34 	  This	   move	   from	   the	   nomadic	   to	   the	  static,	  the	  oral	  to	  the	  textual,	  prefigures	  a	  turn	  to	  hermeneutic	  concerns	  in	  legal	  scholarship	  and	  it	  is	  in	  this	  register	  that	  Derrida’s	  understanding	  of	  writing,	  text	  and	  interpretation	  has	  been	  fruitfully	  deployed.	  	  	  Writing	   against	   Gadamer’s	   philosophical	   hermeneutics,	   Douzinas	   and	   Warrington	   argue	  that	  Derrida’s	  early	  work	  on	  writing	  and	  language	  offers	  much	  needed	  vigilance	  against	  the	  closures	  heralded	  by	  the	  hermeneutic	  approach.35	  Gadamer	  asserts	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  true	  interpretation	  of	  text	  through	  a	  dialogical	  process	  in	  which	  the	  reader	  moves	  between	  her	  own	   historically	   conditioned	   prejudices36	  and	   the	   historical	   horizon	   in	   which	   a	   text	   was	  written.	  This	  is	  connected	  to	  a	  movement	  at	  work	  within	  any	  interpretative	  act	  between	  a	  particular	   part	   –	  a	   sentence,	   stanza	   or	   case	   –	  and	   a	   projected	   whole;	   an	   inchoate	   but	  continually	   evolving	   understanding	   of	   a	   novel,	   poem	   or	   area	   of	   law.	   It	   is	   through	   this	  movement	   (in	   which	   the	   part	   is	   put	   into	   conversation	   with	   the	   whole)	  along	   with	   the	  merging	   of	   the	   two	   horizons	   of	   text	   and	   reader	   that	   meaning	   comes	   to	   be	   determined.	  Gadamer	   –	  whose	  philosophical	   project,	   like	  Derrida’s,	   is	   concerned	  with	   a	   reception	   and	  furtherance	   of	   Heidegger’s	   thought	   –	   shares	   a	   number	   of	   concerns	   with	   Derrida’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Peter	  Goodrich,	  Languages	  of	  Law:	  From	  Logics	  of	  Memory	  to	  Nomadic	  Masks	  (London:	  Winfield	  and	  Nicholson,	  1990),	  114	  et	  passim.	  	  34	  Goodrich,	  Languages	  of	  Law,	  116.	  	  35	  Costas	  Douzinas	  and	  Ronnie	  Warrington,	  Postmodern	  Jurisprudence:	  The	  Law	  of	  text	  in	  the	  Texts	  of	  
Law	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1991),	  29-­‐51.	  On	  Gadamer’s	  philosophical	  hermeneutics,	  see	  Hans-­‐Georg	  Gadamer,	  Truth	  and	  Method	  (London:	  Continuum,	  2004).	  	  36	  Prejudice	  in	  this	  context	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  common	  negative	  sense	  but	  closer	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  pre-­‐	  or	  fore-­‐judgment.	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philosophy37	  but	  as	  Douzinas	  and	  Warrington	   illustrate,	  Derrida’s	   turn	   to	  writing	  eschews	  the	  conservatism	  of	  Gadamer’s	  approach.	  	  	  Underpinning	   Derrida’s	   thinking	   is	   a	   radical	   scepticism	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	  interpretative	  stability,	  particularly	  evidenced	  in	  writing.	  This	  is	  connected	  to	  the	  temporal	  structure	   of	   performativity	   examined	   in	   the	   third	   chapter.	   Here	   we	   suggested	   that	   the	  performative	  was	  temporally	  out	  of	  joint.	  Writing,	  more	  generally,	  is	  structured	  by	  a	  similar	  temporal	  logic:	  as	  with	  the	  performative,	  there	  is	  no	  “now”	  of	  writing.	  The	  force	  and	  efficacy	  of	  writing	   lies	  precisely	   in	   its	   temporal	   ambivalence;	   a	  written	  mark	  or	   sign	   captures	   the	  past	  in	  the	  very	  moment	  that	  it	  is	  inscribed.	  As	  Derrida	  comments:	  Time	   is	   the	   economy	   of	   a	   system	   of	   writing…	   Traces	   thus	   produce	   the	   space	   of	   their	  inscription	   only	   by	   acceding	   to	   the	   period	   of	   their	   erasure.	   From	   the	   beginning,	   in	   the	  “present”	  of	  their	  first	  impression,	  they	  are	  constituted	  by	  the	  double	  force	  of	  repetition	  and	  erasure,	  legibility	  and	  illegibility.38	  Writing,	  in	  a	  purely	  formal	  sense,	  is	  a	  means	  of	  sustaining	  something	  through	  the	  passage	  of	  time.	  The	  everyday	  notion	  of	  writing	   illustrates	   this	  point:	   the	   reams	  of	  notes	   that	   clutter	  my	  desk	  are	  effective	  only	  in	  that	  they	  “store”	  previous	  thoughts	  or	  events,	  bearing	  a	  trace	  of	  a	  past	  idea,	  desire,	  intention	  and	  so	  on.	  But,	  in	  the	  very	  moment	  of	  penning	  such	  a	  note,	  writing	  opens	  up	  a	   sense	  of	   the	  unforeesable	   future:	   the	  writing	  may	  be	  erased	  or	   (more	  likely,	  given	  my	  spider-­‐like	  scrawl)	  be	  unreadable;	  the	  significance	  originally	  intended	  may	  have	  become	  superfluous;	  or	  the	  reader	  (whether	  me	  or	  an	  other)	  may	  read	  the	  words	  in	  a	  radically	  different	  context	  and	  ascribe	  to	  them	  a	  meaning	  that	  was	  not	  originally	  intended.	  	  Legal	  interpretation,	  necessitated	  by	  the	  early	  modern	  shift	  from	  an	  oral	  to	  a	  scriptural	  legal	  culture,	   seeks	   to	   obscure	   these	   structural	   possibilities	  within	  writing.	   As	   Balkin	   suggests,	  the	  traditional	  form	  of	  interpretation	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  authorial	  intention	  or	  historicism	  is	  a	  ‘logocentric	   theory’. 39 	  Written	   law	   is	   always	   open	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   failing	   the	  transparency	   of	   meaning	   it	   so	   desperately	   craves.	   As	   Douzinas	   and	   Warrington	   put	   it,	  Derrida’s	  thinking	  infers	  that,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  On	  the	  question	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Gadamer	  and	  Derrida,	  see,	  Dialogue	  and	  
Deconstruction:	  The	  Gadamer-­‐Derrida	  Encounter,	  Diane	  P.	  Michelfelder	  and	  Richard	  E.	  Palmer	  eds.,	  (New	  York:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press).	  38	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  trans.,	  Alan	  Bass	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2008),	  284.	  	  39	  J.	  M.	  Balkin,	  “Deconstructive	  Practice	  and	  Legal	  Theory”	  The	  Yale	  Law	  Journal	  96(4)	  (1987),	  784.	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All	  traditional	  concerns	  of	  hermeneutics	  must	  be	  challenged	  and	  rethought.	  Authorship	  and	  intentionality	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  principles	  	  of	  unity	  and	  coherence	  of	  a	  text,	  or	  the	  totality	  of	  work.	  The	  text,	  a	  collection	  of	  traces,	   is	  cut	  off	   from	  whoever	  penned	  it,	   torn	  away	  from	  its	  moorings…	  The	   law	  of	   repetition	   fissures	   intention,	  makes	   it	  disjointed,	   internally	  divided,	  never	  fully	  present	  to	  the	  actor.40	  It	   is	   these	  concerns	  that	  prompt	  Goodrich’s	  study	  of	   the	  particular	  written	   legal	   form	  that	  emerge	  in	  the	  early	  modern	  period,	  suggesting	  that	  legal	  scholarship	  needs	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	   textual	   and	   rhetorical	   organisation	   of	   the	   law	   to	   reveal	   its	   underlying	   logics	   and	  ideologies.41	  Deconstruction	  forces	  legal	  scholars	  to	  reckon	  with	  the	  textuality	  of	  the	  law,	  to	  understand	  in	  its	  play	  of	  traces,	  how	  legal	  meaning	  is	  not	  only	  produced	  but	  always	  already	  destabilised	  by	  the	  very	  movement	  that	  produces	  it.	  	  	  These	  early	  efforts	   in	  bringing	  Derrida’s	   thought	   into	  conversation	  with	  the	   law	  sought	   to	  highlight	  the	  contingency	  and	  fluidity	  of	  legal	  texts.	  Acts	  of	  legal	  interpretation	  that	  sought	  to	   resolve	   tensions	   by	   stabilising	   the	   play	   of	   textuality	   should	   be	   exposed	   as	   remaining	  wedded	   –	  like	   Gadmer’s	   hermeneutics	   –	  to	   a	   metaphysics	   that	   elides	   difference.	   The	  approach	   outlined	   here	   in	   relation	   to	   Goodrich,	   Douzinas	   and	   Warrington,	   et	   al,	   casts	  deconstruction	  as	  a	   form	  of	  negative	  critique:	  Derrida’s	   thinking	   is	  used	   to	   show	  how	   the	  law	   fails	   to	  match	  up	  with	   its	  proclaimed	  coherence	  and	  how	  philosophical	  hermeneutics	  falls	  short	  of	  providing	  a	  sound	  method	  for	  legal	  interpretation.	  	  	  The	  way	  in	  which	  Derrida’s	  notion	  of	  writing	  can	  be	  deployed	  in	  this	  way	  is	  significant	  and	  serves	  as	  an	  important	  reminder	  of	  the	  persistent	  opening	  always	  already	  at	  work	  in	  texts.	  However,	   there	   is	   another	   aspect	   to	   the	   Derrida’s	   thought	   that	   I	  want	   to	   pursue	   in	  what	  follows.	  This	  returns	  us	  to	  the	  trans-­‐immanence	  of	  right-­‐ing	  discussed	  above.	  In	  Writing	  and	  
Difference,	  Derrida	   privileges	   particular	   authors,	   styles	   and	  modes	   of	   writing	   that,	   rather	  than	  obscure	  arche-­‐writing	  (as	  the	  law	  does)	  foreground	  this	  play	  and	  difference	  on	  which	  writing	   relies.	   It	   is	   Derrida’s	   suggestion	   that	   certain	   modes	   of	   creative	   practice	   are	  privileged	  points	  at	  which	  we	  might	  glimpse	  the	  necessity	  of	  arche-­‐writing	  that	  particularly	  intrigues	  me	  as	   it	  suggests	   that	  Derrida’s	   thought	  can	  be	  deployed	   in	  a	  positive	  as	  well	  as	  negative	   register.	   Rather	   than	   simply	   undermining	   the	   apparent	   stability	   of	   legal	   texts,	   I	  argue	   that	   Derrida’s	   notions	   arche-­‐writing,	   textuality	   and	   interpretation	   inform	   how	   we	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Douzinas	  and	  Warrington,	  Postmodern	  Jurisprudence,	  49.	  	  41	  Goodrich,	  Languages	  of	  Law,	  114.	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might	  creatively	  act	  in	  the	  world,	  particular	  within	  the	  register	  of	  jurisdiction.	  Writing,	  then,	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  an	  immanent	  inscription	  or	  taking	  of	  space	  that,	  in	  its	  very	  operation,	  engages	  a	  transcendence,	  opening	  this	  immanence	  to	  a	  beyond	  or	  radically	  otherwise.	  Given	  Derrida’s	  insights	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  writing,	  how	  might	  we	  imagine	  styles	  of	  inscription	  and	  spacing	  that	   rather	   than	   disavow	   différance,	   foreground	   its	  movement?	   How	  might	  we	   imagine	   a	  
différantial	  praxis?	  	  	  As	   the	   previous	   chapters	   have	   already	   intimated,	   I	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   an	   isomorphism	  between	   arche-­‐writing	   (a	   generalised	   sense	   of	  movement,	   difference	   and	   deferral)	   and	   a	  sense	   of	   the	   law	   as	   originary	   being-­‐in-­‐common	   or	   sociability.	   As	   arche-­‐writing	   is	   the	  condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   language	   in	   general,	   so	   the	   law	   of	   originary	   sociability	   is	   the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  positive	  law.	  This	  “law	  of	  sociability”	  is	  tied	  to	  a	  reimaging	  of	  our	  
ius	  commune	  and	  has	  been	  expanded	  on	   through	  our	   readings	  of	  Kafka,	   the	  early	  modern	  common	  law	  thinkers,	  Austin	  and	  performativity,	  and	  Nancy’s	  engagement	  with	  community.	  In	   each	   instance	   we	   have	   explored	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   jurisdiction	   mediates	   between	   a	  positive	   and	   determinate	   sense	   of	   the	   law	   and	   a	   more	   primary	   notion	   of	   difference	   and	  deferral	   that	   implicates	   self	   and	   other	   in	   a	   shifting	  web	   of	   relations.	   I	   want	   suggest	   that	  through	   creative	   interventions	   and	   practices	   within	   the	   register	   of	   jurisdiction,	   we	   can	  glimpse	   the	  more	   primary	   “law	   of	   sociability”	   that	   has	   been	   our	   concern	   throughout	   the	  thesis	   so	   far.	   Such	   strategies,	   I	   call	   “juriswriting.”	   Rather,	   like	   Jabès,	   Artaud	   and	   others,	   I	  want	  to	  explore	  strategies	  of	  writing	  –	  but	  a	  “writing”	  that	  exceeds	  the	  notion	  of	  marks	  on	  a	  page	   –	  	   in	   order	   to	   show	   how	   this	   law	   (of	   originary	   sociability)	   can	   be	   expressed	   or	  performed	  in	  order	  to	  displace	  and	  disrupt	  efforts	  at	  closure,	  positivism	  and	  juridification.	  A	  shift	  to	  the	  register	  of	  (arche)writing	  displaces	  our	  common	  conception	  of	  jurisdiction	  and	  allows	  for	  a	  strategic	  occupation	  of	  this	  principle	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  interrupt	  and	  challenge	  the	  law’s	  narrative	  of	  stability,	  sovereignty	  and	  determination.	  	  	  In	   order	   to	   develop	   a	   theoretically	   grounded	   conception	   of	   juriswriting	   we	   must	   move	  slowly.	  Before	  bringing	  “writing”	  into	  relation	  with	  jurisdiction	  and	  law,	  let	  me	  first	  lay	  out	  some	  key	  commitments	  Derrida	  makes	  in	  relation	  to	  writing	  as	  a	  creative	  practice.	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5.3.2	  Writing	  and	  the	  plasticity	  of	  closure	  	  In	   conversation	  with	  Maurizio	   Ferraris,	   Derrida	   suggests	   that	   none	   of	   the	   three	   books	   of	  1967	   –	  Speech	   and	   Phenomena,	  Writing	   and	   Difference	   and	   Of	   Grammatology	   –	  should	   be	  considered	  a	  book	  in	  and	  of	  itself:	  Not	  one	  of	  them	  is	  a	  book,	  not	  one	  of	  them	  was	  planned	  as	  a	  book…	  Writing	  and	  Difference	  is	  a	   collection	   of	   texts	   dating	   from	   1962-­‐3	   to	   1967;	   Of	   Grammatology	   is	   made	   up	   of	   two	  heterogeneous	   passages	   put	   together	   somewhat	   artificially	   (the	   first	   part	   and	   the	   part	   on	  Rousseau),	  and	  this	  logic	  of	  supplementarity	  is	  a	  logic	  of	  incompleteness;	  as	  for	  Speech	  and	  
Phenomena,	  that	  was	  a	  conference	  presentation…	  it	  was	  anything	  but	  a	  project	  for	  a	  book.42	  The	  book	  signifies	  an	  ontic	  reality,	  a	  finite	  closure,	  a	  completed	  project.	  The	  notion	  of	  arche-­‐writing	  examined	  in	  these	  texts	  works	  to	  challenge	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  the	  book,	  suggesting	  that	   at	  work	  within	  a	  written	   text	   is	   a	  movement	   that	   exceeds	  and	   interrupts	   the	   closure	  that	   the	   book	   appears	   to	   represent.	   Firstly,	   the	   three	   texts	   can	   only	   “properly”	   be	  understood	  in	  their	  interrelation,	  they	  rely	  on	  a	  logic	  of	  supplementarity	  with	  one	  text	  both	  standing	  in	  for	  and	  adding	  to	  the	  others.	  Secondly,	  arche-­‐writing	  –	  the	  orientating	  point	  for	  all	   these	   texts	   –	  names	   a	   movement	   that	   escapes	   the	   ontic	   register.	   As	   we	   have	   already	  noted	   arche-­‐writing	   has	   no	   determinable	   origin,	   it	   likewise	   can	   be	   said	   to	   have	   no	   end;	  arche-­‐writing	  is	  always	  already	  underway.43	  Arche-­‐writing	  with	  its	  interminable	  shifting	  of	  difference	   and	   deferral	   disavows	   the	   closure	   associated	  with	   the	   book,	   rather	   it	   opens	   a	  possibility	  beyond	  the	  ontic,	  the	  present	  and	  the	  closed.	  	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  “the	  book”	  and	  “writing.”	  The	  decentring	  and	  play	  associated	  with	  Derrida’s	  expansive	  notion	  of	  writing	  has	  to	  take	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  and	  in	  excess	  of	  the	  closure	  that	  the	  book	  designates.	  Pure	  play	  or	  pure	  différance	  would	  be	  akin	  to	  the	  vacuity	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	   in	  relation	  to	  community.	  Writing	  conceived	  of	   as	   a	   trace	   of	   differences	   and	   as	   capable	   of	   positing	   a	   beyond	   of	   closure	   and	   ontic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Jacques	  Derrida	  and	  Maurizio	  Ferraris,	  A	  Taste	  for	  the	  Secret,	  trans.,	  Giacomo	  Donis	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2002),	  29-­‐30.	  As	  Alan	  Bass	  points	  out	  in	  the	  “Translator’s	  Introduction”	  to	  Writing	  and	  
Difference	  there	  are	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  three	  texts	  could	  be	  organised.	  Writing	  and	  
Difference	  could	  be	  inserted	  after	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  Grammatology	  dealing	  with	  Saussure’s	  linguistics.	  Equally,	  however,	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  Grammatology	  could	  be	  inserted	  into	  Writing	  and	  
Difference	  after	  the	  first	  six	  essays	  of	  that	  collection.	  Speech	  and	  Phenomena	  could	  be	  added	  as	  a	  long	  footnote	  to	  either	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  Grammatology	  or	  Writing	  and	  Difference.	  See	  Writing	  and	  
Difference,	  ix-­‐xii.	  43	  The	  arche-­‐	  of	  arche-­‐writing,	  etymologically	  referring	  to	  the	  beginning	  or	  founding	  principle,	  is	  ironically	  appropriated	  by	  Derrida.	  Writing,	  as	  we	  suggested	  above,	  is	  commonly	  thought	  to	  be	  secondary	  (a	  representation	  of	  a	  representation)	  and	  so	  arche-­‐writing	  paradoxically	  refers	  to,	  “originary-­‐representation.”	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determination	  must	  take	  place	  in	  relation	  to	  such	  closure.	  This	  play	  between	  the	  possibility	  of	   a	   writing	   beyond	   the	   book	   and	   the	   insistence	   of	   the	   book	   as	   closure	   is	   brilliantly	  performed	   in	   the	   final	   essay	   of	   Writing	   and	   Difference.	   Typically	   books	   end	   with	   a	  conclusion	   that	   ties	   together	   themes	   and	   offers	   a	   final	   statement	   on	   the	   argument	  developed	  throughout	  the	  foregoing.	  The	  final	  chapter	  of	  Writing	  and	  Difference	  –	  “Ellipsis”	  –	  performs	   the	   ambivalent	   relation	   between	   play	   and	   closure	   that	   Derrida	   has	   argued	   is	  typified	  by	  writing.44	  In	  a	  sense	  then	  “Ellipsis”	   is	  (not)	  more	  than	  a	  conclusion:	   it	  occupies	  the	  place	  of	  the	  conclusion	  but	  writes	  it	  otherwise.	  	  	  The	  chapter’s	  title	  refers	  not	  only	  to	  the	  literary	  device	  –	  “…”	  	  –	  that	  indicates	  the	  removal	  of	  superfluous	  words	  from	  a	  sentence	  but	  also	  suggests	  the	  geometrical	  figure	  of	  the	  ellipse,	  a	  circle	  that	  does	  not	  attain	  complete	  or	  perfect	  closure.45	  Derrida	  here	  is	  emphasising	  both	  a	  logic	  of	  incompleteness	  and	  supplementarity,	  key	  to	  writing,	  but	  also	  a	  plasticity	  to	  closure	  itself.	  Writing	  takes	  place	  within	  a	  metaphysics	  of	  closure	  and	  presence	  –	  the	  “epoch	  of	  the	  book”	  where	  writing	  is	  conditioned	  by	  certain	  established	  formal	  norms	  and	  conventions	  –	  but	  writing	  is	  not	  absolutely	  contained	  by	  that	  closure.	  As	  he	  comments	  at	  the	  close	  of	  the	  essay:	   The	  beyond	  of	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  book	  is	  neither	  to	  be	  awaited	  nor	  to	  be	  refound.	  It	  is	  there,	  but	  out	  there,	  beyond,	  within	  repetition,	  but	  eluding	  us	  there.	   It	   is	   there	   like	  the	  shadow	  of	  the	  book,	  the	  third	  party	  between	  the	  hands	  holding	  the	  book,	  the	  deferral	  within	  the	  now	  of	  writing,	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  book	  and	  the	  book,	  that	  other	  hand.46	  	  	  Writing,	  as	  an	   inchoate	  opening	  to	  a	  beyond	  of	  metaphysics,	   is	  already	  at	  work	  within	  the	  putative	  closure	  of	  the	  book.	  In	  fact,	  Derrida	  is	  only	  able	  to	  offer	  a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  beyond	  of	  the	  book	  and	  to	  nod	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  writing	  that	  he	  sees	  as	  offering	  vistas	  beyond	  a	  restrictive	  metaphysics	  by	  precisely	  relying	  on	  the	  closure	  of	  book	  itself.	  We	  only	  detect	  the	  irony	  and	  playfulness	   of	   this	   occupation	   of	   the	   “conclusion”	  with	   an	   “ellipsis”	   because	   of	   our	   ready	  acceptance	   of	   the	   closed	   parameters	   erected	   and	   policed	   by	   a	   metaphysics	   that	   Derrida	  wants	   to	  gesture	  beyond.	  We	  are	  returned	  here	  to	   the	  strategies	  associated	  with	  right-­‐ing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  “Ellipsis”	  uses	  Edmund	  Jabès’s	  The	  Book	  of	  Questions	  as	  a	  foil	  for	  (re)presenting	  the	  themes	  of	  writing	  and	  difference	  discussed	  throughout	  the	  book.	  Jabès	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  earlier	  essay	  in	  the	  collection	  –	  “Edmund	  Jabès	  and	  the	  Question	  of	  the	  Book”	  –	  and	  Derrida	  clearly	  finds	  in	  Jabès’s	  aphoristic,	  elliptical	  and	  challenging	  style	  a	  writing	  that	  confronts	  writing	  (in	  the	  ontic	  or	  classical	  register)	  itself.	  It	  is	  the	  doubled	  work	  of	  writing	  that	  particularly	  interested	  Derrida,	  a	  sense	  of	  writing	  as	  both	  closure	  and	  opening.	  	  45	  An	  ellipse	  is	  a	  figure	  produced	  when	  an	  oblique	  plane	  intersects	  a	  cone	  and	  does	  not	  touch	  the	  cone’s	  base.	  	  	  46	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  378.	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which	   occupies	   human	   rights	   discourse	   –	   with	   its	   concomitant	   essentialisms	   and	  reductionisms	  –	  	  with	  an	  aim	  to	  test	  the	  plasticity	  of	  its	  concepts.	  Both	  writing	  and	  right-­‐ing	  involve	  the	  strategic	  occupation	  of	  extant	  (and	  closed)	  forms	  in	  order	  to	  open	  them	  beyond	  their	   current	   determinations.	   Derrida’s	   evocation	   of	   an	   opening	   of	   writing	   beyond	   the	  closure	  of	  the	  book	  suggests	  that	  a	  thinking	  of	  the	  beyond	  or	  of	  the	  radically	  otherwise	   is	  a	  question	  of	  testing	  a	  plasticity	  within	  rather	  than	  a	  utopian	  positing	  beyond.	  Derrida’s	  final	  chapter	   –	  and	   the	   trope	   of	   writing	   that	   is	   developed	   throughout	   the	   1967	   texts	   –	   is	   so	  effective	  because	  it	  occupies	  an	  extant	  form	  but	  finds	  within	  it	  plasticity	  and	  play.	  Writing	  names	  a	  tentative	  reaching	  out	  to	  a	  beyond	  that	  is	  inscribed	  within,	  inscribed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	   closure	   is	   stretched	   or	   distorted,	   like	   a	   circle	   that	   fails	   perfection,	   flattened	   into	   an	  ellipse.	  	  	  
5.3.3	  The	  staging	  of	  writing	  	  Arche-­‐writing	  does	  not	  present	  itself	  as	  such	  but	  is	  only	  seen	  through	  traces	  within	  writing	  itself.	  We	  cannot	  hold	  onto	  arche-­‐writing	  because	  it	  is	  always	  already	  at	  work	  within	  texts	  and	  things.	  Derrida	  is	   interested,	  however,	   in	  the	  way	  that	  writing	  seeks	  to	  frame	  or	  stage	  itself	   as	   if	   it	   were	   not	   affected	   by	   this	   prior	   play	   of	   difference.	   The	   play	   between	   the	  indeterminate	  register	  of	  arche-­‐writing	  and	  the	  apparently	  stable	  and	  determinate	  form	  of	  writing	  suggests	  the	  work	  of	  pretence	  and	  dissimulation.	  Writing	  acts	  as	  if	  it	  were	  free	  from	  arche-­‐writing,	  seeking	  to	  be	  as	  close	  as	  possible	  to	  the	  presence	  and	  sovereignty	  of	  speech.	  Derrida	  connects	  the	  pretence	  within	  writing	  to	  the	  theatre,	  suggesting	  that	  writing	  appears	  as	   if	   on	  a	   stage,	  neatly	   framed	  with	  actors	   speaking	   the	   lines	  of	   a	  present	   and	  authorised	  script.	  Such	  an	  appearance	  of	  writing,	  however,	  hides	  arche-­‐writing,	   the	  play	  of	  difference	  and	   deferral	   that	   allows	   for	   the	   staging	   to	   be	   in	   place	   at	   all.	   Writing,	   then,	   is	   always	  exceeded	  by	  arche-­‐writing	  so	   that	  any	  staging	  will	  always	  be	   incomplete;	   there	  can	  be	  no	  final	  or	  proper	  staging	  of	  writing	  because	  writing	  is	  the	  ‘stage	  of	  history	  and	  the	  play	  of	  the	  world’,47	  a	  play	  (in	  both	  senses	  of	  movement	  and	  theatrical	  performance)	  that	  disrupts	  any	  imposed	  script,	  stage	  or	  authorial	  voice.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Ibid.,	  287.	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These	   themes	  of	   staging,	  writing	  and	  dissimulation	  are	   taken	  up	   in	  Derrida’s	   engagement	  with	  Antonin	  Artaud’s	   experiments	  with	   the	   “theatre	  of	   cruelty”.48	  Derrida	   is	   intrigued	  by	  Artaud’s	  efforts	  to	  imagine	  a	  staging	  and	  performance	  of	  drama	  beyond	  the	  onto-­‐theological	  impositions	   commonly	   associated	   with	   the	   theatre.	   As	   Derrida	   suggests,	   the	   theatre	   is	  dominated	  by	  a	  particular	  theology:	  An	   author-­‐creator	  who,	   absent	   and	   from	  afar,	   is	   armed	  with	   a	   text	   and	   keeps	  watch	   over,	  assembles,	  regulates	  the	  time	  or	  the	  meaning	  of	  representation,	   letting	  this	  latter	  represent	  him…	   he	   lets	   representations	   represent	   him	   through	   representatives,	   directors	   or	   actors,	  enslaved	  interpreters…	  who	  faithfully	  execute	  the	  providential	  designs	  of	  the	  “master.”49	  The	   theatre	   of	   cruelty	   is	   an	   impossible	   notion	   of	   theatre	   that	   escapes	   all	   of	   these	  restrictions.	  Artaud	  argues	  that	  the	  theatre	  with	  these	  strict	  hierarchies	  of	  representation	  –	  and	  with	  audiences	  as	  passive,	  sedentary	  and	  static	  participants	  in	  this	  oppressive	  economy	  –	  has	  become,	  ‘if	  not	  the	  absolute	  negation	  of	  theatre…	  certainly	  its	  perversion’.50	  In	  its	  place,	  then,	  Artaud	  imagines	  a	  theatre	  released	  from	  this	  theological	  distortion	  to	  allow	  for	  a	  more	  vital	  and	  creative	  theatre	  ‘born	  out	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  organised	  anarchy’.51	  	  	  Derrida	   reads	  Artaud’s	  manifesto	   for	   the	   theatre	  of	   cruelty	   as	   an	   attack	  on	   the	   closure	  of	  representation.	   Significantly,	   the	   theatre	   Artaud	   advocates	   would	   no	   longer	   rely	   on	   a	  metaphysics	  of	  presence:	  ‘the	  stage	  will	  no	  longer	  operate	  as	  the	  repetition	  of	  a	  present,	  will	  no	  longer	  re-­‐present	  a	  present	  that	  would	  exist	  elsewhere	  and	  prior	  to	  it’.52	  This	  disavowal	  of	  representation,	  however,	  is	  not	  absolute.	  Rather,	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  Artaud	  points	  to	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Artaud	  develops	  the	  notion	  of	  “the	  theatre	  of	  cruelty”	  in	  a	  number	  of	  letters,	  lectures	  and	  essays.	  The	  key	  texts	  (written	  between	  1931	  and	  1937)	  are	  collected	  in	  Le	  Théâtre	  et	  son	  Double	  (first	  published	  in	  1938).	  As	  Edward	  Scheer	  comments,	  ‘Artaud	  employs	  several	  important	  images	  that	  function	  as	  metonyms	  for	  his	  theatre	  of	  cruelty,	  since	  it	  resists	  any	  positivist	  definition	  or	  formulation…	  cruelty	  is	  Artaud’s	  name	  for	  an	  encounter	  which	  leaves	  no	  category	  secure’.	  See	  Edward	  Scheer	  ed.,	  Antonin	  Artaud:	  A	  Critical	  Reader	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2004),	  3-­‐7.	  The	  “cruelty”	  of	  Antonin’s	  theatre	  is	  perhaps	  best	  understood	  in	  connection	  to	  the	  Latin	  root	  crudus	  meaning	  raw	  or	  rough.	  The	  theatre	  of	  cruelty	  is	  a	  theatre	  that	  seeks	  to	  reveal	  something	  of	  the	  bareness	  of	  life	  without	  or	  beyond	  the	  strictures	  of	  text,	  stage	  and	  set.	  As	  Brian	  Singleton	  argues,	  in	  this	  sense,	  Artaud	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  developing	  an	  “anti-­‐theatre.”	  See	  Claude	  Schumacher	  and	  Brian	  Singleton	  trans.	  and	  ed.,	  Artaud	  on	  Theatre	  (London:	  Methuen	  Drama,	  2001),	  xi.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  something	  importantly	  violent	  in	  Artaud’s	  strategy,	  as	  Derrida	  suggests	  the	  “cruelty”	  is	  connected	  to	  a	  desire	  to	  kill	  the	  father	  figure	  of	  God-­‐author-­‐director:	  ‘the	  origin	  of	  theatre,	  such	  as	  it	  must	  be	  restored,	  is	  the	  hand	  lifted	  against	  the	  abusive	  wielder	  of	  the	  logos,	  against	  the	  father,	  against	  the	  God	  of	  a	  stage’.	  See	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  301.	  	  49	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  296.	  50	  Antonin	  Artaud,	  The	  Theatre	  and	  its	  Double,	  trans.	  Mary	  Caroline	  Richards	  (New	  York:	  Grove	  Press,	  1958),	  106,	  quoted	  in	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  298-­‐299.	  	  51	  Artaud,	  The	  Theatre	  and	  its	  Double,	  52,	  quoted	  in	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  314.	  	  52	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  299.	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notion	  –	  akin	  to	  Derrida’s	  arche-­‐writing	  –	  of	  “originary	  representation.”	  This	  would	  refer	  to	  a	  radicalisation	  of	  representation	  itself,	  suggesting	  that	  there	  are	  only	  ever	  re-­‐presentations	  and	   thus	   no	   primary	   presentation	   or	   presence	   to	   which	   a	   representation	   could	   refer.	   By	  embracing	   this	   logic	   of	   “originary	   representation”	  Artaud	   seeks	   to	  divorce	   theatre	   from	  a	  vertical	  operation	  of	  power,	  evidenced	  by	   the	  author-­‐director-­‐actor	  chain,	  and	  allow	   for	  a	  theatre	  of	   the	  happening	  or	  event.	  Such	  a	  theatre,	   for	  Derrida,	  would	  be	  a	  “writing”	   in	  the	  fullest	  sense	  of	   the	  term:	   ‘an	  experience	  which	  produces	   its	  own	  space’53	  without	  the	  god-­‐author,	   possessing	   a	   sovereign	   intention,	   controlling	   the	   staging	   of	   this	  writing/performance.	  	  	  In	   an	   important	   sense,	  Artaud’s	   theatre	  of	   cruelty	   is	   impossible.	   Just	   as	   arche-­‐writing	   can	  only	   be	   sensed	   within	   and	   up	   against	   a	   metaphysics	   of	   presence	   and	   closure,	   theatrical	  performance	   and	   representation	   will	   itself	   always	   be	   caught	   within	   certain	   hierarchies,	  determinations	  and	  fixities.	  In	  performance	  itself,	  no	  doubt,	  new	  norms	  of	  presentation	  will	  emerge;	  as	  Jacques	  Rancière	  comments,	  theatre	  engages	  ‘a	  set	  of	  perceptions,	  gestures	  and	  attitudes	   that	   precede	  and	  perform	   laws	   and	   political	   institutions’.54	  Artaud’s	   vision,	   then,	  could	   never	   be	   fully	   realised,	   in	   fact	   the	   notion	   of	   “full	   realisation”	   conforms	   to	   the	   very	  authorial	  or	  directorial	  power	  that	  Artaud	  is	  writing	  against.	  The	  theatre	  of	  cruelty,	  then,	  is	  “(im)possible”	   in	   that	   it	   can	   only	   be	   sensed	   through	   degrees	   of	   failure.	   It	   is	   this	  (im)possibility	   of	   arche-­‐writing,	   evident	   in	   Artaud’s	   efforts,	   that	   also	   occupies	   Derrida	   in	  “Freud	   and	   the	   Scene	  of	  Writing”	  where	  Freud	   is	   cast	   as	   a	   performer	  of	  writing,	   a	  writer	  who	  is	  at	  a	  certain	  limit	  where	  arche-­‐writing	  or	  generalised	  difference	  is	  sensed	  within	  his	  writing	  itself:	  ‘Freud	  performs	  for	  us	  the	  scene	  of	  writing.	  Like	  all	  those	  who	  write.	  And	  like	  all	  who	  know	  how	  to	  write	  well,	  he	  let	  the	  scene	  duplicate,	  repeat,	  betray	  itself	  within	  the	  scene’.55	  	  Derrida’s	   interest	   in	   both	   Freud	   and	   Artaud	   lies	   in	   their	   testing	   of	   writing’s	   limits.	   Both	  writers	  display	  a	  generalised	  performative	  element	  to	  writing	  and	  life	  but	  it	  is,	  precisely,	  a	  performance	  without	   script	  or	  director.	  There	   is,	   as	  Derrida	   says	   in	   relation	   to	  Freud,	   ‘no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Ibid.	  54	  Jacques	  Rancière,	  The	  Emancipated	  Spectator,	  trans.,	  Gregory	  Elliott	  (London:	  Verso,	  2011),	  6.	  My	  emphasis.	  	  55	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  288.	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unconscious	  truth	  [or	  text]	  to	  be	  rediscovered	  by	  virtue	  of	  having	  been	  written	  elsewhere’.56	  This	   absence	   of	   an	   orientating	   text	   inspires	   a	   kind	   of	   creative	   acting-­‐out	   as	   “writing.”	  Writing,	  so	  understood,	  is	  a	  creative	  staging	  or	  performance	  that	  both	  creates	  and	  denies	  its	  own	   scene,	   a	   writing	   that	   threatens	   to	   undo	   itself	   in	   its	   very	   inscription,	   a	   fragile	   and	  temporary	   creative	   praxis.	  Writing’s	   force	   comes	   from	   its	   ability	   to	   speak	   from	   a	   neutral	  place,	  it	  names	  a	  happening	  without	  sovereign	  sanction.57	  	  	  
5.3.4	  Writing	  (as)	  the	  law	  	  Right-­‐ing	  directly	   engages	   law:	   “rights”	   its	   object	   and	   site	   of	   intervention.	  Writing,	   on	   the	  other	   hand,	   appears	   –	  at	   first	   blush	   at	   least	   –	  removed	   from	   law.	   Though	   legal	   texts	   and	  procedures	   utilise	   the	   written	   form,	   the	   play,	   ambiguity	   and	   anarchism	   of	   differences	  associated	  with	   Derrida’s	   notion	   of	   writing	   seems	   far	   removed	   from	   (human)	   rights	   and	  their	  concomitant	  obligations	  and	  norms.	  Following	  our	  discussion	  of	  how	  Derrida’s	  notion	  of	  writing	  has	  been	  deployed	  within	   legal	  hermeneutics,	  we	  might	   suggest	   that	  writing	   is	  itself	   contra-­‐legal,	   precisely	   involved	   in	   sedition	   and	   subversion;	   as	   Blanchot	   comments,	  ‘writing	   is	   the	  greatest	  violence,	   for	   it	   transgresses	  the	   law,	  every	   law,	  and	  also	   its	  own’.58	  But	  in	  this	  transgression	  of	  the	  law	  (the	  written	  and	  readable	  law	  of	  lex)	  is	  not	  another	  law	  shown?	  A	  law	  that	  co-­‐opts	  writer	  and	  reader	  in	  a	  quiet	  solidarity,	  opening	  an	  experience	  of	  our	  bare	  condition	  of	  being-­‐with?	  	  	  For	  Nancy,	  writing	   is	   engaged	   in	  precisely	   this	   opening	   to	   another	   law.	  Nancy’s	   notion	  of	  “literary	   communism,”	   developed	   in	   The	   Inoperative	   Community,	   privileges	   literature’s	  ability	  to	  expose	  the	  ontological	  register	  of	  “being	  singular	  plural”.	  Like	  Derrida,	  for	  Nancy,	  the	  potential	  of	  “literature,”	  or	  “writing,”	  lies	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  interrupt	  or	  suspend	  myths	  of	  foundation,	   totality	   or	   closure.	   Importantly,	   writing	   opens	   selves	   to	   otherness,	   to	   an	  originary	   being-­‐in-­‐common.	   Nancy’s	   “literary	   communism”	   does	   not	   suggest	   that	   certain	  literary	  forms	  or	  tropes	  tell	  of	  being	  singular	  plural,	  rather	  Nancy	  suggests	  that	  in	  literature	  or	  writing	  being-­‐in-­‐common	  as	  being	  singular	  plural	  shows	  itself.	  As	  Nancy	  suggests:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Ibid.,	  265.	  57	  The	  notion	  of	  the	  neutral	  voice	  of	  narrative	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  Blanchot.	  See	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  The	  Infinite	  Conversation,	  trans.	  Susan	  Hanson	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  Press,	  2013),	  379-­‐387.	  As	  Derrida	  comments,	  Blanchot’s	  “narrative	  voice”	  is	  ‘a	  neutral	  voice	  that	  speaks	  the	  work	  from	  out	  of	  this	  place	  without	  a	  place,	  where	  the	  work	  is	  silent.	  The	  placeless	  place	  where	  the	  work	  is	  silent:	  a	  silent	  voice,	  then,	  withdrawn	  into	  its	  “aphony”’.	  See	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “Living	  On”	  in	  
Parages	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2011),	  103-­‐191,	  130.	  	  58	  Blanchot,	  The	  Infinite	  Conversation,	  xii.	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Being-­‐in-­‐common	   is	   literary,	   that	   is,	   if	   we	   can	   attempt	   to	   say	   that	   it	   has	   its	   very	   being	   in	  “literature”…	   then	  what	   “literature”	  will	   have	   to	   designate	   is	   this	   being	   itself…	   in	   itself.	   In	  other	  words,	  it	  would	  designate	  that	  singular	  ontological	  quality	  that	  gives	  being	  in	  common,	  that	  does	  not	  hold	   it	   in	  reserve,	  before	  or	  after	  community,	  as	  an	  essence…	  but	  that	  rather	  makes	  for	  a	  being	  that	  is	  only	  when	  shared	  in	  common.59	  “Literature,”	  in	  the	  sense	  outlined	  here,	  exposes	  a	  certain	  originary	  law	  of	  being	  social.	  This	  sociality	   is	   another	   law,	   the	   “other	   law”	   that	   has	   animated	   our	   account	   of	   jurisdiction.	  Rather	   than	   expressing	   the	   law’s	   capacity	   to	   divide	   and	   delimit,	  writing	   exposes	   a	   law	   of	  relation	  to	  which	  we	  are	  abandoned.	  	  	  But	  so	  too	  is	  writing	  insubordinate	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  law,	  able	  to	  interrupt	  and	  suspend	  legal	  norms	  and	  categories.	  With	  this	  conception	  of	  writing	  we	  are	  close	  to	  Derrida’s	  evocation	  of	  a	  law	  that	  ‘not	  only	  exceeds	  or	  contradicts	  law	  but	  also…	  [has]	  such	  a	  strange	  relation	  to	  it	  that	   it	  may	   just	  as	  well	  demand	   law	  as	  exclude	   it’.60	  Writing	  has	  an	  ambivalent	  relation	   to	  legality,	  exposing	   its	  own	   law	  (of	   sociability)	  at	   the	  very	  moment	   it	   interrupts	   the	   law	  (of	  interdiction	   and	   prohibition)	   by	   exceeding	   the	   borders	   that	   are	   erected	   in	   its	   name.	  Blanchot	  describes	  this	  ambivalence	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  The	  Law	  is	  writing	  itself,	  writing	  that	  has	  renounced	  the	  exteriority	  of	   interdiction	  [l’entre-­‐
dire]	   in	   order	   to	   designate	   the	   place	   of	   the	   interdict.	   The	   illegitimacy	   of	   writing,	   always	  refractory	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Law,	  hides	  the	  asymmetrical	  illegitimacy	  of	  the	  Law	  in	  relation	  to	  writing.61	  Blanchot	   alludes	   here	   to	   the	   paradox	   of	   constitutionalism	   whereby	   the	   law	   comes	   to	   be	  through	   an	   act	   of	   a-­‐legality.	   The	   law	   is	   written,	   but	   as	   Blanchot	   intimates,	   this	   law	   is	  illegitimate,	  it	  ‘takes	  the	  place	  of	  the	  interdict’	  rather	  than	  seeing	  the	  interdiction	  as	  external	  to	   it.	   In	   this	   sense	   writing	   is	   co-­‐opted	   to	   write	   a	   new	   law.	   However,	   there	   is	   an	  ‘asymmetrical	   illegitimacy	  of	   the	  Law	   in	   relation	   to	  writing’.	  Writing	  exceeds	   the	   law	  and,	  though	  utilised	  in	  making	  it	  known	  and	  understood,	  remains	  insubordinate	  or	  ‘refractory’	  in	  relation	  the	  law.	  Writing,	  then,	  privileges	  rather	  than	  discards	  the	  sense	  of	  law	  that	  we	  have	  throughout,	   posited	   as	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   the	   positive	   law.	   Writing	   holds	   in	  place,	  within	  the	  law	  –	  and	  indeed	  essential	  to	  it	  –	  a	  prior	  movement	  that	  is	  insubordinate	  and	   inoperative.	   In	   this	  sense,	  writing,	   in	   the	  very	  moment	  of	   inscription,	  both	  marks	  and	  exceeds	  its	  own	  limit.	  But,	  crucially,	  this	  excess	  is	  within	  writing	  itself,	  as	  Leslie	  Hill	  puts	  it,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Nancy,	  Inoperative	  Community,	  64.	  60	  Derrida,	  “Force	  of	  Law,”	  233.	  61	  Blanchot,	  The	  Infinite	  Conversation,	  431.	  	  
	   173	  
‘it	  is	  the	  limitedness	  of	  writing	  that	  is	  key	  to	  its	  limitlessness’.62	  	  
	  
5.4	  Towards	  Juriswriting	  Writing,	  as	  we	  have	  discussed	  it	  so	  far,	  is	  liminal.	  Writing	  itself	  is	  internally	  divided,	  naming	  both	   a	   generalised	   movement	   of	   difference	   and	   deferral	   (i.e.	   arche-­‐writing)	   that	   is	   the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  speech,	  writing	  and	  life,	  but	  also	  a	  creative	  practice	  of	  inscription	  which	  in	  some	  sense	  reveals	  these	  very	  conditions	  of	  possibility.	  Writing	  takes	  place	  at	  the	  limit	   of	   representation,	   troubling	   representation	   itself	   by	   putting	   the	   presence	   of	   re-­‐
presentation	   into	   question.	   Let	   me	   begin	   to	   flesh	   out	   juriswriting	   by	   underscoring	   those	  aspects	  to	  writing	  that	  have	  been	  central	  to	  our	  discussion	  above.	  	  Firstly,	   following	   both	   Blanchot	   and	   Derrida,	   writing	   interrupts	   the	   author-­‐reader-­‐text	  relation.	  Writing’s	   force	   comes	   from	   a	   horizontal	   rather	   than	   vertical	   operation:	   sense	   is	  produced	  through	  a	  plane	  of	  differences	  that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  sovereign	  intention	  of	  a	  reader	  or	  writer.	  This	  disavowal	  of	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  writer/reader	  co-­‐implicates	  self	   and	   other.	   In	   fact,	   through	   writing/reading	   we	   are	   bound	   to	   recognise	   “the	   other”	  always	  already	  haunting	   “the	  self.”	   Secondly,	  writing	   involves	   the	   taking	  of	  place:	   it	   is	   the	  becoming-­‐time	  of	  space	  and	  the	  becoming-­‐space	  of	  time.	  Writing	  is	  a	  material	  occupation	  of	  space	   but	   one	   that	   engages	   a	   temporality	   beyond	   the	   purely	   immanent	   or	   present.	   The	  writing	   that	   interests	   Derrida	   most	   is	   that	   which	   foregrounds	   and	   plays	   with	   its	   own	  temporality,	  that	  is,	  its	  own	  absences	  and	  lacunas,	  performing	  the	  deferral	  central	  to	  its	  own	  material	  form.	  Thirdly,	  writing	  is	  positioned	  against	  the	  limit.	  Writing,	  in	  fact,	  must	  engage	  the	  limit,	  that	  is,	   it	  must	  limit	  itself	  within	  the	  closure	  of	  certain	  ontic	  forms:	  the	  book,	  the	  law,	   the	   theatre,	   the	   thesis.	   But	   given	   the	   trans-­‐immanence	   of	   writing	   (that	   is,	   a	  transcendence	   inscribed	   within	   the	   immanent	   from	   of	   writing),	   this	   positioning	   against	  closure	  reveals	  a	  plasticity	  to	  existing	  forms.	  Whether	  this	  is	  seen	  in	  Artaud’s	  testing	  of	  the	  form	  of	  theatre	  or	  Derrida’s	  experiments	  with	  supplementarity	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  book,	  writing	  is	  both	  creative	  and	  insubordinate,	  naming	  a	  movement	  that	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  change.	   Lastly,	   writing	   is	   bound	   up	   with	   performance	   or	   a	   kind	   of	   “acting	   out.”	   Arche-­‐writing	  is	  subsumed	  within	  scriptural	  writing	  and	  so	  scriptural	  writing	  is	  always	  engaged	  in	  a	   sort	   of	   pretence,	   acting	   as	   if	   it	  writing	  were	   absolutely	   transparent	  with	   regards	   to	   the	  world	  or	   ideas.	  Writing	   is	  a	  question	  of	  staging	  (and	   thus,	  again,	  of	   limits)	  but,	  as	  Derrida	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Hill,	  Extreme	  Contemporary,	  97.	  	  
	   174	  
tells	   us	   writing	   can	   betray	   itself	   in	   its	   staging,	   redoubling	   the	   scene	   of	   its	   own	   making,	  holding	   itself	  as	  a	  question	  of	   representation	  rather	   than	  claiming	   to	  effectively	  represent	  the	  world	  once	  and	  for	  all.	  	  	  How,	  then,	  does	  this	  conception	  of	  writing	  inform	  jurisdiction?	  As	  we	  noted	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	   thesis,	   jurisdiction	   is	   the	   law’s	  expressive	   register.	   It	  names	   those	   techniques	   through	  which	   the	   law	  comes	   to	  be	  known,	  visible,	  heard	  and	  understood.	  Beyond	  efforts	   to	  make	  visible	  certain	  territorial	  distinctions	  and	  demarcations,	  we	  have	  discussed	  how	  jurisdiction	  requires	   the	  manipulation	  of	   both	  narrative	   and	  performative	  modes.	   Jurisdiction	   reveals	  law	   through	   the	   fashioning	   of	   narratives	   of	   continuity	   as	   well	   through	   the	   eruption	   of	   a	  performative	   declaration.	   In	   both	   cases	  we	  have	   suggested	   that	  we	  need	   to	   account	   for	   a	  prior	  register	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  efficacy	  of	  these	  techniques.	  And	  it	  is	  here	  that	  we	  have	  stressed	   the	  significance	  of	  a	   lawful	   register,	  before	   the	  (positive)	   law,	  as	   the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  law.	  As	  we	  have	  maintained	  throughout,	  jurisdiction	  fulfils	  a	  doubled	  function	  of	  declaration	  and	  reflection;	   there	   is	  a	  prior	  movement	  of	   “law”	  at	  work	   that	   jurisdiction	  seeks	   to	   reflect	   as	   law	   itself.	   In	   the	   jurisdictional	   moment,	   however,	   this	   prior	   law	   gets	  transformed	  because	  the	  informal	  and	  inoperative	  web	  of	  relations	  that	  it	  names	  becomes	  formalised,	  present	  and	  –	  supposedly	  –	  stable.	  In	  this	  important	  sense,	  jurisdiction	  names	  a	  staging	  or	  performance	  in	  the	  very	  sense	  of	  staging	  discussed	  above	  in	  relation	  to	  writing.	  Jurisdiction	  tells	  of	  law	  as	  if	   it	  were	  always	  already	  extant.	  It	  hides	  this	  prior	  movement	  of	  “law”	  that	  is	  its	  condition	  of	  possibility	  and	  participates	  in	  a	  fantasy	  of	  presence	  and	  purity.	  Our	   efforts	   so	   far	   have	   been	   to	   reveal	   this	   logic	   and	   stress	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   prior	  informal	  and	  inoperative	  “law”	  that	  jurisdiction	  seeks	  vainly	  to	  do	  without.	  	  	  These	   strategies	   are	   analogous	   with	   Derrida’s	   own	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   writing.	   In	   questioning	   the	  supposed	  purity	  of	  the	  jurisdictional	  moment	  and	  seeking	  to	  account	  for	  another	  movement	  at	  work	   beneath,	   beyond	   or	   before	   the	   present	   and	   posited	   law,	  we	   have	   undertaken	   an	  exploration	  of,	  what	  we	  might	  call,	  an	  “arche-­‐law”	  that	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  possibility	  for	  law.	  But	  as	  the	  discussions	  in	  Writing	  and	  Difference	  make	  clear,	  there	  are	  strategies	  of	  creative	  praxis	  that	  work	  to,	  rather	  than	  efface	  arche-­‐writing,	  underline	  and	  play	  with	  this	  expansive	  notion	  of	  difference,	   and	   in	   so	  doing	  undermine	   the	  apparent	  expulsion	  or	   submersion	  of	  
différance.	  My	   contention	   is	   that	   similar	   strategies	   can	   be	   found	  with	   regards	   to	   the	   law.	  Jurisdiction	   can	   be	   occupied	   otherwise,	   as	   Jabès,	   Artaud,	   Freud,	   Blanchot	   et	   al	   occupy	  
	   175	  
writing	  otherwise.	  In	  privileging	  rather	  than	  effacing	  the	  arche-­‐law	  of	  originary	  sociability,	  such	  an	  occupation	  of	  jurisdiction	  might	  displace	  narratives	  of	  closure,	  purity	  and	  presence	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  test	  the	  plasticity	  of	  the	  legal	  form.	  	  	  Such	  strategies	  I	  call	  juriswriting.	  This	  names	  those	  practices	  that	  efface	  the	  mobilisation	  of	  a	  sovereign	  goal,	  party,	  or	  leader,	  and,	  instead,	  embrace	  the	  happening	  of	  the	  text	  and	  revel	  in	  the	  way	  that	  sense	  that	  is	  produced	  through	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  horizontal	  differences.	  Like	  right-­‐ing,	   juriswriting	   takes	   a	   non-­‐metaphysical	   being-­‐in-­‐common	   as	   its	   founding	   axiom.	  Juriswriting	   involves	   the	   taking	   of	   space	   but	   inscribing	   into	   this	   spacing	   a	   temporality	   of	  becoming,	   an	   opening	   to	   difference	   and	   the	   future-­‐to-­‐come	   (à	   venir).	   Juriswriting	   is	   an	  acting	   out	   in	   the	   world,	   conditioned	   by	   a	   certain	   performativity;	   its	   mode	   of	   expression	  would	   be	   that	   of	   showing	   rather	   than	   telling.	  Blanchot’s	   comments	   apropos	   the	   events	   of	  May	  1968	   in	   this	   regard	  are	   telling,	   the	  uprising,	  he	   claims,	  was	   ‘without	  project…	   saying	  was	   more	   important	   than	   what	   was	   said’.63	  But	   juriswriting	   does	   not	   refer	   to	   creative	  practices	   of	   intervention	   that	   suspend	   the	   sovereignty	   of	   authorship	   or	   the	   hegemony	   of	  representation	   alone.	   Juriswriting	   also	   privileges	   the	   lawful	   register	   exposed	   through	  writing	  practices:	  a	  sociality	  or	  communism	  of	  the	  literary,	  where	  self	  is	  necessarily	  opened	  to	  other.	  The	  relationality	  that	  this	  names,	  prefigures	  the	  (positive)	  law	  and,	  indeed,	  exceeds	  and	  resists	   it.	   Juriswriting	  seeks	   to	   right	   the	   law	   through	  an	  occupation	  of	   the	   function	  of	  jurisdiction.	   Rather	   than	   declaring	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   (positive)	   law	   or	   announcing	   the	  “proper”	  relation	  between	  law	  and	  the	  political	  community,	  juriswriting	  shows	  or	  performs	  an	  other	   law,	  a	   law	  of	   inoperative	  being-­‐with,	   that	   is	  –	  as	  Derrida	   intimates	  –	  perhaps	   the	  very	  essence	  of	  the	  law.64	  	  	  Through	   an	   occupation	   of,	   and	   intervention	   within,	   the	   law’s	   jurisdictional	   register,	  juriswriting	  names	  a	  strategy	  of	  creative	  practice	  that	  seeks	  to	  expose	  this	  “other	  law”	  that	  is	   always	   already	   at	   work	   within	   the	   putative	   rigidity	   of	   the	   extant	   legal	   form.	   Such	   a	  “writing”	  of	  the	  law	  would	  seek	  to	  expose	  a	  more	  fundamental	  “law”	  that	  comes	  before	  the	  law,	   a	   law	   of	   sharing	   and	   fracture,	   through	   which	   self	   and	   other	   are	   always	   already	   co-­‐implicated.	   Such	   practices	   seek,	   through	   creative	   praxis	   and	   intervention,	   to	   right	   the	  (positive)	  law	  by	  writing	  this	  law	  of	  sociability	  anew.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  The	  Unavowable	  Community,	  30.	  64	  Derrida,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Friendship,	  231.	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5.5	  Juriswriting	  in	  the	  Squares	  The	   global	   Occupy	   movement;	   revolutions	   and	   uprisings	   in	   North	   Africa;	   the	   Spanish	  
indignados;	  the	  ‘stasis	  syntamgma’65	  in	  Athens;	  the	  later	  mass	  mobilisations	  of	  the	  Gezi	  Park	  protests	   and	   the	   uncanny	   “standing	  man”	   in	   Taksim	   square;66	  as	  well	   as	   the	   insurrection	  and	  riots	  on	  the	  streets	  of	  English	  cities	  all	  interrupted	  and	  challenged	  existing	  structures	  of	  power	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   financial	   crash	   of	   2008.	   The	   number	   of	   protests,	   rallies	   and	  gatherings	   that	  were	  sparked	  by	   the	  collapse	  of	   the	   financial	   system	  are	   too	  numerous	   to	  mention	  and	  are	  imbricated	  within	  a	  much	  wider	  series	  of	  protests	  and	  insurrections	  from	  the	  events	  in	  the	  Paris	  banlieues	  of	  2005	  to	  the	  Athens	  riots	  of	  2008	  and	  owe	  much	  of	  their	  politics	  to	  the	  anti-­‐globalisation	  movements	  of	  the	  early	  2000s.67	  The	  economic	  conditions	  that	   precipitated	   the	   crash,	   State	   policies	   pursued	   in	   its	   aftermath,	   and	   the	   political	  procedures	  that	  were	  mobilised	  in	  the	  occupations	  all	  fall	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  our	  present	  concerns.68	  Each	  of	  the	  eruptions	  of	  2011	  have	  a	  unique	  heritage,	  and	  need	  to	  be	  situated	  in	  relation	   to	   particular	   national	   political	   disputes	   animated,	   in	   part	   at	   least,	   by	   local	  grievances.	  However,	   ‘the	  systematic	  pressures	  and	   the	  political	   reactions	  are	  similar’69	  in	  the	  various	  cases;	  despite	  the	  differences,	  certain	  communalities	  remain.	  Reflecting	  on	  how	  these	  events	  inform	  the	  theoretical	  commitments	  developed	  in	  this	  chapter,	   I	   focus	  on	  the	  strategy	  that	  was	  common	  to	  many	  of	  the	  uprisings	  of	  2011:	  the	  occupation	  of	  public	  space.	  I	  assess	  how	  these	  events,	  and	  this	  strategy	  in	  particular,	  force	  us	  to	  reconsider	  the	  category	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  See	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  “Stasis	  Syntagma:	  The	  Names	  and	  Types	  of	  Resistance”	  in	  New	  Critical	  Legal	  
Thinking	  Matthew	  Stone,	  Illan	  rua	  Wall	  and	  Costas	  Dounzinas	  eds.,	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  32-­‐45.	  66	  On	  the	  standing	  man	  protest	  (led	  by	  performance	  artist	  Erdem	  Gündüz)	  see	  Karim	  Talibi,	  “Turkey’s	  ‘Standing	  Man’	  protest	  By	  Erdem	  Gündüz	  Spreads	  Across	  the	  Country,”	  Huffington	  Post,	  18	  June	  2013.	  And	  on	  the	  Gezi	  protest	  in	  general	  see,	  Basak	  Ertür,	  “The	  Gezi	  Uprising	  and	  Particularities	  of	  Discontent”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  25(1)	  (2014),	  3-­‐7.	  	  67	  On	  the	  difficulty	  of	  connecting	  recent	  events,	  particularly	  Tahrir	  square,	  to	  a	  wider	  set	  of	  political	  actions,	  especially	  to	  the	  “colour	  revolutions”	  of	  Eastern	  Europe,	  see	  Zeinab	  Abul-­‐Magd,	  “Occupying	  Tahrir	  Square:	  The	  Myths	  and	  the	  Realities	  of	  the	  Egyptian	  Revolution”	  The	  South	  Atlantic	  Quarterly	  111(3)	  (2012),	  565-­‐572.	  68	  The	  multifarious	  uprisings	  of	  2011	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  a	  wealth	  of	  literature.	  For	  full	  accounts	  of	  political	  and	  –	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  –	  economic	  analysis	  see,	  Slavoj	  Zizek,	  The	  Year	  of	  Dreaming	  
Dangerously	  (London:	  Verso,	  2012);	  Alain	  Badiou,	  The	  Rebirth	  of	  History:	  Times	  of	  Riots	  and	  Uprisings	  (London:	  Verso,	  2012);	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  Philosophy	  and	  Resistance	  in	  the	  Crisis	  (London:	  Polity,	  2013);	  Paul	  Mason,	  Why	  It’s	  Kicking	  Off	  Everywhere:	  The	  New	  Global	  Revolutions	  (London:	  Verso,	  2012).	  The	  question	  of	  the	  legal	  significance	  of	  2011	  events	  has	  received	  less	  attention.	  However,	  a	  number	  of	  themes	  are	  pursued	  in:	  	  New	  Critical	  Legal	  Thinking	  Matthew	  Stone,	  Illan	  rua	  Wall	  and	  Costas	  Douzinas	  eds.,	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012)	  and	  “Theory	  Engaged:	  Perspectives	  of	  Discontent”	  Matthews	  and	  Tzanakopoulos	  eds.,	  Law	  and	  Critique,	  23(3)	  (2012),	  183-­‐311.	  	  	  69	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  Philosophy	  and	  Resistance	  in	  the	  Crisis	  (London:	  Polity,	  2013),	  9.	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of	  jurisdiction.	  By	  reading	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  writing	  discussed	  above,	  I	  hope	  to	  reflect	  on	  how	  juriswriting	  both	  speaks	  to	  and	  is	  itself	  informed	  by	  these	  events.	  	  	  If	  jurisdiction	  makes	  the	  positive	  law	  known	  by	  determining	  its	  limits	  and	  scope,	  the	  “law”	  expressed	   or	   written	   in	   the	   squares	   privileged,	   rather	   than	   effaced,	   that	   inoperative	   and	  elusive	   sense	   of	   being-­‐with	   that	   is	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   for	   the	   (positive)	   law.	   The	  squares	  wrote	   the	   law	  or,	  we	  might	   say	   that	   they	  performed	   the	   law	  as	  writing.	   The	   law’s	  claim	  to	  represent	  the	  people	  and	  speak	  with	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  community	  was	  co-­‐opted	  by	  the	  “motley	  crews”	  that	  gathered	  in	  the	  squares.	  These	  gatherings	  were	  jurisdictional	  in	  nature	  but	   they	  did	  not	  declare	  or	  announce	  the	  positive	   law,	  sign	  a	  constitutional	   text	  or	  delimit	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   community’s	   authority. 70 	  A	   different	   “law”	   was	   written.	   In	  embracing	  difference	   and	  deferring	   teleological	   commitments	   to	   constituted	  power,	   these	  events	  –	  as	  much	  of	  the	  journalistic	  coverage	  at	  the	  time	  testified71	  –	  hovered	  between	  the	  readable	  and	   the	  unreadable,	  deriving	   their	   force	   from	  a	  resistance	   to	   final	  determination	  and	  definition.	  These	  events	  were	  writing	  the	  law,	  exposing	  another	  law,	  a	  “law”	  of	  a	  more	  primary,	  but	  inchoate,	  sense	  of	  sociability.	  	  The	   occupations,	   then,	   performed	   a	   politics	   of	   writing,	   nascent	   in	   Blanchot’s	   critique	   of	  Sartre	   discussed	   above,	   and	   developed	   in	   Derrida’s	   later	   interventions	   in	   Writing	   and	  
Difference.	   Writing,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   we	   have	   been	   using	   it	   throughout,	   does	   not	   refer	  exclusively	  to	  the	  scriptural	  form	  of	  marks	  on	  a	  page.	  Writing	  names	  a	  movement	  of	  creative	  practice	  that	  opens	  singular	  selves	  to	  others,	  it	  names	  those	  practices,	  devoid	  of	  sovereignty	  and	   stable	   authorship	   that	   take	   the	   risk	   of	   playing	  with	   the	   ‘aleatory	   force	   of	   absence’.72	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  some	  of	  the	  occupations	  did	  publish	  a	  “declaration”	  or	  a	  set	  of	  “demands”.	  The	  strategy	  of	  juriswriting	  that	  interests	  me	  here	  is	  the	  taking	  space	  and	  place	  that	  prefigures	  and	  exceeds	  these	  declarations.	  For	  the	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street	  declaration	  see,	  http://www.nycga.net/resources/documents/declaration/.	  First	  published	  29	  September	  2011.	  Accessed	  online,	  25	  May	  2014.	  The	  Occupy	  London	  movement	  made	  a	  similar	  announcement	  charting	  a	  series	  of	  demands	  and	  concerns.	  See,	  Murray	  Wardop,	  “Occupy	  Protesters:	  Activists	  Deliver	  Charter	  of	  Grievances”	  Daily	  Telegraph.	  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/8831851/Occupy-­‐protests-­‐activists-­‐deliver-­‐charter-­‐of-­‐grievances.html.	  First	  published	  17	  October	  2011.	  Accessed	  25	  May	  2014.	  Significantly,	  the	  declarations	  themselves	  were	  not	  the	  centrepieces	  of	  occupations	  and	  did	  not,	  in	  fact,	  receive	  much	  media	  coverage.	  	  71	  As	  Douzinas	  and	  Mason	  note,	  the	  uprisings	  in	  2011	  were	  largely	  unforeseen	  by	  the	  media	  and	  other	  commentators,	  when	  they	  did	  arrive	  were	  greeted	  with	  bewilderment.	  See	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  
Philosophy	  and	  Resistance	  in	  the	  Crisis	  (London:	  Polity,	  2013),	  8	  and	  Mason,	  Why	  It’s	  Kicking	  Off,	  25-­‐40.	  72	  Blanchot,	  The	  Infinite	  Conversation,	  xii	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Significantly,	   the	  squares	  deferred	   from	  the	  proclamation	  or	  declaration	  of	  demands,	   they	  
showed	  rather	  than	  told	  of	  their	  opposition	  to	  the	  status	  quo.	  This	  “writing”	  was	  a	  liberating	  force	   but	   not	   in	   Sartre’s	   sense	   of	   engaging	   the	   freedom	   of	   a	   political	   actor,	   rather	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  exposing	  those	  involved	  and	  observers	  alike	  to	  ‘possibilities	  that	  are	  entirely	  other’,	  to	  an	  ‘anonymous,	  distracted,	  deferred,	  and	  dispersed	  way	  of	  being	  in	  relation’.73	  	  	  	  Douzinas	  counter-­‐poses	  the	  occupation	  of	  Syntagma	  Square	  with	  the	  uprisings	  in	  Athens	  of	  December	  2008	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  December	  was	  characterised	  by	  time,	  Syntagma	  by	  place,	  December	  by	  transience,	  Sytagma	  by	  permanence,	  December	  by	   (limited)	   violence,	   Syntagma	  by	   the	   repudiation	  of	   violence,	  December	  by	  mobility,	  Syntagma	  by	  a	  static	  presence.	  Syntagma’s	  relationship	  to	  space	  and	  time	  differed	  from	  December.74	  	  The	  relative	  permanence	  of	   the	  occupations,	  compared	  to	  other	   forms	  of	  protests	  that	  are	  done	  and	  dusted	  within	  a	  matter	  of	  hours,	  is	  key	  to	  understanding	  their	  relation	  to	  writing.	  Those	   involved	   took	   the	   space	   of	   the	   squares,	   they	   were	   engaged	   in	   a	   spacing	   out	  (éspacement)	   of	   bodies	   that	   sought	   to	   leave	   a	   trace	   of	   presence	   rather	   than	   a	   march	   or	  procession	  that	  vanishes	  soon	  after	  it	  starts.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  squares	  were	  without	  dynamism	   or	   movement	   from	   within,	   the	   occupations	   were	   characterised	   by	   a	   hive	   of	  activity	  from	  media	  centres	  to	  libraries,	  food	  stalls	  to	  open	  meetings	  and	  debates.	  But	  their	  relative	  stasis	  provided	  a	  stage	  on	  which	  a	  sense	  of	  being-­‐together	  before	  the	  law	  could	  be	  performed.	   Like	  writing,	   the	   occupations	  were	   enduring	   but	   temporary,75	  permanent	   but,	  from	  their	  inception,	  threatened	  by	  erasure.	  	  	  Judith	  Butler’s	   remarks	   at	   the	  Zuccotti	   Park	  occupation	  make	   clear,	   the	  occupations	  were	  less	  concerned	  to	  declare	  or	  make	  present	  a	  particular	  position,	  than	  they	  were	  to	  perform	  or	  “act	  out”	  a	  sense	  of	  resistance:	  ‘we	  are	  coming	  together	  as	  bodies	  in	  alliance,	  in	  the	  street,	  in	   the	   square…	  we’re	   standing	  here	   together	  making	  democracy,	  enacting	  the	  phrase	   “we	  the	  people”’.76	  This	   enactment	   is	   associated	  with	   the	  mobilisation	  of	   force.	   In	  Writing	  and	  
Difference	  writing	  is	  read	  together	  with	  Freud’s	  notion	  of	  breaching	  [Bahnung],77	  suggesting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Ibid.	  	  74	  Douzinas,	  Philosophy	  and	  Resistance	  in	  the	  Crisis	  ,150	  75	  Adam	  Ramadan,	  “From	  Tahrir	  to	  the	  World:	  The	  Camp	  as	  a	  Political	  Public	  Space”	  European	  Urban	  
and	  Regional	  Studies	  20(1)	  (2012),	  145-­‐149,	  146.	  76	  Judith	  Butler,	  “Remarks	  at	  Zuccotti	  Park,	  October	  23	  2011”	  in	  Occupy!,	  193.	  My	  emphasis.	  77	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  251-­‐258.	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that	  writing	  (and	  éspacement)	   is	  not	  without	   force,	  potency	  or	  potentia.	   It	   is	  only	   through	  such	   force	   that	   writing	   can	   leave	   a	   mark	   and	   affirm	   itself	   through	   the	   passage	   of	   time.	  Juriswriting	   too	   is	   connected	   to	   this	   “breaching”	   or	   forcing	   associated	   with	   writing.	   Jodi	  Dean’s	  comments	  on	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street	  are	  here	  apposite:	  [The	   occupation]	   asserts	   a	   gap	   by	   forcing	   a	   presence.	   This	   forcing	   is	  more	   than	   simply	   of	  people	  into	  places	  where	  they	  do	  not	  belong…	  It’s	  a	  forcing	  of	  collectivity	  over	  individualism,	  the	  combined	  power	  of	  a	  group	  that	  disrupts	  a	  space	  rarely	  accommodating	  of	  individuals.78	  	  Freud’s	  term	  Bahnung	  is	  derived	  from	  Bahn,	  meaning	  road	  or	  way.	  Derrida’s	  translation	  of	  
Bahnung	  is	  frayage,	  an	  idiomatic	  term	  suggesting	  a	  power	  capable	  of	  breaching	  or	  breaking	  through	  something	  but	  also	  having	  a	  generative	  inference,	  referring	  to	  the	  change	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  breach.	  As	  Alan	  Bass	  notes	  the	  term	  “breaching”	  –	  which,	  intriguingly,	  has	  the	  inference	  of	  something	  illicit	  or	  unsanctioned,	  as	  in	  the	  breach	  of	  a	  contract	  or	  legal	  duty	  –	  should	  be	  read	  as	  implying	  not	  only	  the	  force	  that	  opens	  a	  path	  but	  also	  the	  space	  opened	  by	  it.79	  This	  seems	  particularly	  relevant	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  occupations:	   in	  the	  act	  of	   forcing	  or	  breaching	  a	  new	  path,	  a	  new	  space	  was	  created	  (or	  written)	  for	  political	  action.	  	  	  By	   embracing	   a	   plurality	   of	   voices	   and	   concerns	   rather	   than	   articulating	   a	   single	   “party	  line”80	  and	  by	  embracing	  the	  mode	  of	  performance	  and	  enactment	  rather	  than	  declaration,	  the	  occupations,	   like	  Artaud’s	   theatre	  of	  cruelty	   that	   inspires	  Derrida’s	  account	  of	  writing,	  did	  without	  the	  hierarchies	  associated	  with	  author,	  actor,	  director	  and	  script.	  Writing,	  and	  by	  extension	  juriswriting,	  as	  Blanchot	  reminds	  us	  is	  always	  interrupting	  itself,	  performing	  a	  ‘speech	   without	   reference	   to	   unity’	   a	   speaking	   ‘only	   to	   interrupt	   oneself’.81	  The	   lack	   of	  authorship	  and	  vertical	  authority	  allowed	  for	  a	  greater	  plurality	  in	  the	  occupations.	  As	  Wall	  suggests	  of	  the	  protest	  and	  resistance	  in	  Tunisia	  ‘there	  was	  no	  condition	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  protests’:82	  there	  was	  no	  pre-­‐determined	  identity	  to	  which	  participants	  had	  to	  conform,	  no	  party	   or	   ethnicity	   of	   which	   one	   had	   to	   be	   a	   member.	   There	   was	   no	   script	   to	   which	   the	  actors/activists	   were	   wedded,	   the	   script	   was	   being	   written	   in	   its	   performance.	   The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Jodi	  Dean,	  “Claiming	  Division,	  Naming	  a	  Wrong”	  in	  Occupy!,	  91-­‐92.	  	  79	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  see	  the	  translator’s	  note,	  426,	  n.	  2	  80	  One	  prominent	  banner	  in	  Syntagma	  Square	  captured	  the	  attitude	  to	  parties	  in	  the	  squares:	  “Party	  member,	  we	  want	  you	  here,	  but	  not	  your	  party”.	  See	  Douzinas,	  Philosophy	  and	  Resistance,	  159.	  	  81	  Blanchot,	  The	  Infinite	  Conversation,	  78-­‐79.	  82	  Illan	  rua	  Wall,	  “A	  Different	  Constituent	  Power:	  Agamben	  and	  Tunisia”	  in	  New	  Critical	  Legal	  
Thinking	  Matthew	  Stone,	  Illan	  rua	  Wall	  and	  Costas	  Douzinas	  eds.	  (Abingdon:	  Routledge,	  2012),	  64.	  Wall	  contrasts	  this	  with	  the	  situation	  in	  Libya	  where	  the	  resistance	  against	  Gadhafi	  was	  quickly	  racialised	  where	  “darker	  skinned”	  inhabitants	  were	  expelled	  or	  executed,	  blamed	  for	  being	  mercenaries.	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occupations	  themselves	  were	  internally	  differentiated	  but	  this	  did	  not	  restrict	  their	  impact.	  As	  Douzinas	  notes	   their	  was	  an	   “upper”	   and	  a	   “lower”	   square	   in	  Syntagma,	  with	  differing	  strategies	  in	  play	  in	  the	  two	  zones.83	  And	  in	  Tharir,	  Abul-­‐Magd	  stresses	  the	  plurality	  of	  sites	  for	   rest,	   health	   care,	   as	   well	   as	   front-­‐line	   assault.84	  In	   part	   at	   least,	   the	   force	   of	   the	  occupations	   lay	   in	   their	  multiplicity	   and	   difference,	   they	  were	  marked	   by	   a	   disavowal	   of	  signification	   and	   representation	   and	   the	   affirmation	   of	   sense,	   performance	   and	   writing.	  Whilst	   not	   making	   exacting	   demands,	   they	   nonetheless	   gave	   a	   sense	   of	   resistance	   and	  democracy.	   As	   Nancy	   suggests,	   ‘sense	   is…	   not	   the	   “signified”	   or	   the	   “message”:	   it	   is	   that	  
something	  like	  the	  transmission	  of	  a	  “message”	  should	  be	  possible.85	  The	  content	  (in	  terms	  of	  explicit	  demands	  and	  so	  on)	  of	  the	  occupations	  was	  less	  important	  than	  creating	  the	  space	  where	  communication	  of	  particular	  positions	  might	  be	  possible.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  occupations	  privileged	   rather	   than	   ignored	   the	   différantial	   set	   of	   relations	   that	   is	   their	   condition	   of	  possibility.	   In	   this	  way	  we	  might	   see	   the	   juriswriting	   of	   the	   squares	   as	   the	   khora	   for	   the	  legal,	   the	   staging	   of	   a	   being-­‐together	   that	   resists	   final	   determination,	   exceeding	   the	  (positive)	  law	  that	  might	  be	  written	  in	  its	  aftermath.	  	  	  	  The	  loci	  of	  the	  occupations	  as	  well	  as	  their	  modes	  of	  resistance	  is	  significant.	  As	  Ramadan	  suggests,	   regarding	   Tahrir	   Square,	   the	   protest	   camp	   occupied	   existing	   monuments	   and	  memorials	   of	   the	   State	   and	   succeeded	   in	   transforming	   these	   sites	   into	   a	   locus	   of	   radical	  potential:	  The	   camp	   at	   Tahrir	   Square	   was	   an	   enclave	   of	   another	   order,	   an	   assemblage	   of	   people,	  politics	   and	   technologies	   set	   apart	   from	   its	   surroundings	   and	   embodying	   its	   own	   value	  system.	  However,	  it	  was	  an	  enclave	  in	  those	  surroundings;	  it	  made	  holes	  in	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  spilled	  out.86	  The	   occupations	   were	   engaged,	   then,	   in	   the	   kind	   of	   trans-­‐immanence	   so	   crucial	   to	   both	  writing	  and	  right-­‐ing.	  By	  lodging	  themselves	  within	  the	  existing	  parameters	  of	  public	  space,	  the	   protests	   were	   immanent	   to	   the	   State	   but	   in	   their	   politics	   and	   aspirations	   they	  transcended	   the	   existing	   regimes	   of	   power,	   reaching	   out	   towards	   a	   new	   order	   based	   on	  social	   and	   economic	   justice.	   The	   encampments	   were	   located	   in	   the	   heart	   of	   financial	  districts	   (Zuccotti	   Park,	   the	   London	   Stock	   Exchange	   and	   later	   St	   Paul’s	   Cathedral)	   or	   in	  amongst	  the	  buildings	  associated	  with	  State	  power	  (Tahrir,	  Syntagma,	  Puerta	  del	  Sol)	  giving	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  See,	  Douzinas,	  Philosophy	  and	  Resistance,	  168-­‐170.	  84	  Zeinab	  Abul-­‐Magd,	  “Occupying	  Tahrir	  Square,”	  566.	  85	  Nancy,	  The	  Sense	  of	  the	  World,	  118.	  	  86	  Ramadan,	  “From	  Tahrir	  to	  the	  World,”	  146.	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rise	   to	   unusual	   encounters	   between	   activists	   and	   bankers,	   radicals	   and	   government	  employees.	  The	  strategy	  of	  occupation	  tested	  the	  plasticity	  of	  State	  authority.	  In	  Egypt	  this	  proved	   to	   be	   explosive,87	  elsewhere	   radical	   change	   has	   not	   been	   effected	   but	   nonetheless	  certain	  traces	  of	  2011	  remain.88	  	  	  The	  events	  of	  2011	  pose	   important	  questions	  about	  how	  we	   theorise	   jurisdiction.	  To	  give	  the	   expression	   of	   law	   over	   to	   juridical	   authority	   alone	   is	   to	   cede	   legality	   from	   its	  foundations	   in	   social	   and	   communal	   practice.	   As	   we	   have	   argued	   from	   the	   outset,	  jurisdiction’s	  efficacy	  depends	  on	   some	  constitutive	   relation	  with	   informal	   legal	   relations:	  the	   ius	   of	   people	   being-­‐together.	   The	   squares	   of	   2011	   could	   well	   have	   given	   rise	   to	  declarations	   of	   the	   traditional	   sort,	   placing	   themselves	   within	   a	   long	   tradition	   of	  pronouncing	  the	  righteousness,	  independence	  or	  integrity	  of	  their	  cause.	  The	  deferral	  from	  this	  kind	  of	   jurisdictional	   logic	   is	   intriguing.	  By	   suspending	   firm	   lines	  of	  demarcation,	   the	  occupations	  opened	   themselves	   to	   the	  play	  of	   their	  own	   text,	   to	   the	  ambiguity	  of	  writing,	  foregrounding	  sense	  over	  signification.	  There	  is,	  perhaps,	  a	  danger	  here	  of	  romanticisation.	  This	   more	   primary	   “law	   of	   sociability”	   that	   was	   written	   in	   the	   squares	   cannot,	   in	   itself,	  secure	  the	  political,	  economic	  and	  moral	  conditions	  that	  those	  present	  campaigned	  for.	  Such	  rights	   and	   duties	   ultimately	   depend	   on	   the	   positive	   law’s	   determinative	   capacity	   for	  enforcement.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   power	   of	   these	   events	   is	   to	   show	   another	   shade	   to	   the	  expression	  of	  legality	  and	  force	  us	  to	  construct	  new	  vocabularies	  to	  capture	  their	  tenor	  and	  form.	  Juriswriting	  is	  one	  such	  offering.	  	  	  
5.6	  Jurisdiction	  and/or	  Juriswriting	  Jurisdiction	   and	   juriswriting	   are	   both	   engaged	   in	   the	   expression	   of	   law,	   both	   name	  techniques	  that	  make	  a	  legal	  form	  known.	  Both	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  particular	  logic	  of	  reflection	  and	  grounding,	   seeking	   to	  articulate	  a	  particular	  relation	  between	  an	   informal	  and	   formal	  legality.	   Juriswriting,	   however,	   differs	   from	   jurisdiction	   in	   important	   respects.	   Where	  jurisdiction	  relies	  on	  the	  supposed	  full	  presence	  of	  speech	  and	  a	  speaking	  subject	  (whether	  collective	  or	  otherwise),	  juriswriting	  embraces	  and	  underscores	  the	  absences	  and	  deferrals	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  As	  Catherine	  Malabou	  reminds	  us,	  plasticity	  infers	  the	  possibility	  of	  giving	  form	  (as	  in	  plastic	  surgery)	  and	  receiving	  form	  (in	  the	  sense	  that	  clay	  in	  plastic)	  but	  also	  destroying	  form	  (as	  in	  plastic	  explosives).	  See	  Catherine	  Malabou,	  Plasticity	  at	  the	  Dusk	  of	  Writing,	  trans.,	  Carolyn	  Shread	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  87,	  n.	  13.	  	  88	  In	  the	  European	  context,	  the	  most	  enduring	  effect	  of	  the	  occupation	  of	  public	  space	  is	  seen	  in	  Greece	  where	  the	  radical	  left	  party	  Syriza	  has	  become	  the	  main	  opposition	  party.	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that	   haunt	   such	   a	   claim.	   Where	   jurisdiction	   seeks	   to	   articulate	   the	   “proper”	   relation	  between	   the	   community	   and	   law,	   or	   the	   “proper”	   relation	   between	   an	   informal	   ius	   by	  determining	  it	  as	  lex,	  juriswriting,	  by	  emphasising	  the	  temporality	  of	  becoming	  stresses	  the	  fluid	   and	   dynamic	   qualities	   to	   the	   legal	   form.	  Where	   jurisdiction	   presents	   the	   law	  as	   if	   it	  were	  already	  extant,	  seeking	  to	  efface	  both	  the	  prior	  movement	  that	  makes	  it	  possible	  and	  the	  contingencies	  of	  its	  history,	  juriswriting	  takes	  the	  risk	  of	  foregrounding	  the	  fiction	  and	  fantasy	  attached	  with	   the	   law,	   taking	  performance	  and	  enactment	  as	   its	  mode	  of	   address.	  Juriswriting	   is	   not	   concerned	   with	   feigning	   authority	   and	   unlike	   jurisdiction	   is	   not	   self-­‐conscious	   about	   the	   groundlessness	   to	   positive	   law.	   Juriswriting	   names	   those	   techniques	  that,	   while	   acknowledging	   the	   very	   groundlessness	   of	   the	   law,	   nonetheless	   affirm	   the	  possibility	   of	   a	   law	   that	   has	   an	   organic	   relation	   to	   the	   bare	   sociability	   to	  which	   it	   always	  stands	  in	  relation.	  Importantly,	  where	  jurisdiction	  privileges	  the	  law	  that	  cuts	  and	  divides,	  that	  draws	  lines	  and	  carves	  up	  people,	  territory	  and	  things,	   juriswriting	  privileges	  the	  law	  to	  which	  we	  are	  all	  abandoned,	  the	  ontological	  axiom	  that	  modern	  law	  tries	  to	  do	  with	  out,	  an	  inoperative	  law	  of	  our	  being-­‐with-­‐others	  in	  the	  world.	  	  	  Does	  all	  this	  suggest	  that	  we	  can	  do	  without	  jurisdiction?	  Certainly	  not.	  As	  we	  suggested	  in	  our	   discussion	   of	   community,	   the	   formation	   of	   communities,	   with	   their	   concomitant	  jurisdictional	   logic,	   is	   inevitable.	   And	   jurisdictional	   techniques	   that	   erect	   borders,	  mobilising	   firm	   lines	   of	   demarcation	   backed	   by	   force	   are	   often	   necessary	   and	   offer	   a	  bulwark	   for	   the	   defence	   of	   a	   community’s	   values.	   What,	   then,	   of	   the	   relation	   between	  jurisdiction	  and	  juriswriting?	  	  	  Juriswriting	  would	  name	  those	  efforts	  that	  put	  such	  jurisdictional	  practices	  in	  question,	  that	  interrupt	   the	   effort	   to	   naturalise	   and	   neutralise	   such	   practices,	   that	   reiterate	   their	  contingent	   and,	   thus	   ultimately	   groundless,	   authority.	   In	   the	   1980s	   Lacoue-­‐Labarthe	   and	  Nancy	  re-­‐affirmed	  the	  necessity	  to	  question	  and	  re-­‐work	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  political	  (le	   politique)	   rather	   than	   focus	   on	   the	   everyday	   joshing	   and	   positioning	   of	   politics	   (la	  
politique).	   There	   is	   no	   sense	   that	   their	   analysis	   calls	   for	   the	   jettisoning	   of	   politics,	   rather	  they	   sought	   to	   emphasise	   that	   politics	   itself	   is	   conditioned	   by	   the	   political,	   by	   a	   series	   of	  assumptions	   about	   the	   proper	   space	   and	   ground	   for	   political	   action,	   decision	   and	  engagement.	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  juriswriting	  would	  represent	  a	  restless	  reminder	  to	  reconnect	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the	  law	  to	  its	  social	  and	  ontological	  foundations,	  to	  hold	  such	  “foundations”	  in	  question	  and	  from	  here	  to	  interrupt,	  resist	  and	  challenge	  that	  law	  that	  acts	  as	  if	  it	  can	  do	  without	  them.	  	  	  The	   insistence	   of	   both	   jurisdiction	   and	   juriswriting	   is	   particularly	   evident	   in	   the	   Occupy	  camps.	  Though	  embracing	  the	  kind	  of	  difference	  and	  openness	  that	  we	  have	  assessed	  above,	  jurisdictional	   assertions	  were	   still	   present.	   For	   example,	   the	   Occupy	  Wall	   Street	   camp	   in	  Zuccotti	  Park	  had	  to	  confront	   the	  dangers	  and	  difficulties	  associated	  with	  the	  openness	  of	  the	   encampment.	   As	   Mulqueen	   and	   Tataryn	   point	   out,	   in	   order	   to	   offer	   protection	   for	  potentially	  vulnerable	  people	  and	  to	  dissuade	  drug	  dealers	  from	  operating	  within	  the	  camp,	  ‘participants	   found	   themselves	   in	   the	   paradoxical	   position	   of	   having	   to	   set	   up	   a	   security	  committee	  to	  monitor	  activity	  in	  the	  park’.89	  Regardless	  of	  the	  open	  mode	  of	  expression	  that	  the	   occupy	   movement	   mobilised,	   the	   question	   of	   policing	   its	   limits	   inevitably	   arose.	  However,	  the	  continual	  un-­‐working	  of	  jurisdictional	  lines	  was	  precisely	  what	  the	  movement	  kept	  in	  play,	  confronting	  the	  ‘permeability	  of	  the	  borders	  and	  boundaries	  of	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  physical	  space	  that	  they	  occupied’.90	  It	   is	  this	  suspension	  of	  the	   legal	   limit	  and	  the	  holding	  of	  strict	  determination	  in	  question	  that	  connects	  the	  camps	  and	  squares	  to	  writing,	  to	  a	  movement	  that	  is	  always	  exceeding	  its	  own	  parameters.	  	  	  Let	  me	  address	  a	  couple	  of	  concerns	  that	  might	  be	  felt	  with	  regards	  to	  juriswriting.	  Firstly,	  it	  might	  be	  supposed	  that	  these	  practices	  could	  be	  utilised	  for	  any	  political	  end;	  juriswriting,	  could	  perhaps,	  be	  utilised	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  nationalistic	  or	  fascistic	  endeavours.	  Nationalism	  and	  fascism	  are,	  at	  bottom,	  rooted	  in	  essentialism,	  orientating	  themselves	  around	  a	  closed	  and	   pre-­‐determined	   sense	   of	   togetherness:	   an	   ethnic	   identity	   or	   a	   myth	   of	   national	  superiority.	  The	  notion	  of	  writing	  that	  animates	  juriswriting	  names	  the	  very	  movement	  that	  makes	  such	  assertions	  impossible.	  We	  must,	  as	  Derrida	  reminds	  us,	   ‘be	  several	  in	  order	  to	  write’.91	  The	   unifying	   communion	   of	   nationalism	   with	   its	   myths	   of	   purity	   and	   integrity	  denies	   this	  plurality	   from	   the	  off.	  Wall	   says	  of	   right-­‐ing,	   and	   the	   same	   can	  be	   claimed	   for	  juriswriting,	   that	   nationalistic	   groups	   ‘make	   community	   itself	   operative	   and	   perform	   the	  sacrificial	  logic	  of	  sovereignty…	  theirs	  is	  not	  a	  right-­‐ing	  by	  any	  stretch	  of	  the	  imagination’.92	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Mulqueen	  and	  Tataryn,	  “Don’t	  Occupy	  this	  Movement,”	  294.	  90	  Ibid.,	  295.	  91	  Derrida,	  Writing	  and	  Difference,	  284.	  92	  Wall,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Constituent	  Power,	  144.	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Secondly,	  if	  juriswriting,	  like	  right-­‐ing,	  does	  without	  a	  teleological	  orientation	  does	  this	  not	  side	   juriswriting	   with	   a	   kind	   of	   “anything	   goes”	   postmodernism	   in	   which	   no	   (grand)	  narratives	   can	   be	   mobilised?	   In	   Blanchot’s	   short	   story	   The	   Madness	   of	   the	   Day,93	  the	  narrator	   asserts,	   at	   the	   story’s	   close,	  what	  might	   be	   construed	   as	   the	   nihilism	   associated	  with	   this	   denial	   of	   narrative.	   Blanchot’s	   text	   is	   an	   infuriating	   but	   virtuosic	  meditation	   on	  narrative	   fiction,	   in	   many	   respects,	   enacting	   the	   theory	   of	   writing	   that	   we	   sketched	   out	  above.	  The	  story	  is	  constantly	  holding	  itself	  in	  abeyance,	  denying	  the	  reader	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  clear	  plotting.	  As	  Derrida	  has	  argued,	  the	  text	  performs	  the	  impossibility	  of	  any	  text	  being	  closed	  or	  unified,	  affirming	  instead	  a	  kind	  of	  anarchy	  of	  textuality.94	  The	  story	  –	  to	  be	  brutal	  to	  this	  play	  for	  a	  moment	  –	  tells	  of	  a	  bout	  of	  madness	  which	  results	  in	  (though	  we	  know	  not	  how	   nor	   why)	   glass	   being	   crushed	   into	   the	   narrator’s	   eyes.	   This	   is	   followed	   by	   the	  narrator’s	   incarceration	   in	   a	   hospital	   where	   he	   frustrates	   the	   doctors	   –	  cast	   as	  representatives	  of	  the	  law	  –	  by	  being	  unable	  to	  tell	  the	  narrative	  of	  how	  this	  came	  to	  pass.	  The	   story	   is	   never	   fully	   drawn	   out,	   rather	   it	   folds	   in	   on	   itself	   performing	   what	   Derrida	  describes	   as	   a	   ‘chiasmic	  double	   invagination’.95	  The	  opening	   lines,	   ‘I	   am	  not	   learned;	   I	   am	  not	   ignorant.	   I	  have	  known	   joys.	  That	   is	   saying	   too	   little….’	  are	   repeated	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  story	  when	  the	  narrator	  is	  pushed	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  how	  he	  sustained	  the	  injuries	  to	  his	  eyes:	   Tell	  us	  “just	  exactly”	  what	  happened.	  A	  story?	  I	  began:	  I	  am	  not	  learned;	  I	  am	  not	  ignorant.	  I	  have	  known	  joys.	  That	  is	  saying	  too	  little.	  I	  told	  them	  the	  whole	  story	  and	  they	  listened…	  But	  the	  end	  was	  a	  surprise	  to	  all	  of	  us.	  “That	  was	  the	  beginning,”	  they	  said.	  “Now	  get	  down	  to	  the	  facts.”	  How	   so?	  The	   story	  was	   over!...	   [They]	   remained	   firmly	   convinced,	   I	   am	   sure,	   that	   a	  writer,	  a	  man	  of	  distinction,	  is	  always	  capable	  of	  recounting	  the	  facts	  that	  he	  remembers.	  A	  story?	  No.	  No	  stories	  never	  again.96	  	  The	   denial	   of	   narrative	   here	   is	   not	   absolute.	   Rather	   like	   Derrida	   in	   “Ellipsis,”	   Blanchot	  occupies	  the	  narrative	  –	  the	  subtitle	  of	  one	  version	  of	  the	  piece,	  it	  must	  be	  remembered,	  is	  itself	   un	   récit	   or	   “a	   story”97	  –	  but	   this	   story	   is	   written	   otherwise.	   A	   writer’s	   denial	   of	  narrative	   is	   itself	   an	   affirmation	   of	   story	   telling:	   as	   if	   a	   writer	   could	   do	   without	   stories.	  Rather	  than	  abandon	  narrative	  all	  together	  Blanchot	  reaches	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  narrative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Maurice	  Blanchot,	  The	  Madness	  of	  the	  Day	  trans.,	  Lydia	  Davis	  (New	  York:	  Station	  Hill	  Press,	  1981).	  	  94	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “The	  Law	  of	  Genre”	  in	  Acts	  of	  Literature	  Derek	  Attridge	  ed.	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1992),	  223-­‐252.	  95	  Derrida,	  “The	  Law	  of	  Genre,”	  236-­‐238..	  	  96	  Blanchot,	  The	  Madness	  of	  the	  Day,	  18.	  97	  The	  publication	  in	  Tri-­‐Quarterly	  40	  (1977)	  included	  this	  as	  a	  subtitle.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  title	  see	  Derrida,	  “The	  Law	  of	  Genre,”	  239-­‐243.	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and	  re-­‐inscribes	  this	  beyond	  within	  the	  narrative	  form,	  testing	  the	  plasticity	  of	  story	  telling.	  Blanchot’s	   “no”	   or	   refusal	   of	   narrative,	   then,	   must	   be	   read	   together	   with	   a	   “yes”	   or	  affirmation	   of	   writing	   which	   in	   turn	   is	   a	   yes	   to	   stories,	   just	   not	   stories	   as	   we	   might	  commonly	  understand	  them.	  	  	  We	  should	  understand	   juriswriting’s	  disavowal	  of	   teleology	   in	  a	  similar	   fashion.	  To	  affirm	  play	  and	  open	  possibility	  and	  defer	  the	  making	  of	  strict	  limits	  and	  concrete	  claims	  is	  not	  the	  disavowal	   of	   determinate	   action	   tout	   court.	   Juriswriting	   interrupts	   the	   law’s	   narrative	   of	  stability,	  sovereignty	  and	  natural	  authority	  but	  in	  so	  doing	  it	  affirms	  rather	  than	  denies	  the	  possibility	   of	   telling	   a	   different	   story	   of	   the	   legal	   form.	   This	   is	   narrative	   –	   to	   echo	  Wall’s	  characterisation	  of	  right-­‐ing	  –	  ‘without	  model	  or	  warranty’,98	  a	  narrative,	  then,	  without	  end.	  	  	  
5.7	  Conclusion	  Taking	   inspiration	   from	  both	   the	  events	  of	  2011	  and	  Douzinas	  and	  Wall’s	  notion	  of	   right-­‐ing,	  juriswriting	  is	  a	  creative	  praxis	  and	  names	  certain	  strategies	  for	  making	  an	  inoperative	  or	  différantial	  law	  of	  sociability	  known.	  I	  have	  sought	  to	  offer	  a	  grounding	  for	  this	  notion	  by	  reference	  to	  a	  deconstructive	  understanding	  of	  writing.	  Following	  Blanchot,	  Nancy	  and	  –	  in	  particular	  –	  Derrida,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  certain	  writing	  practices	  foreground	  the	  difference	  and	  deferral	  that	  is	  writing’s	  condition	  of	  possibility.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  jurisdiction,	  we	  can	  read	  these	  practices	  of	  writing,	  what	   I	  call	   juriswriting,	  as	   those	  that	  express	   the	   law	  but	  do	  so	  without	  reference	   to	  sovereign	  authorship	  or	   the	  marking	  of	   strict	   lines	  of	  determination.	  Like	   Freud,	   Jabès,	   Blanchot	   and	   others,	   such	   practices	   play	   with	   writing’s	   own	   excesses,	  privileging	  sense	  over	  signification.	  	  	  Jurisdiction	   is	   commonly	   associated	  with	  making	   the	   law’s	   limits	   known	  and	  understood.	  But	  as	  we	  have	  said	  from	  the	  outset,	  jurisdiction	  too	  must	  reflect	  an	  extant,	  but	  informal	  set	  of	  relations.	  Juriswriting	  reverses	  that	  which	  is	  privileged	  by	  jurisdiction.	  Rather	  than	  focus	  on	   the	   line	   drawing	   obsessions	   of	   the	   cartographer	   or	   judge,	   juriswriting	   privileges	   the	  sense	  of	   law	  as	  an	  originary	   sociability	   that	   is	   reflected	   in	   the	   jurisdictional	  moment.	  The	  events	  of	  2011	  not	  only	  provoke	  us	  to	  reconsider	  the	  form	  that	  jurisdiction	  might	  take	  but	  also	  give	  us	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  styles	  of	  (juris)writing	  that	  might	  be	  mobilised	  in	  order	  to	  reveal	  this	   prior	   category	   of	   the	   law.	   Beyond	   the	   traditional	   variants	   of	   critique	   that	   expose	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Wall,	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Constituent	  Power,	  143.	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transcendental	  conditions	  of	  possibility;	  inherent	  contradictions	  and	  aporias;	  or	  undertake	  an	  immanent	  critique	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  power	  within	  the	  social	  fabric,	  juriswriting	  points	  to	   the	   necessity	   for	   critical	   and	   creative	   intervention	   within	   the	   law	   and	   its	   expressive	  register.99	  Juriswriting	  offers	  a	  corrective	  to	  the	  traditional	  operation	  of	  jurisdiction	  and	  its	  mobilisation	  by	  State	  power.	  Juriswriting	  is	  a	  strategy	  of	  intervention	  that	  expresses	  the	  law	  otherwise,	  writing	  the	  inoperative	  “with”	  on	  which	  jurisdictional	  claims	  ultimately	  rest.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  For	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  various	  forms	  critique	  might	  take	  in	  a	  legal	  context	  see,	  Costas	  Douzinas,	  “Oubliez	  Critique,”	  Law	  and	  Critique	  (2005)	  16(1),	  47–69.	  Douzinas’s	  analysis	  is	  instructive:	  in	  an	  injunction	  for	  political	  intervention	  and	  engagement	  Douzinas	  suggests	  that	  we	  forget	  critique	  because	  it	  is	  ‘by	  forgetting	  (the	  dominant	  types	  of)	  critique	  that	  we	  might	  be	  able	  to	  defy	  the	  law’(69).	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